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Introduction 
 
 
 The aim of this dissertation is to address the issue of public justification in 
political theory. I develop my analysis starting from the Rawlsian conception of liberal 
justice, as I believe that Rawls has provided us with an extremely exhaustive and 
powerful paradigm for building up – and justifying – a political theory of justice. Yet, 
Rawls’ theory faces many criticisms and requires amendments. The first goal of my 
dissertation is to show that it is possible, starting from a general Rawlsian paradigm, to 
construct a procedure of justification in alternative to the traditional accounts of political 
justification that have been outlined in the last decades. In the development of this 
work, I discuss the “political turn” of Rawls’ theory and show that a strictly political 
account of liberalism faces an tension: according to my interpretation, the “political 
turn” gives rise to a dilemma between the attempt of such theories to be sensible to the 
actual circumstances in which political theory should apply and the normative 
requirement of establishing criteria of justice for assessing the actual political 
circumstances. Different theories of justice address the dilemma either by proposing to 
give priority to one of the two horns of the dilemma or by claiming that such dilemma 
can be solved on a theoretical ground.  
 I present an argument to show that the Rawlsian theory does not solve the dilemma. 
My proposal for re-interpreting and modifying the Rawlsian paradigm is to distinguish 
an ideal and a nonideal part of the theory of justice. One of the main problems of 
Rawls’ justificatory paradigm is to assess which role is played by the ideal aspects of 
the theory, namely whether the ideal justification is sufficient alone to provide 
justification, or whether a normative role is required for nonideal reasoning as well. My 
line of argument is that if we do not distinguish properly between the ideal and the 
nonideal aspects of the justificatory procedure, it will be impossible to understand if and 
how a theory of justice can solve the dilemma of liberalism.  
 In order to understand why I consider such a distinction fundamental, in this 
introduction I want to highlight the fundamental differences between an ideal and a 
nonideal approach to the practice of justification in political theory. I will start from the 
distinction as Rawls has explained it
1
. According to Rawls, the ideal theory provides the 
                                                 
1
 For good analyses of this distinction see Phillips (1985), Valentini (2009) and Simmons (2010). 
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input of the whole theory of justice, as we should articulate a “perfectly just scheme” 
that will “guide the course of social reform”2. Ideal theory is developed starting from 
idealized conditions that grants strict compliance with the principles of justice from 
citizens. According to this model, strict compliance with the principles of justice is 
granted by the fact that ideal theory provides a justification that relies on some idealized 
conditions that are applied both to the circumstances of justice and to the citizens’ 
epistemic capacities. By contrast, nonideal theory has to face the actual circumstances 
of justice and the impossibility of grant strict compliance given the actual set of beliefs 
held by citizens. It is for this reasons that Rawls claims that nonideal theory cannot look 
for nothing more than partial compliance. In this regard, Rawls claims: 
“The principles of justice that result are those defining a perfectly just society, given 
favorable conditions. With the presumption of strict compliance, we arrive at a certain 
ideal conception. When we ask whether and under what circumstances unjust 
arrangements are to be tolerated, we are faced with a different sort of question. We must 
ascertain how the ideal conception of justice applies, if indeed it applies at all, to cases 
where rather than having to make adjustments to natural limitations, we are confronted 
with injustice. The discussion of these problems belongs to the partial compliance part 
of nonideal theory”3. 
 
 According to this distinction between ideal and nonideal theory, the normative 
aspects of the theory are granted by the ideal theory, while the goal of the nonideal 
theory is to amend as much as possible the imperfections of the concrete political 
context in order to establish a political system that it might be as close as possible to the 
ideal conception. Following this account of the relation between ideal and nonideal 
theory, the latter theory cannot help in solving the dilemma of liberalism, as the 
nonideal stage of the theory will be restricted  to managing the actual circumstances of 
justice in order to eliminate injustices in the light of the normative example furnished by 
the ideal theory. This model maintains that the whole normative role is played by the 
ideal theory, while the nonideal theory looks for the actual circumstances of 
implementations of the normative theory.  
“In practice we must usually choose between several unjust, or second best, 
arrangements; and then we look to nonideal theory to find the least unjust scheme. 
Sometimes this scheme will include measures and policies that a perfectly just system 
would reject. Two wrongs can make a right in the sense that the best available 
arrangement may contain a balance of imperfections, an adjustment of compensating 
injustices”4.  
                                                 
2
 Rawls, 1971, p. 215. 
3
 Ivi, p. 309. 
4
 Ivi, p. 247. 
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Rawls maintains that the purpose of nonideal theory is to find the best way for 
establishing a political social system that, beginning from the actual circumstances of 
justice, might become as much close as possible to the political model developed and 
justified in the ideal theory. Therefore, the nonideal theory deals with the feasibility 
aspects of the theory of justice, rather than with the desirability aspects. Rawls holds 
this view both in his first work A Theory of Justice
5
 (hereafter TJ) and in his last one on 
international justice The Law of People
6
. Therefore, we can say that this distinction is a 
stable feature of his whole paradigm. 
 Following Rawls’ paradigm, it is true that the every argument for granting the 
desirability of a theory of justice should be addressed by an ideal model of reasoning. 
Meanwhile, nonideal theory must work on modifying the actual circumstances of 
justice, so that a nonideal implementation of the ideal concept of justice might meet 
feasibility constraints. Therefore, nonideal theory addresses the transitional aspects of 
the theory of justice, rather than being employed within the justificatory procedure. This 
aspect is coherent with the idea that every normative aspect of the theory of justice 
stems from ideal reasoning. Ideal theory introduces constraints on feasibility, namely 
idealized assumptions with regard both to the epistemic and moral capacities of the 
actors and to favorable social conditions. Thanks to these idealizations, the ideal theory 
may develop a normative theory of justice assuming that citizens are able to abide by 
the principles of justice, once that they have been laid out
7
. Ideal theory provides us 
with a description of how justice would work in an idealized – quasi-perfect world – 
and therefore establishes a normative criterion for assessing and revising the nonideal 
world
8
. According to this view then, the task of nonideal theory is to modify the actual 
circumstances of justice in the light of the ideal paradigm and trying to transform partial 
compliance in strict compliance even within a nonidealized world
9
. What can be 
                                                 
5
 Rawls, 1971. 
6
 Rawls, 1999b. 
7
 In this regards, Valentini (2009, p. 252) states: “all idealisations are false statements, which make the 
world appear simpler or better than it actually is”. 
8
 “Viewing the theory of justice as a whole, the ideal part presents a conception of a just society that we 
are to achieve if we can. Existing institutions are to be judged in the light of this conception and held to 
be unjust to the extent that they depart from it without sufficient reason”, Rawls, 1971, p. 216. 
9
 “There are, as we saw in the Introduction, two kinds of nonideal theory. One kind deals with conditions 
of noncompliance, that is, with conditions in which certain regimes refuse to comply with a reasonable 
Law of Peoples; […]. The other kind of nonideal theory deals with unfavorable conditions, that is, with 
the conditions of societies whose historical, social, and economic circumstances make their achieving a 
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accomplished in nonideal theory depends on the reference to the normative framework 
already justified by ideal theory. Indeed, nonideal theory needs that an ideal theory had 
already been developed, in order to have the normative criteria by which assessing the 
imperfections of the actual words. 
 “Nonideal theory asks how this long-term goal might be achieved, or worked toward, 
usually in gradual steps. It looks for policies and courses of action that are morally 
permissible and politically possible as well as likely to be effective. So conceived, 
nonideal theory presupposes that ideal theory is already on hand. For until the ideal is 
identified, at least in outline—and that is all we should expect—nonideal theory lacks 
an objective, an aim, by reference to which its queries can be answered.”10. 
 
The major task fulfilled by ideal theory is to provide a normative framework against 
which to assess the actual conditions of justice and injustice in the ongoing societies. 
Even if actual citizens will never perfectly adhere to the idealized view on them, still the 
regulative ideal of a theory of justice as a whole is to provide us good reasons for 
supporting those changes that will mitigate the causes of injustices, making the nonideal 
context closer to the ideal one. “Where ideal theory dictates the objective, nonideal 
theory dictates the route to that objective (from whatever imperfectly just condition a 
society happens to occupy)”11. 
 I think that this account of the distinction between ideal and nonideal theory is not   
adequate  if compared to the issues arising from the dilemma of liberalism. I hold that 
we need a nonideal theory that does not simply deal with the actual conditions of 
noncompliance and the unfavorable social circumstances. Rather, it is fundamental to 
stress that even the nonideal theory should play a normative role within the justificatory 
procedure. Since the dilemma of liberalism stresses the inner tension between normative 
and motivational requirements , it is not possible to solve this tension just from the ideal 
point of view. Therefore, I defend the view that we should distinguish the two parts of 
the justificatory procedure in an ideal and a nonideal stage. Both stages are designed to 
provide normative arguments in favour of the justification of a political system; 
nevertheless the tools that can be employed in the ideal stage are different from those 
used in the nonideal one. However, the fact that the ideal theory applies robust 
idealizations to the justificatory framework, while nonideal theory should develop 
                                                                                                                                               
well-ordered regime, whether liberal or decent, difficult if not impossible. These societies I call burdened 
Societies”, Rawls, 1999b, p.90. 
10
 Ivi, pp. 89-90 (emphasis added). 
11
 Simmons, 2010, p. 12. 
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arguments starting from the actual circumstances, does not necessarily mean that the 
task of nonideal theory is limited to remove injustices in the light of a regulative ideal 
provided by the ideal theory. Once that the intrinsic tension between normative 
requirements and the fact of pluralism has been brought to the foreground, then it is not 
possible to claim that the whole normative task can be accomplished by the ideal theory 
alone. I maintain that a crucial important normative role can be fulfilled by nonideal 
theory, to wit, the development of a deliberative procedure in which actual citizens 
discuss and try to publicly justify a set of principles and mid-level rules for ruling the 
political society.  
 In this dissertation I provide different arguments to the purpose – epistemic as well 
as political. In this brief introduction I cannot properly expose these reasons. Still in 
order to explain which is my view on the division of labour between ideal and nonideal 
theory, let me introduce a metaphor that I will discuss more exhaustively later
12
. 
Liberalism can be described both as a theory-framework and as a theory-picture. While 
a theory-framework establishes a loose normative framework as a criterion for assessing 
and regulate the actual process of political deliberation, a theory-picture deals with the 
actual possibility of building up a complete theory of justice, made up by principles and 
rules and by specific interpretations of general concepts. Following this metaphor, we 
can say that for Rawls the goal of nonideal theory would to reproduce in the best way 
possible the original picture that the ideal theory has provided, even if the brushes are 
defective, the canvas is ruined and therefore the copy will never be perfect as the 
original. By contrast, according to the view that I defend here, the ideal theory provides 
autonomous and well-justified arguments for establishing a loose normative liberal 
framework, while nonideal theory should address the actual possibility of ruling a 
deliberative process for actual circumstances of justice. Hence, the ideal theory 
constitutes just the frame of the painting, while the original picture should be drafted by 
the nonideal theory. Of course, this division of labour implies that we cannot establish 
in advance which the outcomes of the nonideal procedure will be, as the ideal theory 
does not furnish us with a full-fledged theory of justice for social reforms. The main 
goal of this work consists in showing that, in order to solve the liberal dilemma, we 
should distinguish carefully between the two different normative tasks that apply 
respectively to the ideal and the nonideal stage.  
                                                 
12
 I will discuss the metaphor more exhaustively later on. See infra, section 2.4.3. 
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   The second part of my dissertation will focus on the epistemic and feasibility 
constraints of an adequate non-ideal theory of justice for actual circumstances. Some of 
these are: impossibility of obtaining strict compliance by citizens; unfavourable 
historical, social or economic conditions; indeterminacy; inconclusiveness; fallibility; 
disagreement; human vulnerability; human nature,  problems of institutional design
13
. 
These features expresses two slightly different way in which a theory can be nonideal. 
On the one hand there are strictly epistemological features that constrain  the public 
practice of reasoning over political matters. On the other hand, there are nonideal 
circumstances and contextual features that define the requirements for a fact-sensitive 
theory of justice
14
. 
 My aim is to investigate the nonideal features of a theory of justice referring both 
to the epistemic and the feasibility constraints. In the first chapter I address the 
epistemic constraints for a nonideal theory of justice, defending what I call a moderate 
epistemic view: that is, a fallibilist account of knowledge within a coherentist view of 
justification. Then, in the two central chapters, I analyse the historical and contextual 
constraints on nonideal theory. Here, I articulate Rawls’ paradigm and some of the 
critical contributions to the “public justification” debate of the recent years (e.g. Quong, 
Gaus, D’Agostino, Sen, Habermas). In the third chapter, I introduce and defend the idea 
of a multistage framework. Although the justificatory paradigm is developed along 
Rawlsian lines, I defend a view different from Rawls' about the role played by the 
nonideal theory. This is the view that, in order to solve the dilemma of liberalism, 
nonideal theory plays an autonomous normative role, instead than being relegated to 
deal with transitional issues. In order to assess the validity of my proposal, in the last 
chapter I discuss the application of this justificatory paradigm to some cases studies. 
Case studies are essential to highlight how epistemic and contextual feature constrain 
the theory Clearly, the way nonideal theory deals with the concrete case studies will 
partly depend on the normative framework justified by ideal theory, but this is not in 
contrast with the multistage framework I have in mind: rather than conflicting, ideal and 
                                                 
13
 See Farrelly, 2007, p. 847. 
14
There is a deep disagreement, among theorists, with regard to how fact-sensistive a theory of justice 
should be. Gerald Cohen (2003), for example, maintains that a good theory of justice should be 
completely fact-insensitive. By contrast, Rawls holds a view that is fact-sensitive. My line of argument, 
however, is that in order to stress the normative role played by nonideal theory, the theory of justice 
should become even more fact-sensitive than it has been in Rawls’ theory. For an exhaustive analysis of 
the theoretical relation between ideal and nonideal theory on the one hand, and fact-sensitivity on the 
other, see Farrelly, 2007. 
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nonideal theory mutually support each other and the outcomes of the theory should be 
analysed and evaluated against the whole justificatory paradigm. Going back to the 
frame-picture metaphor, we can say that it is impossible to evaluate whether a frame 
suits a painting, before trying to put them together. The value of the frame stems from 
the fact that the frame is useful to reveal the value of the painting. By the same token, 
the painting itself requires the frame in order to be complete. This is true the other way 
as well: before we start painting, we do not know which image is going to be 
represented in the painting, and yet we can count on a solid and stable picture frame for 
establishing in advance which should be the limits of the painting.  
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Chapter 1 – A Nonideal Account of Moral Justification 
 
 
 
“Fallibilism is an anti-dogmatic intellectual stance or attitude: 
 an openness to the possibility that 
one has made an error and an accompanying willingness 
to give a fair hearing to arguments that one’s belief is incorrect” 
Adam Leite (2010 p. 370) 
 
 
“Our holding a moral belief  
is never best explained with reference  
to the assumption that it is true” 
Folke Tersman (1993, p.74) 
 
 
  
 
1.0  Introduction 
 
  In this chapter, my aim is to provide a broad account of the procedure of 
justification in ethics. Even though my primary area of interest is political philosophy, 
in this first chapter I want to outline a broad description of what it means to hold a 
justified moral belief. I believe it is worth spending some time analysing the issue of 
justification from a general perspective, as this analysis will lead me to specify which 
kind of epistemic paradigm I consider to be the most valuable in the domains of ethics 
and political philosophy. Indeed, in the introduction I have already stated that in this 
project my first goal is to show that a correct procedure of public justification should be 
divided in an ideal and a nonideal phase. Consequently, it is extremely relevant to begin 
this work addressing some strictly epistemic issues, in order to define a general 
framework that will be employed in a more specific way when we will be dealing with 
the different stages of the justificatory procedure. 
 My analysis will be developed in different steps. First of all, I briefly present some 
general well known remarks about what it means to justify a belief (1.1). Secondly, I 
discuss the fundamental epistemic differences between foundationalism and 
coherentism (1.2 and 1.3). Thirdly, I connect the nonideal approach to moral 
justification with a general paradigm in political philosophy (1.4). Finally, I introduce 
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the distinction between top-down and bottom-up justification, providing reason for 
preferring the late one – at least within the field of political philosophy – and I examine 
the issue of political constituency, connecting therefore the matter of justification with 
the practical analysis of determining who are the addressees of moral justification (1.5). 
 
 
1.1  The Epistemic Gap Between Justification and Warrant 
 
1.1.1 A Moderate epistemic view 
  In the last few decades liberal theories have been divided into two camps: those 
theories that support a morally strong foundation of liberalism and those theories that 
look for a moderate, often strictly political, account of the justification of liberalism. In 
this chapter my goal is to analyse this debate from the perspective of moral 
epistemology, as I hold that a technical analysis of what it means to justify a belief will 
provide us with good reasons for supporting a moderate epistemic account of 
justification in political theory. I define the epistemic perspective about justification I 
am defending as moderate, since is equidistant from two extreme positions. On the one 
hand, an extremely demanding position is occupied by those theories that maintain the 
impossibility of providing a sound justification without coupling the justificatory 
argument with the attempt to discover moral truths. On the other hand, there are theories 
according to which there are no rational grounds for choosing among competing moral 
systems. A moderate perspective is equidistant from these two perspectives, as it 
maintains that the selection of an objectively justified moral theory does not necessarily 
depend on the attempt to establish moral truths. A moral principle might result to be 
publicly justified – through sound reasons – and yet the agent that holds such moral 
principles is not committed to the existence of a corresponding moral truth
1
. According 
to a moderate epistemic view  the primary purpose of justification in ethics is to provide 
sound reasons to an agent for choosing among different moral theories or principles. 
The justificatory procedure provides sound arguments to an agent for choosing one 
moral theory instead of another. The moral agent plays a fundamental deliberative role 
within the justificatory process, as she is the last authority for determining which is the 
moral theory she is going to uphold. In this regard, this moderate perspective about 
                                                 
1
 For a discussion of this issue close to mine, see Little, 1984. 
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justification stresses the role played by the agents, instead that referring primarily to the 
value and the validity of moral truth per se
2
. Consequently, the relevant feature of the 
procedure of justification is not its connection with a truth-conducive argument; rather 
its value lies in being a selective procedure within the deliberative perspective of moral 
agents.  
 According to this moderate view, the epistemic role of justification is not exhausted 
by the introduction of a set of reasons ‘R’ that provides a propositional justification for 
p. Rather, if the epistemic value of a justification hinges in part on the deliberative role 
played by moral agents, then any comprehensive justification should involve a doxastic 
analysis that implies focusing on the actual possibility that an agent S might believe, for 
sound reasons, that p. In this regard, Thomas Scanlon is right when, in his “Rawls on 
Justification”, starts his analysis with this epistemic distinction: 
a. To justify a principle or judgement is “to say that it is supported by good and 
sufficient reasons”; 
b. but there is also the issue of “a person’s being justified in holding a certain view”3. 
This distinction perfectly explains the difference between propositional justification and 
doxastic justification. The former justification refers to the conditions under which a 
proposition can be proved to be justified independently of what an agent believes, 
whereas the latter accounts for the deliberative process through which an agent 
justifiably holds some beliefs
4
. According to this epistemic distinction, the provision of 
a set of good reasons ‘R’ is not a sufficient condition for the agent S to correctly believe 
that p. Agent S might believe that p for different, and unjustified, reasons or, even, do 
not accept the set of reasons ‘R’ as acceptable within her doxastic system. 
Consequently, a doxastic justification is usually defined as a justification in which non-
doxastic justification is coupled with a basing requirement, namely the fact that agent S 
                                                 
2
 In this regard, I think it is worth mentioning that one the most important critique that Rawls develops 
against intuitionism is that such approach leaves not enough space to the agent’s deliberation within the 
procedure for determining the principles of justice. See Rawls (1993, p. 92): “The third feature concerns 
the sparse conception of the person. Although not explicitly stated, this feature may be gathered from the 
fact that rational intuitionism does not require a fuller conception of the person and needs little more than 
the idea of the sell as knower. This is because the content of first principles is given by the order of moral 
values available to perception and intuition as organized and expressed by principles acceptable on due 
reflection. The main requirement, then, is that we be able to know the first principles expressing those 
values and to be moved by that knowledge”. 
3
 Scanlon, 2003, p. 140. 
4
 For a deep analysis of the value of doxastic justification in moral epistemology, see Timmons (1993, 
1996) 
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bases her belief on the reasons that propositionally justify it
5
. The doxastic 
presupposition that I defend implies that when we analyse the set of reasons ‘R’ that are 
available to an agent S, we should also take into consideration the epistemic 
performance by the same agent S. 
“The way in which the subject performs, the manner in which she makes use of her 
reasons fundamentally determines whether her belief is doxastically justified. Poor 
utilization of even the best reasons for believing p will prevent you from justifiedly 
believing or knowing that p”6. 
 
 This epistemic distinction between propositional and doxastic justification is 
extremely important for understanding the value of the moderate epistemic perspective 
about justification I am dealing with. From the epistemic perspective, in fact, it is 
possible that sometimes a moral agent is justified in holding a belief (b), even if from an 
external epistemic perspective, such belief is not warranted (a). In order to understand 
this epistemic tension it is useful to introduce a quite common epistemic distinction 
between two fundamental concepts
7
: 
i. Judgement, i.e., activity that pertains to the epistemic appraisal of the judger. It is a 
subjective epistemological notion governed by the rational connections among different 
agents’ internal mental states. Even if subjective, this epistemic activity of producing 
judgements is ruled by normative criteria (e.g. being correct or incorrect; meeting 
rationality constraints) and therefore epistemic justified beliefs are those beliefs that is 
rational to believe. 
ii Warrant, i.e., is a feature of the relation between agent’s judgements and the external 
world. In this regard, the notion of warrant is more an objective or external criterion. If 
a judgement is subjective, even when it has been produced according to epistemic 
normative criteria, then its correctness depends on some epistemic warranties that are in 
some senses independent from the subject. “Epistemic warrant is whatever, when added 
to truth and belief, makes knowledge. Knowledge is true, epistemically warranted 
belief”8.   
 I have introduced this epistemic distinction in order to argue that, within the field 
of moral epistemology, justification and warrant may be contingently related (coincide 
                                                 
5
 “S’s belief that p at time t is [doxastically] justified (well-founded) iff (i) believing p is justified for S at 
t; (ii) S believes p on the basis of evidence that supports p”, Feldman, 2003, p. 46. 
6
 Turri, 2010, p. 318. 
7
 See De Paul (1993, p. 5), Wedgwood (2007, pp. 154-8), Skorupski (in Dancy (ed.), 2000, p. 121). 
8
 Peter Markie in Dancy, Setup, Sosa (eds.), 2010, p. 72. 
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to be precise), but not necessary so. If I will be able to demonstrate the validity of this 
statement, then this argument would be extremely useful for arguing against those 
strong versions of moral justification (like intuitionism) that identify in the most basic 
beliefs that justify an epistemic assertion (justification) the mark of causal import of the 
external world on our senses (the warrant). 
 When Scanlon distinguishes between the epistemic claims that a principle is 
justified (a) and that a person is justified in holding a certain moral view (b), I think that 
he is referring to the same epistemic tension I am outlining. Indeed, we can have 
situations in which our justificatory procedure grants the coincidence of justification 
and warrant. Nevertheless, it could also be the case – and often is – that justification and 
warrant do not coincide. As Scanlon points out: “a person can be justified, in this sense, 
in accepting a principle (for certain reasons) even though the principle itself is not 
justified because, say, there are other factors (which he could not be expected to be 
aware of) that undermine the justificatory force of the considerations he takes to be 
reasons for it”9. According to this example, a moral agent that has been engaged in a 
sound deliberative procedure is able to provide a justified judgement, even if such 
judgment is not sustained also by warranty. 
“A justified choice is one that a real agent could make given all the reasoning that it has 
performed up to the present time and without violating the constraints of rationality. A 
warranted choice is one that would be justified if the agent could complete all possibly 
relevant reasoning”10. 
 
 This stark distinction between justification and warrant could appear as 
problematic, since it could seem that any possibility of providing objective moral 
statements should be excluded. However, I want to argue that within the field of moral 
epistemology judgement and warrant are two distinct epistemic concepts, but that it is 
possible to provide an account of moral justification in which these two aspects of 
justification are defined as contingently related, even though not necessarily coincident. 
Sustaining a moderate perspective about moral epistemology implies that we can argue 
in favour of an objective status of moral judgements without at the same time requiring 
a necessary coincidence of justification and warrant. Claiming for a coincidence 
between justification and warrant that is not necessarily guaranteed does not imply that 
doxastic justification is a no truth-related epistemic perspective. Rather, what I want to 
                                                 
9
 Scanlon, 2003, p. 140. 
10
 Quote from Pollock in Gaus, 2010, p. 244. 
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stress is that, even though the doxastic justification is still a justification for believing 
true a certain proposition p, the whole epistemic procedure of justification cannot 
guarantee truth by definition. As a matter of fact, if the coincidence of warrant and 
justification cannot be taken for granted, then the truth-conduciveness aspects of the 
epistemic procedure of justification should be handle carefully. On the one hand, the 
moderate perspective about justification maintains that when a sound justification is 
obtained, such justification provides a good reason to believe true. On the other hand, 
this same justification, being constitutes both by a doxastic and a propositional side, 
cannot guarantee truth necessarily.  
 The moderate perspective is again equidistant from a strong and a weak conception 
of moral justification. Whereas a strong approach in epistemology requires the 
necessary relation between judgement and warrant
11
, the weak perspective maintains 
that this coincidence is impossible to attain. By contrast, a moderate perspective claims 
for the possibility of achieving a coincidence between justification and warrant, as the 
epistemic relevance of the procedure of justification stems from the possibility of 
providing good reasons in order to believe something true. Nevertheless, the moderate 
perspective is aware of the epistemic difficulties of such justificatory procedure and, 
therefore, does not take for granted the coincidence between justification and warrant. 
The epistemic gap between warrant and justification can be determined by different 
factors, not necessary correlated. Firstly, it might be the upshot of our limited cognitive 
capacities. In this regard, the fact that not always a justified belief is as well warranted 
would stem from our flawed and imperfect epistemic capacities. Secondly, it could be 
the case that the gap between warrant and justification depends on the fact that truth is 
not at all attainable. Of course, this two arguments focus their attentions on different 
features, the first relying on an epistemic argument with regard to our cognitive 
capacities and their relation with the external world, while the second being supported 
by an anti-realist stance about the ontological status of truth. I will discuss these two 
different possibilities later one, when I will deal with sceptical scenarios. 
                                                 
11
 It is important to recall that not just foundational theories (as intuitionism) require the coincidence of 
doxastic and propositional justification. Indeed, constructivism as well implies a justificatory procedure in 
which these two aspects of justifications coincide. According to constructivist in mathematics for 
example, mathematical truths are the outcome of a correct procedure, not a path of discovery. If one is 
justified in following a procedure, such justification is not simply a subjective process of reasoning; rather 
implies the construction of a system of beliefs that is objective. Justification and warrant coincide in this 
case. 
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 If we accept the distinction between doxastic and propositional perspective, then 
the epistemic gap between justification and warrant is extremely relevant. For example, 
a moral agent that has been engaged in a sound deliberative procedure may be able to 
provide a justified judgement, even when such judgement is not as well sustained by 
warranty. As a matter of fact, if the perspective of the agent is part of the procedure of 
justification – as I think it should be – then the justification in not necessary connected 
with the warrant. Within moral perspective it cannot be the case that a sound 
justification of moral judgement (propositional perspective) might be completely 
detached from the fact that a moral person is actually justified in holding this specific 
moral view (doxastic perspective). If a complete procedure of justification has to take 
into consideration both the doxastic and propositional perspective, then the issue of the 
relation between justification and warrant is always problematic, as it is impossible to 
solve the epistemic asymmetry between the two once for all. However, I want to argue 
that within the field of moral epistemology judgement and warrant are two distinct 
epistemic concepts, but that it is possible to provide an account of moral justification in 
which these two sides of justification can be contingently related without necessarily 
coinciding. 
 
1.1.2 The Gettier’s Argument 
  The epistemic distinction between justification and warrant can be better 
understood if we introduce the argument by Edmund Gettier against the classical 
definition of knowledge as justified true belief. This definition of knowledge merges 
together the two different aspects of justification that Scanlon has described, namely the 
idea that a belief could be defined as genuine knowledge if and only if an agent is 
justified in holding this belief (doxastic justification) and such belief is also warranted 
as true belief (propositional justification). Gettier, in his short paper “Is Justified True 
Belief Knowledge?”12, introduces several counter-examples to show that such 
conditions are necessary, but not jointly sufficient for genuine knowledge. 
Gettier starts from the classical definition of knowledge according to which: 
Sonia knows that p if and only if: 
i. p is true; 
ii. Sonia believes that p;  
                                                 
12
 Gettier, 1963. 
PhD Dissertation in Political Theory – XXV Cycle                                 PhD Candidate: Federica Liveriero  
Pag. 20 
 
iii. Sonia is justified in believing that p
13
. Gettier provides some counter-examples to 
such definition by showing that the three conditions are not jointly sufficient for having 
genuine knowledge. Gettier shows that “it is possible for a person to be justified in 
believing a proposition that is in fact false”14. His counter-examples concern situations 
where a person’s belief is assumed to satisfy all these conditions, but given that her 
knowledge is acquired by accident, then the examples show that the conditions used to 
define knowledge may be unsatisfactory. 
A Gettier-type of argument would assume this form:  
i. Sonia wants to know which time it is; 
ii. Sonia checks her watch and it tells her that is noon; 
iii. it is actually noon when she looks at her watch. 
Can we say that Sonia knows that it is noon? It seems that she knows that is noon from 
the moment in which she has looked at her watch, given that now she has a true belief 
(it is noon and Sonia has the belief that is effectively noon) and this belief is also 
justified (given that her watch is telling her that is noon when it is actually noon and 
usually a watch is a reliable tool for ascertaining what time is it). However, it could be 
also the case that: 
iv. Sonia looks again to the watch later and she discovers that it is stuck, because it still 
tells noon even if at least two hours have passed by. 
v. Sonia has checked her watch at noon and her belief about the fact that was noon was 
right just by chance, given that in every other moment of the day her watch would have 
given her wrong information instead that the correct one. 
 This counter-example is shaped on the Gettier intuition that a justified true belief is 
still not enough to establish knowledge, since is always possible to build up a counter-
example in which our actually true and justified beliefs are not providing knowledge, 
for they have been formed just because of luck and therefore are just accidentally true. 
This example is helpful for clarifying the framework in which the epistemic relation 
between doxastic and propositional justification is viewed as contingent. As a matter of 
fact, in a Gettier-type example, the doxastic and propositional justifications seem to 
coincide, but this relation is obtained just out of luck. In this regard, an epistemic 
approach that looks for a positive relation between doxastic and propositional 
                                                 
13
 Ivi, p. 121. 
14
 Ibid. 
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justification, although without requiring a necessary coincidence between the two, has 
to take the sceptical challenge seriously. Facing the sceptical challenge implies that one 
is aware that even idealized justification might not correspond with truth, as arguments 
of irreducible scepticism are always raisable
15
. For example, if we are brains in vats or 
our perceptions are misled because of a Cartesian evil demon
16
, then it is impossible to 
warrant that any of our justified beliefs guarantees truth. Under a sceptical scenario it 
could be the case that one agent is justified in holding a certain belief, since her belief is 
supported by a sound deliberative route of reasoning; even if this belief is not true. In 
this regard, the coincidence of doxastic and propositional justifications can never be 
taken for granted.  
 Gettier’s argument, coupling the issue of the relation between internal and external 
criteria for guaranteeing justification with the issue of determining what knowledge is, 
has shown that epistemic scepticism is relevant to the extent that tells us not that our 
beliefs are false, but that they might be false. The sceptical challenge implies that if we 
want to take scepticism seriously, then we have to claim in favour of an evidence that is 
intrinsically fallible. According to a fallible paradigm, knowledge, that is defined as 
necessarily dependent on doxastic evidence as well as on propositional arguments, is 
compatible with the possibility of error. In this regard, it should be distinguished 
between two meanings of “knowing”: 
i. If S knows that p, then S is justified in believing that she is not mistaken about p. 
ii. If S knows that p, then S could not be mistaken about p.  
Fallibilism accepts (i) and rejects (ii). Indeed, (ii) requires a too high standard, namely 
the “impossibility of error” argument, according to which “to know something requires 
that it be that sort of thing that you could not be mistaken about”17. According to 
Feldman, a fallibilist view rejects the Introspective Indistinguishable Argument that 
maintains that “there cannot be cases of knowledge that are introspectively 
indistinguishable from cases of nonknowledge”18. By contrast, fallibilism maintains that 
                                                 
15
 The irreducible sceptical argument can be always raised against theories of justification or knowledge. 
Two famous arguments in this regard are those of evil demon presented by Descartes (1642) and the 
possibility that we are just brains in a vat developed by Hilary Putnam (1981). 
16
 Descartes in the Meditations on First Philosophy (1992 [1642], p. 29) states that: “I shall, then, suppose 
hat not the optimal God – the font of truth –, but rather some malign genius – and the same one most 
highly powerful and most highly cunning –, has put all his industriousness therein that he might deceive 
me: I shall think that the heavens, the air, the earth, colours, figures, sounds and all external things are 
nothing other than the playful deceptions of dreams by means of which he has set traps for my credulity”. 
17
 Feldman, 2002, p. 125. 
18
 Ibid. 
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“for some P, it is possible for one to know that P even if one could have exactly the 
same justification for believing P when P is false” and yet that “for some P, it is 
possible for one to know that P even if one’s evidence for P does not necessitate or 
entail the truth of P”19. This conclusion follows from the fact that fallibilism maintains 
that the reasons that an agent can hold in her doxastic system are merely extremely 
good, but never perfect and that, therefore, it is possible to have very good reasons and 
yet holding a false belief. In this regard, fallibilism is against the sceptical idea that 
knowledge necessary requires certainty or the impossibility of error.  
 The moderate epistemic perspective I am defending embeds within its paradigm the 
fallibilist stance with regard to the epistemic status of the evidence at our disposal. In 
this way, a moderate perspective can explain why the coincidence between justification 
and warrant is never necessarily guaranteed and, still, being not constrained by the 
argument itself to give up the possibility of claiming in favour of the fact that it is an 
intrinsic feature of the epistemic meaning of justification to be truth-related. Thus, the 
moderate perspective does not maintain that sceptical arguments are irresistible. 
However, this approach takes seriously into consideration the kind of scenarios that 
scepticism outlines. By contrast, models of justification grounded in an epistemic 
paradigm that I defined as too demanding claim that sceptical challenges are irrelevant, 
since there is always the possibility of providing a justificatory argument that 
guarantees the coincidence between warrant and justification
20
. In order to explain this 
line of argument, in the next section I analyse and confront two general paradigms of 
the structure of justification: foundationalism and coherentism. 
 
  
1.2    Foundationalism vs Coherentism 
 
1.2.1 Structure of Justification 
   Foundationalism is an epistemic theory of justification according to which all 
justified beliefs are either basic or derived from some basic beliefs. Following 
foundationalism, an agent S is justified in believing that p if and only if p is either non-
inferentially justified, or it is derived from a basic belief. A foundational theory of 
                                                 
19
 Adam Leite contribution on “Fallibilism” in Dancy, Setup, Sosa, 2010, p. 370. 
20
 For a deep analysis of the sceptical issue, see Brink, 1989. 
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justification claims that only those beliefs that are foundational or that are derived 
inferentially from such foundational beliefs are justified
21
. 
“The first principles of morals are not deductions. They are self-evident; and their truth, 
like that of their axioms, is perceived without reasoning or deduction. And moral truths, 
that are not self-evident, are deduced not from relations quite different from them, but 
from the first principles of morals”22. 
 
 The challenging point about foundational theories of justification concerns the 
nature of the non-inferential justification of foundational beliefs. Which kind of 
justification is this one? Some theorists have argued in favour of the existence of some 
self-evident moral truths that can be grasped by our intellectual capacities without being 
derived from nothing else. Intuitionism provides the best example of this perspective
23
. 
However, although foundationalism is often connected with intuitionism, the two 
theories are different. Intuitionism is a more demanding theory that claims not just that 
there are foundational moral beliefs, but also that we have knowledge of evidence-
independent moral facts that are not-natural. In this regard, we can say that intuitionism 
is a theory about the nature of moral values and about the specific faculty through which 
one discovers such moral values (namely by intuition), whereas foundationalism is an 
epistemic theory regarding the structure of justification. Therefore, we can hold a 
foundational theory of justification in moral epistemology without necessarily 
sustaining intuitionism. A confirmation of this conclusion is given by the theoretical 
possibility of defending a foundationalist theory of moral justification in which all 
moral beliefs are derived inferentially from foundational beliefs that are not moral
24
. 
 Coherentism, on the contrary, is a theory of justification according to which there 
are not foundational beliefs. In this regard, all justified beliefs are inferentially justified. 
The agent S is justified in holding the belief p, if and only if, p is part of a coherent 
system of beliefs and therefore can be justified inferentially through the connection with 
other beliefs that are part of the same coherent system. In this regard, the degree of S 
                                                 
21
 A good example of a contemporary foundational theory is the one provided by Gerry Cohen. For 
example, Cohen (2003, p. 214, italics in the original) claims that: “a principle can reflect or respond to a 
fact only because it is also a response to a principle that is not a response to a fact. To put the same point 
differently, principles that reflect facts must, in order to reflect facts, reflect principles that don't reflect 
facts”. 
22
 Reid, 1788 (1969), p. 471. 
23
 As defenders of intuitionism, see Clarke (1728), Price (1787), Reid (1788), Sidgwick (1879, 1907), 
Moore (1903), Broad (1930), Ross (1930) and Prichard (1949). 
24
 This kind of theory would be part of a naturalist framework according to which normative statements 
can be derived and justified in the light of non-normative facts. By contrast, intuitionism is exactly the 
theory that pairs a foundational theory of justification with an anti-naturalist account of moral facts. 
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being justified in holding p is directly proportional to the level of coherence achieved by 
the whole coherent system. Hence, the fundamental methodological principle sustained 
by coherentism asserts that justification should always take in consideration the whole 
coherent system, as no assessment or justification is available when beliefs are 
evaluated singly
25
.  
 The first important remark to add is that a coherentist justification does not just 
imply logical consistency among all the beliefs of the coherent system. Logical 
consistency is a necessary condition, but not a sufficient one as well. As a matter of fact, 
we can have completely consistent systems that are still false
26
. For this reason, a sound 
coherentist theory of justification requires that the mutual support among beliefs 
establishes coherence as well as explanatory connections. In this regard, David Brink 
clams that “the degree of a belief system's coherence is a function of the 
comprehensiveness of the system and of the logical, probabilistic, and explanatory 
relations obtaining among members of the belief system. In particular, explanatory 
relations are an especially important aspect of coherence”27. 
 In the next chapters I will analyse a specific coherentist justificatory procedure: the 
reflective equilibrium method. In this first chapter meanwhile, I want to focus primarily 
on the discussion about the fundamental differences between foundationalism and 
coherentism, in order to show why I consider the latter a better option for a theory of 
justification in political philosophy
28
. 
 Foundationalism is very often regarded as a more appealing proposal than 
coherentism as a theory of moral justification, even if how we can get non-inferential 
sound justifications for some of our moral beliefs is not at all clear. My hint is that this 
preference stems from the fact that foundationalism appears to be a more “grounded” 
theory than coherentism. This truth-conduciveness ascribed to foundationalism by its 
                                                 
25
 This methodological epistemic principle can be defined as holistic. In this regard, I recall that holism 
owes its popularity to W.V. Quine (1951), as he has claimed that a scientific theory cannot be tested in 
isolation, because it is part of a web of theories that mutually support each other. Another slightly 
different perspective about holism is the one provided by Jonathan Dancy. Dancy (2004, p. 7) claims that 
holism, as a theory of reasons, implies that “a feature that is a reason in one case may be no reason at all, 
or an opposite reason, in another”.  
26
 In this regard, one can say that both astronomy and astrology are coherent systems of beliefs and that 
we do not have a criterion for determining which of the two provides a correct account of the world. 
Hence, coherence alone is not a sufficient condition for discriminating between the correctness and the 
incorrectness of alternative, but equally coherent, systems of beliefs. 
27
 Brink, 1989, p. 103. 
28
 Most of arguments I am going to develop in the second part of this section are based on the analysis 
provided by David Brink in his Moral Realism and the Foundation of Ethics (1989). Another important 
source for a subtle analysis of these issues is Sayre-McCord (1996). 
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defenders seems to be a feature of justification that we are not willing to give up lightly 
especially when moral values are at stake. Indeed, as I outlined in the previous section, a 
fundamental epistemic issue is to determinate if, for having justified moral beliefs, it is 
necessary that justification and warranty are epistemically related. According to 
foundationalism, a justificatory structure must guarantee the coincidence between 
doxastic and propositional justification and therefore the epistemic relation between 
justification and warranty is determined as necessary. However, foundationalism will 
lead to warranted judgments in moral reasoning if and only if non-inferential justified 
beliefs prove to be exactly what foundationalism thinks that they are: a sort of self-
justifying moral truths. In this regard, foundationalism is a good example of the 
epistemic approach that I have defined at the beginning of this chapter as too 
demanding. Indeed, under a foundationalist perspective, the moral theory that is chosen 
at the end of the justificatory procedure is not just the “best” theory according to the 
array of theories we have to choose among, but it is rather an infallible theory that 
necessary guarantees the truth. A moral theory grounded and justified through a 
foundational procedure depends on some beliefs – at least one29 - that are non-
inferential justified and therefore are warranted, no matter what. Theoretically speaking 
however, we are far away from reaching an agreement about the nature of such non-
inferential form of justification. For this reason among the others, I deem much more 
reasonable to focus our theoretical efforts on a moderate perspective according to which 
a theory of justification in ethics provides sound reasons for preferring a moral theory 
over the others; without connecting the procedure of justification with the even more 
debatable issue of ascribing a character of necessary truth-conduciveness to such 
procedure
30
. 
 David Brink, in his Moral Realism and the Foundation of Ethics, claims that there 
are two important arguments in favour of foundationalism: 
 a regress argument; 
 a sceptical argument. 
 The regress argument objects to coherentism that its procedure of justification leads 
to an infinite regress, as every belief is justified inferentially and therefore the 
                                                 
29
 I think that all moral theories that are grounded through a theological argument about the existence of 
God could be described as foundational theories in which one self-evident truth provides all the necessary 
normative force. 
30
 On the same line Gaus (1996, p. 42) states: “a rational belief system is to be analysed in terms of the 
relations among its members (reasons and beliefs) and not with reference to the idea of truth” 
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inferential chain would be endless. According to the regress argument, the coherent 
procedure of justification is described by this framework: 
i. belief p is justified given that q; 
ii. q is a justificatory premise that needs to be justified itself; 
iii. q is justified given that r; 
iiii. r is justified given that s; 
iiii  and so on, ad infinitum. 
 A foundationalist theory of justification never risks producing an infinite regress, 
since every inferential chain is stopped by a self-justifying belief. In this regard, we can 
outline different schemes of argumentation concerning justifications
31
: 
(a) every justification is both linear and inferential; 
(b) every justification is inferential, but not all of them are also linear; 
(c) every justification is linear, but not all of them are inferential. 
According to the regress argument, just the option (c) is able to avoid any possible 
infinite regress. The option (c) represents the justificatory structure that is employed by 
a foundationalist theory of justification. With regard to coherentism, by contrast, it is 
reasonable to wonder whether a coherentist perspective is represented by the scheme (a) 
or (b). The scheme (a) is clearly unable to avoid an infinite regress. As a matter of fact, 
if every inferential deduction is also linear, then the inferential chain is never-ending
32
. 
Is (a) the correct scheme for describing a coherentist procedure of justification? If we 
defend a sophisticated theory of coherentism, one in which some epistemic constraints 
are respected, then we can affirm that coherentism is well described by (b), rather than 
by (a). A coherentist theory of justification might avoid the risk of infinite regress 
thanks to the fact that the justificatory connections among different beliefs are not like a 
linear chain, rather could be represented by the image of a holistic web. In this regard, 
the mutual support scheme looks for arguments that are all inferential, but not all of 
them are also linear, as every system’s set of beliefs will support each other circularly. 
Within this coherent holistic web we can encounter situation in which a belief q is 
justified through the reference to some other beliefs (s; r; p) that are justified thanks to 
some other beliefs (z; t; y) whose justification is at the end in some way justified also by 
the reference to belief q. However, in order to avoid a vicious circularity, the coherentist 
                                                 
31
 Brink, 1989, pp. 115-122. 
32
 According to Brink, the argumentative scheme outlined by (a) will lead to scepticism, given that we 
cannot hold an infinite number of beliefs. 
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method requires that the procedure of justification must respect an independence 
constraint according to which if a set of beliefs (Z) provides justificatory support for a 
set of beliefs (Q) that is in some way independent from the support that (Q) receives 
from being consistent with another set of beliefs (S), then some interesting, nontrivial 
portions of the set of justificatory beliefs for (Z) must be disjointed from the set of 
justificatory reasons in support of (S)
33
. All beliefs within the coherent system mutually 
support each other, but some justificatory chains should be disjoint from some others, so 
that the independent constraint is respected.  
 
1.2.2 The Sceptical Argument 
  The sceptical argument is a challenge for both foundationalism and coherentism. 
However, I suppose that the sceptical challenge is one of the reasons why common 
sense attitudes are inclined to consider foundationalism as more adequate within the 
domain of moral reasoning. The idea is that a foundationalist perspective of 
justification, providing non-inferential, justified moral beliefs, is definitely more 
adequate for coping with sceptical arguments. I think it is worth spending some time 
developing an argument that might spell out analytically the common sense preference 
for a foundational reply to sceptical scenarios: 
i. If we are to answer skeptical doubts, justified beliefs must rule out sceptical 
scenarios. 
ii. Hence, justified beliefs must be true. 
iii. Purely inferential accounts of justification cannot ensure contact with reality. 
iv. Hence, purely inferential accounts of justification cannot ensure that justified beliefs 
are true. 
v. Coherentism is a purely inferential account of justification. 
 
vi. Therefore, coherentism cannot answer sceptical doubts. 
 
This argument is usually defined as the no contact with reality objection. According to 
this argument, even if a coherent system of belief might appear as justified, given the 
internal explanatory connections of mutual support among the beliefs of the system, still 
there is no epistemic warranty that the coherent system is connected in any relevant way 
with the external world
34
. A coherentist approach can provide sound reasons for 
                                                 
33
 See Daniels (1996), De Paul (1993). I will discuss again the theoretical possibility of having a circular 
support among beliefs that is not vicious in the third chapter, when I will outline Nelson Goodman theory 
of induction. 
34
 For a deep analysis of this issue, although focused just on the reflective equilibrium approach, see 
DePaul, 1993, ch. 1, pp. 13-56. 
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supporting a coherentist account of justification, nevertheless this same account does 
not grant epistemic warrant for a coherent theory of knowledge as well
35
. This outcome 
is strictly speaking consistent with the general framework in moral epistemology I am 
outlining. As a matter of fact, if coherentism provides an account of moral justification 
that refers just to the justificatory relations that can occur among beliefs, then the fact 
that the epistemic relation between justification (doxastic) and warrant (propositional 
justification) is not necessary guaranteed is a sensible outcome of the procedure of 
justification itself. 
 Refuting the idea that a sound justification must imply the necessary coincidence of 
the set of reasons ‘R’ that constitutes the right evidence for S to believe p (doxastic 
justification) with the external warrant for this same belief (the propositional 
justification depending on the actual evidence it is available for believing rationally p) 
means that we are against the second assumption of the argument (ii), namely the fact 
that justification must guarantee true. Brink calls this principle objectivism about 
justification
36; a principle according to which “justification for believing p is 
justification for believing p to be true”37.  
 Is coherentism obliged, by definition, to refuse objectivism about justification and 
therefore to concede to the validity of the sceptical challenge? The answer is no. 
However, the only possibility that coherentism has for satisfying objectivism about 
justification is to assume a constructivist theory of truth, according to which a coherent 
theory of truth is true
38
. In this way, truth would be always coincident with the coherent 
system of justified beliefs, since the truth itself would be determined by a coherentist 
theory of truth. At a first glance this would seem to be a good solution, in order to reply 
in a definitive way to sceptical challenges. Indeed, the possibility of coupling 
coherentism and constructivism is a strategy that will settle the sceptical challenge once 
for all. Nevertheless, this is not the solution I want to undertake. In introducing my 
version of a moderate account of moral justification I did not take a stance with regard 
                                                 
35
 Keith Lehrer (in Dancy, Sosa, Setup (eds.), 2010, p. 281), in this regard states that: “A defender of 
coherentism must accept the logical gap between justified belief and truth, but she may believe that her 
capacities suffice to close the gap to yield knowledge. That view is, at any rate, a coherent one”. 
36
 In this regard, Brink (1989, p. 106) affirms: “Now realism and objectivism about justification provide 
an antisceptical argument for foundationalism. For only an account of justification that includes non-
inferential justification can possibly guarantee that our justified beliefs accurately describe a world whose 
existence and nature are independent of our beliefs about it”. 
37
 Brink, 1989, p. 106. 
38
 “Systematic coherence is not only the criterion we use for truth; it is what in the end we mean by truth” 
(Blanshard 1939, p. 304); 
PhD Dissertation in Political Theory – XXV Cycle                                 PhD Candidate: Federica Liveriero  
Pag. 29 
 
to the ontological status of moral facts. In my opinion, in fact, an account of moral 
justification can be described as “moderate” when it is determined that the structure of 
justification that is employed is not foundational. What I believe to be relevant is the 
fact that a foundational epistemology dismisses the doxastic presupposition as irrelevant 
with regard to the procedure for providing an ultimate and infallible justification. As a 
matter of fact, if we take seriously the doxastic presupposition and the epistemic gap 
between justification and warrant, then the requirement of the principle of the 
objectivism about justification appears to be extremely demanding. Objectivism about 
justification, in fact,  maintains that it cannot be the case that a justified belief is not at 
the same time also warranted. I have already claimed that even though is correct to see 
justification as a reliable evidence toward truth, still there are good epistemic arguments 
for refusing a more committing claim, namely the fact that justification must guarantee 
truth. Knowledge implies truth, but justification does not. Moreover, we have seen – 
through the reference to Gettier’s argument – that even the definition of knowledge is 
extremely debatable and that we always have to deal with the possibility that our 
justified beliefs might be false anyway. Therefore, even in the case that realism would 
be true, still there are good epistemic reasons for refusing objectivism about 
justification. I hold that one of the most important aspect of coherentism is that this 
approach, if coupled with a general fallibilist account about human deliberation, is able 
to argue against objectivism about justification inasmuch this requirement is viewed as 
too demanding, as it presupposes unreasonably high standards for knowledge. The 
rejection of objectivism about justification as adequate epistemic standard rests on 
simply epistemic arguments like, for example, the recognition of the unbridgeable gap 
between justification and warrant
39
. 
 This conclusion is extremely relevant, as it shows that the fundamental issue at 
stake, when dealing with sceptical scenarios, is the determination of which structure of 
justification we deem to be the most adequate, not to determining which is the 
ontological status of external facts. Indeed, if a moderate account of epistemology 
refuses the principles of objectivism about justification, then it does not matter if 
realism or constructivism are true. A moderate account of moral epistemology can be 
                                                 
39
 A similar view is present in Lehrer’s epistemic account when he claims that there is an intrinsic 
epistemic difference between a belief being “completely justified” and a claim about a belief producing 
knowledge. See Lehrer, 1974, p. 214. 
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agnostic with regard to the ontological status of moral facts
40
 and still providing sound 
arguments in order to supporting coherentism, and therefore refuting foundationalism. 
Coherentism, supporting a structure of justification that is strictly inferential, refuses the 
validity of the principle of objectivism about justification. This principle, indeed, 
requiring to necessarily close the epistemic gap between justification and warrant, is a 
too demanding principle that can be maintained and defended solely under an ideal 
paradigm of justification. 
 Now, coherentism reject objectivism about justification. But what about the 
ontological status of moral facts? Does coherentism necessarily imply an anti-realist 
perspective about moral facts? Coherentism provides an articulation of the way in which 
moral beliefs can be justified, as it tells us that such justification depends on the 
relations of coherence among beliefs that are part of the same doxastic system. 
Consequently, coherentism entails as well that every sound moral justification must take 
the agent’s perspective in consideration. However, this statement does not entail 
anything regarding the metaphysical status of moral facts. Indeed, coherentism is 
compatible both with realism and anti-realism to the extent that the ontological status of 
moral fact is at stake. On the one hand, there are theories that couple a coherentist 
approach about the justificatory procedure with moral constructivism (that claims the 
necessary dependence of moral facts from the evidence in their favour)
41
. On the other 
hand, there is the possibility of sustaining both coherentism and a realist account of the 
moral facts embedded into the coherent system
42
. What usually has seemed at odds 
between coherentism and moral realism is that moral realism is defined as “the view 
that there are moral facts and true moral claims whose existence and nature are 
independent of our beliefs about what is right and wrong”43. Since according to 
coherentism all justification is inferential, then it seems that coherentism is unable to 
account for moral facts that are objectively true regardless of what we believe. 
However, it is possible to hold a realist thesis regarding moral facts (that claims that 
moral facts are true or false according to whether some facts obtain in the world) and 
                                                 
40
 I will introduce more reasons for upholding an agnostic stance with regard to the determination of the 
ontological status of moral facts when I will deal with the determination of the paradigm I claim to be the 
best one within the field of political philosophy, see infra sections 1.4 and 1.5. 
41
 Two good examples of this tendency could be founded in Blanshard (1939) and BonJour (1976, 1986). 
Regarding Rawls, I would say that it is not clear if he could be described as a supporter both of 
coherentism and constructivism. I will try to clarify my position on this issue in the next chapter. 
42
 For a very well developed theory of this kind, see Brink, 1989. 
43
 Ivi, p. 7. 
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still defend a coherentist perspective regarding moral justification. The realist theory 
regarding the status of moral facts, and other connected beliefs, would be part of the 
coherent system that provide a sound justification – and also evidence – for this 
approach in moral theory. For example, according to Brink, realism is consistent with 
coherentism if “the second-order beliefs we accept are realist second-order beliefs. 
They are realist beliefs because they are beliefs about our relation to a world that though 
causally dependent on us in some ways, is metaphysically or conceptually independent 
of our evidence about it. […] The result is a theory of the world and our place in it that 
identifies certain features of the world that we reliably detect and explains why this 
should be so”44. 
 Defending coherentism implies being against the validity of the objectivism about 
justification thesis. Yet, the choice between realism and anti-realism is undetermined 
with regard to the establishment of coherentism as the best available theory of 
justification in ethics. Hence, even if coherentism can argue against the validity of 
objectivism about justification, the sceptical argument outlined in a form that is 
specifically at odds with coherentism, as recalls the no-contact with reality objection,  is 
still valid.  
 The solution that a moderate account of moral justification can provide for coping 
with sceptical scenarios is through an indirect strategy. An indirect strategy for facing 
this challenge would be to demonstrate not that coherentism is a strong and indubitable 
form of justification as it would be required under an ideal, and strongly committing, 
paradigm of epistemic justification. Rather, I think that it is possible to show that 
foundationalism itself is not such a reliable form of justification. If it is possible to 
argue against the infallibility of foundationalist justification, then defending 
coherentism against no contact with reality objection would be extremely easier. Instead 
that forcing coherentism to fit the “ideal epistemic justification” framework 
requirements - namely the necessary correlation between justification and warrant -, the 
indirect strategy gives us sound reason for criticizing these same requirements as too 
demanding and unrealistic under the perspective of moral epistemology. Thanks to this 
indirect strategy, a moderate approach would claim two important things: i. that 
foundationalism itself is not such a reliable form of justification; ii. that coherentism is 
                                                 
44
 Ivi, p. 127. 
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the most adequate approach for dealing with justification of moral principles under a 
moderate, nonideal, account. 
 
1.3  Epistemological Scepticism 
  
  As I have said, foundationalism, at first glance, may seem the most suitable 
theory of justification for coping with the sceptical challenge. Yet, this common sense 
endorsement of foundationalism as “best answer” to scepticism is justifiable just in the 
case that foundationalism can really uphold two thesis: 
 the truth of realism; 
 objectivism about justification. 
If these two positions are both true, then coherentism is false. Given that coherentism is 
a theory of justification that accounts for the kind of epistemic connections holding 
together an agent's beliefs, then the epistemic relation with the external world is never 
guaranteed. For this reason, a foundationalist account of justification that is based on 
non-inferential premises appears to be the only good option for coping with scepticism. 
Yet the only way in which foundationalism can grant that justification leads to objective 
indubitable truths is through a strong objective foundationalism. According to this 
version of foundationalism, every inferential justified belief must be inferred in a 
warranted way from foundational beliefs (that are self-justifying and therefore true). 
The only way for granting a warranted inference is through a deductive inference. 
Therefore, a strong objective foundationalism provides justifications made up by self-
justifying, and therefore infallible, beliefs and other deductively derived beliefs. 
According to Brink this form of foundationalism is possible, but is not appealing, since 
“if our justified beliefs are restricted to infallible beliefs and their deductive 
consequences, we are unlikely to be justified in most of our beliefs. Certainly we will be 
justified in none of our beliefs about the existence and nature of the external world”45.  
 The argument I have just presented for criticizing the position that foundationalism 
is the best answer to the sceptical challenge is not, theoretically speaking, strictly 
against the possibility of arguing in favour of foundationalism per se. Rather, it shows 
that a strong objective version of foundationalism, is not really attractive, given that 
very few beliefs would end up to be justified.  This argument can then be paired with a 
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 Ivi, p. 115. 
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second more stringent one that argues against the very possibility of having self-
justifying beliefs. 
 We have shown that foundationalism can grant objective truth just if it renounces 
to the possibility of engaging in the justification of many fundamental issues concerning 
our life. Indeed, as I have already discussed in the first section of this chapter, every 
theory of justification has to deal with the possibility of irreducible scepticism. In this 
regard, foundationalism may try to overcome the sceptical charge with two moves: 
i.  By drastically reducing the amount of beliefs that we can claim being justified; since 
it provides a very demanding notion of justification according to which are justified 
only beliefs that are infallible justified.  
ii. By claiming for the validity of objectivism about justification, foundationalism 
maintains that self-justified beliefs are also infallible. The truth of self-justifying beliefs 
is necessary, since self-justifying beliefs correspond to true warranted beliefs. 
Therefore, iii. Foundationalism can cope with sceptical scenarios arguing in favour of 
some basic beliefs that are not solely self-justified, but infallible as well.  
 The way in which foundationalism tries to overcome the impasse of absolute 
scepticism is through the fundamental role played within the procedure of justification 
by self-justifying beliefs. However, there are good reasons for criticizing the epistemic 
validity of these self-justifying beliefs. Indeed, according to Brink, “one cannot be 
justified in holding a belief p, even if p is in fact infallible, independently of any beliefs 
whatsoever about why p should be true (e.g., independently of belief that p is infallible). 
The mere fact that p must be true does not justify one in holding p”46. The insight here 
is that, again, there is an epistemic gap between the procedure for justifying a belief 
regarding the world and the attempt to assess whether such belief about the world is 
true
47
.   
 This critique provided by Brink recalls the already mentioned problem of the 
relationship that incurs between two aspects of justification: (a), the justification that 
concerns the good external reasons for holding a belief, and (b), the justification related 
                                                 
46
 Ivi, p. 118. It is worth noting that Sayre-McCord (1996, pp. 154-156) mentions the same argument 
naming it as the doxastic ascent. However, Sayre-McCord affirms that foundationalism is able to criticize 
this argument, whereas a second argument, the one he labels as epistemic ascent, is the correct one for 
demonstrating that foundationalism itself is unable to provide non-inferential justified beliefs. 
47
Regarding the reliability of observational experience, I want to recall a distinction provided by Bonjour 
(1986, ch. 6, pp. 111-138). The author distinguishes between two ways of being inferential: i. a belief 
could be inferential in its origin, as is justified through an inferential deduction; ii. an observational belief 
is non-inferential in its origin, but its justification is inferential, as the criteria for determining if a factual 
observation is reliable depend on inferential arguments. 
PhD Dissertation in Political Theory – XXV Cycle                                 PhD Candidate: Federica Liveriero  
Pag. 34 
 
to the internal reasons for an agent being justified in belief something. If we consider (a) 
and (b) as two parts of a unique procedure of justification, then the self-justifying 
beliefs are self-justifying concerning just (a) perspective. This critique is perfectly 
compatible with the historical fact that usually foundationalist theories have provided 
few arguments regarding the way in which self-justifying moral principles or truths can 
be grasped by moral agents. Focusing just on the intrinsic value of moral truths per se, 
without connecting this issue to that of moral agents’ reasons for being justified in 
holding such beliefs, entails important epistemic difficulties for every foundationalist 
theory.  
 Following Brink’s critiques of foundationalism, we can see that if you consider 
justification as a procedure that takes into account both doxastic and propositional 
justifications, then it is impossible to have justifications that are completely non-
inferential. Indeed, for me being justified in holding p (even if it is the case that p is a 
self-justifying belief and therefore compatible with a foundational approach) I have to 
hold other second-order beliefs about what kind of belief is p and why I have good 
reasons for considering p true. If Brink is right, as I think he is, then there is always an 
inferential side of justification that cannot be dismissed
48
. In this regard, it can be 
claimed that coherentism is a more adequate theory of justification than 
foundationalism, as coherentism gives us good reasons for considering justification (a) 
and (b) as part of the same whole structure of justification. It is impossible to have an 
exhaustive account of moral justification without one of the two. Given that the 
justification depends on the coherent and explicative connections among moral and 
nonmoral beliefs within a whole system of beliefs, it cannot be the case that a moral 
belief is justified per se, without any normative connection with agent’s other moral 
beliefs and intuitions
49
.  
 This argument has shown that the common sense attitude toward foundationalism 
in, at the end of the day, misleading. As a matter of fact, critics of coherentism sustain 
that coherentism is untenable, as it is unable to solve the sceptical challenge as, they 
say, a good foundational theory is able to do. The indirect strategy against these 
                                                 
48
 Another argument that Brink provides against self-justifying beliefs is that self-justification can be 
described as an extreme case of circular reasoning in which the justificatory circle is the smallest 
imaginable. See Brink, 1989, p. 116. Moreover, for a strictly epistemic articulation and defense of a 
coherentist paradigm, see Lehrer, 1974. 
49
 In the third chapter, where I will analyse deeply the concept of reflective equilibrium, this feature of 
coherentist moral justification will be fundamental. 
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criticism, then, hinges on an argument that shows that foundationalism itself is not so 
well-equipped for replying, once for all, to the possibility of sceptical scenarios. If 
foundationalism itself does not meet the demanding epistemic requirements that would 
be necessary for coping one for all with every sceptical challenge, then it is reasonable 
to ask why it should be preferred over coherentism. Hence, the indirect strategy aims to 
show that foundationalism is not more well-equipped than coherentism when they have 
to face sceptical scenarios. For this reason, it is worth to spend some time analysing 
how coherentism can face sceptical scenarios. 
 Coherentism is a theory of justification that maintains the validity of the procedure 
of justification, without claiming in favour of its irresistibility. Given that our access to 
the world is always mediated, coherentism strategy against radical scepticism is to reject 
the statement, that foundationalism necessarily should support, that justified beliefs 
must be true. Following this moderate approach, we can argue that the objectivism 
about justification overestimates the relevance of the connection between justification 
and truth. Recalling the distinction between a justified belief and a warranted belief, it 
should be now clear that for the objectivism about justification it cannot be the case that 
a justified belief is not at the same time also warranted. I have provided sound 
arguments against this claim, showing that even for foundational theories is extremely 
difficult, form the epistemic perspective, to bridge the gap between justification and 
warrant in a definitive way. Yet, I still need to show that a coherentist paradigm can 
face the no contact with reality objection. If we want to take seriously the sceptical 
challenge
50
, then we need to prove that a coherent system of belief is not just a 
consistent system, as it provides evidential reasons for believing that the coherent 
system of beliefs is not completely detached from the factual world. Furthermore, a 
coherent procedure of justification has to give us discriminatory reasons in favour of 
some beliefs instead than others, in the case that both the subsets of beliefs are 
consistent with the whole system
51
. In order to solve these problems, coherent theories 
                                                 
50
 I want to recall that according to Brink (1989, p.33) constructivism constitutes a “sceptical solution” to 
the sceptical challenge, as constructivism tries to argue that the same possibility of having sceptical 
scenarios is invalid. 
51
 Recalling the example of the difference between astronomy and astrology, it is important noting that a 
sound epistemic procedure of justification should be able to provide reasons in favour of the fact that: i. 
astrology could be supported by a consistent system of beliefs, yet there are not evidential connections 
between these beliefs and the external world; ii. there are good reasons for preferring astronomy over 
astrology as a general theory that account for astronomical phenomena. 
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need to highlight the fundamental role played by second order beliefs within the 
procedure of justification
52
. According to this scheme, we can distinguish among: 
 first-order beliefs about features of the world external to us; 
 second-order beliefs that regard the relationship between the first order beliefs and 
the world. 
As we have seen before in developing the argument against the possibility of having 
pure non-inferential justified beliefs, the second-order beliefs play a fundamental role 
within the procedure of justification. The second-order beliefs connect among them 
beliefs at different levels of generality and provide sound reasons for considering our 
first-order beliefs as reliable. Second-order beliefs include beliefs about different issues: 
as, for example, beliefs about ourselves as moral agents, beliefs about scientific 
theories, beliefs about our belief-formation mechanisms, and so on
53
. Second-order 
beliefs provide explanatory reasons in favour of the acceptance of first-order beliefs
54
. 
Of course, even the second-order beliefs must be justified and, again, the way in which 
they are justified is through their coherent connections with other second-order beliefs. 
 I have argued in favour of coherentism because I think that a moderate approach in 
moral epistemology that averts a necessary epistemic connection between justification 
and truth is the best choice. Moreover, the only good reason I can see for preferring 
foundationalism over coherentism is that foundationalism might result to be able to 
better coping with the sceptic challenge. However, I have already shown that 
foundationalism is not able to deal successfully with the sceptical challenge as its 
defenders argue. Yet, coherentism itself seems unable to cope with scepticism, given the 
                                                 
52
 “We not only hold beliefs about tables and chairs, the sun and the stars; we also hold beliefs about the 
technique of acquiring beliefs”. Blanshard, 1939, p. 285, italics in the original. See also M. Williams 
(1980, p. 248, emphasis added): “By ‘epistemic beliefs’ I mean beliefs about beliefs. Our epistemic 
beliefs include beliefs about techniques for acquiring and rejecting beliefs, beliefs about the conditions 
under which beliefs of  certain kind are likely to be true, and so on. The importance of epistemic beliefs 
can be brought out if you look at beliefs based on observation. Philosophers who claim that knowledge 
needs foundation think that these foundations must include beliefs based on observation and this means 
that some observation beliefs must be intrinsically credible. A much more credible view is that our 
attitude toward beliefs based on observation reflects some very general epistemic beliefs about the 
reliability of human observation, the conditions under which perceptual error is likely and other beliefs of 
this kind”. 
53
 This description of second-order beliefs is deeply connected with the role played by the background 
theories in the justificatory procedure of the reflective equilibrium. I will provide a definition of the 
background theories in the third chapter when I will introduce the difference between narrow reflective 
equilibrium and wide reflective equilibrium. See infra section 3.2.1. 
54
 For example, some second-order beliefs regarding scientific theories of universe are good reasons for 
supporting astronomy, instead that astrology, as coherent system of beliefs regarding the study of celestial 
objects. 
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possibility that all our beliefs are coherent among themselves, but still all of them false. 
As Brink perfectly points out:  
“These sceptical possibilities are real, but they bear on our knowledge claims, not our 
justification claims. Sceptical possibilities make the truth of our knowledge claims (or at 
least those subject to sceptical doubt) contingent. If we are brains in vats or the 
playthings of Cartesian demons induced to have beliefs with which realist second-order 
beliefs cohere, then we cannot have knowledge, because knowledge implies true belief. 
But we can nonetheless have justified beliefs”55. 
 
 Is a scenario in which our beliefs are justified, even if the sceptical threat is always 
at hand, an acceptable possibility from the epistemic perspective? By now it should be 
clear that every theory of justification has to face the possibility that a scenario as the 
one of the Cartesian demon could be true. However, taking epistemological scepticism 
seriously does not imply that we have to reject any attempt to build up a satisfactory 
theory of justification. This is exactly what coherentism tries to do. It takes the sceptical 
challenge seriously, whereas theories of justification that affirm that objectivism about 
justification is true reject every genuine sceptical scenario as false. Moreover, 
coherentism is a theory of justification that, being holistic, allows for readjustment and 
modification in order to resolve internal contradictions occurring among some beliefs 
within the coherent system. For these reasons, I consider coherentism as a much more 
flexible theory than foundationalism, as infinite readjustments are always possible. 
Coherent system is made up by explicatory relations among beliefs of different levels 
and when we have to face an internal inconsistency, it is possible to analyse the 
different first and second order beliefs for deciding which belief might be modified or 
erased in order to reach a new coherent equilibrium. This work in progress procedure of 
readjustment and mutual balancing among different beliefs is a never ending enterprise 
as well as an undetermined. We can provide sound epistemic methods for facing 
inconsistency; nevertheless the procedure is never predetermined by the theory, as the 
coherent system shows its validity just in the actual attempt to achieve coherence, not in 
a foundational argument that precedes every other development of the theory itself. 
 Of course, the fact that coherentism takes epistemological scepticism seriously 
implies that the attained coherence is always under scrutiny and that the “maximal 
coherence” goal is more a regulative ideal, than a realistic goal56. I hold that the fact that 
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 Brink, 1989, p. 129. 
56
 This feature will be fundamental when I will analyse reflective equilibrium; see infra sections 3.1 and 
3.2.  
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the epistemic enterprise of reaching coherence is never solved once for all is a virtue of 
this paradigm, rather than a flaw. Indeed, I will argue in favour of a work in progress 
perspective regarding political justification, as the intrinsic revisability of publicly 
justified principles is a fundamental aspect of the nonideal approach I want to defend.  
 In the next chapters I will analyse the value of coherentism as the best theory 
available for accounting the issue of moral disagreement. For the moment, it worth 
noting that the flexibility of the coherent procedure of justification, through ceaseless 
readjustments and balancing acts opens up the theoretical possibility of managing moral 
disagreement. In order to understand this last statement is necessary to reintroduce the 
sceptical argument with whom coherentism seems to run afoul with. According to this 
argument, 
i. If we are to answer sceptical doubts, justified beliefs must rule out sceptical 
scenarios. 
ii. Hence, justified beliefs must be true. 
iii. Purely inferential accounts of justification cannot ensure contact with reality. 
iv. Hence, purely inferential accounts of justification cannot ensure that justified beliefs 
are true. 
v. Coherentism is a purely inferential account of justification. 
 
vi. Therefore, coherentism cannot answer sceptical doubts. 
 
 After a quite long survey, it should be now clear that the coherent indirect strategy 
involves to reject the sentence [i] in order, then, to reject sentence [ii]. Rejecting the fact 
that justified beliefs must be true, indeed, is the major consequences of the moderate 
epistemology account I am defending in this chapter
57
. However, the argument that can 
be defended by coherentism proceeds, firstly, from the rejection of the idea that: [i] if 
we are to answer skeptical doubts, justified beliefs must rule out skeptical scenarios.  
 A moderate epistemology, coupled with a coherentist account of the justificatory 
procedure, defends a fallibilist intuition with regard to the epistemic status of our 
knowledge. Indeed, if we assume that all our beliefs are inferential and that therefore the 
agent’s perspective is always part of a sound account of the procedure of moral 
justification, then our account of objectivity should seriously take into consideration the 
role played by the deliberative performances of the agents. In this regard, a moderate 
account of epistemology does not argue against the possibility of having objective true 
moral statements. Nevertheless, this same account in aware of the intrinsic subject-ive 
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 “We avoid scepticism by constructing a theory of justification without a guarantee of truth”, Lehrer, 
1974, p. 239. 
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aspect of our epistemic processes. Subject-ive is a term introduced by Peter Railton in 
order “to express the notion of that which is essential connected with the existence or 
experience of subjects, i.e., beings possessing minds and point of view, being capable of 
forming thoughts and intentions”58. The fact that our knowledge is intrinsically subject-
ive – as implies doxastic states – does not mean that it cannot be still objective59. Yet, 
the “subjective-ity side” of the knowledge is the aspect of coherentism that is criticized 
by the non-contact with reality objection. Indeed, if our notion of objectivity is partly 
mind-dependent, as depends on the mutual explanatory support among different beliefs 
that are held by moral agents, then the possibility of being wrong is always an option at 
stake
60
. In this regard, the fundamental sceptical challenge I have in mind is an 
epistemic sceptical thesis, rather than an ontological one. The former thesis maintains 
that even if there are ethical truths, still we cannot know with absolute certainty what 
they are, given our imperfect epistemic abilities. On the other hand, the ontological 
sceptical thesis claims that the relevant point is not our ability to establish or not ethical 
truths, since they do not exist
61
. In my opinion, the sceptical challenge that is relevant is 
the epistemic one, as it criticizes the actual epistemic ability of moral agents to claim for 
the existence of ethical truths. What is relevant, therefore, is not whether these truths 
exist or not. Rather, the question concerns how much objectivity can be reached in 
moral reasoning, starting from the intrinsic epistemic imperfection ascribed to the whole 
category of moral agents. This kind of epistemic scepticism is relevant as it tells us not 
that our beliefs are false, but that they might be false. The sceptical challenge implies 
that if we want to take scepticism seriously, then we have to claim in favour of an 
evidence that is intrinsically fallible. Consequently, a scalar account of objectivity is the 
most adequate for dealing with the assessment of or moral knowledge. A moral theory 
could be objective, but this notion of objectivity somehow reflects and incorporates a 
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 Railton, 1995, p. 263. 
59
 “Beliefs are fundamentally subject-ive, given their jobs, but it must be kept in mind that the sense of 
‘subject-ive’ is technical and stipulative. It is opposed not to ‘objective’, but to ‘object-ive’, that is, 
having to do essentially with nonsubject-ive entities – entities that lack a mind or point of view, entities 
that are not a locus of experience or intention. Knowledge, for example, is by its nature subject-ive since 
it involves belief. But though it therefore cannot be object-ive, it might well be objective”, ivi, p. 270. 
60
 “Not only does a coherentist treat each belief as open to revision in light of others, she recognizes also 
that even a fully coherent and so wonderfully justified, set of beliefs might turn out to be false. 
Justification's link to truth, such as it is, is not provided by coherence itself, but instead by the evidential 
relations that bind beliefs together into coherent sets. Thus the theory makes good sense of how we can 
look back on our own earlier beliefs as having been justified and yet now justifiably thought wrong” 
Sayre-McCord (1996, p. 178). 
61
 For a deeper analysis of this difference, see Feldman, 2002. 
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fallibilist account of our epistemic perspective
62
. A moral theory could be objective to 
the extent that its justified principles are at least fallibly (and less than infallibly) 
justified
63
. Therefore, a moderate account of epistemology replies to the sceptical 
challenges defending the possibility of having objective true and false statements and 
yet, this same model does not ruled out any sceptical possibility as intrinsically wrong. 
This epistemic modesty recognizes the fact that given the intrinsically subject-ive status 
of our epistemic strategies, our justification in holding beliefs does not guarantee truth. 
There are degrees of justification in holding a beliefs and the objective “certainty” we 
can reach is always mitigated by the recognition of the fact that we cannot reject every 
sceptical scenario as indubitably false. 
 This moderate approach, sustaining a fallibilist framework, establishes a procedure 
of justification that is intrinsically pluralistic and that allows revisions along the 
deliberative procedure itself. In this regard, this moderate approach is utterly nonideal, 
as refuses to recognize any special epistemic status to some seemingly basic, self-
justified, beliefs which alleged validity depends on moral reasons that are completely 
detached from our doxastic system as moral agents. This epistemic modesty, coupled 
with a general fallibilist framework, is the most important feature of the moderate 
epistemic view when such view is applied to the moral domain. Indeed, this model is 
able to account for moral disagreement, while still refuting relativism as a correct 
description of the moral realm. In order to explain this insight thoroughly, in the next 
sections I shall introduce some strictly political issues that can be articulated and  solved 
in a specific way, thanks to the moderate epistemic account I have defended in this first 
part of the chapter. 
 
 
1.4   Political Realm: the Reasons in Favour of a Nonideal Justification 
 
1.4.1 Metaphysical Austerity 
                                                 
62
 Baron Reed (2002, p. 144) states that different forms of fallibilism yield two thesis: 
“(FK1) S fallibly knows that p =df (1) S knows that p on the basis of justification  j and yet (2) S’s belief 
that p on the basis of j could have been false. 
(FK2) S fallibly knows that p =df (1) S knows that p on the basis of justification j even though (2) j does 
not entail that S’s belief that p is true”. 
63
 This notion of objectivity is strictly connected with an epistemic account of justification according to 
which we have an epistemic justification of a belief when we can provide a good argument that would 
make such a belief more, rather than less, rationally well supported or established. 
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  “If Waldo holds a moral belief p, he must think that p is true and that 
contradictory moral beliefs are false. Belief p is a first-order belief. But Waldo can also 
hold a second-order belief (that is, a belief about his first-order beliefs) that some of his 
moral beliefs, possibly including p, are mistaken”64. 
 
 This quote helps me to introduce a new argument, namely the determination of a 
correct procedure of justification within the realm of political philosophy. Until now I 
have provided different arguments in order to defend a moderate account of moral 
justification. According to this model, coherentism is the correct account of the 
structure of justification that can be defined as adequate for moral deliberation. 
Moreover, coherentism is consistent with a general fallibilist paradigm with regard to 
the objective epistemic status of the moral discourse. The quote by Brink show exactly 
this point: a coherentist account of moral justification is compatible with a fallible status 
of the moral evidence that support the justified beliefs. This epistemic modesty is 
extremely important when political matters are at stake. Firstly, this cautious epistemic 
account is able to explain why moral disagreement arises and, moreover, to define it as 
tractable. Secondly, this model highlights the subject-ive aspects of moral knowledge. 
These features are fundamental aspects of a paradigm of justification that is defined as 
nonideal. 
 I define this paradigm as nonideal in order to distinguish it from those paradigms, 
committed to a non-moderate epistemology, according to which moral discourse is 
objective and can be grounded thanks to a foundational argument that refers to moral 
truths. Very often, indeed, the attempt to defend the objectivity of moral discourse is 
coupled with an argument if favour of moral realism. Following this approach, an 
argument with regard to the semantic status of the moral discourse (viz. the claim that 
moral beliefs are propositional and that can be defined as true or false) is connected 
with an argument about the metaphysical status of moral facts (i.e. determining if moral 
facts exist and in the case they do, determining which kind of act they are)
 65
. By 
contrast, the arguments that I developed in the previous sections were focused on 
epistemic issues, rather than on metaphysical analyses. For, I think that a nonideal 
paradigm in moral and political philosophy might be defined as an approach that “takes 
an austere approach to moral metaphysics yet attempts to remain faithful to moral 
                                                 
64
 Brink, 1989, p. 94. 
65
 A good example of this ideal attempt can be provided by Platonism in ethics, “which says we are 
equipped to apprehend ethical truths that hold independently of what we ourselves are like” (Darwall, 
Gibbard and Railton, 1192, p. 141). 
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phenomenology”66. On the one hand, being austere with regard to moral metaphysics 
implies eschewing a strictly metaphysical inquiry with regard to the determination of 
the ontological status of moral facts. On the other hand, yet, being faithful to moral 
phenomenology means that we are committed to the ordinary practice of moral 
discourse according to which moral beliefs have a propositional content and can be 
defined as objectively true or false
67
.  
 The kind of nonideal paradigm I am outlining, then, is deeply committed to an 
epistemic analysis, more than to a metaphysical inquiry. Actually, this same 
metaphysical austerity is one of the fundamental reason for defining such an account as 
strictly nonideal. For, the “nonideality” of this account rests on the fact that it looks 
more for the practical side of political philosophy, rather than for the foundational one. 
It is important to highlight that there is nothing intrinsically wrong with the foundational 
inquiry both in moral and political philosophy. Yet, I believe that in order to deal with 
the fact of disagreement - a fact I will explain deeply later on – metaphysical austerity 
might be an advisable attitude.  
 Consistently with the arguments developed in the previous sections, this nonideal 
paradigm upholds a moderate epistemic view
68
. Such epistemic view defends 
coherentism as the best account of our justificatory procedure with regard to moral and 
political beliefs. Moreover, this moderate epistemology defends fallibilism as general 
paradigm and highlights the relevance of the doxastic presupposition for moral 
deliberation. Finally, it is relevant to add an important distinction, introduced by Dale 
Dorsey
69
, about two different senses of objectivity: 
a. an ontological thesis according to which there are objects or real properties out there 
to which ethical truths correspond; 
                                                 
66
 Horgan and Timmons, 2006, p. 220. 
67
 In this regard, Peter Railton (1995, p. 259) claims: “Perhaps, then, morality is different but moral 
discourse as such is not. And perhaps our willingness to talk in terms of moral properties and facts simply 
registers our readiness to apply the terms ‘true’ and ‘false’ to moral judgements. As such, it might be 
considered innocent of any significant metaphysical implications. Its real basis would be seen as lying in 
our discursive practices in morality, our tendencies to deliberate and disagree in distinctive ways - to 
make arguments, to insist upon consistency, to adduce evidence, and so on, Beyond this, no purported 
insight into the real composition of the world is claimed”. 
68
 Habermas (1996, p. xli) states that a serious analysis of the human way of reasoning should uphold a 
nonideal account: “Yet modernity, now aware of its contingencies, depends all the more on a procedural 
reason, that is, on a reason that puts itself on trial. The critique of reason is its own work: this double 
meaning, first displayed by Immanuel Kant, is due to the radically anti-Platonic insight that there is 
neither a higher nor a deeper reality to which we could appeal — we who find ourselves already situated 
in our linguistically structured forms of life”. 
69
 Dorsey, 2006, pp. 511-512. 
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b. an ordinary practice of morality objectivity that refutes the ontological disputes and 
merely claim “that every moral sentence has a determinate status, true or false, and this 
status is applicable to all interlocutors. Moral disputes, in principle, can be settled”. 
A nonideal approach of the kind I am outlining would defend the second meaning of 
objectivity as the most adequate for dealing with the justification of political matters. It 
is important to clarify that claiming so does not imply the refusal of the ontological 
thesis as irrelevant or misguiding. Rather, my point is that different fields of research 
require a differentiation with regard to the determination of fundamental goals. The 
ontological thesis is a fundamental topic with regard to the determination of the 
objective or non-objective status of any human discourse. Yet, I think that when we are 
dealing with political philosophy, rather than, for example, with the epistemic discourse 
on the appraisal of physical objects, the role played by objectivity it is not necessarily 
the same. The fact that I claim for a flexibility in the determination of epistemic 
categories as well as in the articulation of fundamental philosophical goals when 
dealing with different realms could be seen as a flaw of the whole argumentative 
structure. Again, I consider this attitude, a sort of sensibility with regard to the 
requirements and expectations that derive from different philosophical realms, as a 
positive feature of a nonideal approach in  political philosophy. 
 To conclude, the nonideal approach I want to defend can be summarized through 
different propositions: 
 it is possible to achieve a sound justification of moral beliefs and principles, even 
avoiding reference to any foundational beliefs; 
 it is possible to account for genuine and strong disagreement, given that agent 
evaluative perspective is always part of the procedure of justification; 
 the procedure of justification can be described as a work in progress enterprise, 
given that – at least theoretically –  it is always possible to claim in favour of 
further improvements, or revisions, of our coherent system of beliefs; 
 it is possible to claim that beliefs and principles are objective, where this notion of 
objectivity hinges on the intrinsic normativity attached to the “epistemic 
correctness” criteria that are employed in the assessment of the validity of our 
moral practice of deliberation. In this regard, this notion of objectivity 
underdetermines the choice between different accounts of the metaphysical status 
of moral facts and therefore meets the requirement of metaphysical austerity. 
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1.4.2 Two Models of Liberalism 
  Political philosophy is a subset of moral theory in which moral principles are 
applied to a specific area of human interactions, namely the domain of political 
institutions. The main goal of political philosophy is to articulate, justify and support 
principles of justice that can shape the structure of a political community determining 
how we ought to live together. Being an intersubjective enterprise, political philosophy 
should address the issue of justification in a very serious way, as from an ideal point of 
view, political principles might be justifiable with the regard to all the citizens of a 
specific moral community. However, I introduced different epistemic reasons that help 
us understanding why it is so complicated for a political theory to theorize a 
convergence of all citizens on a specific conception of political justice. As a matter of 
fact, fallibilism as well as the doxastic presupposition provide us with sound reasons for 
taking disagreement seriously. 
 Liberalism is the approach in political philosophy that more than other has been 
able, historically, to account for and try to mitigate the fact of political disagreement. 
Indeed, the liberal theory has been articulated as a development of the doctrine of 
toleration that constitutes the pragmatic solution to the religious wars that hit Europe 
between 16
th
 and 17
th
 centuries. Hence, the fact of disagreement and the attempt to deal 
with it in a publicly justified way constitutes one of fundamental benchmarks of liberal 
paradigm. 
 Contemporary theories of liberalism claim that the first goal of political institutions 
is to provide a strong endorsement of civil and personal liberties as well as a basic 
structure of society that promotes equality among citizens
70
. Moreover, political 
institutions should respect a strong commitment toward a normative notion of political 
legitimacy
71
. According to this notion of legitimacy, no political regime is legitimate 
                                                 
70
 Liberalism is a theory that has been developed starting from the political works of authors such as 
Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant. Regarding the definition of liberalism as a political theory whose pivotal 
values are freedom and equality, we can quote Kant from On the Common Saying: ‘This May be True in 
Theory, but it does not Apply in Practice’ ([1793], 1991, p. 74): “The civil state, regarded purely as a 
lawful state, is based on the following a priori principles: 
1. The freedom of every member of society as a human being. 
2. The equality of each with all the other as a subject. 
3. The independence of each member of a commonwealth as a citizen”. 
71
 This strong commitment toward a normative notion of legitimacy is due to the fact that, within a liberal 
system, every coercion should be ideally justified in the name of safeguarding the freedom and the 
equality of citizens. In this regard, Kant’s words are extremely clear: “No-one can compel me to be happy 
in accordance with his conception of the welfare of the others, for each may seek his happiness in 
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unless it can demonstrate its ability of obtaining assent by all who are affected by the 
laws of this regime. Therefore, the first goal for political liberalism is to provide 
theoretical support for a political framework that should be able to maintain justice and 
stability inside the society, gaining a consensus that is independent from the use of 
coercion
72
. In this regard, any attempt to justify liberalism has at least to deal with two 
close issues: i. the search for sound arguments in favour of the validity of specific 
principles of justice; ii. the concrete analysis of how such principles might be respected 
and supported by the citizens that are subjected to these principles themselves. 
These two activities express the difference that obtains between the two forms of 
justification introduced by Scanlon. Indeed, providing a sound, may be top-down, 
argument for justifying political principles represents a justification that takes into 
consideration just the good and sufficient reasons that are available for supporting the 
principles. However, the principle of legitimation compels the general liberal theory to 
focus its analysis on the citizens doxastic perspective as well. As a matter of fact, it is 
not sufficient to provide sound arguments for supporting a principle of justice, since it is 
also fundamental to look at the actual possibility that every citizen might support such 
principle as justified with regard to the beliefs that she happens to hold in her doxastic 
system. A theory of justice justified independently from what citizens believe with 
regard to justice probably would not pass the legitimacy test. In this regard, liberalism 
risks falling into a dilemma. On the one hand, in fact, liberalism should provide a 
justification of its core principles that is not relativized to the actual consent of citizens, 
otherwise all the normative force of the argument would be lost. On the other hand, 
however, liberal theory should also take into consideration the political intuitions and 
beliefs held by citizens, as liberalism usually tries to adhere to an ideal of inclusiveness 
and therefore should meet citizens expectations
73
. 
                                                                                                                                               
whatever way he sees fit, so long as he does not infringe upon the freedom of others to pursue a similar 
end which can be reconciled with the freedom of everyone else within a workable general law - i.e. he 
must accord to others the same right as he enjoys himself” (Kant, [ 1793], 1991, p.74). 
72
 In this regard, Rawls (1993, p. 137) claims that : “our exercise of political power is fully proper only 
when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free and equal 
may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to their common 
human reason. This is the liberal principle of legitimacy. […] Only a political conception of justice that 
all citizens might be reasonably expected to endorse can serve as a basis of public reason and 
justification”. 
73
 Regarding this apparent dilemma, see Rawls (1993, p. 216) when he affirms that: “I now turn to what 
to many is a basic difficulty with the idea of public reason, one that makes it seems paradoxical. They 
ask: why should citizens in discussing and voting on the most fundamental political questions honor the 
limits of public reason? How can it be either reasonable or rational, when basic matters are at stake, for 
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 The dilemma derives from the dialectic tension between individual reasons for 
supporting a political regime and political publicly justified arguments for justify the 
legitimacy of such regime. Indeed, the more liberalism tries to respect an ecumenical 
ideal (viz. the attempt to justify liberalism to as much people as possible), the more it is 
constrained to avoid reference to normatively committing arguments that can result to 
be incompatible with many personal beliefs held by citizens. I will analyse the issue of 
the dilemma of liberalism and propose a possible solution to it in the next chapter. 
Meanwhile, it is important to understand which is the theoretical connection between 
these issues and the coherentist method of justification. I hold that coherentism and the 
moderate epistemic view that I have paired with it provides us with a good method for 
answering to this question: how can liberalism maintain a balance between the claim 
that its principles should be preferred over others as they are better political principles 
and the commitment to respect the varied conceptions of life supported by citizens in 
the contemporary multicultural societies? This issue concerns the legitimacy of political 
power and the possibility that liberal democracies may find the correct way for 
justifying their coercive actions without falling into self-contradiction. Indeed, if 
liberalism imposes liberal principles of justice without looking for the possibility of 
justifying such principles with regard to the doxastic sets of beliefs held by citizens, 
then liberalism turns out to be, after all, an illiberal approach. In this regard, the issue of 
justification is a fundamental one, as within the political domain is relevant not just that 
a political principle might be justified, rather is fundamental the way in which the 
justification is produced and which arguments and intuitions are provided and discussed 
during the deliberation. Being an intersubjective enterprise, the procedure of 
justification of political principles should submit to some epistemic and practical 
constraints specific of the political domain. Liberalism, in fact, attempts to create an 
impartial point of view that manages to treat all equally. The difficulty then becomes to 
remove from the public deliberation any argument that can be defined as partisan, as it 
is supported by a specific group of interest and it is opposed by the rest of the citizens. 
 The fundamental issue at stake for theories of liberalism in the last twenty years 
has been the recognition of fundamental role played by disagreement within the 
deliberative procedure for justifying political principles. While between the seventies 
                                                                                                                                               
citizens to appeal only to a public conception of justice and not to the whole truth as they see it? Surely, 
the most fundamental questions should be settled by appealing to the most important truths, yet these may 
far transcend public reason!”. 
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and the nineties, the most relevant issue was to build up and justify sound distributive 
theories of justice for a political community
74
, since the nineties the crucial issue has 
become pluralism. Rawls, for example, has described the growing disagreement and 
tension in contemporary, multicultural democracy as the “fact of pluralism”75. 
Disagreement regarding moral views is a permanent feature of our contemporary 
multicultural world. Starting from pluralism as a “fact” of contemporary multicultural 
societies, contemporary liberal theories try to justify their authority and legitimacy, 
notwithstanding a deep and persistent disagreement among citizens. In order to deal 
with the issue of irreducible pluralism, usually liberal theories have provided two 
different answers: a. the discontinuist/neutral answer
76
 and b. the 
continuistic/comprehensive answer
77
. 
a.  The discontinuist/political answer maintains that liberalism cannot any more claim 
that a specific moral theory is the true one, deriving the principles of justice from such 
moral theory, as political consensus cannot be based on any particular moral doctrine 
that is not shared by everyone. In this regard, the discontinuist/neutral stance is close to 
the historic tradition of liberalism, given that liberal neutrality is a concept that has been 
developed together with liberalism itself, starting from the recognition of the pragmatic 
relevance of the principle of tolerance for solving the European wars of religion. 
However, the traditional neutral liberal approach has to face different challenges. First 
of all, many critics claim that a strictly political liberalism is not able to provide a sound 
and full justification of its normative principles. Secondly, political liberalism is 
described as too weak for dealing successfully with the moral disagreement of our 
                                                 
74
 Rawls (1971), Nozick (1974), Walzer (1981), Dworkin (1981), Sen (1992).  
75
 “Under the political and social conditions secured by the bask rights and liberties of free institutions, a 
diversity of conflicting and irreconcilable - and what's more, reasonable - comprehensive doctrines will 
come about and persist if such diversity does not already obtain”, Rawls (1993, p. 36). 
76
 Ackerman (1983), Larmore (1996, 2008), Rawls (1985, 1993). 
77
 Dworkin (1988b, 2000) is the thinker that introduces this theoretical distinction; however other 
philosophers, as Galston (1980) and Raz (1986), may be counted as liberal continuists. Dworkin (1988b, 
p. 208) defines the two strategies in this way: “Both strategies try to find reasons that people who are 
engaged and committed in their private lives have for taking up the neutral and austere political 
perspective of liberalism. Both aim to show how people of diverse substantive ethical convictions can 
unite in liberal politics. The difference lies in the attitude each encourages people to take toward these 
convictions. Discontinuity, exemplified in the social contract tradition, asks them to regard the most 
profound and abstract of these – those Rawls describes as forming a comprehensive ethical view – not as 
abandoned or renounced but rather as bracketed or set aside in political occasions. […] The strategy of 
continuity assumes, on the contrary, that all one’s ethical convictions are available in politics, that liberal 
politics follow not from setting some of these aside but on the contrary on  from giving full effect to the 
most comprehensive and philosophical convictions among them. On this view, ethics and politics are 
intertwined so that some of the most far-reaching questions about the character of the good life are 
political questions too”. 
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multicultural societies. Finally, a lot of thinkers argue against the possibility (practical 
or epistemic) of affirming a deep discontinuity between personal strong moral 
convictions and political principles. 
b.  The continuist/comprehensive solutions, instead, maintain that liberalism should be 
developed in the terms of a comprehensive moral doctrine tout court, otherwise it would 
lack the necessary normative force. According to this perspective, sound principles of 
justice can only stem from moral ideals of good life that are justified through the 
reference to a specific moral comprehensive doctrine. In this regard, according to a 
continuist perspective, the right (determined by the principles of justice) and the good 
(determined by our personal comprehensive doctrines) can both be part of a coherent 
theory accounting for both. 
  These two strategies reply in completely opposite way to the dilemma of 
liberalism. On the one hand, the discontinuist/neutral model tries to achieve an 
agreement on political principles as broader as possible among citizens, thanks to a 
procedure of justification that averts any reference to values that are not strictly 
political. On the other hand, the constinuist/comprehensive paradigm evaluates as more 
relevant the normativity horn of the dilemma, to wit, the fact that a substantive theory of 
justice should provide justificatory arguments that appeal to the strong and more 
committing moral values available.  
 I believe that both these strategies show something true about political justification 
and yet, both of them are too extreme in their conclusions. The discontinuist/neutral 
approach is right in trying to be faithful toward the inclusiveness ideal. Still, a 
completely neutral account of political deliberation would dismiss many important 
reasons and arguments as non-neutral, losing therefore argumentative power and 
normative strength. By contrast, the continuist/comprehensive model correctly highlight 
the fact that is not reasonable to provide a neutral justification of political principles that 
is completely at odds with the comprehensive set of values held by citizens. However, a 
continuist/comprehensive practice of political deliberation seriously risks to became 
illiberal, as it would hinge on reasons and values that some citizens might consider as 
parochial.  
 In this work I defend a perspective about liberalism that, in the wake of Rawls’ 
works, can be defined as political liberalism. This kind of liberalism stems from the 
discontinuist/neutral model, rather than from continuistic/comprehensive one. Indeed, 
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the term “political” means that this kind of liberalism provides a theory that deliberately 
forgoes many discussions that are connected to political issues, but not necessarily 
derived from them
78
. In this regard, a political liberalism is intrinsically and deliberately 
neutral with regard to many fundamental philosophical issues, e.g. the ontological status 
of moral fact; the existence of God; the intrinsic value attached to a specific conception 
of good and so on
79
. However, the political account of liberalism is not strictly 
coincident with the discontinuist/neutral view, as this latter view accepts disagreement 
as a given fact and it simply tries to provide a justification of a “political module” that 
can be accepted by any person, no matter which are her personal values and beliefs. By 
contrast, political liberalism is neutral with regard to many not strictly political aspects 
of moral deliberation, and yet it argues in favour of the possibility that every citizen 
might achieve a convergence among her comprehensive values
80
 and the political ones. 
The recognition of the fact of pluralism as an intrinsic fact of contemporary 
multicultural democracies deeply modifies our way to articulate and justify a theory of 
justice. Still, a political account does not give up neither the possibility of providing a 
substantial justification of its tenets or the attempt to find a conciliation – not necessary, 
but extremely relevant – between political and non-political values. 
 Political liberalism is closer to the discontinuist/neutraul view, but it also agrees 
with the continuistic/comprehensive model that the relevance of the whole system of 
values endorsed by different citizens cannot be dismissed. In this regard, the moderate 
epistemic view that I have articulated provides us with a good support in order to 
develop a political model of justification that might be a sort of “middle way” between 
                                                 
78
 Rawls, for example, claims that political theory should be independent form epistemological and 
metaphysical analyses. “Thus, to formulate such a conception, we apply the principle of toleration to 
philosophy itself: the public conception of justice is to be political, not metaphysical”, Rawls, 1985, p. 
223. 
79
 “The state is not to do anything intended to favor or promote any particular comprehensive doctrine 
rather than another, or to give greater assistance to those who pursue it”, Rawls, 1993, p. 193. 
80
 “Assume first that reasonable persons affirm only reasonable comprehensive doctrines. Now we need a 
definition of such doctrines. They have three main features. One is that a reasonable doctrine is an 
exercise of theoretical reason: it covers the major religious, philosophical, and moral aspects of human 
life in a more or less consistent and coherent manner. It organizes and characterizes recognized values so 
that they are compatible with one another and express an intelligible view of the world. Each doctrine will 
do this in ways that distinguish it from other doctrines, for example, by giving certain values a particular 
primacy and weight In singling out which values to count as especially significant and how to balance 
them when they conflict, a reasonable comprehensive doctrine is also an exercise of practical reason. 
Both theoretical and practical reason (including as appropriate the rational) are used together in its 
formulation. Finally, a third feature is that while a reasonable comprehensive view is not necessarily fixed 
and unchanging, it normally belongs to, or draws upon, a tradition of thought and doctrine. Although 
stable over time, and not subject to sudden and unexplained changes, it tends to evolve slowly in the light 
of what, from its point of view, it sees as good and sufficient reasons”, Rawls, 1993, p. 59 
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these two paradigms. Indeed, a fallibilist approach, when coupled with a coherentist 
epistemology, is exactly the kind of general paradigm that provides us with a good 
strategy for dealing with disagreement. As a matter of fact, a coherentist procedure of 
justification, especially when anchored to fallibilism, provides us with a deliberative 
structure that is intrinsically open to reform and revision. Fallibilism shows us that 
when we disagree with another person, or even when some of our beliefs are in 
contraposition with each other, it is possible that such inconsistency is due to our 
fallible performance in deliberating. Therefore, sustaining the validity of a fallibilist 
perspective allows us to stress the work in progress structure of the intersubjective 
enterprise of establishing a public justification of political issues. It is the confrontation 
with other people’s beliefs that show us what it could be missing or went wrong in our 
deliberative processes and therefore pushes us to revise or amend some of our beliefs. 
Naturally, it is also possible that the confrontation produces nothing but a harsher 
disagreement and a dogmatic entrenchment on our own positions. Still, what is really 
relevant at this theoretical level is that coherentism is able to account for a possible 
accommodation of disagreement, while foundationalism is not. Indeed, if one holds a 
foundational account of justification, then moral disagreement can derive from nothing 
but the recognition of the fact that “at least one of the protagonists has to be guilty of a 
deficiency in the way he arrives at his view, or to be somehow constitutionally unfit”81. 
Indeed, if the justificatory structure hinges on the discovery of self-evident, infallible, 
moral truths, then the disagreement can never be defined as genuine, but solely as the 
outcome of a defective cognitive deliberation by some of the moral agents.  
 Coherentism, therefore, is much more adequate than foundationalism if we want to 
account for the existence of  genuine disagreement among moral agents and yet do not 
reduce morality to a relativistic discourse. Coherentism does not just accept 
disagreement as a possible outcome of moral reasoning. Rather, coherentism supports a 
view on moral deliberation according to which it is possible to argue in favour of a 
practical accommodation of disagreement that ends up in assuming as regulative ideal 
the possibility of convergence. The possibility of overcoming disagreement in the light 
of the ideal of convergence is supported by the fallibilist insight according to which my 
belief about the validity of the evidence in favour of p is not necessarily in contrast with 
the actual falsity of such evidence. Consequently, coherentism is able to account both 
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for the possibility that two or more of my own beliefs were in disagreement between 
each other and for the fact that, in an interpersonal perspective, I disagree with another 
person about p being morally right or wrong. The way in which this accommodation of 
disagreement can be realized practically would be object of inquiry in the next chapters. 
For the moment, it was important to show that coherentism is a correct account of 
justification within the moral and political fields. A part from the strictly technical 
reasons for believing so, it is also true that coherentism is more adequate as general 
paradigm, as it better accounts for moral phenomenology. Indeed, moral 
phenomenology tells us that moral disagreement arises genuinely during moral 
deliberation. However, such disagreement might as well be accommodate either for just 
pragmatic reasons or thanks to more substantial arguments. Coherentism provides us 
with a sensible narration of how our moral deliberation works and it also yields good 
tools for trying to solve disagreement respecting the fact that such disagreement is a 
genuine one, rather that the contingent outcome of a defective cognitive appraisal. 
 My analysis in favour of a coherent theory of justification has been conducted for 
the sake of supporting a political version of liberalism that is able to respect the deep 
disagreement among citizens, while providing strong and sound reasons for publicly 
justifying principles of justice. The main issue at stake is how liberalism can be justified 
as a valid and worthwhile theory, maintaining in the meanwhile a neutral attitude 
toward the attempt to define a specific and victorious theory of moral good. 
Coherentism, as a model of justification that is intrinsically compatible with pluralism is 
extremely important for achieving this goal in many regards. First of all, coherentism 
shows that no justifications are possible without taking in consideration the agents’ 
perspective. Secondly, the disagreement among people is described not just as the 
outcome of a lack of rationality (as foundationalism would describe it), rather it is 
considered the upshot of people holding different doxastic sets of beliefs. Thirdly, this 
method provides theoretical support for the possibility of reaching agreement about 
some aspects of our living in a political community, whereas we still strongly disagree 
about other fundamental issues. Finally, being a work in progress method, coherentism 
upholds the possibility of diachronic improvement – in ways that are no foreseeable 
now – of political theory. 
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1.5  Political Justification 
 
1.5.1 Contextual and Systematic Justification 
  In the foregoing section of this chapter I linked the epistemic issue of providing 
a sound and legitimate account of moral justification with the general topic of defending 
a political version of liberalism. I believe that clarifying the epistemic features of the 
justificatory procedure is a necessary step in order to build up a robust theory of 
justification. However, a general theory of justice might be perfectly justifiable from a 
strictly epistemic perspective, but still being completely unsatisfactory from practical 
and normative standpoints. A concrete example of this theoretical discrepancy between 
strictly epistemic issues regarding the justification of specific moral beliefs and instead 
matters about the normative adequacy of a general theory is provided by many of the 
critiques addressed to strictly political liberalism. According to these critiques, the 
relevant matter at stake is not so much if political liberalism could build up a justified 
system of political principles, rather it is important to wonder whether such principles 
would ever be able to gain a deep support from citizens. According to these critiques 
political liberalism, even if justifiable, is not an adequate option, given its intrinsic 
weakness. Indeed, a political version of liberalism would always be too weak, since it 
refutes to ground itself in the reference to some self-evident moral truths. These critics 
question how liberalism, legitimated by a coherentist procedure of justification that 
averts to be anchored in an ultimate reference to infallible moral truths, can respond in a 
convincing way both to selfish individuals and to comprehensive visions (religious and 
non-religious) which do not accept compromises. It is from such doubts and fears that, 
spontaneously, is growing the stimulus for re-addressing the fundamental value of 
cultural and religious roots that have formed the historical and social environment in 
which liberalism itself has been developed. These cultural roots are thought to be the 
ethical core that underlies neutral, liberal principles
82
. In addition, critics of the political 
solution reduce this view to a strictly discontinuist/neutral one, arguing that if one gives 
up references to moral values in political discussions, then liberalism would not be able 
to cope, with the proper authority, with the more and more frequent challenges that 
illiberal fanaticisms are posing to democratic institutions. Political liberalism, with its 
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attempt to create a public space for inclusive and super partes debate, is criticized 
inasmuch produces a philosophically unbearable “epistemic abstinence”83. The 
epistemic abstinence argument stresses the fact that strictly political values would be 
both theoretically and practically inadequate for facing religious fanatics and 
unreasonable individuals. In practice, the liberal openness to diversity would make it 
possible for the liberal theory to be accused of fragility and excessive hospitality, given 
that the ideal of neutrality would force liberal democracies to be ready for dialogue, and 
to be friendly towards those that really do not deserve, nor desire, to take part in a 
public and constructive dialogue. It is possible to argue that, according to these 
criticisms, political liberalism is endangered by its inability to become itself “illiberal”, 
since this approach refuses to coerce – within certain limits – those who are not ready to 
give up, even within the public domain, the “infallibility” status of the truths they hold 
in their doxastic system and that therefore are against any form of open discussion with 
people that hold different and contrasting beliefs that their own. 
 Following this line of argument, many critics claim against the adequacy of  
political liberalism, as this approach will lack the necessary normative authority for 
determining an objectively valid theory of justice. Substantially, these critiques hold 
that for successfully counter illiberal positions, we have to assume – and demonstrate – 
that liberal principles are not only justified, but also that they stems from the normative 
reference to true values. Otherwise, these critics continue, liberalism will end up for 
being justified just for people that are already “liberal”, erasing the possibility to 
convince people that are not already liberal about the validity of some liberal principles 
or concepts. According to these critiques, in order to avoid the epistemic abstinence, 
liberalism should be justified by top-down arguments that refers to some liberal ideals 
that are defined not just as intersubjectively justified, but as intrinsically true ideals. By 
contrast, the nonideal perspective I am defending claims that we can have top-down 
argumentations, but that those are always embedded within a broader framework in 
which the structure of moral reasoning is characterized as bottom-up. A bottom-up 
argument is developed starting from some relevant, but not ultimately justified facts that 
are considered as the point of departure of moral reasoning; namely our intuitions as 
moral agents and the normative relations between them and mid-level principles. A 
bottom-up procedure provides good arguments for justifying principles beginning with 
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the actual and concrete practice of moral reasoning we experience as moral agents every 
day. In this regard, a justification that is bottom-up never guarantees the validity of the 
principles as starting point, rather the justification of these principles is reached at the 
end of a complex and revisable procedure that remains intrinsically work in progress. 
 I will defend the possibility of a sound and not too weak political liberalism in the 
next chapter, when I will present and broadly discuss Rawls’ proposal in this regard. 
Meanwhile, I want to conclude this chapter adding few points to the discussion. I think 
that my previous claim that a nonideal perspective allows top-down arguments, yet only 
when they are included in a broader bottom-up perspective needs clarification. This 
argument is connected with one feature of coherentism that I have already presented, 
namely that a coherentist justification is made up with inferential arguments that are not 
always linear (otherwise the infinite regress charge would be irresolvable). Of course 
the mutual support among beliefs produces a justificatory procedure that is circular. 
Nevertheless, this circularity is not vicious and I will explain why it is so in the third 
chapter. For the moment, I just want to add an important specification regarding two 
different forms of justification: systematic and contextualist
84
. A systematic justification 
is a justification that satisfies the epistemological requirements that even justifying 
beliefs should be justified, providing therefore every argument needed for justifying 
every belief of the system. By contrast, a contextualist justification is partial, and 
therefore does not need to meet this epistemological requirement strictly. When we 
proceed with a contextualist justification, we take for granted the justification of some 
background beliefs, even if we do not engage ourselves in their actual justification
85
. 
Contextualist justification is extremely important, practically speaking, as allows us to 
develop our moral reasoning without requiring the justification of every single belief 
every time. Nevertheless, the epistemological requirement of the systematic view makes 
sense and therefore is necessary that every background belief, even if not actually 
justified during the contextualist justification, should result to be “justifiable” in an 
epistemic framework in which a justification is demanded for every belief. 
 Accepting the relevance and the epistemic validity of contextualist justifications 
implies that in our daily moral reasoning, most of our arguments will be developed 
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through top-down arguments starting from beliefs that are taken for granted. However, 
this contextualist approach is justified and supported in the light of a broader framework 
in which every belief results to be justifiable through a coherentist procedure. The 
relevant point here is that this division in two different kinds of justification means that 
the daily moral reasoning could support the wrong impression that all our moral 
justified principles are provided by top-down arguments starting from beliefs that are 
taken for granted as moral truths that do not need further justifications. However, it 
should be clear now that no beliefs are ultimate non-inferential truths that do not need 
justification (given that our considering a belief p as true, entails second-order belief 
about the kind of belief that p is). For this reason, contextualist justification is a 
fundamental part of our daily moral reasoning; yet this approach is justified in the light 
of a second perspective that takes the epistemological requirement seriously and 
therefore implies systematic justifications as well.  
 To conclude, we can say that contextualist justification very often implies just 
linear justifications, given that many background beliefs are taken for granted. By 
contrast, when systematic justification is brought into the picture, linear arguments are 
no more available, as any background belief can be justified just through the reference 
to the relation of mutual support shared with all the other beliefs of the system. As 
Brink perfectly points out: 
“Coherentism meets this demand for systematic justification by claiming that one's 
belief p is fully or systematically justified insofar as p is part of a maximally coherent 
system of beliefs and p's coherence at least partially explains why one holds p. In this 
way, coherentism can explain and defend the importance we attach to linearity and the 
inadmissibility of circular reasoning in contextualist justification, while offering a 
nonlinear account of systematic justification, and so can distinguish the probative values 
of small and large circles in reasoning”86. 
 
 
 
1.5.2 Political Constituency 
  In order to conclude this chapter, I want to address one more topic: the political 
constituency issue. If we start from a definition of political justification according to 
which a sound justification must be able to persuade those addressed by the political 
institutions to accept certain political principles freely, then it follows that the definition 
of the political constituency is an extremely relevant matter. In this regard a 
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contemporary liberal perspective about political justification starts from two 
assumptions
87
: 
i. all political justifications must start with some assumptions about those to whom the 
justification is addressed
88
; 
ii. the fact of pluralism. 
 According to this liberal framework, political justification should be valid for all 
the people who are embedded within the political domain and, moreover, meet the 
epistemic and normative constraint of respecting the intrinsic fact of pluralism. For this 
reason, it is not enough if political liberalism describes itself as a theory that is valid just 
for people that are already liberal
89
. Indeed, given the contemporary pluralist societies in 
which we live, political liberalism has to find a normative way for justifying principles 
of justice that can obtain support from people that hold different comprehensive 
perspectives. In this regard, political liberalism needs a theory of justification that 
maintains normative validity, without becoming too demanding for the political 
constituency itself. Again, it could be claimed that for maintaining its action guiding 
prerogative (namely the fact that citizens are willing to follow the principles of justice), 
political liberalism should avert any reference to justificatory arguments that involve the 
reference to moral values that are partisan and that therefore cannot be made coherent 
with many beliefs hold by a subset of the political constituency. 
 Catriona McKinnon, in her book Liberalism and the Defence of Political 
Constructivism, claims that political justification should respect two constraints: the 
intelligibility constraint and the motivational adequacy constraint
90
. 
The intelligibility constraint requires that political justification be framed in terms that 
people are able to understand. Consequently, the political reasons that are provided 
should be intelligible, sound and yield evidence – when possible – for supporting 
political principles. Finally, politically justified reasons should be able to defeat other 
competing reasons
91
. 
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The motivational adequacy constraint instead requires that political reasons respect the 
fact of pluralism. In this regard, the justification of political principles should not be too 
demanding, imposing that all citizens should share the same perspective about 
fundamental political and moral issues. 
 Therefore, the challenge for liberal theory is to provide a theory of justification that 
reaches two fundamental goals with regard to citizens’ beliefs: i. outline a theory of 
justice that meets the normative requirements of “acceptability” and therefore is 
supported by citizens for good reasons; ii. citizens can support political principles 
without necessarily abandoning their beliefs about a comprehensive doctrines of the 
good life.  
 The liberal ideal about constituency is to be inclusive and open to diversity as 
much as possible. Indeed, the liberal notion of constituency, given the fact of pluralism, 
includes diversity among the fundamental features of modern political constituencies. 
For this reason, political liberalism “searches for reasons which could become 
motivating for all, while minimising the diminishment of deep diversity in its ideal 
constituency of justification”92. In this regard, political liberalism argues in favour of a 
complex balance between philosophical and practical aspects of the political theory 
enterprise. The philosophical aspects regard the possibility of arguing in favour of a 
sound – may be the best possible – justification of principles of justice through the 
reference to valid schemes of justification. The practical side, instead, refers to the 
contemporary issue of the fact of pluralism and to the attempt to establish an agreement 
in spite of a genuine moral disagreement among individuals. Political principles need to 
be soundly justified (for meeting the philosophical/normative requirements of the 
theory), but the procedure of justification of these principles, in order to be motivational 
effective and inclusive toward the entire political constituency, should not dismiss the 
role played, within the political deliberation, by the comprehensive beliefs held by 
citizens in their doxastic sets 
 This work so far has just addressed issues about moral epistemology. I defended a 
coherentist perspective and I applied it to the framework of political philosophy. Then, 
in the light of this epistemological background, I assumed a nonideal stance with regard 
                                                                                                                                               
institutions satisfying the principles of a liberal conception of justice realize political values and ideals 
that normally outweigh whatever other values oppose them. The preceding corollaries of completeness 
strengthen its stability; allegiance based on chose political values is stronger, and so the likelihood that 
they will be outweighed by opposing values is that much less”. 
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to the adequate procedure for obtaining agreement among citizens on politicalalpoliticla 
issues. Finally, I highlighted that, within a perspective that is strictly political, every 
sound procedure of justification has to respect at least two constraints: the intelligibility 
constraints and the motivational adequacy constraints. In the next chapter I will outline 
Ralws’ attempt to provide a political theory of this kind. While analysing the Rawlsian 
proposal, I will provide a detailed account of the epistemic framework that backs up 
Rawls’ arguments, as I believe that it is not possible to provide an exhaustive account of 
the practice of public justification if some relevant epistemic matters remain 
overlooked. 
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Chapter 2 – The Dilemma of Liberalism and Public Consensus 
 
 
 
“Equal right of each to be treated only with justification” 
Adley Akers (in Gaus, 1996, p. 163) 
 
 
“Public justification should be a never-ending commitment. 
It would be sheer hubris to think that we have, or ever will have, 
the whole political truth. We are always learning and confronting 
 new circumstances; we will always have progress to make” 
Stephen Macedo (1990, p. 287) 
 
“A conception of justice cannot be deduced from self-evident 
  premises or conditions on principles; instead, its justification is 
a matter of the mutual support of many considerations, of everything 
fitting together into one coherent view” 
John Rawls (1971, p. 19) 
 
 
 
 
 
2.0  Introduction 
 
  In the first chapter I distinguished between an ideal and a nonideal model of 
justification in ethics. According to this distinction, an ideal version of the procedure of 
justification implies at least one of these three features: i. a realistic account of moral 
facts; ii. a foundationalist epistemology; iii. a nonreductive metaphysics of moral facts. 
By contrast, I argued in favour of a moderate account of moral justification from the 
epistemological perspective. According to this moderate approach any foundational 
attempt to justify moral principles starting from basic, self-justified, beliefs is 
irremediably problematic. Starting from strictly epistemic arguments, I claimed that 
coherentism provides us with a better structure of justification as far as moral and 
political issues are concerned. In this regard, I defined my general approach as a 
moderate, nonideal, account of the procedure of justification in ethics. The nonideal 
model I am presenting therefore rejects the second feature of a strong model of 
justification that can be defined as “ideal”, namely the foundational epistemology. My 
thesis is that foundationalism, meant as a thesis about the structure of justification, is 
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too demanding. I support a doxastic presupposition, according to which no moral 
principles can be justified by an argument that is completely detached from the doxastic 
systems held by moral agents. In this regard, even though I did not argue against realism 
as an ontological thesis in metaethics, it should be clear that I refuse any account of 
moral justification in which moral facts – even if existent in an autonomous world - are 
justified regardless of which are our doxastic beliefs about them. 
 Later on, I connected these epistemic arguments with the specific issue of 
justifying liberal political principles. Assuming a nonideal approach with regard to the 
justification of moral principles entails fundamental modifications with regard to the 
way in which political theory deals with disagreement. I believe that there are sound 
practical reasons, as well as epistemic, for upholding a moderate approach of 
justification within the political domain. A nonideal framework, meeting the fallibilist 
intuition that our knowledge is compatible with the possibility of error, develops a 
notion of moral deliberation that is ideally always open to revisions. This moderate 
approach, in order to deal in a correct way with the normative and practical issues of 
contemporary multicultural democracies, should be intrinsically pluralistic as well as 
revisable and work in progress. In my opinion, such moderate approach can be defined 
as Socratic, as according to the Socratic’s method the deliberation should always begin 
with premises believed by the individuals engaged into the deliberative process. In this 
regard, being believed by the interlocutor is at least a necessary condition of premises 
acceptability
1
. Of course these conditions are extremely loose and general, but it should 
be considered that these are just conditions of acceptability for premises to be accepted 
as starting point of the deliberation. However, what is relevant for my analysis is the 
fact that, according to the Socratic’s method, doxastic coherence in a fundamental 
criterion for assessing the deliberative performance of agents involved in the public 
discussion over political issues. 
 This “Socratic” attitude with regard to the procedure of justification in ethics and 
political theory is coherent with the analysis of the issue of the political constituency I 
analysed at the end of the first chapter. I showed that the normative issue of liberal 
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 For a wider analysis of the Socratic method, see “Socratic Method” by Hugh H. Benson in Morrison 
(ed.), 2011, pp. 179-200. In this analysis, Benson claims that for Socratic deliberation being believed is 
both a necessary and sufficient condition of premises acceptability. However, I do not want to maintain 
such strong epistemic position, since I believe that the doxastic presupposition that I am defending 
requires just that being believed is a necessary condition in order to establish the acceptability of a 
premise. 
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legitimacy is strongly connected with the practical definition of the political 
constituency. Once that the political constituency is defined, political liberalism should 
respect two constraints: the intelligibility constraint and the motivational adequacy 
constraint. The moderate approach of justification I uphold is able to meet these two 
constraints, since it is well-aware of the actual disagreement among moral agents. Being 
intrinsically fallibilist, such an approach respects and deals with the fact of pluralism in 
a way that is unavailable for any foundational theory of justification. This sort of 
Socratic public deliberation model stresses the fact that every moral agent should be 
considered responsible of what she believes, as the doxastic side of deliberation is 
always part of the procedure of justification. For this reason, any theory of justice that 
provides a public justification of its principles has to take into consideration the 
individual’s doxastic systems to whom the justification is addressed. In this regard, the 
procedure of public justification needs to be intelligible for all the individuals that 
belong to the constituency and, moreover, should be motivationally adequate in order to 
become part of the different doxastic systems of the individuals. A Socratic method of 
deliberation allows a work in progress development of the procedure that aims to 
achieve an agreement among different moral agents and for this reason is a suitable 
option for meeting the two normative constraints we are dealing with. Furthermore, this 
method begins with the actual beliefs held by moral agents in their doxastic systems, 
instead of claiming for an idealized agreement on some basic beliefs that are justified 
independently from what is believed by the agents. Thus, this method respects the fact 
of pluralism intrinsically as, thanks to the doxastic presupposition, any public 
deliberation necessarily includes within the deliberative process the beliefs that 
individuals hold in their personal doxastic sets.  
 The major goal of this second chapter is to analyse how this epistemic moderate 
framework can work when coupled with the attempt to justify principles of justice 
within the political domain. In the first section (2.1) therefore I connect my previous 
analysis with the specific difficulties we have to cope with when we try to develop a 
public procedure for justifying political principles and concepts to a multicultural 
constituency. After having outlined the general structure, I discuss the Rawlsian project 
for the justification of a strictly political liberalism (2.2). Then, I analyse some of the 
most important critiques to this model and I articulate them starting from the 
perspective of moral epistemology (2.3). Afterward, in the last section (2.4), I introduce 
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my own proposal of a justificatory paradigm that respects some moderate epistemic 
constraints and the fact of pluralism, while not losing normative force and motivational 
adequacy. 
 I have concluded the foregoing chapter dealing with the constituency issue, as this 
topic is the most relevant in order to grasp the theoretic connection between the liberal 
issue of legitimacy and the epistemic analysis of disagreement. I claimed that the liberal 
legitimacy is one of the core tenets of contemporary liberal theories. According to this 
principle, no political principles can be legitimate, if the individuals to whom they are 
addressed do not assess them as justified. Since for the moderate approach I am 
defending a principle is justified when is coherently part of the doxastic systems held by 
the citizens, then the definition of who are the members of the political constituency 
becomes a fundamental issue. The analysis of the political constituency topic allows me 
to define and cope with different fundamental issues: determining which kind of 
agreement we need or we are able to achieve in the political domain; showing how 
pluralism and disagreement are interconnected; dividing the practice of political 
justification in an ideal and a nonideal phase. 
 
 
2.1  Political Liberalism: the Internal and the External Conception  
  
  In the first chapter I presented epistemic arguments for defending a fallibilist 
perspective with regard to moral epistemology. Now, I am going to analyse how this 
fallibilist framework works with regard to the issue of political disagreement and the 
attempt to justify a political paradigm to the members of the constituency. If one starts 
from the fallibilist intuition that an individual can be justified in holding a belief that is 
actually false
2
, then the way in which moral disagreement is defined and managed is 
absolutely peculiar. I agree with Kai Nielsen when he affirms that the realization of the 
Socratic ideal is an utterly different enterprise in the contemporary disenchanted world 
than it was in less pluralistic and differentiated societies of the past
3
. Given the 
pluralistic societies in which we are living, the search for an agreement on political 
                                                 
2
 Without talking of fallibilism as epistemic standpoint, Gerald Gaus (1996, 2011) claims for a 
justificatory liberalism that is aware of two features of moral agents deliberation: the bounded rationality 
and the epistemic akrasia. 
3
 See Nielsen, 1991. 
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arguments that is grounded in the reference to an ultimate truth is an unrealistic 
enterprise. Even though an agreement on an ultimate truth would be the main goal of a 
an ideal theory of justification, I believe that, when dealing with nonideal aspects of our 
contextual reality, we should look for other epistemic standards of assessment of public 
deliberation. In this regard, the Socratic model of deliberation is useful, as it highlights 
important features of a nonideal paradigm. Firstly, it should be already clear that the 
doxastic aspects of moral deliberation should always be taken into account. Secondly, a 
model of deliberation developed in the light of the Socratic method stresses the role 
played by intersubjective process of giving and receiving reasons. For, avoiding the 
reference to a foundation grounded in an ultimate truth implies that the outcome of 
deliberation cannot be established at the beginning, rather it completely depends on the 
deliberative process itself. Thirdly, this deliberative process should be open to endless 
revisions, since our limited epistemic capacities are not able to meet every epistemic 
standard perfectly and therefore the possibility of error is never eliminated altogether. 
Thanks to these features, the Socratic model of deliberation is able to express the 
pluralistic features of contemporary political constituency and the epistemic intuition 
that our moral reasoning is intrinsically fallible. However, it is important to specify one 
more time that fallibilism does not imply scepticism. The fact that we, as moral agents 
and moral theorists, are aware of the epistemic difficulties of achieving a coincidence 
between doxastic justification and ultimate warranty of our knowledge does not imply 
that we are compelled to claim that no political values or principles are justifiable. 
Holding a fallibilist approach implies that one claims for the validity and justification of 
her moral and political beliefs, but along with the awareness that such justification is not 
conclusive. Indeed, for a justification to be conclusive it requires that we are able to 
grant that no defeaters are available. Yet, given our limited epistemic abilities, 
fallibilism is telling us that we will never be able to claim in a conclusive way against 
any possible defeaters. Thus, the epistemic regulative ideal of a nonideal model of 
deliberation does not correspond with the establishment of ultimate truths that are 
definitely undefeated, rather it is expressed by the pursuit of principles that moral agent 
would be best justified in believing. In this regard, under the fallibilist perspective, I 
want to argue in favour of a normative theory of justification in political philosophy that 
is expression of a demythologized sense of Socratic philosophy
4
.
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 The first problem that this nonidealized approach has to face is to differentiate the 
normative notion of acceptability from the actual acceptance. Eschewing any reference 
to the establishment of moral truths can be a reasonable choice, given practical and 
epistemic reasons, nevertheless the procedure of justification should preserve its 
normative force. In this regard, Gerald Gaus is right when he claims that the actual 
assent thesis is not a good perspective of assessment with the regard to the legitimacy of 
political justification. According to Gaus, if we just look for the actual acceptance of 
political principles by citizens, then the theory of justice is nothing more than a 
justificatory populism
5
. Of course, this is not a plausible solution for a theory of 
political justification that wants to affirm and sustains a public deliberation that is 
normatively binding. Thus, we need to introduce some idealized conditions, in order to 
draw a line between actual acceptance and the normative relevant criteria of 
acceptability. A political principle requires to be accepted by the members of the 
constituency as legitimated in order to be normatively valid. However, the reason why 
the members of constituency accept the political principles as legitimated and the 
definition of the political constituency itself are two fundamental features of the 
procedure of justification. As Jonathan Quong points out in his Liberalism without 
Perfection, the first decision that should be taken when dealing with political liberalism 
is the definition of the political constituency. On the one hand, there is an external 
conception of political liberalism according to which the constituency works as an 
external constraint on the deliberation about the content of any liberal theory. Following 
this perspective, pluralism is described as a brute fact of reality that political 
deliberation should accommodate in the best way possible. Thus, even though the fact 
of pluralism is accepted as a fact of contemporary democracies, still the ideal 
justification might be able to overcome the differences and being accepted as valid by 
the widest constituency possible. On the other hand, there is the internal conception of 
                                                                                                                                               
provided by Jean Hampton in her “Should Political Philosophy be Done Without Metaphysics” (1989). 
Hampton maintains that a Socratic enterprise can never be accomplished if it does not seek for the 
establishment of truth. In this regard, a political account of liberalism that eschews any reference to the 
truth would fall into a Hobbesian system where the arguments provided for justification can be just 
instrumental and never substantially normative. By contrast, I believe that is not necessary to see the 
moral and political procedure of justification as an “all or nothing” enterprise. Even if political principles 
are not defined as ultimate, unassailable, true principle, still it is possible to argue in favor of their 
normativity. In this regard, the Socratic deliberation would be accomplished through the reference to the 
value of holistic internal coherence, rather that through a deductive top-down argument that begins with  
self-justified basic beliefs. 
5
 Gaus, 1996, pp. 130-131. 
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political liberalism that is represented in the best way by Rawls’ political liberalism. 
According to this internal model pluralism is a natural effect of political liberalism 
itself. In this regard, such pluralism is not something that must be accommodate, rather 
is a characteristic feature of any theory of justice that is intrinsically liberal. Pluralism is 
defined then as reasonable pluralism and is interpreted as an internal challenge within 
the structure of political public deliberation. Given this internal model of interpretation 
of the liberal deliberation, the constituency itself, according to Quong, should be 
circumscribed to an idealized constituency in which the members already share some 
liberal premises
6
. 
 This distinction between external and internal conceptions of political liberalism 
provides a perspective by which analyse different, fundamental, topics connected with 
the general issue of political justification. Firstly, it is fundamental to discriminate 
between an idealized and not idealized conception of the political constituency. 
Secondly, determining which of the two models is the best one implies as well taking a 
stance with regard to the best procedure for dealing with disagreement (reasonable or 
unreasonable). Thirdly, this distinction helps to determine which kind of normative 
relation obtains between the concept of right and good. 
 In order to deeply analyse the external conception of political liberalism a 
specification must be provided, as it seems to me that there is an intrinsic tension with 
regard to the development of this model. The external conception maintains that the 
constituency is an external constraint to the deliberation. For this reason, such 
constituency cannot be constrained from the beginning by an idealization. Rather, this 
model tries to achieve agreement starting from the actual constituency. However, even 
if the constituency is a nonidealized one and therefore it seems harder to achieve an 
agreement, this approach develops a theory in which the liberal procedure of 
justification can overcome the differences and being accepted by all the citizens just 
thanks to its good and sound arguments. In this way, the external conception is both less 
demanding and more ambitious of the internal model. On the one hand is less 
demanding, since this model starts from a constituency of actual citizens, without 
requiring any shared beliefs among them. On the other hand, nevertheless, this approach 
is much more ambitious, as claims to be able to achieve an agreement starting from 
nothing but disagreement. By contrast, the internal conception of political liberalism 
                                                 
6
 For a deep analysis of this issue, see Quong, 2011, ch. 5, pp. 135-160. 
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starts with a strong idealization regarding the political constituency and therefore is less 
ambitious from the beginning. However, through the argument for an idealized 
constituency, this model provides robust normative arguments for evaluating political 
liberalism as the most viable and coherent theory of justice within a context of 
reasonable pluralism
7
. 
 In my opinion the most important difference between these two conceptions of 
political liberalism derives from a different perspective with regard to the definition of 
the major scope of a theory of justice. According to the external model the fundamental 
goal of political liberalism is to achieve a broad agreement on some specific political 
principles starting from a disagreement that, in our contemporary societies, is often deep 
and unleashed. In this regard, the procedure of justification of political liberalism is 
viewed as extremely powerful, since is able to overcome the brute fact of pluralism and 
to reach a binding consensus that ideally regards every member of the constituency. 
According to this view, the procedure of justification of political liberalism should be 
able to provide principles that are victoriously justified over all the others beliefs held 
by citizens
8
. If this hope is realistic or not it would be an issue to be analysed in the 
development of this chapter. With regard to the internal conception, by contrast, it is 
important to highlight its “reconciliatory aspects”9. For, even it is true that this model 
starts with an idealization, after all within this model the deliberation is employed to 
achieve an agreement given the fact pluralism, not in spite of it. In the next section I 
will discuss these two models in the light of the Rawlsian attempt to provide a strictly 
political justification of liberal’s tenets. 
 
 
2.2   The Socratic Attitude within Rawls’ Theory 
 
2.2.1 A Realistic Utopia 
                                                 
7
 “The legitimacy of political principles does not depend on whether current liberal citizens do accept 
them, or whether the principles are congruent with their current beliefs. Instead principles are defined as 
legitimate if it is possible to present them in a way such that it could be endorsed by rational and 
reasonable citizens”, Quong, 2011, p. 144.  
8
 Gaus (1996, pp. 144-150) defines a justification as victorious as far as it meets three epistemic 
constraints: i. it is a justification that is undefeated; ii. it is a justification that respects high standards of 
proof; iii. it is a justification that satisfies the publicity conditions. 
9
 “My aim in this work is to provide a general account of social morality that reconciles freedom and the 
demands of public order in a society in which individuals, exercising their reason about the best thing to 
do, deeply disagree”, Gaus, 2011, p. 2. 
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 I want to resume the analysis I have just carried out by contextualizing it in 
relation to the development of John Rawls’ theory in the shift from TJ to Political 
Liberalism
10
 (hereafter PL). Rawls claims that the main differences between these two 
texts are determined by the fact that in TJ he did not distinguish a moral doctrine of 
justice, with a general application, from a purely political conception of justice
11
. 
Starting from his works of the 1980’s instead, Rawls has circumscribed the domain of 
the political to specific matters, avoiding to take a stance on strictly metaphysical or 
epistemic issues. This reduction in the scope of action of the Rawlsian theory of justice 
is one of the fundamental points of the analysis. The underlying rationale for this 
change is the fact that Rawls, in an act of self-criticism, admits that he has had to revise 
some of the central thesis of TJ. In fact, in that work, he did not properly separate the 
issue of giving procedural legitimacy to the principles of justice, from the attempts to 
ensure the stability of public consensus on these same principles. As a mater of fact, in 
the third part of TJ, Ends, the stability of a well-ordered society, defined by the 
principles of justice obtained in the original position, was derived almost automatically 
from the normativity of the procedure of construction of the principles themselves as 
well as from a specific doctrine of moral psychology. Basically, the main problem 
highlighted by Rawls is precisely the one discussed above: the idea that in TJ the 
stability and desirability of the principles of justice were obtained at the same moment 
thanks to the fact that the Rawls’ theory of justice, in comparison with utilitarianism 
theories, has been presented as a comprehensive doctrine tout court. On the contrary, in 
PL Rawls starts his analysis with the acknowledgment of the fact of pluralism. Such 
pluralism is not just a brute fact of contemporary multicultural societies, rather is an 
outcome of the liberal procedure of deliberation itself
12
. This definition of pluralism as 
intrinsic to the liberal epistemology is a fundamental feature of my analysis, since it is 
coherent with the epistemic modest conception I am defending. If we defend a fallibilist 
perspective regarding our moral knowledge, then the fact of pluralism is not something 
that should be amended, rather it is a constituent feature of our moral reasoning. 
Moreover, if the principles of justice must be justified with regard to the doxastic 
                                                 
10
 Rawls, 1993 (2
nd
 edition 1996).  
11
 See the Introduction in J. Rawls, 1993, pp. xiii-xxxiv. 
12
 “Political liberalism assumes that, for political purposes, a plurality of reasonable yet incompatible 
comprehensive doctrines is the normal result of the exercise of human reason within the framework of the 
free institutions of a constitutional democratic regime. Political liberalism also supposes that a reasonable 
comprehensive doctrine does not reject the essentials of a democratic regime”, Rawls, 1993, p. xvi (italics 
in the original). 
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system of moral agents, then it is not sufficient to provide a sound external justification 
of political principles apt to show that such principles are the best principles possible. A 
correct procedure of justification must demonstrate the ability of the political module to 
become part of the doxastic system of every member of the constituency to whom the 
political principles are addressed. In this regard, I consider Rawls much more a theorist 
of disagreement, than a theorist of agreement. 
 In PL then, the starting point of the deliberative enterprise is the acknowledgment 
of deep pluralism. Consequently, Rawls maintains the impossibility of providing an 
ultimate justification of political principles that proves to be always victoriously 
justified over the comprehensive doctrines held by citizens. Under this new paradigm, 
Rawls investigates the possibility of providing good arguments for justifying a theory of 
justice even within this deeply pluralistic political environment. According to this new 
model of deliberation, a full justification of the principles of justice does not entirely 
depend on the powerfulness and undefeatability of an  argument provided theoretically. 
Rather, principles of justice can be described as victoriously justified if and only if 
every agent is able to make these principles coherent with her doxastic set of beliefs. In 
this regard, therefore, political liberalism requires a procedure of justification that looks 
not simply for a theoretical sound argument. Rather, any top-down justificatory 
argument should meet the doxastic constraint, namely being able to provide good 
reasons to moral agents in order for them to be motivated in including such political 
principles in their doxastic sets of beliefs. 
 Rawls defines his theory about global justice as a realistic utopia
13
. I think that this 
definition can be applied quite well to the entire body of his works starting from the 
papers of the 1980s
14
. In these papers his analysis begins to be focused on the issue of 
disagreement, more than on the definition of a theory of justice justifiable in itself and 
on which all people can agree. Rawls has realized that the issue of stability has to be 
treated differently than the strictly theoretical issue of providing good philosophical 
arguments for justifying a theory of justice. When the search for a stability for the right 
reasons
15
 becomes a relevant issue, then the definition of political constituency turns out 
                                                 
13
 Rawls uses the label “realistic utopia” in the Law of People: “Political philosophy is realistically 
utopian when it extends what are ordinarily thought to be the limits of practicable political possibility and, 
in so doing, reconciles us to our political and social condition” (Rawls, 1999, p. 11). 
14
 These papers have been republished together in Rawls, 1999. 
15
 Rawls (1993, 1995) distinguishes between stability for the right reasons and modus vivendi. If the latter 
is the case, then “society's stability depends on a balance of forces in contingent and possibly fluctuating 
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to be extremely problematic. For example, Rawlsian “political turn” has been charged 
by many authors for its theoretical weakness
16
. According to these critiques, Rawls 
political liberalism lacks any theoretical and normative argumentative force, since this 
strictly political approach is just focused on achieving agreement among the actual 
citizens of multicultural liberal societies. In this regard, these authors believe that Rawls 
framework of justification is coincident with the externalist conception of political 
liberalism delineated by Quong. However, Rawls has been also accused to defend a 
transcendental theory of justice that is completely detached from the analysis of which 
are the actual beliefs and preferences of the members of the political constituency
17
. 
These two criticisms address respectively the two features of the external conception of 
political liberalism that I claimed being in tension between each other. On the one hand, 
the actual consensus charge is moved against the first characteristic of the external 
model, namely the theoretical decision to provide a justification of the political 
conception that should be accepted by the actual members of the political constituency, 
without requiring any initial idealization. On the other hand, the second charge is 
directed against the too ambitious side of the external conception. Indeed, this model 
claims to be able to justify the principles of justice in a way that is epistemic 
victoriously over all the other beliefs of the members of the constituency. I think that 
both these charges are correct as far as they concern the external conception of political 
liberalism. By contrast, the internal model can be charged with similar critiques, but its 
way of replying to them is extremely different and more interesting. I agree with Quong 
when he claims that the Rawlsian theory, at least from PL on, is better explained by the 
internal conception paradigm. In this regard, his theory can be fruitfully interpreted as a 
realistic utopia within a moderate epistemic framework of justification. On the one 
hand, his approach is slightly utopian, as it starts the procedure of justification with the 
assumption that the political constituency can be theoretical circumscribed to an 
idealized constituency of reasonable liberal citizens
18
. Of course, this assumption 
                                                                                                                                               
circumstances” (1995, p. 147). On the contrary, stability for the right reasons is reached when citizens 
support a theory of justice through the achievement of a reasonable overlapping consensus. 
16
 See for example: Cohen G.A. (2003 and 2008), Dworkin (2000), Estlund (1998), Habermas (1995 and 
1996), Hampton (1989), Pogge (1989), Raz (1989). 
17
 Seev Sandel (1982), Galston (1996) and Sen (2009). 
18
 For an analysis of the theoretical possibility of promoting utopian theories, see Nagel, 1989. Nagel 
states that a strictly utopian theory risks to be motivationally ineffective, as the agents would look at this 
theory as a unfeasible theory and therefore intrinsically not motivational. Nagel claims that the political 
institutions have to balance interpersonal and personal motivations, in order to be motivational adequate 
with regard to the individual perspective. 
PhD Dissertation in Political Theory – XXV Cycle                                 PhD Candidate: Federica Liveriero  
Pag. 70 
 
requires a justification and I will analyse this issue later on. On the other hand, this 
model is also strongly realistic, as the justificatory procedure is divided in different 
stages and the achievement of a sound justification is under scrutiny all the way down to 
the different stages. Moreover, the fact that the justification is viewed as legitimated at 
one stage does not imply that it would be necessary justified at the further stage. This 
realistic side is consistent with the fallibilist intuition that our moral knowledge cannot 
be defined as ultimately undefeatable and also with the Socratic insight regarding the 
doxastic responsibility of the moral agents for the principles and beliefs they end up to 
uphold. 
  
2.2.2 Contextualism 
 So far, I have argued that the political turn in the Rawlsian theoretical paradigm 
shows us why Rawls is much more a theorist of disagreement, than a theorist of 
agreement. As a matter of fact, if we uphold a fallibilist perspective about moral 
justification, then pluralism is an intrinsic feature of our justificatory public structure of 
justification
19
. In this regard, disagreement is not something we can avoid or 
circumscribe as an irrelevant matters, rather is a stable feature of our moral and political 
lives. For this reason, Rawls assumes that a “method of avoidance” is a correct 
procedure in order to respect the deep disagreement among citizens. According to this 
method, the public paradigm of justification of political theory should avert any 
reference to a specific moral epistemology and a metaphysical analysis. Therefore, 
Rawls claims, the “method of avoidance”20 should be applied both to metaphysics and 
epistemic theories. Nevertheless, Rawls argues as well that a theory of justice should 
respect the burdens of judgement and in my opinion the epistemic attitude that these 
burdens of judgments expresses is exactly a fallibilist perspective with regard to moral 
epistemology. In fact, recognizing the burdens of judgments implies the acceptance of 
the fact that even reasonable people can disagree among them
21
. Thus, disagreement is 
                                                 
19
 As Rawls (1993, p. 58) states: “many of our most important judgments are made under conditions 
where it is not to be expected that conscientious persons with full powers of reason, even after free 
discussion, will all arrive at the same conclusion. Some conflicting reasonable judgments (especially 
important are those belonging under peoples' comprehensive doctrines) may be true, others false; 
conceivably, all may be false”. 
20
 “The hope is that, by this method of avoidance, as we might call it, existing differences between 
contending political views can at least be moderated, even if not entirely removed, so that social 
cooperation on the basis of mutual respect can be maintained”, Rawls, 1985, p. 231. 
21
 Rawls outlines six sources of reasonable disagreement that can be defined as the burdens of reason. See 
Rawls, 1993, pp. 56-57. 
PhD Dissertation in Political Theory – XXV Cycle                                 PhD Candidate: Federica Liveriero  
Pag. 71 
 
not just the outcome of flawed procedure of reasoning or provoked by unreasonable 
people. On the contrary, disagreement is a realistic outcome even when reasonable 
people are deliberating regarding moral and political matters. Hence, disagreement is a 
feature of public deliberation we have to deal with in a positive attitude, regarding it as 
already an outcome of liberal procedure of deliberation, instead that viewing it as an 
irredeemable flaw of human beings way of reasoning. 
 This analysis of the burdens of judgment and of the intrinsic fallibilist framework 
in which PL has been developed helps me to introduce the next argument. As a matter 
of fact, this positive attitude toward disagreement is consistent with the “reconciliatory 
aspects” of the Rawlsian project developed from the papers of the early 1980s. In my 
opinion this reconciliatory attitude is represented perfectly by some features of political 
liberalism, namely the regulative ideal of inclusivity, the work in progress side of the 
political enterprise and the normative relevance of political context. Regarding 
contextualism, it is important to highlight the relevance of some Hegelian insights for 
the political turn within the development of Rawlsian theory of justice
22
. The 
fundamental Hegelian concept for grasping the contextual turn in the Rawlsian 
paradigm is that of Sittlichkeit (ethical life) that Hegel develops in his Elements of the 
Philosophy of Rights
23
. This concept is useful for understanding that when we have to 
deal with the production of a public procedure of justification the reference to the 
doxastic system of moral beliefs of every moral agent is not sufficient for granting a 
sound and intersubjective justification of moral or political principles. Rather, the public 
social context in which the public justification is produced is a normatively relevant 
feature
24
. According to Hegel, the social institutions own a substantive value with 
regard to the historic process through which they have been developed. First of all, 
Rawls shares with Hegel the idea that the political context of a society can represent a 
normative source for the procedure of justification of political principles
25
. According to 
                                                 
22
 Neal (1990, p. 46, italics in the original) in this regard states “Thus one come to imagine a possibility of 
an ‘Hegelian interpretation’ of “Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical”, an interpretation that 
would make of it not a doctrine which ‘steers a course between’ Hobbes and Kant, but one that transcends 
both even as it retains each within itself. “Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical” needs to be 
interpreted or rendered in such a way that its aim is not that of balancing Kant and Hobbes, but of 
synthesizing them. Hegel may be said to have attempted just such a project”. 
23
 Hegel [1821], 1991. 
24
 “Hegel wants us to find our moral compass in the institutions and customs of our social world itself, as 
these institutions and customs have been made part of us as we grow up into them and develop habits of 
thought and action accordingly”, Rawls, 2000, p. 333”. 
25
 For an analysis close to mine with regard to the Hegelian insights within Rawlsian paradigm, see 
Cohen, 1994.  
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Rawls, the fact that historically some values have been developed and it has been 
reached a broad stable agreement on their validity is a fundamental aspect of 
contemporary liberal democracy. In this regard, Rawls states: 
“We collect such settled convictions as the belief in religious toleration and the rejection 
of slavery and try to organize the basic ideas and principles implicit in these convictions 
into a coherent political conception of justice. These convictions are provisional fixed 
points that it seems any reasonable conception must account for. We start, then, by 
looking to the public culture itself as the shared fund of implicitly recognized basic 
ideas and principles. We hope to formulate these ideas and principles clearly enough to 
be combined into a political conception of justice congenial to our most firmly held 
convictions. We express this by saying that a political conception of justice, to be 
acceptable, must accord with our considered convictions, at all levels of generality, on 
due reflection, or in what I have called elsewhere “reflective equilibrium”26. 
 
 According to this interpretation of the influence of the Hegelian perspective on the 
development of Rawlsian philosophy, what it is relevant for Rawls are the conciliatory 
aspects of the Hegelian social philosophy
27
. A fundamental difference between TJ and 
PL stems from the fact that in the latter Rawls has understood that there are facts of the 
political reality (as the fact of pluralism or the existence of unreasonable people) that 
cannot be amended or reduced to a theoretical irrelevant position. Therefore, a political 
theorist should try to deal with these facts and, without abandoning the attempt to 
provide a normative theory of justice, being aware of the practical and theoretic 
difficulties of this enterprise. The political turn in the Rawlsian theory does not imply a 
normative weakness or a refuge into relativism. Yet, Rawls in PL wants to build up a 
theory of justice starting from the “here and now” of the contemporary societies. 
However, “to become reconciled to our social world does not mean to become resigned 
to it. Versöhnung and not Entsagung — resignation. It is not as if the existing social 
world is the best among a number of unhappy alternatives. Rather, reconciliation means 
that we have come to see our social world as a form of life in political and social 
institutions that realizes our essence—that is, the basis of our dignity as persons who are 
free”28.  
 To conclude, I hold that the underlying reason for the Rawls’ interest in the concept 
of Sittlichkeit is due to the theoretical difficulties of granting the stability for the right 
reasons. Highlighting the normative-laden side of the public culture of liberal 
democracies is in fact relevant in order to investigate how principles of justice, already 
                                                 
26
 Rawls, 1993, p. 8. 
27
 For an exhaustive analysis of Hegel0’s reconciliatory project, see Hardimon, 1996. 
28
 Rawls, 2000, p. 331. 
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justified through a sound procedure, can obtain loyalty from the citizens. Rawls indeed 
is not saying that is not possible to have a procedure of justification that is independent 
from the context of the here and now. Nevertheless, he wants to demonstrate that 
specific principles of justice, that can be justified through a normative sound 
philosophical argument, can also be justified thanks to an another criterion, namely the 
perspective of being victoriously justified within the doxastic system of beliefs of the 
members of the actual political constituency. In this regard, it is important to focus not 
just on the soundness of the normative arguments provided for justifying the principles 
of justice, rather it is necessary to analyse the circumstances of justice under which 
citizens might embed moral and political beliefs within their coherent doxastic systems. 
 Hegel’s social philosophy, whose primary object of inquiry can be identified with 
reconciliation
29
, is fundamental for Rawls when he tries to solve the theoretical tensions 
between the two souls of the external conception of political liberalism we are 
discussing. I have claimed that the external conception is unable to solve such conflict 
between the actual constituency perspective of the model and the theoretical attempt to 
overcome any form of political disagreement through a victorious justification of 
political principles. In my opinion, Rawls political turn can be interpreted properly 
thanks to the reference to the difference between these two models. The external model 
would be a quite fair description of the procedure of justification employed in TJ. 
Indeed, in that work the justification of a theory of justice – without distinction between 
a comprehensive and strictly political account of such theory, hinges on a top-down 
argument that is developed taking into consideration the standpoints of the parties in 
original position. Then, thanks to the moral psychology developed in the third part of 
TJ, Rawls claims that even the actual citizens would agree on such principles of justice, 
as they are part of a sort of comprehensive moral doctrine that can be shared by every 
citizen. This model of justification, much more ambitious and idealized, maintains 
pluralism as an amendable fact that can be reduced to an irrelevant matter thanks to a 
good normative argument of justification
30
. By contrast, in PL the agreement on the 
                                                 
29
 Ibid. 
30
 “There is one further assumption to guarantee strict compliance. The parties are presumed to be capable 
of a sense of justice and this fact is public knowledge among them. This condition is to insure the 
integrity of the agreement made in the original position. It does not mean that in their deliberations the 
parties apply some particular conception of justice, for this would defeat the point of the motivation 
assumption. Rather, it means that the parties can rely on each other to understand and to act in accordance 
with whatever principles are finally agreed to. Once principles are acknowledged the parties can depend 
on one another to conform to them. In reaching an agreement, then, they know that their undertaking is 
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principles of justice depends on different stages of justification and still the 
disagreement is not at all resolved, since reasonable people can agree on some specific 
principles, although holding different comprehensive doctrines. Moreover, the 
procedure of justification addresses just the constituency of reasonable people that 
already agree on some liberal tenets like, for instance, the two model conceptions 
regarding citizens as free and equal and the notion of a well-ordered society as a fair 
system of cooperation. This agreement on some specific tenets of the liberal paradigm 
constitutes the criterion for establishing who might be embedded within the idealized 
political constituency. With regard to the internal conception of political liberalism, in 
fact, is not sufficient that the constituency is circumscribed by the criterion on 
reasonableness – as it happens for the external conception -, rather reasonable citizens 
must also agree on the model conceptions derived from the conception of an ideal 
liberal society
31
. Such agreement, in Rawls view, is granted by a contextual move. 
According to this way of reasoning, an agreement on a loose framework of liberal 
justice is granted from the beginning given the definition of the political constituency. 
In this regard, again, the Rawlsian structure of reasoning is both realistic and utopian. 
On the one hand, it is strictly realistic, as Rawls admits that “not everything, then, is 
constructed; we must have some material, as it were, from which to begin”32. Thus, 
Rawls is strongly aware that it is unrealistic to believe in a top down procedure of 
justification that is able to grant the necessary normativity and motivational adequacy 
without any connection with contextual culture of contemporary societies. This 
awareness of the indeterminacy provoked by a solely top down approach represents one 
of the starker difference between TJ and PL. As a matter of fact, in TJ the top down 
argument proposed in the original position, when coupled with the coherentist 
procedure of reflective equilibrium, was regarded as able to guarantee a stable 
agreement on the principles of justice by citizens. By contrast, in PL the original 
position argument is still available as a “device of representation”33, but the normativity 
of the whole process of justification relies on the fact that the members of the political 
                                                                                                                                               
not in vain: their capacity for a sense of justice insures that the principles chosen will be respected”, 
Rawls, 1971, p. 125. 
31
 See Quong, 2011, p. 144. 
32
 Rawls, 1993, p. 104. 
33
 “As a device of representation the idea of the original position serves as a means of public reflection 
and self-clarification. It helps us work out what we now think, once we are able to take a clear and 
uncluttered view of what justice requires when society is conceived as a scheme of cooperation between 
free and equal citizens from one generation to the next”, Rawls, 1993, p. 26. 
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constituency agree – here and now - on some specific features of liberal theory that are 
derived from the public culture of liberal democratic societies and that constitute the 
“society’s political capital”34. 
 
2.2.3 Coherentism 
  Quong claims that the normative relation that obtains between the procedure of 
justification and some implicit ideas of our pubic culture generates some difficulties for 
the internal conception of political liberalism. The difficulties derive from the fact that 
is not at all clear why for political liberalism it is so fundamental to begin the public 
deliberation with some shared public ideas. One view claims that political liberalism 
requires as starting point some values shared in a public culture, since it is an 
interpretive enterprise, more than a justificatory one. According to this interpretive 
view, all the normative force would depend on the contextual validity of the actual 
public culture shared by citizens. Consequently, the only possibility for developing a 
liberal theory of justice would stem from the actual fact that the members of the 
constituency are already liberal reasonable citizens
35
. By contrast, the second 
interpretation claims that we begin with some shared ideas not because they are the best 
or because they contextually happen to be our ideas. Rather, this contextual turn should 
be interpreted in the light of the procedure of reflective equilibrium and the general 
coherent framework of justification. According to the reflective equilibrium 
explanation
36
, the shared ideas of a public culture are not justified as they are our ideas. 
Consistently with the coherentist framework I have outlined in the first chapter, these 
shared ideas are part of the doxastic sets of moral and political beliefs held by citizens. 
Being part of the doxastic system does not imply to be necessary justified, for the 
fallibilist insight should be always take into consideration, even if just on background. 
However, I also claimed that no moral procedure of justification can be viewed as 
complete and exhaustive if such procedure does not demonstrate to be consistent with 
the doxastic systems of the agents that are involved in the procedure of justification. 
Thus, the reference to the shared ideas of a public culture should be interpreted as being 
                                                 
34
 “The term ‘capital’ is appropriate and familiar in this connection because these virtues are built up 
slowly over time and depend not only on existing political and social institutions ([...]), but also on 
citizen’s experience as a whole and their knowledge of the past”, Rawls, 1987, p. 17. 
35
 For a discussion in some length of this possibility, see “The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy” in 
Rorty, 1991, pp. 175-196. 
36
 For the definition of these two explanations, see Quong, 2011, pp. 154-157. 
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part of the coherentist framework of justification that I claim to be the general structure 
of justification that supports the political liberalism enterprise. 
 The public culture of a liberal society is the here and now from which we begin our 
deliberation for justifying principles of justice. During this procedure, different insights 
might become regulative ideas for developing the procedure of justification. First of all, 
the fallibilist insight helps us to understand that is extremely unrealistic to think that a 
foundational account of moral justification can realize all the job for us, as the epistemic 
relation between justification and warrant can never be taken for granted. Second, the 
moderate perspective about justification provides us with good reasons for upholding a 
coherentist as the most adequate framework in order to account for the procedure of 
justification involved within the political domain. Third, the Hegelian intuition about 
the normative-laden side of the public culture it yields a theoretical framework in which 
the reference to a public liberal cultural is not reduced to be part of a descriptive account 
of political justification. 
 The shared ideas of the public culture of liberal democracies become the 
provisional fixed points that any theory of justice should try to account for. These ideas 
are consistent with the doxastic systems of the members of the constituency and for this 
reason are sound criteria for assessing the validity of the principles of justice that are 
under scrutiny. However, these same ideas are not taken for granted once for all, as they 
are subjected to the scrutiny of coherence as well. In fact, the normative procedure of 
justification of political principles is itself a good criterion for assessing the actual 
validity of the shared ideas of the public culture. In this regard, including within the 
deliberation some background ideals that constitutes “the society political capital” is a 
positive and normatively powerful instrument for reaching agreement, nevertheless 
these same background ideals can always be subjected to modification and revision, as 
the public attempt to shape a coherent normative framework of our political intuitions 
and principles is a work in progress enterprise.  
 If we accept the reflective equilibrium explanation of the relevance of the public 
culture, then we are also able to explain why the idealization of the political 
constituency is a correct move from the theoretical perspective. According to this view, 
the relevant standards of objectivity and justifiability are basically congruent with their 
defensibility within a public framework of thought. This framework of thought would 
provide us with some specific “fundamental organizing idea within which all ideas and 
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principles can be systematically connected and related”37. These organizing ideas are in 
some sense derived from the public culture of liberal democratic societies but on the 
other hand they are normatively justified through an argument that is independent from 
the actual beliefs held by citizens of those societies. Therefore, these underlying 
considerations, that Rawls identifies with the conception of society as a fair system of 
social cooperation and with the notion of citizens as free and equal persons, are both 
consistent with and autonomous from the public culture of liberal democratic 
societies
38
. Thus, political principles must be shaped in the light of respecting and being 
consistent with these organizing ideas. If such a coherentist deliberative process can be 
accomplished, then it is sensible to claim in favour of the possibility, at least 
theoretically meaningful, of achieving stability for the right reason. However, the actual 
assent of the political consistency over such underlying ideas is a loose constraint over 
the normative deliberation. The fact that actual citizens can agree upon these organizing 
ideas, and consequently on the principles of justice as well, is not a bond for the theory 
itself. The theory should be shaped in order to favouring such an agreement; 
nevertheless the normativity of the process cannot be determined by the reference to a 
relativistic and contextual consent from the citizens. The possibility for principles of 
justice to be victoriously justified over other beliefs held by citizens is the regulative 
ideal that shapes the political framework of the Rawlsian theory of justice. Shared ideas 
of a public liberal culture display the way that must be undertaken by a political 
deliberation for justifying political principles – through the underlying considerations -, 
but the same shared ideas can be modified and revised in the light of principles of 
justice justified through a sound procedure of political deliberation. As Quong points 
                                                 
37
 Rawls, 1993, p. 8. 
38
 In this regard it is worth noticing that in PL Rawls does not call these basic ideas “model conceptions” 
as he used to do in “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory” (Rawls, 1980). In PL the two ideas around 
which his political conception is built are referred to as “organizing ideas”. Indeed, the “moral doctrine’s 
model conceptions” (Rawls, 1980, p. 537) are derived from a correct procedure of construction already 
embedded into a political context; while the organizing ideas are more fundamental ideas strictly derived 
from a specific political tradition (Rawls, 1993, p. 14). In my opinion the difference in the terminology 
can be explained with the fact that in the Dewey Lectures, written in 1980, Rawls is developing the 
perspective of political constructivism that is still present in PL but in a mitigated way. In my opinion, in 
“Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory” constructivism procedure was the prominent tool for 
justifying political principles, whereas in PL political constructivism is still relevant, but within a 
framework that is deeply coherentist. Of course, coherentism as a theory about the structure of 
justification and constructivism as a theory regarding the validity of practical objectivity and of a 
reasonable procedure of construction are consistent and quite often they have been coupled in a single 
theory of justice. However, I hold that in PL and even more in the paper Rawls wrote in order to reply to 
Habermas (Rawls, 1995) Rawls’ appeal to constructivism becomes weaker and weaker in favour of a 
strictly coherentist account of justification.  
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out, this structure is lightly circular and consistent with the general coherentist 
framework: “Our considered convictions gain justificatory force if they fit within a 
coherent conception of justice, and the conception of justice gains justificatory force if it 
can explain our most important considered convictions”39. Consequently, the actual 
constituency is not a normative constraint for the deliberation itself. Rather, the 
organizing ideas are shaped in the light of an idealized constituency that is constituted 
by citizens that, besides being reasonable (a normative features that has been required 
by the external conception as well), are also the citizens that would dwell in a well-
ordered society and that therefore accept the organizing ideas as justified within their 
doxastic system of beliefs. Thus, the internal conception of political liberalism averts 
the risk that a justified political principles can be refuted as illegitimated if the actual 
citizens of the political constituency do not recognizes it as valid. Again, the attempt to 
reconcile the theory to the here and now of the political domain does not coincide with a 
normative resignation. 
“If some citizens do not accept say, the burdens of judgement, then they must decide for 
themselves whether this fact warrants rejecting political liberalism, or whether they find 
political liberalism compelling enough that this causes them to re-consider their view 
about the burdens of judgement. Each citizen must engage in his or her own process of 
reflective equilibrium and arrive at a considered view about the coherence of political 
liberalism. Political liberalism, in other words, is not flawed from the start if it begins 
with premises that actual citizens may not accept”40. 
 
 
2.3  Political Justification and its Critiques 
 
 In the previous section I analysed the Rawlsian political paradigm, that I claimed 
being well described by the expression “realistic utopia”, dividing the analysis into two 
major areas of inquiry: contextualism and coherentism. In my opinion, these two 
categories help to depict a reliable framework of the Rawlsian structure of justification. 
I have outlined the Rawlsian paradigm in the light of the fundamental aim of this 
dissertation, to wit, introducing and defending a justificatory paradigm that respect the 
public justification ideal and that stems from a moderate epistemic paradigm. In this 
regard, I have claimed that coherentism is the best equipped model of justification for 
dealing with the public procedure for justifying political principles. Moreover, I stressed 
                                                 
39
 Quong, 2011, p. 155. 
40
 Ivi, p. 155-156. 
PhD Dissertation in Political Theory – XXV Cycle                                 PhD Candidate: Federica Liveriero  
Pag. 79 
 
that a coherentist procedure of justification is adequate, within the Rawlsian paradigm, 
if coupled with a contextual analysis that appeals to the normative value of some shared 
ideals that are reflected in the actual institutional practice. 
 I have described Ralws’ paradigm in the light of coherentism and contextualism, 
averting any reference to constructivism. Notwithstanding the fact that Rawls has 
supported a version of political constructivism in his works, I hold that a valid account 
of his justificatory approach can be provided eschewing any reference to constructivism. 
Let me explain why. Rawls states that political constructivism
41
 is part of the procedure 
of justification and that its relevance lies in the connection with the fact of reasonable 
pluralism and the possibility of an overlapping consensus on the fundamental political 
values
42
. However, already in PL the role played by political constructivism is mitigated 
with respect to the wider relevance it had in “Kantian Constructivism in Moral 
Theory”43, a collection of three public lectures Rawls gave in 1980. In PL political 
constructivism determines the procedure of construction of political principles 
addressed by the original position argument. However, the original position itself in PL 
is defined as a “device of representation”44, whereas in TJ such argument was the 
benchmark of the entire procedure of justification. With the political turn, the original 
position is still relevant, but in a different way: the procedure of construction of fair 
principles of justice under the veil of ignorance aims to model the two organizing ideas, 
of citizens as free and equal and of society as a fair system of cooperation, that are in 
some sense already internal to the public culture of liberal democracies. The attempt to 
model such underlying considerations is the first role played by the original position. 
Consequently, the justificatory force of such argument stems from its explanatory 
ability
45
. The original position, through the procedure of construction, shows us that it is 
possible to conceive a fair society and that such idealization derives somehow from 
already shared ideas of our public culture. Thus, even though political constructivism is 
                                                 
41
 Rawls calls his constructivist approach “political”, as he wants to differentiated it from the 
metaphysically involved comprehensive Kantian constructivism. “Political constructivism is a view about 
the structure and content of a political conception. It says that once, if ever, reflective equilibrium is 
attained, the principles of political justice (content) may be represented as the outcome of a certain 
procedure of construction (structure)”, Rawls, 1993, pp. 89-90. 
42
 See Rawls, 1993, p.90.  
43
 Rawls, 1980.  
44
 Rawls, 1993, p. 25. 
45
 Concerning the epistemic explanatory force of an argument, it is worth mentioning that the same 
explanatory force will be addressed in the next chapter as one of the most important feature f the 
reflective equilibrium method. See infra, sections 3.1 and 3.2. 
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still normatively relevant within the Rawlsian paradigm in PL, I regard it as less 
fundamental than before. Moreover, Rawls himself admits that political constructivism 
relies on the idea of reflective equilibrium
46
. For, if we avert a foundational structure of 
justification, then the procedure of construction of political principles can be granted as 
valid if and only if it matches our considered judgments in reflective equilibrium. Thus, 
the normative force of constructivism requires to be assessed within a coherentist 
framework of reasoning
47
. This outcome is therefore consistent with my claim that an 
adequate articulation of the Rawlsian structure of justification can be provided through 
two fundamental epistemic categories: coherentism and contextualism. 
 
2.3.1 Epistemic Abstinence 
 Before proceeding with the exposition of some proposals for arranging the 
Rawlsian paradigm in order to solve some difficulties concerning the structure of 
justification, it is worth introducing some critiques to the Rawlsian model. The main 
criticism to Rawls’ political turn can be divided in two main families: continuist critics 
according to which Rawls political liberalism is extremely weak as far as the 
justificatory procedure is concerned, as a powerful justification requires more continuity 
between political conception and a theory about the good life and the discontinuist 
critics who considers political liberalism as too comprehensive, for even an agreement 
on a strictly political conception is viewed as unrealistic as far as it requires to 
institutionalize specific moral claims
48
. In this section I focus my attention on a 
paradigmatic example of continuist criticism: the argument of epistemic abstinence 
introduced by Joseph Raz. This argument is more interesting than others, with regard to 
the general aim of this dissertation, since it is directed against the epistemic status of the 
justificatory procedure defended by Rawls. According to this criticism, any procedure 
of justification of political principles that eschews reference to the concept of truth is 
hopelessly weak, as it lacks the necessary epistemic strength for guaranteeing a sound 
                                                 
46
 Ivi, p. 95. 
47
 In the next chapter I will show that it is possible to sustain a paradigm of political justification even 
though focusing just on the coherentist aspects of justification; eschewing any reference to 
constructivism. I want to show that is not necessary to uphold a constructivist perspective in order to 
defend a definite structure of justification for political liberalism. In this regard, my proposal is different 
from the Rawlsian one. Indeed, I hold that constructivism – even when outlined as simply political – is 
still a too committing theory that cannot be managed within the framework of a reasonable disagreement. 
For a well-developed criticism of the Rawlsian political constructivism, see Brink 1987 and 1989 
48
 For a comprehensive survey of these criticisms, see Maffettone, 2010, ch. 7, pp. 158-188. 
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justification of its principle. For Raz and other authors
49
, it is very unlikely that a 
political liberalism, avoiding any reference to a system of ultimate truths or deep values, 
might be able to provide normative arguments sufficient for motivating citizens and for 
distinguishing the political system from a Hobbesian modus vivendi. In this regard, the 
authors that charge political liberalism of epistemic abstinence do not see how political 
liberalism might account for the difference between a mere instrumental stability and 
the desirability of a political consensus backed by right reasons. According to these 
authors, the desirability of a theory of justice is necessary connected with the 
establishment of moral truth
50
.  
In order to better understand the value of the epistemic abstinence issue, I briefly 
outline the main arguments presented by Raz in his article “Facing Diversity: The Case 
of Epistemic Abstinence”. Here, Raz articulates the fundamental assumptions around 
which Rawls develops his proposal of a strictly political liberalism. He describes them 
as: 
1. limited applicability; 
2. shallow foundation; 
3. autonomy; 
4. epistemic abstinence. 
According to Raz, the limited applicability is determined by the Rawlsian focus on 
the context. Indeed, starting from “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory”, Rawls 
ties up his justificatory procedure to the contextual circumstances of justice. In this 
regard, Rawls is promoting a theory of justice for a determined society (the democratic, 
liberal one), rather that a general theory valid universally. This first feature is connected 
with the shallow foundation, since as Raz summarizes: “the only definitive foundation 
is the rootedness in the here and now”51. This normative connection with a relevant, but 
contingent, context of applicability of the theory leaves the theory open to a criticism 
that I have already mentioned: namely the fact that this theory provides political values 
whose justification depends on the actual acceptance of a specific community, more 
than on a normative argument. Afterwards, Raz connects the shallow foundation with 
the autonomy of political philosophy that Rawls is looking for. According to Raz, these 
                                                 
49
 As, for example, Jean Hampton (1989) or Patrick Neal (1990). 
50 In this regard, Raz (1990, p. 15) states: “Their achievement – [...] – makes the theory true, sound, valid, 
and so forth. This at least is what such a theory is committed to. There can be no justice without truth”. 
51
 Raz, 1990, p. 6. 
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two assumptions, that are taken together within the Rawlsian paradigm, provide the 
answer to the fact of pluralism. Indeed, the Rawlsian attempt is to build up a political 
paradigm whose fundamental elements are part of a common public culture. In this 
regard, the possibility that actual citizens can share a common public culture would 
allow to the political practice of justification to transcend pluralism
52
. 
Finally, Raz reaches the argument of epistemic abstinence. According to this 
argument, Rawls, that refutes to claim that his doctrine of justice is a “true” doctrine, 
incurs in an epistemic weakness, since a strictly political approach would lose the 
possibility of appealing to a normative argument for justifying its principles of justice. 
Moreover, Raz claims that the epistemic abstinence is directly proportional to the 
degree of autonomy of the theory itself. The more the theory of justice is freestanding 
with regard to moral convictions, the more the theory lacks the necessary epistemic 
force for granting normative efficacy to its principles of justice. According to Raz, it is 
theoretically impossible to find a way for grounding a political theory, that should be 
normatively binding, without referring to some values as true values. In this regard, Raz 
thinks that for preserving normative force, a political theory must accept the demanding 
side of a metaphysical foundation. According to Raz, it is a wrong choice to avert any 
reference to truth in order to better manage pragmatic issues. Moreover, this choice 
would lead the theory to a sort of strong conventionalism, according to which the 
justifiability of the principles of justice will necessary stem from the fact that they are 
contingently chosen by members of society
53
. The desirability of Rawlsian liberalism 
therefore would completely rely on its degree of popularity within a contextual 
society
54
, rather than on the soundness of the procedure of justification itself. To 
conclude, it could be said that Raz, starting from his perfectionist perspective, does not 
succeed in finding that place, within Rawlsian project, in which political liberalism, 
avoiding any reference to truth, is however able to implement the right. In Raz view, the 
feasibility of a theory of justice should be derived all the way down from a normative 
argument that grounds the desirability of the theory itself in the fact that such theory can 
                                                 
52
 Raz (ivi, p. 9) states: “The common culture matters to Rawls as a fact, regardless of truth. That is the 
meaning of the shallow foundations. They, and the autonomy of the doctrine of justice, allow the 
generation of a theory of justice which can form the basis of a consensus in the face of pluralism”. 
53
 Raz is so strongly convinced that the Rawlsian approach lacks any epistemological criterion for 
distinguish a good normative theory from a bad one that he asserts (1990, p. 17): “His epistemic 
abstinence means that his doctrine of justice should be accepted even if false”. 
54
 Raz, 1990, p. 19. 
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be defined as a true theory of justice
55
. Thus, Raz defends an approach in epistemology 
that I defined in the first chapter as  too demanding, for it does not contemplate the 
possibility that a moral theory can be defined as valid and justified without being in the 
meanwhile described as a true theory. 
 
2.3.2 Transcendence 
 After having introduced a continuist sort of criticism against Rawls theory of 
political liberalism, I want to discuss another kind of criticism, namely a charge of too 
strong transcendence pressed by Amartya Sen in his last book The Idea of Justice
56
. In 
this book, Sen blames Rawls’ theory to be an expression of transcendental philosophy. 
According to Sen, the major flaw of all the transcendental approaches is to believe that 
from a notion of perfect justice it is possible to derive criteria of comparative justice. 
Sen describes Rawlsian approach as a normative theory that, in order to establish some 
general principles of justice, loses any contact with the contextual reality in which 
justice should be implemented. Any theory that starts with the definition of what is a 
“just society” is too transcendental, as the relevant issue is to analyse the actual 
instances of injustice and try to amend them. Sen regards Rawlsian political liberalism 
as a strongly ideal theory that does not take into consideration two fundamental and 
inescapable features of public deliberation, namely the unbridgeable gaps in information 
and the incompleteness of individual grading systems
57
. According to Sen, a feasible – 
and also desirable – theory of justice must be intrinsically nonideal and defined and 
defended through bottom-up arguments. In order to manage the contextual reality of our 
societies, we cannot start the analysis of justice trying to reconcile the reality with an 
ideal theory of justice that is determined by strictly theoretical arguments. Rather, 
                                                 
55
 Jonathan Quong (2011, ch. 8, pp. 221-255) proposes an analysis of the epistemic abstinence argument 
close to mine, as he claims that Raz’s critique would be well directed if and only if the fact of reasonable 
pluralism and the recognition of the burdens of judgement might be put aside as not stringent features of 
our contemporary societies. Naturally, given the strong theoretical connection I defended between a 
moderate paradigm of political justification and the recognition of the fundamental role played by 
epistemic fallibilism, I completely agree with Quong.  
56
 Sen, 2009. 
57
 “Thus, for reasons both of incomplete individual evaluations and of incomplete congruence between 
different individuals’ assessments, persistent incompleteness may be a hardy feature of judgements of 
social justice. This can be problematic for the identification of a perfectly just society, and make 
transcendental conclusions difficult to derive. And yet, such incompleteness would not prevent making 
comparative judgements about justice in a great many cases – where there might be fair agreement on 
particular pairwise rankings – about how to enhance justice and reduce injustice”, Sen, 2009, p. 105. 
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beginning with the analysis of actual cases of injustice, a nonideal theory of justice 
should try to build up a correct normative framework for dealing with such injustices. 
 Sen assesses Rawls’ theory from a strongly different perspective than mine, as he 
maintains social choice theory to be the correct framework for political reasoning. In 
this regard, Sen highlights some important features that a nonideal theory of justice 
should take into consideration:
58
 
  The first aim of justice should be a comparative analysis of the circumstances of 
justice, rather than a transcendental argument for outlining a just society. 
  It is fundamental to acknowledge the inescapable plurality of competing principles. 
  In order for the theory to be able to change with regard to the modification in the 
contextual reality, an important aim is to allow and facilitating as much re-
examinations as required by changes in the circumstances. 
  Given the fact that the ranking of individual preference, and consequently the 
interpersonal ranking as well
59
, is always partial or at least indeterminate in some 
extent, any theory of justice has to deal with the fact of valid alternative 
interpretations of the same event or principle. For this reason, then, a nonideal 
theory of justice permits partial resolutions. Sometimes this partiality can be 
resolved through an increase of the amount of information available. Other times, 
instead, the partiality should be asserted as a definite feature of our public 
deliberation over specific matters. In this regard, there could be an agreement of 
general concept, but indeterminacy on the consequences of such principles
60
. 
  Finally, a nonideal theory is necessary a work in progress enterprise, as there is not 
the possibility of determining – in a conclusive way – the structure of a theory of 
justice from the beginning. Rather, every principle of justice should pass through 
the assessment of real circumstances of implementation of justice. In this process, 
an important role is played by public reasoning because such public deliberation, 
when coupled with the development of democratic institutions, is able to modify 
the behavioural parameters in the society. 
 In my opinion, Sen’s criticism to the Rawlsian paradigm is misleading, as I 
consider Rawls’ theory of justice closer to a nonideal theory – when this latter is defined 
by the features presented above – than to a classic transcendental model of ideal theory. 
                                                 
58
 See Sen, 2009, pp. 106-11. 
59
 The fundamental argument in this regard is the theorem of impossibility by Kenneth Arrow. 
60
 See Gaus, 1996, pp. 151-158. 
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Probably, the different interpretation of the Rawls’ proposal between me and Sen is due 
to our different theoretical starting points. While Sen’s framework of reference is the 
rational choice theory, for me the relevant starting point for assessing a theory of justice 
is determining its procedure of justification
61
. Consequently, Sen focuses his main 
attentions on the possibility, for the theory of justice, to account for the indeterminacy 
in the interpersonal ranking of preferences and for the attempt to promote an evolution 
of social norms. Following Sen’s structure, fairness is a feature of public social life that 
must be evaluated through comparative rankings that derive their validity from 
contextual circumstances, rather than from a theory that establishes some criteria that 
hold in any circumstance. By contrast, in Rawls’ theory of justice the demand of 
fairness is a prelude to the whole system for the scrutiny of justice. In my opinion, Sen’s 
criticisms of Rawls’s theory are more valid and powerful if we look at TJ, more than at 
PL. For it is true that the original position argument is still normatively relevant in PL 
and that the constituency is an idealized one; however I do not see how the structure of 
justification defended in PL can be defined as transcendental. If it is assumed as valid 
the moderate interpretation of the epistemic background assumptions of PL that I am 
defending and these moderate framework is coupled with the structure of justification in 
different stages sustained by Rawls in his last essays, then almost all the requirements of 
justice introduced by Sen are realized in political liberalism as well. Of course, there are 
still main differences between these two models, as a procedure of justification shaped 
on Rawlsian insights does not regard the comparative model as the guiding one in 
political deliberation. However, both evaluative comparisons and social choice theory 
insights can be involved coherently within a nonideal approach for justifying a theory of 
justice modelled on the fundamental ideas developed in PL. I believe that both Sen and 
Rawls would be ready to agree on the fact that “we do not live in an ‘all or nothing’ 
world”62 and that, for this reason, feasible theories of justice have to meet realistic 
constraints and develop a structure of public deliberation that is intrinsically nonideal.  
  
2.3.3 Continuism VS Discontinuism 
  In the first chapter I introduced a fundamental distinction between two 
strategies: the continuist account of liberalism and the political one. According to this 
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 “The proper domain of the political is circumscribed by the ideal of public justification”, ivi, p.5. 
62
 Sen, 2009, p. 398. 
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distinction, the continuist strategy derives the validity and normativity of political 
principles from the fact that the theory of justice is embedded in a wider comprehensive 
argument regarding the moral ideals of the good life. The right can be independent from 
the good but, still, the fundamental justification of the former depends on our 
comprehensive doctrine with regard to the latter. By contrast, the political view holds a 
discontinuist strategy according to which the justification of political principles, for 
being legitimated, does not require any reference to a specific conception of the good.  
 Ronald Dworkin, in his essay “Liberal Community”63, argues in favour of liberal 
conception of the continuist strategy. According to Dworkin, his approach is still strictly 
liberal as the priority of the right over the good is assumed as a fundamental tenet. 
However, Dworkin maintains that the traditional liberalism focused too much attention 
to the issue of neutrality. The notion of neutrality has been defined theoretically after 
that its instrumental value was already acknowledged, since the neutrality of the state 
with regard to religious matters had been established as the best practical solution to the 
religious wars aroused in Europe around the 16
th
 and 17
th
 centuries. In this regard, the 
liberal theory itself was built in the light of the regulative ideal of neutrality of the state 
and the principle of toleration. Consequently, Dworkin continues, the liberal tradition 
has been developed through a discontinuist strategy, since the neutrality tenet was the 
bench mark of the entire procedure of justification. By contrast, Dworkin believes that 
the liberal principles of toleration and neutrality can be derived from a substantial 
argument that refers to the notion of the good life. In his “Equality and the Good 
Life”64, Dworkin defends a continuist strategy for the justification of political 
principles. The validity and normativity of such principles stem from the intrinsic value 
attached to responsibility that every person has for the accomplishment of her ideal of 
the good life. According to this approach, the validity of the principles of justice cannot 
be assessed if detached from the analysis of the good life. Dworkin shares the Plato 
insight that the right can never be inconsistent with the realization of  the ideal of the 
good. If a theory of justice requires us to sacrifice our possibility of living well – 
according to our substantial notion of good life -, then this theory of justice is incorrect. 
In Dworkin’s framework, morality and ethics are strictly interconnected, as they support 
and explain each other. Every person has a responsibility to live an authentic life and the 
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 Dworkin, 2000, pp. 211-236.  
64
 Ivi, pp. 237-284. 
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normative category of “living well” applies both to individual morality and public 
ethics
65
. This paradigm is strictly continuist and the procedure of justification can be 
defined as monological, as the deliberation spins off intersubjective morality out of a 
subjective position regarding ethics
66
. According to this paradigm, when we deal with 
public and private morality, a correct and normatively valid interpretation of the notion 
of the good life provides us with sound arguments in favour of principles of justice that 
can be embedded in the doxastic system of beliefs of every moral agent. Consequently, 
the principles of justice can be defined not just as valid, rather they are made true by 
their consistency with the substantive value of living well. According to this model, the 
strictly political justification of liberalism that is defended by Rawls after his political 
turn is too weak and schizophrenic. The schizophrenic charge maintains that is both 
theoretically incorrect (as morality and ethics are necessary intertwined) and practically 
unreasonable (since it would have no motivational force at all) to demand that citizens 
accept as valid principles of justice that are not part of their system of beliefs regarding 
the good life. The charge of weakness follows directly from it. A theory of justice 
justified just through the reference to political arguments and that refuses to be 
characterized as “true” is unable to override our beliefs about the good life that are 
supported and valorised thanks to the commitment to a comprehensive moral doctrine.  
 
2.3.4 The Dilemmatic Character of Liberalism 
  Political liberalism, as I have already explained shortly in the first chapter, faces 
an intrinsic tension within its theoretical framework. This tension does not simply 
regard the distinction between strictly political principles and moral comprehensive 
doctrines. Rather, the fundamental dualism within PL system is given by two aspects of 
the procedure of justification that seem to be inconsistent between each other: on the 
one hand there is the philosophical requirement of justifying political principle via a 
normative sound argument; on the other hand there is the practical constraint of 
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 “Why do people take an interest in moral issues? If, as I believe, people want to live well and sense that 
living well includes respecting their moral responsibilities, then it is wholly natural that they mainly feel 
at least some impulse to do what they think they ought to do” (Dworkin, 2011, p. 58) and also “We might 
think, that is, that living well simply incorporates morality without that connection in any way affecting 
what morality requires. Or we might treat the content of morality as fixed at least in part by the in de pen 
dent character of ethical responsibility: we might suppose that just as our ethical responsibilities are partly 
fixed by our moral responsibilities to others, so the latter are fixed in part by what our ethical 
responsibilities are. On this second view, morality and ethics are integrated in the interpretive way we 
have been exploring over the last few chapters”, (ivi, p. 202). 
66
 The definition of Dworkin notion of deliberation as “monological” is due to Prof. David Rasmussen. 
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respecting the fact of pluralism. In order to develop a procedure of justification 
consistent with both these commitments, Rawls claims that the philosophical argument 
for justifying principles of justice is freestanding, as completely detached from any 
specific comprehensive doctrine. However, if the justification of political principles is 
freestanding, how is it possible that it achieves the necessary robustness
67
? Robustness 
is an epistemic notion according to which a “theory T1 is robust vis-a-vis T2 to the 
extent that changes in T2 — including the total rejection of T2 in favour of some 
competing theory T2' — do not weaken the justification of T1. Robustness is to be 
contrasted with sensitivity; to the extent that the justification of T1 is affected by 
changes in T2 T1 is sensitive to T2”68. The regulative ideal of PL is to provide a public 
justification of political principles that demonstrate how these principles can achieve 
robustness in relation to various metaphysical and epistemic theories. In this way, 
political liberalism would be justified through a procedure that is philosophically 
adequate, but still it would respect the fact of pluralism and the variety of 
comprehensive doctrines held by citizens. According to Gaus, it is sensible to claim that 
reasonable pluralism is a stable outcome of our contemporary democracies if and only if 
there is a theoretical possibility to argue that two individuals hold two different beliefs 
that are simultaneously justified and incompatible with each other. In this regard, 
political liberalism has to draw a line between personal and public justification. The 
category of public justification applies just to a specific range of matters and beliefs. In 
order to claim that a belief (or principle) is publicly justified, such belief must result 
robust enough to be justified regardless of the other comprehensive beliefs that different 
persons hold in their doxastic sets of beliefs. However, Gaus distinguishes between 
robustness and uncontroversiality as, given the fact of reasonable pluralism, public 
justification can result to be victoriously justified in our doxastic systems, but still 
without providing us with uncontroversial beliefs. Again, the moderate account of moral 
epistemology is the best equipped paradigm for dealing with this distinction. As Gaus 
states “the general idea of truth is highly contested today, as the notion of ethical truth 
has long been. Analyses of justified belief that do not presuppose the concept of truth 
are much more apt to achieve the robustness that justificatory liberalism seeks”69. Even 
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 Both Gaus (1996) and D’Agstino (1992 and 1996) highlight the relevance of robustness as a 
fundamental feature of justificatory arguments.  
68
 Gaus, 1996, p. 6. 
69
 Ivi, p. 27. 
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though this account of the procedure of public justification can be epistemically sound 
and realistic, still from the perspective of achieving stability for the right reasons this 
same account can be problematic. Political liberalism has to overcome the dualism 
between the philosophical and realistic side of its structure of justification. On the one 
hand, the philosophical side requires the procedure of justification to provide a sound 
argument of justification that grants the normativity of the whole structure. On the other 
hand, the political turn has involved a major focus on the actual circumstances of justice 
and on the fact of pluralism. Given the fact of pluralism, the justification of political 
principles should avert any reference to a specific comprehensive doctrine. 
Consequently, the political theory should be strictly freestanding and therefore not 
sensitive to the different comprehensive doctrines held by citizens. Thus, the public 
justification would be consistent with different theories of truth or the good life and 
therefore political principles might obtain support from different moral perspectives. 
“Thus regardless of which doctrine is embraced or accepted as true—or indeed which 
one may someday be demonstrated true—political liberalism will be justified, and in 
this sense is robust”70. Nevertheless, the more the theory acquires political efficacy 
being robust in relation to as many as comprehensive doctrines possible, the more the 
theory loses philosophical depth. If the procedure of justification should be 
freestanding, then the array of philosophical arguments that can be employed into the 
justification is extremely reduced. Moreover, if the justification of political principles 
cannot employ the beliefs that citizens more strongly believe within the deliberative 
procedure, since these are strongly connected with different comprehensive doctrines, 
then it seems that the motivational force of the political principles is extremely reduced. 
In this regard, political liberalism seems to be counter-intuitive, as some of the most 
important beliefs for us - beliefs that are strongly upheld into our personal doxastic 
system of beliefs - cannot be engaged in the public deliberation over political principles. 
As Maffettone clearly points out, political liberalism faces a dilemma between stability 
for the right reasons and pluralism
71
. In this regard, liberal procedure of justification has 
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 Ivi, p. 6. 
71
 “Rawls actually does not think in terms of a coherent integration between a normative-philosophical 
justification and a factual legitimation. Rather he continues to work within the horizon of a philosophical 
theory of justice. Nevertheless, in order to settle the central dilemma between stability and pluralism, he 
must concede that a pure philosophical justification of liberal democracy is itself insufficient to guarantee 
the equilibrium between these opposing claims” (Maffettone, 2010, p. 22) and also “He is forced to admit 
that the mere philosophical justification of liberal democracy through a theory of justice as fairness – of 
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to find a way for dealing with an inverse proportionality that incurs between the 
“realistic sensitiveness” of the theory with regard to the actual circumstances of justice 
here and now and the philosophical attempt to produce a theory of justice that is 
normatively binding and motivationally powerful. Thus, it seems that political 
liberalism is arrived to a dead end. Either political liberalism accepts the realistic stance 
all the way down and therefore becomes inclined to focus its attention more on the issue 
of the actual consent than on the quest for a philosophical normative argument, or it 
faces the fact of pluralism reaffirming the validity of liberalism as a true – and 
philosophically powerfully justified – theory of justice. To conclude, it could be said 
that Rawls, in his development of a strictly political theory of liberalism, ends up for 
sustaining a framework of justification that is intrinsically dualistic, if not even 
dilemmatic
72
.  
 This dualism is well expressed by Rawls himself at the end of his survey, within 
the Lecture of the History of Moral Philosophy
73
, about Hegel philosophy of right 
claiming that for Hegel only two possibilities are available: either we look for continuity 
between individual morality and the public ethical life (expressed by the concept of 
Sittlichkeit); or we are left with individual atomism. These two solutions, in some sense, 
might express the intrinsic dualism of political liberalism that I am articulating. On the 
one hand, the continuist perspective would represent the philosophical expectation with 
regard to the validity of public justification. Even when connected with the normative 
value of a public culture, still this continuist account upholds a notion of justification in 
which political principles are not just robust, rather they should be defended as 
conclusively justified as consistent with a specific moral comprehensive theory. On the 
other hand, individual atomism focuses all the attention on the individual motivations 
and partisan interests. Following this perspective then, all the theoretical effort should 
be directed to the achievement of the wider consent possible. Thus, this second 
perspective would be closer to a Hobbesian system, than a normative one. 
 By contrast, the Rawlsian attempt to build up a strictly political liberalism without 
losing the normative side of the procedure of justification can be interpreted as a third 
                                                                                                                                               
the kind he himself presents in TJ – is insufficient for achieving the desired equilibrium between 
pluralistic normative claims and institutional stability” (Maffettone, 2010, p. 316). 
72
 Again, Maffettone (2010, p. 282) is very helpful when he refers to the dilemma of public reason: “This 
dilemma consists in the limits of public reason in terms of justification. What remains unclear is the way 
in which the citizen is supposed to act when the duties connected with public reason are in conflict with 
the duties deriving from the preferred comprehensive doctrine”. 
73
 Rawls, 2000. 
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solution that tries to find a balances between the other two. As I explained in the first 
chapter, this political theory of justice is closer to a neutral/political account of 
liberalism, than a continuist one. However, one of the fundamental aim of the Rawlsian 
political liberalism is to show that even if liberalism refutes a continuist paradigm of 
justification – a paradigm in which political theory ends up to be coincident with a 
comprehensive doctrine that can be shared by all the members of society –, this it does 
not imply that political liberalism must be reduced to a strongly individualistic theory in 
which what does it matter are just the individual interests and personal motivations. In 
order to reply to Hegel, Rawls maintains that a third solution is possible, between 
comprehensive continuism and mere individualism. This approach claims for an 
objective public theory of justice that cannot either be reduced to the sum of individual 
interests or described as a comprehensive doctrine that should be upheld by every 
citizen as it overrides all the other beliefs citizens hold in their doxastic system of 
beliefs. In PL Rawls tries to embed the freestanding stage of the theory
74
 – grounded on 
strictly philosophical arguments – within a justificatory structure that takes as relevant 
some facts of our contextual political life. In this regard, a strictly philosophical 
argument, which can be defined as top-down, is still present, but is part of a wider 
structure of justification that employs both a coherentist paradigm of justification and a 
contextual standpoint. 
 In my opinion, this structure of justification that is made up by different stages of 
justification and by both top-down and bottom-up arguments is a very well equipped 
theory of justification. First of all, this approach allows political liberalism to be 
sensitive both to pluralism and to stability for the right reasons constraints. Recognizing 
the fact of pluralism entails that principles of justice, in order to be able to gain support 
from the members of the political constituency, should be justified publicly, averting 
any reference to a liberal comprehensive doctrine. The stability for the right reasons 
constraints demands that liberal theories yield a normatively binding procedure of 
justification that grants the acceptability of political principles, more than their 
contextual acceptance. In this regard, is not sufficient to provide good philosophical 
arguments for justifying a principle; rather is also necessary that these philosophical 
arguments are accepted as victoriously justified within the doxastic system of the 
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 “A political conception of justice is what I call freestanding when it is not presented as derived from, or 
as part of, any comprehensive doctrine. Such a conception of justice in order to be a moral conception 
must contain its own intrinsic normative and moral ideal”, Rawls, 1993, p. xlii. 
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members of the constituency. Consequently, it is not sufficient that the priority of the 
right over the good is supported by theoretical arguments. For the priority of right 
should be justified in a way that is acceptable and therefore motivational adequate for 
the members of the constituency. For these reasons, this procedure of justification 
divided in different steps accounts for the diachronic side of morality and for the fact 
that political justification can be viewed as a work in progress enterprise. Second, this 
approach replies in a powerful way both to the charge of being too transcendental and to 
the risk of sustaining a procedure of justification that is strictly instrumental and 
therefore epistemically weak. 
 To conclude, I want to add few comments on the “third view” identified and 
defended by Rawls. This third view, as I discussed earlier, is closer to a neutral/political 
paradigm of political theory than to a continuist one. This feature of PL accounts for the 
political turn that Rawls has theorized after TJ. The “political” aspects of Rawlsian 
liberal theory are different and not always well explained. First of all, the liberal theory 
discussed in PL is political, as it requires a freestanding argument for justifying political 
principles of justice. This freestanding argument, although philosophically powerful and 
normatively binding, is not supported by any comprehensive doctrine; rather it is strictly 
political. Second, there is a second meaning in which Rawlsian theory is political, 
namely the fact the Rawls embeds the freestanding argument regarding the validity of 
the principles of justice into the context of the “here and now” of contemporary 
democracies. Therefore, the ideal side of the theory is not sufficient in itself for granting 
a sound justification of political liberalism. We need a different stage of analysis, a 
nonideal one, in which the principles of justice are assessed through the lens of real 
democratic multicultural societies. In this regard, I take political liberalism to be strictly 
“political” as it is extremely well aware of the real circumstances of justice and of the 
fact that a work in progress stage of the theory would be always required. 
 On the one hand, the third view outlined by Rawls in PL refused the atomistic 
individualism as unable to theorize the existence of an objective public perspective on 
justice. Still, it deduces from it the relevance of the motivational adequacy constraint for 
any theory of justice. On the other hand, Rawls shares with Hegel the insight that the 
public political culture is a relevant normative feature for our political normative 
deliberation. Nevertheless, he refuses to establish a continuist framework in which 
individual morality should necessary end up to coincide with the public ethics. 
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Therefore, the third way tries to build up and justify a theory of justice that is a realistic 
utopia. According to this model, the theory should be normatively valid and therefore 
desirable. However, the same theory must meet some feasibility constraints due to the 
circumstance of justice of the here and now. While in TJ the feasibility of the theory of 
justice was derived directly from the normative desirability of the theory itself, in PL 
this relation is not taken for granted, as the recognition of fact of pluralism involves an 
awareness regarding the difficulties of obtaining stability for the right reason. 
Consequently, in PL the actual feasibility of the theory of justice becomes a 
fundamental criterion in order to assess the desirability of the theory as well.  
 
 
2. 4 Achieving Public Consensus 
 
 In the foregoing sections, I analysed the Rawlsian proposal and some of the 
main criticisms to such paradigm. Then, I focused my attention on some dualisms and 
difficulties that are inherent to the Rawlsian structure of justification. In this last section 
of this chapter my main goal is to provide a different interpretation of the Rawlsian 
paradigm: an interpretation that is consistent with the general framework I am defending 
and that might as well turn out to be a good solution to the dilemmatic tensions within 
the classic versions of political liberalism. There are three main theoretical bench marks 
that are fundamental for the development of public justification: normative justification; 
individual motivation and public political culture. However, the connection among 
these aspects with the procedure of justification itself is not always clear and involves 
problematic tension that must be resolved. Understand the way in which these three 
issues are intertwined and how they can be systematized in a coherent procedure of 
justification is the main goal of this last section of this chapter.   
 Within the paradigm of political liberalism, the relation between normative 
justification and individual motivation is intrinsically problematic. Given the fact that 
political account of liberalism should provide a justification of its principles that is 
completely independent from any specific comprehensive doctrine, then the 
motivational force of such procedure of justification is both enhanced and weakened. 
On the one hand, political liberalism is structured in such a way in order to be 
compatible with every comprehensive doctrine held by citizens and being therefore 
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respectful of the fact of pluralism. In this regard, the strictly political justification of 
political principles should enhance the possibility, for the theory itself, to be included 
within the different individuals’ doxastic sets. On the other hand, the reference to solely 
political arguments for justifying the theory is viewed as a flaw, since it is difficult to 
see how a strictly political account of justice can became motivationally strong enough 
to trump comprehensive beliefs regarding the personal conception of the good. It is in 
order to solve this tension that the public culture becomes theoretical relevant. 
According to Rawls, it might be too utopian to presuppose that political ideals can 
override personal interests and comprehensive beliefs within the individual doxastic 
systems of beliefs. For this reason, Rawls attaches a motivational force to the fact that 
the members of a liberal society already share some ideals regarding a well-ordered 
society and about some features attached to the people that dwell such society. 
Nevertheless, which is the normative force attached to this contextual reference to a 
shared public culture? I am going to analyse this issue through the discussion of the 
normative validity of the overlapping consensus, as the determination of the 
justificatory role played by such concept it will help me to introduce my own solution 
for establishing and maintaining a fruitful relationship between normative justification, 
individual motivation and the reference to a public culture. 
 
2.4.1 The Overlapping Consensus 
 The role played by the overlapping consensus within the Rawlsian structure of 
justification has been deeply criticized by Jürgen Habermas in his exchange with Rawls 
that it has been published in The Journal of Philosophy in 1995
75
. The debate between 
the two authors begins with an article by Habermas in which he states that he essentially 
shares Rawl’s project, but he criticises the execution of the project. For the sake of 
brevity, I will simply list the three points on which Habermas focuses his criticism: 
i. The representation’s mechanism of the original position; 
ii. the role played by the overlapping consensus; 
iii. the relationship between private autonomy and political autonomy. 
 Habermas wonders whether the overlapping consensus plays a cognitive role in the 
justification or simply imposes itself as a necessary step in order to obtain a concrete 
stability. According to Habermas, is not at all clear if the role played by the overlapping 
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 Habermas (1995) and Rawls (1995). 
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consensus is normative or simply descriptive. Habermas wants to show that, compared 
to its normative communicative procedure of deliberation, Rawl’s political liberalism 
assumes, at the starting point, two very demanding burdens of proof:  
- The reference to the intrinsic normativity of the principles of justice. 
- The possibility to show that a public agreement over these principles can achieve a 
stable consensus for the right reasons. 
According to Habermas, providing a justification starting from such committing – 
normatively speaking – assumptions is an enterprise deemed to fail. On the one hand, 
assuming the validity of these assumption compels the theory to begin with strong 
idealization that cannot be supported by theoretical arguments, given the post-
metaphysical context in which this theory should be endorsed. On the other hand, if this 
assumptions are justified given an actual agreement by citizens, then all the justificatory 
force ends up depending on the actual acceptance by citizen. 
 By contrast, Habermas maintains that the paradigm of public deliberation that he 
defends does not presuppose any committing normative stance as well as any moral 
presuppositions. In this regard, it is worth noting that a post metaphysical model of 
reasoning, as the one defended by Habermas, is constrained to eschew certain 
metaphysical arguments not just in the political domain – as it is required in the strictly 
political paradigm introduced by Rawls – but in every deliberative reasoning76. 
Therefore, the normativity that Habermas defends is derived entirely from the 
constraints intrinsic to the use of rationality itself. The discourse principle assures that 
any substantive principle is already being justified through a deliberative discourse. In 
this regard, the discourse principle does not presuppose a moral theory of any kind
77
. 
The major difference between the Rawlsian and Habermasian paradigms is that in PL 
the initial credibility – and desirability qua feasibility – of the principles of justice 
hinges on a contextual reference to some shared ideals, whereas for Habermas all the 
normative force of the structure stems from the universal validity of the communicative 
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 “In a pluralistic society, the theory of justice can expect to be accepted by citizens only if it limits itself 
to a conception that is postmetaphysical in the strict sense, that is, only if it avoids taking sides in the 
contest of competing forms of life and worldviews. In many theoretical questions, and all the more so in 
practical questions, the public use of reason does not lead to a rationally motivated agreement”, 
Habermas, 1996, p. 60. 
77
 “The discourse principle is only intended to explain the point of view from which norms of action can 
be impartially justified; I assume that the principle itself reflects those symmetrical relations of 
recognition built into communicatively structured forms of life in general”, ivi, pp. 108-109. 
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action
78
. Within the Rawlsian paradigm the warranty of the citizens commitment toward 
principles of justice is derived from the fact that the principles of justice are already 
modelled on some specific conceptions of society and citizens that the members of the 
constituency share. In this regard, the whole structure of justification hinges on a 
coherentist paradigm. Indeed, principles of justice are ultimately justified if and only if 
they demonstrate to be consistent, in reflective equilibrium, with the doxastic sets of 
beliefs held by citizens. By contrast, Habermas framework does not begin with any 
shared conception. Rather, it is grounded into the rational practice of lawmaking and all 
the normativity force attached to the procedure of justification stems from the discourse 
principles. Habermas’ framework is structured from the beginning as transcendental – 
in the Kantian meaning – as he establishes a set of norms that govern the process of 
raising and contesting validity claims. Following this model, the correct procedure of 
construction would refer to the norms, that people are committed to, by the mere fact 
that they are engaging in a practice of discourse
79
. Hence, the public justification first 
aim is to codify the normative infrastructure that is already present in the free give-and-
take communicative activity. Therefore, the theoretic apparatus is heavier in Habermas’ 
framework than in Rawlsian political liberalism. However, the major charge that 
Habermas addresses to Rawls is that his structure of public deliberation does not leave 
enough room for the actual practice of democracy. The justification of the principles 
would be carried out at the first level, which is purely theoretical, of the conceptual 
artifice of the original position, whereas the concrete overlapping consensus would 
address only the difficulties concerning stability and social unity
80
. Following this 
perspective, Habermas argues that a strict political liberalism, using the predicate 
“reasonable” in place of the predicate “true”, could not prevent a breakdown between 
the question of the acceptability (of a norms, as previously justified) and the factual 
acceptance. If the second level of Rawls’ theory of justice is really bound to the simple 
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 For a very exhaustive analysis of the difference between the justificatory paradigms defended by Rawls 
and Habermas, see Hendrick, 2010. 
79
 “For the justification of moral norms, the discourse principle takes the form of a universalization 
principle. To this extent, the moral principle functions as a rule of argumentation. Starting with the 
general presuppositions of argumentation as the reflective form of communicative action, one can attempt 
to elucidate this principle in a formal-pragmatic fashion”, Habermas, 1996, p. 109. 
80
 Habermas (1995, p. 121, italics in the original) states: “Because Rawls situates the ‘question of 
stability’ in the foreground, the overlapping consensus merely expresses the functional contribution that 
the theory of justice can make to the peaceful institutionalization of social cooperation; but in this the 
intrinsic value of a justified theory must already be presupposed. From this functionalist perspective, the 
question on whether the theory can meet with public agreement […] would lose an epistemic meaning 
essential to the theory itself”. 
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quest for stability, then political liberalism loses the essential distinction between the 
preservation of the status quo, as a guarantor of mere stability, from the much deeper 
value of promoting normative and legitimated principles
81
. In this regard, the objectivity 
of political liberalism would rely on a reconstructive hermeneutic, rather than being 
dependent over a normative procedure of construction. Habermas claims that the 
epistemic weakness of the Rawlsian model is represented by his theoretical decision to 
substitute the term “reasonable” to the predicate “true”. Indeed, for Habermas, the 
reasonable could be interpreted in two ways: 
a. As a synonym for moral truth (there would be a mere lexical difference with truth). 
b. As the ability to deal with different moral visions, in the awareness of the 
impossibility of establishing a certain truth. Reasonableness is the aspect of human 
reasoning that is conscious of the burdens of reason and that, therefore, aims to 
manage the dissent among people. According to this interpretation, reasonableness 
would be an epistemic tool for solving disagreement, rather than a normative 
commitment toward the possibility of establishing the validity of individual 
opinions.  
In presenting these two different meanings of the terms “reasonable”, Habermas wants 
to show that Rawls’ project to promote an explicitly political, but still normatively 
powerful and motivational adequate, liberalism is condemned to failure. According to 
Habermas, Rawls’ attempt to justify his theory of justice just through strictly political 
arguments would deprive his theory of the possibility of investigating the epistemic 
connotations of the term “reasonable”. Thus, Rawls would fall into a kind of 
contradiction, as he expects to limit the doctrine to the political field by eliminating the 
epistemological questions, nevertheless such questions would still be implicitly present, 
as the normative status of reasonableness is not at all clear. Habermas maintains that 
without investigating the normative and epistemic features of reasonableness it is 
theoretical impossible to assume that “reasonable” principle of justice might trump 
“true” – according to the holder of the beliefs – beliefs that are justified through the 
reference to a comprehensive doctrine. Moreover, even if the epistemic strength of 
reasonableness is investigated and defended, still Habermas maintains that the decision 
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 “The risk here is of Rawls confusing overlapping consensus as a normative device able to support 
moral stability, and overlapping consensus as an empirical fact able to support just social stability. In 
these terms, the overlapping consensus would oscillate between a ‘cognitive role’ and a mere 
‘instrumental role’”, Maffettone, 2010, p. 182. 
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of establishing the limit of reasonable from the beginning is flawed. Given his 
communicative framework, Habermas believes that the only correct way for 
establishing the limit of reasonableness is through a political debate. Otherwise, all the 
structure of justification will end up for being monological, as the fundamental 
normative notions and procedures were established in advance, before that the actual 
practice of public political deliberation is carried through. “For Habermas, the limits of 
the political cannot be a priori decided either constitutionally or philosophically. They 
must instead be decided via an actual debate among real individuals”82. In this regard, 
the theory defended by Habermas is more modest, as it defines public reason as just 
procedural. Starting from an unconstrained disagreement – given the post-metaphysical 
context in which we are living – his theory of communicative action allows to reach a 
superior stage of impartiality through the discourse principle. In this superior stage, 
then, the principles justified are defined as truth-claims, where truth is defined as 
cognitive validity
83
.  
 Habermas criticism of Rawls’ procedure of justification on PL is twofold. On the 
one hand, as I said previously, Habermas defends a more modest approach, according to 
which the actual practice of the political deliberation in which citizens give and receive 
reasons should be unconstrained. In this regard, he is against the Rawlsian attempt to 
model the concept of reasonableness at the first, merely theoretical, level of the theory. 
Habermas maintains that if too many normative aspects of the theory are determined 
before the actual democratic procedure of exchanging reasons is realized, then the 
theory illegitimately favours the liberty of the moderns over the liberty of the ancients
84
. 
According to this interpretation of Rawls, all the normative structure of the theory of 
justice would be determined and justified in a theoretical stage of the theory in which 
the actual citizens of democratic society play no role. Then, these citizens will find 
themselves living in an institutionalized world in which they are subjected to norms that 
they have not contributed to justify
85
. On the other hand, Habermas theory is more 
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 Maffettone, 2010, p. 188. 
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 Ivi, p. 184. 
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 It is worth noting that Habermas famously argues in favour of a co-originality thesis with regard to the 
relationship between the liberty of ancients and the liberty of the moderns. “The system of rights calls for 
the simultaneous and complementary realization of private and civic autonomy. From a normative 
standpoint, these two forms of autonomy are co-original and reciprocally presuppose each other, because 
one would remain incomplete without the other”, Habermas, 1996, p. 314. 
85
 “For the higher the veil of ignorance is raised and the more Rawls's citizens themselves take on real 
flesh and blood, the more deeply they find themselves subject to principles and norms that have been 
anticipated in theory and have already become institutionalized beyond their control. In this way, the 
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ambitious than the Rawlsian one, as he wants to demonstrate that through the 
communicative action it is possible to reach a stage of justification in which, thanks to 
an impartial point of view, some principles of justice are established and justified as 
true, not simply as the most reasonable principles on which different people can agree 
upon. 
 Now, it should be clear why Habermas criticizes the normative role played by the 
overlapping consensus in the Rawlsian paradigm. According to Habermas, a social 
contingent fact as the achievement of an overlapping consensus cannot be transformed 
in a normative relevant aspect of the justificatory procedure. Habermas maintains that it 
is theoretically wrong to ground the structure of justification on the possibility that an 
actual overlapping consensus is possible within our post-metaphysical societies. Even if 
a sort of overlapping consensus might be reached, however its achievement cannot be 
granted a-priori and certainly it cannot be used as the starting point of the whole 
procedure of justification. Consequently, the role played by the overlapping consensus it 
would be merely instrumental, as it would be directed to describe the fact that actual 
citizens do share some common ideals
86
.  
 
2.4.2 Three Different Stages of Justification 
 After having spent some time analysing Habermas’ critiques to the Rawlsian 
model of justification, it is now time to focus on Rawls’ reply. First of all, it is 
important to highlight that the Rawlsian procedure of justification, when explained 
properly (as Rawls indeed does in his “Reply to Habermas”), is more complicated than 
it might seem at a first glance. Indeed, the procedure of justification takes into 
consideration three different standpoints: the perspective of parties in the original 
position; the perspective of an idealized constituency of citizens and then the point of 
view of reasonable citizens here ad now. 
 Naturally, the justification that must be provided with regard to these different 
standpoints is different. For this reason, Rawls divided its structure of justification into 
different stages. Rawls first aim, when dealing with the procedure of justification, is to 
uncover public basis of justification. It is exactly this attempt that leads Habermas to 
                                                                                                                                               
theory deprives the citizens of too many of the insights that they would have to assimilate anew in each 
generation”, Habermas, 1995, p. 128. 
86
 In this regard, the normative validity of such consensus stems from the contingent fact that such 
consensus is realized in the contextual reality. Consequently, the overlapping consensus model would be 
extremely closed to a Hobbesian modus vivendi. 
PhD Dissertation in Political Theory – XXV Cycle                                 PhD Candidate: Federica Liveriero  
Pag. 100 
 
claim that Rawlsian procedure of justification is nothing more than a reconstructive 
“hermeneutic clarification of a contingent tradition”87. However, I am going to show 
that this “conciliatory” attitude that steers Rawls’ procedure of justification does not 
necessary imply a relativistic perspective or a solely instrumental establishment of 
political principles. Rawls wants to develop a normative argument regarding the 
reasonable constraints that the members of the political constituency might accept as 
legitimate as they are consistent with the organizing ideas that are shared in the public 
culture of that society. According to a moderate account of political justification, it is 
not possible to provide normatively binding arguments of justice if these same 
arguments do not result acceptable in the light of the doxastic systems of beliefs of the 
members of the society to whom such principles are addressed. Consequently, Rawls 
believes that is necessary, in order to begin the procedure of justification, to establish a 
loose meta-consensus on some specific organizing ideas and general concepts. In this 
regard, the meta-consensus would be a sort of transcendental condition for granting the 
possibility of arguing in favour of a normative concept of public reason. Naturally, both 
the deliberative procedure of public reason and the underlying considerations are 
constantly under scrutiny, as even though they are justified or shared here and now, they 
are still always revisable. This structure of justification is coherent with the modest 
paradigm of justification that I outlined in the first chapter, as it has been laid out under 
a fallibilist framework and averts any reference to pure normative standpoints. To 
conclude, it could be said that Rawls, in contrast with Habermas, substitutes the rational 
universal constraints of communicative action with a public framework of justification 
in which moral and epistemic constraints are derived from a antecedent meta-consensus 
on some share ideals.  
 In order to better understand the Rawlsian’s project I outlined briefly in the 
previous section it is worth to spend some time analysing the distinction between the 
three kinds of justification that constitutes the procedure of justification of PL. All these 
three different stages of justification are necessary for political liberalism in order to 
achieve the legitimacy of the principles of justice and the stability for the right reasons 
requested. These three kinds of justification are: 
1. Pro tanto justification; 
2. Full justification; 
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3. Public justification88. 
1. The pro tanto justification constitutes the bottom level of the procedure, since it 
takes into account only values that are intrinsically political. Despite this 
epistemological limitation, justification pro tanto will still be structured in terms of a 
freestanding justification that is complete in its own way. At this level the procedure of 
justification hinges on a philosophical argument for justifying a specific procedure of 
construction of principles of justice. The pro tanto justification does not depend on any 
reference to the actual circumstances of justice, as it developed thanks to sound 
philosophical arguments. The pro tanto justification is expressed perfectly by an 
argument as the original position. According to this procedure, in fact, a procedure of 
construction is modelled in order to provide sound principles of justice that are justified 
through the reference to philosophically valid arguments that show how it is possible to 
achieve a fair agreement between the parties. Therefore, this first level of freestanding 
justification addresses the parties as the specific receiver of the arguments for justifying 
the validity of the principles of justice. 
 The Rawls’ view, at this first level of justification, is certainly discontinuous, since 
the theory, through a procedure that brackets every value that is not strictly political, is 
able to achieve a neutral justificatory argument that is intersubjectively shared. 
Nevertheless, Rawls himself admits that it would be too demanding and illusory to 
believe that members of a real liberal society would be able to accept and justify a 
procedure that is so schizophrenic. Even if the device of representation of the original 
position builds up a reasonable structure of justification for some general principles of 
justice, still this justification, developed in strictly political terms, is completely 
detached from the comprehensive beliefs held by citizens in their doxastic systems. For 
this reason, at the level of pro tanto justification, the political values are destined to be 
trumped by the comprehensive doctrines held by citizens. 
2. Thus, to avoid the impasse of a conflict between private comprehensive doctrines 
and the political values justified by a deliberative procedure related to a device of 
representation (the original position), Rawls introduces the second level of justification: 
the full justification. At this level, thus, “it is left to each citizen, individually or in 
association with others, to say how the claims of political justice are to be ordered, or 
weighed, against nonpolitical values. The political conception gives no guidance in such 
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questions, since it does not say how nonpolitical values are to be counted. This guidance 
belongs to citizens’ comprehensive doctrines”89. It is at this level that principles of 
justice already justified by a freestanding argument should demonstrate their ability to 
enter into the doxastic systems of beliefs of the members of the constituency of 
reasonable citizens here and now. In this regard, this second stage of justification is 
closer to a continuist perspective, as every single member of the constituency should 
find her personal way for maintaining the necessary coherence, within her doxastic 
system, between political and comprehensive doctrines. Rawls’ hope is that the political 
values could be embedded within individual doxastic systems, without requiring to the 
individuals to abandon their comprehensive beliefs
90
. As the same Rawls claims
91
: 
“even though a political conception of justice is freestanding, that does not mean that it 
cannot be embedded in various ways into – [...] – the different doctrines citizens 
affirm”. The fact that the theory of PL is defined as exclusively political does not 
necessarily mean that it can never be possible to establish a process of integration 
between comprehensive visions and political values. Rawls describes as feasible a 
procedure of justification in which political liberalism can be both discontinuously and 
continuously justified with regard to the doxastic systems of beliefs of the member of 
the political constituency. A freestanding argument, discontinuous with regard to the 
comprehensive doctrines held by citizens, is the right starting point for providing a 
sound and philosophically autonomous justification of the principles of justice. 
However, for political liberalism to enhance its desirability – through an argument that 
grants its feasibility – the procedure of justification should show that political liberalism 
in motivationally adequate, as it is reasonable to expect that citizens will be able to 
balance political values with non-political values.  
3. Finally, public justification. This last stage of justification is accomplished thanks 
to the actions of the whole society and, in Rawls’ view, it is the regulative idea behind 
the entire concept of political liberalism. The idea of public justification constitutes a 
fundamental feature of political liberalism in tandem with other three basic ideas:  
i. A reasonable overlapping consensus; 
ii. stability for the right reasons; 
iii. legitimacy. 
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 Rawls, 1995, p. 143. 
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 Quong (2011, p. 163) labels this requirement as ‘congruence argument’. 
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Even this third stage, the higher stage, is related to a procedure of justification that 
never takes absolute connotations. Public reason is the deliberative stage where citizens, 
accepting the reasonable constraints, reasons together over the validity and the 
justification of a political conception. “This basic case of public justification is one in 
which the shared political conception is the common ground and all reasonable citizens 
taken collectively (but not acting as a corporate body) are in general and wide reflective 
equilibrium in affirming the political conception on the basis of their several reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines”92. There would be willingness, from everyone, to respect and 
consider every other person and the comprehensive doctrine that each holds as a 
reasonable way to contribute to the formation of a public culture
93
. At the stage of 
public justification, in fact, political principles would have been already embedded in 
the doxastic sets of citizens and for this reason committing the political deliberation just 
to freestanding arguments is not necessary anymore; since every citizens, ideally 
speaking, would be ready to commit herself to the practice of public reason.  
 Rawls judges this third stage as the best realization of the most complete 
justification that can be provided within a liberal society that wants to publicly 
deliberate over political matters although accepting and respecting the fact of pluralism. 
It could not be otherwise, given the fact that the third level of justification, again public 
and strictly political, requires an antecedent level where the principles of justice should 
have been able to demonstrate their ability in obtaining a stable support from the 
individual point of view of citizens. This support is obtained thanks to a coherentist 
procedure of justification in which political principles are balanced against the other 
beliefs that citizens strongly believe in their doxastic systems. Since, as Rawls states, 
“these doctrines represent what citizens regard as their deepest convictions, religious, 
philosophical and moral”94 and given the fact of pluralism, it follows the recognition of 
the impossibility of gaining a wide – and publicly justified - consensus over a specific 
comprehensive version of a theory of justice.  
 
 
 
                                                 
92
Rawls, 1995, p. 144. 
93
 This interpretation of the public justification stage is consistent with the last, and much more open to 
the various voices present in the public arena, version of the practice of public reason that Rawls 
introduces in his “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited” (1997). 
94
 Ivi, p. 147. 
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2.4.3 Overlapping Consensus: Common and Alternative View  
 In the previous section I have outlined the three different stages of justification 
that Rawls develops in his exchange with Habermas. I believe that the whole Rawlsian 
proposal cannot be understood in all its force without correctly exposing these three 
stages of justification. Indeed, I hold that structuring the paradigm of public deliberation 
in different stages that refer to different justificatory goals is the partial solution that 
Rawls introduces in order to overcome the inner tension between the philosophical and 
practical aspects of his political liberalism. For example, the first deliberative level, the 
pro tanto justification, grants a justification of political liberalism that, though not fully 
morally neutral
95
, can be described as a freestanding procedure of justification that can 
be judged as normatively correct by reasonable citizens. At this point, though, it is 
necessary to understand how political principles might result to be victoriously justified 
within the doxastic systems held by the members of the society. In order for the political 
module to be robust in relation to the different doxastic systems of the citizens, it is 
important to grant the possibility that actual citizens are motivated in supporting such 
political module even when they are reasoning starting from their actual sets of moral 
and political intuitions and values. For this reason, Rawls provides a second stage of 
justification where citizens should be able to join the political conception from their 
own personal and comprehensive perspectives. Therefore, the establishment of the 
public justification stage is constrained by the previous achievement of the two other 
stages. Indeed, a strictly public deliberation is possible if and only if every agent 
involved into the deliberation has found her way for embedding the political module 
within her doxastic set of beliefs and consequently the supposed schizophrenia of the 
justificatory process is avoided. 
 Many critics of Rawls' project, however, as I highlighted in the foregoing section of 
this chapter, maintain that this reconciliation is unrealistic, because the theory does not 
provide sufficient reasons to people for judging political principles as victoriously 
justified over the non-political values that are embedded in their different doxastic sets. 
                                                 
95
 Rawls (1985, p. 224) claims that, although strictly political, political liberalism is still a moral 
conception. Of course this moral conception is thin and neutral in many concerns, as it is figured out for 
dealing with a specific subject: the establishment of fair political institutions and the development of a 
public deliberation among reasonable citizens. This specification is necessary, as it should be noted that 
the deliberative framework employed by Rawls cannot be neutral with respect to any model-conception 
possible, since it begins with some shared ideas that are extrapolated from the nonideal context, the “here 
and now”. However, according to Rawls, this awareness does not affect the attempt to establish a public 
procedure for justifying  a political conception of liberalism. 
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The right question here is if Rawls is able to articulate a justificatory structure in which 
a strategy of discontinuity on the one hand and a strategy of continuity on the other 
hand can be reconciled in a coherent and unified system
96
. The theoretical tool through 
which, according to Rawls, it is possible to achieve this reconciliation is the overlapping 
consensus. Many authors have focused their attention on the normative role played by 
the overlapping consensus. As I have already showed, while I was delineating 
Habermas’ criticisms toward Rawls theory of justification, this normative role played 
by the overlapping consensus is not at all clear. The major charge against this 
justificatory procedure is that such procedure is nothing but a descriptive procedure in 
which ideals, already shared by a contingent constituency, are merely exposed. 
However, there are other authors that, although accepting the normative side of the 
overlapping consensus, wonder whether it is realistic to expect that every citizen would 
be able to make consistent a specific theory of justice with her comprehensive system of 
values. These two different interpretations of the role played by the overlapping 
consensus, according to Quong, led us to face a dilemma; 
“This objection can be put in the form of a dilemma: (a) either the overlapping 
consensus is superfluous within political liberalism, since reasonable people will by 
definition endorse the (correct) political conception of justice, or (b) or the overlapping 
consensus is not superfluous, and people could (in the second justificatory stage) reject 
the political conception without being unreasonable. But if we embrace the second horn 
of this dilemma, this leads right back to the initial worry that people could veto the 
liberal conception of justice by claiming that it is not congruent with their illiberal 
comprehensive views”97. 
 
If we follow the first horn of the dilemma, the overlapping consensus is nothing more 
than a descriptive procedure that accounts for the fact that reasonable citizens might 
actually agree on some principles of justice. By contrast, assuming as true the second 
horn, we have to face the possibility that the actual disagreement among citizens with 
regard to the correct principles of justice would lead us to claim that the freestanding 
procedure of justification is not sufficient for granting that such theory of justice will 
result to be robust enough in relation to the different comprehensive doctrines held by 
citizens in the actual world. As a matter of fact, if the overlapping consensus is 
described as a an agreement that is achieved when there is an actual agreement of the 
                                                 
96
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members of the society – even if just reasonable members – over specific principles of 
justice, then the overlapping consensus itself becomes a very strict constraint for the 
accomplishment of such theory of justice. This dilemma accounts for the intrinsic 
tension between desirability and feasibility that I described previously when I accounted 
for the possible dilemmatic outcomes of a theory such as political liberalism
98
. As I 
said, thanks to the political turn Rawls gives up a theoretical perspective, defended in 
TJ, according to which a philosophical argument that establishes the desirability of a 
theory of justice might as well granting its feasibility. In PL in fact, the feasibility 
aspects of a theory of justice are complementary reasons for granting its desirability. 
However, it is still not possible to reduce the desirability of the theory – its strictly 
philosophic/normative side – to the feasibility of an overlapping consensus between 
specific principles of justice and the comprehensive doctrines held by citizens. 
Otherwise, the normative force of the theoretic argument would be constantly submitted 
to the contingent possibility that reasonable citizens are willing to embed the principles 
of justice within their systems of comprehensive values. According to this interpretation 
of the overlapping consensus, that Quong names “common view”99, the theory of 
justice is the output of two procedures of justification. On the one hand there is the 
discontinuist and freestanding argument of the original position; on the other hand there 
is the continuist procedure of the overlapping consensus that tries to achieve coherence 
between the liberal principles of justice and the comprehensive doctrines held by 
citizens. 
 In my opinion, the common view interpretation of the overlapping consensus is not 
an unfair interpretation of this procedure as far as PL is concerned. Indeed, in PL Rawls 
does not distinguish specifically enough between the three levels of justification and 
this imprecision leads to a sort of confusion, since it seems correct to assume that 
political deliberation aims to demonstrate that political values are in some sense 
“superior” to non-political values. By contrast, I hold that the real goal of political 
deliberation, within a nonideal framework, is to demonstrate that even when citizens 
strongly believe that their comprehensive beliefs are true, still they have sound reasons 
for accepting some political constraints when engaged in a public discussion. In this 
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 “Although such a model fares well in relation to the desideratum of motivational force, it has, really, 
the vices of its virtues. For it secures motivation by ‘pragmatizing’ and therefore does so at the expense of 
failing in relation to robustness and being forced to ‘trade-off’ inclusiveness and strength against one 
another”, D’Agostino, 1992, p. 154. 
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regard, the inclusion of political principles within their doxastic sets of beliefs does not 
depend on the recognition of a substantial and or epistemic superiority of political 
principles over comprehensive ones. However, in order to grasp the real meaning of  my 
proposal, it is important to previously understand the common view properly. 
According to this scheme, political values would be evaluated and compared with all 
the other values in a sort of competition for first place in the individual preferences 
scheme. During this process, reasonable citizens, by definition, would be able to meet 
the constraints imposed by reasonable pluralism and therefore they would be motivated 
in considering the right as always prevailing over good. It would therefore be right to 
defend the creation of an overlapping consensus between the political domain and the 
different comprehensive values held by citizens. Such overlapping consensus grants the 
feasibility of an agreement in which a political doctrine is made coherent with the 
comprehensive doctrines of citizens. Consequently, the domain of the political would be 
defined by the area of overlapping between the comprehensive beliefs and the political 
principles, (see image A). 
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According to this scheme
100
, the same political conception that has been justified 
through a freestanding argument (the pro tanto justification) can be defined, thanks to 
the overlapping consensus (full justification), as victoriously justified within the 
individual doxastic systems of the reasonable citizens. However, this scheme involves 
various difficulties. First of all, this scheme might be granted as valid if and only if the 
limitation to a constituency of solely reasonable members is already justified as a valid 
move within the justificatory structure. By contrast, if such delimitation of the relevant 
constituency to just reasonable citizens is not justified, then the overlapping consensus 
stage of justification is always endangered by the fact that it is unrealistic to believe that 
unreasonable people will agree on an overlapping consensus between political and 
personal comprehensive values. Second, if the overlapping consensus is achieved and 
therefore the full justification is accomplished, then it seems that the 
normative/deliberative role played by public reason is extremely reduced. As a matter of 
fact, if every reasonable citizen is able to establish an overlapping consensus between a 
political conception of justice and her comprehensive beliefs, then all the relevant 
features of a theory of justice are settled and just few, small, adjustments are required
101
. 
Third, there are good epistemic reasons – supported by the moderate perspective on 
justification and by the fallibilist general framework – for claiming against the 
possibility of achieving an agreement on a specific conception of justice strating from 
extremely different comprehensive perspectives. As Rawls pointed out already in TJ: 
“Men disagree about which principles should define the basic terms of their association. 
Yet we may still say, despite this disagreement, that they each have a conception of 
justice. That is, they understand the need for, and they are prepared to affirm, a 
characteristic set of principles for assigning basic rights and duties and for determining 
what they take to be the proper distribution of the benefits and burdens of social 
                                                 
100
 Quong (ibid.) introduces a scheme slightly different from mine. In his scheme the area of 
“overlapping” is made up by the political conception of justice, whereas the two arguments that overlap 
are the original position and the different comprehensive doctrines held by citizens. I do not think that this 
difference is extremely relevant. Quong was keen to show that within the procedure of the overlapping 
consensus a single, specific conception of justice can be justified with regard both to a freestanding and a 
continuist argument. By contrast, I want to focus my attention more on the fact that the overlapping 
consensus itself is the outcome of a coherentist procedure in which a political conception already justified 
is embedded within the doxastic system of every reasonable citizen. The area of overlap between the 
political beliefs and the comprehensive values would constitute the overlapping consensus, within the 
doxastic system of reasonable citizens, between political and non-political beliefs. 
101
 This critique is close both to Habermas and Sen criticisms of Rawlsian structure of justification. On 
the one hand, Habermas maintains that Rawls’ theory does not leave enough room for the actual practice 
of political deliberation. On the other hand, Sen presses against Rawls the charge of defending a theory 
that is intrinsically transcendental, as every relevant political issue would be resolved in an idealized 
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reasonable citizens. 
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cooperation. Thus it seems natural to think of the concept of justice as distinct from the 
various conceptions of justice and as being specified by the role which these different 
sets of principles, these different conceptions, have in common”102. 
 
This distinction between a concept and various conceptions of justice is extremely 
relevant when coupled with the issue of determining the normative role played by the 
overlapping consensus. As Gaus explains
103
, a public justification of principles of 
justice it is possible. However, this justification, although being victorious, involves a 
nested inconclusiveness according to which different undefeated, yet unvictorious, 
interpretations of a victoriously justified principle are available. “In essence, it seems 
that victoriously justified liberal principles are cases of nested inconclusiveness. What is 
victoriously justified is a range of conceptions of, say, the fundamental liberal principle; 
within that range, as we shall see, it may be impossible to victoriously justify a 
particular interpretation” 104. 
 Therefore, even when principles of justice – that are part of a specific concept of 
justice – are correctly and victoriously justified, still different reasonable interpretations 
of such principles are available
105
. In order to respect the epistemic authority of every 
member of the constituency, it is not possible to claim for a specific conception of 
justice to be victoriously justified in the same way as it was claimed for the concept of 
justice. Hence, any particular conception of justice can be viewed as an inconclusive 
interpretation of a set of ideals and background evaluative standards that constitute a 
victoriously justified concept of justice
106
.  
 A theory of justification that highlights the epistemic relevance of nested 
inconclusiveness is a theory that is aware of the fallibilist framework in which a 
political theory should be justified. According to this framework, robustness does not 
coincide with uncontroversiality. In this regard, disagreement is not necessarily due to a 
lack of rationality or an unwillingness to be reasonable or to an incommensurability of 
values. Rather, “given the complexity of our belief systems, it is, other things equal, 
always plausible to conjecture that any given disagreement is an instance of 
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 In this regard, Gaus (1996, p. 180) distinguishes between nested inconclusive justifications and merely 
inconclusive justifications: “As I have stressed, a nested inconclusive justification appeals to a 
victoriously justified principle for which no victoriously justified specific interpretation is to be had. In 
contrast, a merely inconclusive proposal is one that is not put forward as an articulation of a victoriously 
justified principle, but stands, as it were, on its own”. 
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inconclusive reasoning, resulting from the complexity of the issues and our inability to 
declare victory for our view”107. Therefore, the first issue that a theory of political 
justification has to cope with is that of inconclusiveness
108
. The concept of the 
overlapping consensus constitutes a fundamental step within the strategy for coping 
with the intrinsic nested inconclusiveness that derives from our public procedure of 
deliberation for determining a conception of justice on which people might agree stably. 
Given the moderate epistemic framework about moral and political justification I am 
defending, the solution to this problem is not to deny the existence of such nested 
inconclusiveness. Rather, this inconclusiveness is consistent with the moderate 
epistemic paradigm, as the indeterminacy is due to the epistemic relevance attached to 
the doxastic systems of the members of the constituency and to the fact that this 
epistemic approach provides a framework in which it is possible to have a reasonable 
disagreement between beliefs that are justified within the different doxastic systems 
held by moral agents. In this regard, reasonable pluralism implies that even if in my 
doxastic system a certain belief is soundly defeated, the same belief could be soundly 
undefeated within an another doxastic system
109
.  
 How can we deal this nested inconclusiveness? We have two possibilities. On the 
one hand, we can decide to look for a stronger philosophical argument that establishes a 
conception of justice that should be both victorious and conclusively justified. On the 
other hand, we can accept the nested inconclusiveness as a natural fact of our political 
structure of justification. Then, we could divide our structure of justification in two 
fundamental stages: the ideal and nonideal part of the theory. The ideal phase of the 
justificatory procedure would be devoted to establish and justify a political concept of 
justice that can be victoriously justified in relation to the “idealized” sets of beliefs held 
by citizens that – for the sake of the ideal justificatory argument – are described as 
reasonable. By contrast, the nonideal phase will deal with the actual sets of beliefs held 
by citizens, without any process of idealization. In this phase, therefore, the deliberative 
process should face both nested inconclusiveness and a deep disagreement among 
people with regard to different, undefeated, interpretations of the concept of justice. 
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 It is worth noting that all this discussion regarding the nested inconclusiveness of a political theory of 
justice is consistent with one of the charge that Sen presses against Rawls, namely the charge of being too 
transcendental and for this reason not enough focused on the indeterminacy in the interpersonal ranking 
of preference. Through this argumentation that I am presenting, then, I hope to provide some good 
insights for understanding why I consider Rawls not a transcendental theorist at all. 
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Since at the nonideal stage the idealizations are undone, then the justificatory procedure 
should face unreasonable citizens as well as reasonable ones. In this regard, deliberative 
issues cannot be solved once for all and, more important, disagreement will be always a 
stable outcome of deliberation. 
 So far, I have articulated overlapping consensus as the justificatory strategy by 
which Rawls believes that it is possible to make consistent between each other a 
discontinuist justificatory argument and a continuist one. Nevertheless, I have also 
highlighted that the common view on overlapping consensus implies some difficulties 
that are extremely relevant both from the theoretical and pragmatic perspective. Among 
the others, there is the difficulty of establishing how the nested inconclusiveness of our 
public deliberation can be coped with. In this regard, I believe that the best strategy for 
dealing with nested inconclusiveness and the fact of disagreement is to divide the 
justificatory paradigm in two stages, the ideal and the nonideal one. In this regard, it is 
important to stress that, according to the common view on overlapping consensus, this 
distinction between an ideal and a nonideal stage is not required, as the stage of 
overlapping consensus will grant the coherence between the freestanding justification of 
the political module and the support that this very same module obtain from the 
different reasonable comprehensive doctrines. 
 Notwithstanding the popularity of this articulation of the overlapping consensus, I 
believe that Quong is correct in proposing an “alternative view” of overlapping 
consensus. According to this view, the subject of the overlapping consensus should not 
be the principles of justice. Rather, the overlapping consensus is a consensus over the 
fundamental organizing ideas of a liberal democracy – that in the Rawlsian paradigm, 
for example, would be the concept of a well-ordered society as a fair system of social 
cooperation and the concept of citizens as free and equal people. Such organizing ideas 
are laid out starting from a specific historic context – as they have been developed, 
although imperfectly, within the historic process that has originated the first liberal 
democracies. In this regard, Rawls takes as paradigmatic the example of toleration. The 
theoretical concept of toleration that is now part of our public political culture it has 
been historically introduced as an instrumental tool for solving the religious wars that 
flamed Europe between 16
th
 and 17
th
 centuries. The intrinsic value of the toleration does 
not derive its normativity from these historic facts. However, the same evolution of the 
theoretical concept would not have been possible if the historic facts where not 
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happened. The regulative ideal of a political conception of liberalism is to develop as 
much as possible normatively relevant provisional fixed points starting from the 
evaluation of the historical process that has conducted such provisional points to 
become characteristic features of liberal societies. These organizing ideas provide to the 
theory a loose normative framework
110
 in which it is afterwards possible to build up a 
specific conception of justice that might be justified through the reference to a strictly 
freestanding argument. This theoretical and normative-laden framework is necessarily 
loose for at least two reasons. On the one hand, this framework is loose as it derives, 
partly, from a contingent historical process. In this regard, the looseness of the 
framework is a necessary condition, as possible revisions are always possible, as the 
fixed points are just provisionally justified. On the other hand, the loose framework in 
extremely useful for pragmatic reasons, as for dealing with disagreement it is relevant to 
have a theoretical framework that, although normative, is still flexible and that therefore 
allows work in progress solutions. 
 The organizing ideas of a well-ordered society and of free and equal people are 
shared ideas of a public political culture, but they might become prescriptive if, when 
embedded in the doxastic system of an individual, they motivate such individual to 
uphold a liberal theory of justice in order to “become” the kind of citizen that would live 
as free and equal in a well-ordered society. Again, this justificatory procedure in which 
a normative weight is attached to the historical democratic practice, as such practice 
reflects some fundamental normative ideas, is intrinsically coherentist. Indeed, the 
normativity attached to such background normative ideas is not expressed and justified 
at the beginning, through a top-down approach, rather hinges on a bottom-up argument 
that stresses the role they have been playing within the emerging democratic practice. 
“The aim of political philosophy, when it presents itself in the public culture of a 
democratic society, is to articulate and to make explicit those shared notions and 
principles thought to be already latent in common sense; or, as is often the case, if 
common sense is hesitant and uncertain, and doesn't know what to think, to propose to it 
certain conceptions and principles congenial to its most essential convictions and 
historical traditions” 111. 
 
 In the next chapter I will come back on the discussion over the epistemic adequacy 
of such model of justification. Meanwhile, I want to provide few further comments with 
                                                 
110
 Rawls talks about a “loose framework for deliberation” in his Dewey Lectures (1980, p. 560). 
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 Rawls, 1980, p. 518.  
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regard to the “alternative view” of the overlapping consensus. According to this view, 
achieving an overlapping consensus over some specific organizing ideas of liberalism is 
the starting point of the entire justificatory structure
112
. Thanks to the internal model of 
political liberalism we have discussed previously, we can claim that an idealized 
constituency of reasonable citizens is exactly the constituency in which the underlying 
considerations of a well-ordered society of free and equal people would result to be 
victoriously justified within the doxastic sets of beliefs of every member of such 
constituency. Therefore, the ideal stage of the theory of justification of political 
liberalism will start with an agreement – an overlapping consensus – on the validity of 
organizing ideas around which a loose normative framework might be built up. 
According to this internal conception, the defining feature of political liberalism is that 
of being a theory of justice that can be justified to a certain idealized constituency 
through an overlapping consensus. However, this agreement constitutes just the first 
stage of the ideal part of the theory itself. As a matter of fact, this agreement provides 
the normative tools for developing a freestanding argument – that Rawls articulates 
through the device of representation of the original position – for producing and 
justifying some general principles of justice. The freestanding argument, then, will be 
focused on the production and the justification of a specific concept of liberal justice. 
Afterwards, in the nonideal stage of the theory, it is again necessary to wonder whether 
a specific concept of justice might be victoriously justified, even when the doxastic sets 
of beliefs of the citizens have not undergone a filtering process in which the 
unreasonable beliefs have been eliminated. Naturally, the possibility of reaching an 
agreement on a concept of justice are far fewer at the nonideal level. In this regard, we 
can distinguish between a liberalism-framework and a liberalism-picture
113
. The 
liberalism-framework would be the loose normative framework developed within the 
ideal stage of the theory. This loose framework is depicted in the light of the organizing 
ideas that are justified in overlapping consensus by reasonable – by definition – citizens. 
The ideal analysis, thanks to a freestanding argument provides us with an optimal 
eligible set of unvictoriously justified conceptions of justice and interpretations of the 
Archimedean points. All the different proposals within the optimal set are able to be 
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 “I argue the overlapping consensus is thus not, despite how it is sometimes portrayed, a further test 
that a political conception of justice must pass in order to be fully justified. Instead, the consensus 
provides the initial common ground from which any attempt at public justification needs to proceed”, 
Quong, 2011, p. 162. 
113
 For a similar interpretation, see Maffettone, 2010, p. 217. 
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publicly justified vis-à-vis the doxastic systems of beliefs of the members of the 
idealized constituency. However, none of the different interpretation might be 
uncontroversially justified as well. In this regard, such liberalism-framework works as it 
usually works a frame with regard to the picture, to wit, it provides the limits within 
which the picture can be painted. The hope is to grant that the liberalism-picture, even 
at the nonideal level, might be constrained by the normative frame while trying to 
establish an ethical and political institutionalized conception of justice. Even though at 
the nonideal level the idealized notion of constituency is not adequate anymore, and 
therefore the theoretical and practical tools that the theory of justice can employ for 
dealing with actual disagreement are different from those used in the ideal stage, still 
the justification can start from the reference to the loose normative framework in order 
to provide a sound argument for justifying a single interpretation among those present 
within the eligible set. It is not possible to establish in advance which form will take the 
picture, as many different pictures may be justifiable, however any possible solution 
will be constrained by the normative frame. This picture-frame metaphor, in my 
opinion, perfectly expresses the fact that within the nonideal phase the outcomes of the 
justificatory and deliberative processes are not established from the starting point, as it 
is not possible to be sure about the outcomes of the democratic practice of public 
reasoning. Notwithstanding this intrinsic vagueness and work in progress 
characterization of the nonideal stage, we can refer to some organizing ideas and 
contextually established Archimedean points as the normative frame that regulates and 
limits the deliberative process. 
 In my opinion, this articulation of the Rawlsian framework that divides it in two 
phases and that distinguishes among three different standpoints with regard to the 
political constituency is more adequate for dealing with the various challenges that have 
been presented in this chapter. The ideal phase starts with an analysis of the overlapping 
consensus that can be achieved with regard to the organizing ideas around which a loose 
framework of liberalism might be outlined. Concerning the establishment of an 
overlapping consensus, the correct standpoint to take into consideration – following the 
internal model of political liberalism – is that of an idealized constituency of reasonable 
members
114
. Then, the ideal phase provides a freestanding philosophical argument for 
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 A similar view to mine, with regard to an idealized constituency, is provided by Gaus (2010, p. 26): “I 
will argue that a Member of the Public is an idealization of some actual individual; a Member of the 
Public deliberates well and judges only on the relevant and intelligible values, reasons, and concerns of 
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justifying a specific concept of justice. Here the justificatory argument addresses not 
even the members of the idealized constituency, rather the parties in the original 
position. The characterization of the parties and the device of representation of the 
original position itself already rely on the normative role played by the organizing ideas 
outlined in the overlapping consensus stage. For example, the procedural constraints 
that mark the deliberation in the original position are outlined in the light of some 
previous notion of fairness and of citizens as free and equal. The veil of ignorance is 
structured in that specific way in order to grant that every citizen reasons from the same 
sort of universalized perspective. Without a previous notion of fairness the same 
procedure of construction of the original position could not be determined. 
 Naturally, the parties’ standpoint is the most abstract standpoint that is employed 
within the multi-stage procedure of justification. By contrast, within the nonideal phase, 
the idealization of first stage are abandoned in order to assess the validity of the political 
module in relation with the actual, unconstrained, sets of beliefs held by citizens here 
and now. The way in which an already justified concept of justice can result to be 
victoriously justified within the doxastic systems of beliefs of the members of an actual 
political constituency is the object of analysis of the nonideal theory. At this level of 
analysis, no outcomes can be established at the beginning as necessarily derived from 
the freestanding argument provided in the ideal phase. Rather, even if the normative 
validity of justificatory argument accomplished in the ideal phase is not dismissed 
completely, still the possibility of such concept of justice being embedded in the 
doxastic systems of the citizens should be granted in the light of a nonidealized context. 
 The nonideal phase of the theory is intrinsically work in progress and hinges on the 
possibility of developing a normative relevant process of public reasoning among 
citizens. I will outline my proposal with regard to the justificatory procedure within the 
nonideal phase in the next chapter, where I will connect this discussion about the 
justification of political principles with the strictly epistemic framework I developed in 
the first chapter. The fundamental concept that allows me to connect these two issues 
will be reflective equilibrium. Furthermore, I will introduce a new concept: “reflective 
agreement”. Such concept, slightly different from reflective equilibrium, stresses the 
possibility of achieving a public agreement on a normative framework thanks to a 
                                                                                                                                               
the real agent she represents and always seeks to legislate impartially for all other Members of the Public. 
The moral rules (giving rise to imperatives) that a Member of the Public endorses are the ones that as a 
moral person she has sufficient reason to endorse”. 
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public deliberative procedure. While reflective equilibrium can be viewed as a personal 
attempt, by different citizens, to justify principles of justice in the light of the other 
various beliefs they have; reflective agreement is more a work in progress public 
procedure for articulating rules of conduction that can be established and on which 
citizens can agree upon despite the fact of pluralism and of nested inconclusiveness.  
  
2.4.4 An Upside Down Construction 
  “What we need in order to achieve a society where citizens can publicly reason 
with one another about matter of justice is to identify the deep, or fundamental, values 
or ideas that can serve as a common framework within which liberal citizens can 
reasonably conduct disputes about justice”115. According to Quong, any theory of 
justification that tries to build up a justification of liberalism starting from deep 
disagreement is condemned to failure. In order to provide a justification of political 
principles, we should start from some shared ideals that at least an idealized 
constituency might share. In this regard, this internal conception of political liberalism 
emphasizes the distance - or at least makes it starker – between the Rawlsian and the 
Habermasian structure of justification. Indeed, the Rawlsian system, when divided in 
different stages of justification and in an ideal and nonideal phase, begins with an 
idealized circumstance in which some organizing ideas are justified in an overlapping 
consensus. Even if different members of society hold different comprehensive doctrines, 
they are able to achieve an overlapping consensus starting from their different 
standpoints. This consensus is possible and is not too demanding, as these members of 
the idealized society already share a reasonable commitment toward liberal ideals. 
According to Quong, it is misleading to depict political liberalism as a theory that is 
able to achieve a stable agreement on a specific conception of justice without 
presupposing that the political constituency, by definition, attaches deliberative priority 
to those ideals, as freedom, equality and fairness, that are part of the loose normative 
framework around which the conceptions of justice might be outlined. Then “the central 
aim of political liberalism, on the internal account, is to understand how liberal theory 
can be made internally coherent - to see how the commitment to public justification can 
be realized under liberal conditions”116. 
                                                 
115
 Quong, 2011, p. 185. 
116
 Ivi, p. 180. 
PhD Dissertation in Political Theory – XXV Cycle                                 PhD Candidate: Federica Liveriero  
Pag. 117 
 
 From the alternative view of the overlapping consensus it derives that the first goal 
of a procedure of justification of liberal theory is to demonstrate that political liberalism 
is a coherent and sound account of a political ideal. Thanks to the freestanding argument 
such theory is built up and the principles of justice are outlined out of a device of 
construction. However, this same construction is determined in light of a loose 
framework that stems from the reference to some organizing ideas that can be justified, 
in overlapping consensus, starting from the different comprehensive doctrines held by 
reasonable citizens. Even though connected with the contextual value of some shared 
ideas, this approach is not committed to a contingent relativism, as the overlapping 
consensus introduces a normative evaluation of ideas that can be reasonably shared by 
all those citizens who would live in a well-ordered society
117
. Afterward, the theory of 
justice has to cope with the nonidealized constituency of the actual citizens. Here, 
expecting an overlapping consensus over a specific conception of justice is an 
unrealistic hope, since a concept of justice can be victoriously justified, but still cannot 
result conclusively justified as well. Moreover, a political constituency that is not 
filtered by an idealization is composed both by reasonable and unreasonable citizens. In 
this regard, at the nonideal level should be now clear that the way in which the public 
deliberation addresses the unreasonable cannot be determined by a theoretical move, as 
it will depend on the actual circumstances of justice. For this reason, even the nonideal 
stage requires to be divided in different stages that aim to different goals in relation to 
what can be accomplished by a general political theory when any ideal abstractions in 
abandoned and the actual political constituency is faced. 
 Building a theory of justice starting from the mere fact of disagreement is not a 
reasonable utopia, it is an utopia tout court. For this reason, I do not believe that 
Habermas is correct when he claims that we can start from an unconstraint disagreement 
and then, thanks to the normatively binding communicative public deliberation, arguing 
in favour of an intersubjective construction of an impartial point of view. Alternatively, 
I hold that it is reasonable to start our procedure of justification investigating even the 
minimal raw ideas that we can have in common. Of course these ideas can be structured 
in a general framework just if we put into effect an idealization with regard both to the 
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 I think that Anthony Laden (2003, p. 380) is right when he talks about “the citizen of faith”: a citizen 
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definition of the members of the political constituency and of the coherent structure in 
which such organizing ideas are given. In this regard, the starting idealization 
concerning the status of reasonable citizen ascribed to every member of the political 
constituency is similar to the idealization employed by the theories of rationality when 
they assume that people are rational. Of course this assumption is a strong idealization, 
as usually people are not at all fully rational. However, having a criterion of rationality 
that should apply to every individual – even if just through an idealization - helps us in 
the assessment of the actual degree of rationality that can be ascribed to the individual 
when they are deliberating. In the same way, actual citizens are never fully reasonable 
and an overlapping consensus in never utterly achieved; still these organizing ideas are 
fundamental, as they constitute both a regulative ideal and a criterion of evaluation for 
the actual, nonidealized, public deliberation among citizens. However, these 
idealizations cannot be maintained in the nonideal phase. Still, when the political 
deliberation is at stake, these underlying considerations and the regulative ideal of 
reasonableness constitutes a common set of reasons and values that are valuable in order 
to develop a public reasoning
118
. In this regard, the major difference between a 
reasonable and an unconstrained disagreement is that the former is a sort of justificatory 
disagreement, while the latter is a foundational disagreement. Justificatory disagreement 
is a disagreement in which the people that disagree between each other still share some 
premises and the disagreement is due to the different view about what these premises 
entail
119
. By contrast, it is foundational that disagreement that stems from a 
disagreement that regards the more basic convictions, as different individuals hold  
doxastic sets that have very few beliefs in common. Naturally, this second kind of 
disagreement is almost impossible to be reconciled, as the people involved would 
almost certainly disagree about the epistemic and normative standards by which the 
dispute might be solved. 
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 “Public reason, and thus liberal legitimacy, would be impossible without a fundamental stock of ideas 
that citizens can draw on when they deliberate with one another regarding their disagreements about 
justice. Because the very idea of public reason presupposes disagreement about justice (disagreements 
that cannot be resolved by appealing to the general liberal principles), we must look to a higher level of 
abstraction to find the common ground that ensures our political principles can be legitimate - that 
ensures that they can be justified on grounds that all reasonable people could accept”, Quong, 2011, 
p.190. 
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 “A justificatory framework acts like a filter. It ensures that any values or arguments used in debate will 
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 Habermas defends a conception in which the starting point of the procedure of 
justification is unconstrained, while the outcome of the procedure itself is determined in 
advance thanks to the transcendental normativity intrinsic to the practice of 
communicative action expressed by the discourse principle. By contrast, the version of 
Rawlsian liberalism I am defending starts with an idealization of some specific 
contextual facts for, later on, in the nonideal phase of the theory, leaving room to the 
actual practise of public deliberation. In this regard, the structure of justification can be 
represented quite fairly by a second scheme (see image B). This scheme is depicted as 
an upside down pyramid in order to illustrate the anti-foundational character of political 
liberalism and to emphasize its unstable work in progress aspects
120
. The overlapping 
consensus represents the ground on which it is possible to build up the pyramid itself. 
Once that the overlapping consensus is achieved, then there is the stage of the 
freestanding justification of the principles of justice. This stage is represented by the tip 
of the pyramid, as the freestanding justification expressly asserts a strictly political 
theory, neutral and blind to differences. The freestanding argument is philosophically 
valid and normatively relevant, still needs to be embedded in a wider structure of 
justification in order to be able to grant stability for the right reasons. The ideal phase of 
the theory, represented by the overlapping consensus as “grounding” stage and by the 
pro tanto justification as the tip of the pyramid, aims to show that political liberalism is 
not an unstable theory under ideal conditions. Still, this stability is again challenged 
when we enter in the nonideal stage of the theory. As a matter fact, the stability under 
ideal conditions is not at all granted when the contingent facts are introduced into the 
picture. The pyramid, representing the procedure of justification, is deliberatively 
depicted as upside down, since the more we proceed into the nonideal world, the more 
the stability of the whole process is endangered. The nonideal phase of the theory is 
characterized by the full justification and public justification stages. After we have 
granted the validity of a specific concept of justice, we have to look at the actual 
possibility that this concept of justice might be victoriously justified in relation to the 
different doxastic systems of beliefs held by the actual members of the political society. 
Here, even though the loose normative framework of political liberalism provides us 
with some shared reasons for starting the public deliberation, still we have to face both a 
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justificatory and a foundational disagreement and try to develop a public deliberative 
structure that is able to deal, in different ways, both with reasonable and unreasonable 
citizens.  
 
 
  
 
 I have introduced this image in order to show that the real value of the proposal of 
political liberalism can be grasped in its complete force only if we highlight its 
development in different justificatory stages. Each stage has to deal with a specific 
agent’s standpoint as well as a definite objective. Without explaining the different goals 
that every phase should realise, it is difficult to understand why both an ideal and a 
nonideal stage of the theory are needed. Once these distinctions have been illustrated, it 
should not be surprising anymore that political liberalism tries to find a balance between 
the strictly theoretical arguments that can philosophically support the theory of justice 
and, on the other hand, more practical evaluations concerning the actual practice of 
public deliberation. In sum, we can say that political liberalism is a theory that 
constantly struggles for reaffirming its normative and practical validity. Such intrinsic 
“instability” is a sensible outcome due both to the anti-foundational paradigm of 
justification – for this paradigm maintains the fundamental role played, within the 
procedure of justification, by the individuals’ doxastic perspectives - and to the 
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fallibilist epistemic framework that describes the fact of pluralism as a legitimate 
outcome of the public procedure of reasoning. In this regard, the challenge against 
liberalism pressed by the unreasonable or illiberal citizens will never be defeated once 
and for all. However, the fundamental regulative ideal that should steer the political 
liberalism when dealing with the nonideal phase of political deliberation is the 
openness to diversity. As a matter of fact, the justification of political liberalism starts 
with a strong idealization thanks to which every member of the constituency is 
described as reasonable and able to achieve an overlapping consensus over some shared 
liberal ideas. However, in the passage to the nonideal phase, it is not sufficient that the 
theory looks for those members of the actual political constituency that “fit” the 
paradigm of reasonableness. Rather, liberal institutions and citizens are engaged in a 
political deliberation in which many citizens are unreasonable or illiberal. First, political 
liberalism must provide a nonideal account of how to deal with these citizens. Second, 
the aspirational side of liberalism itself looks for a work in progress enlargement of the 
consensus and for the possibility, through the actual historical process of public 
deliberation, to modify the doxastic systems of beliefs of citizens in order to extend the 
constituency of reasonable people to as much citizens as possible. In this regard, Rawls 
speaks properly of an “educative role of public reason”121. 
 The upside down pyramid represents the structure of justification of political 
liberalism as I see it. It is not grounded in a top-down argument; rather it depends on the 
possibility that is reasonable to expect, in an idealized world, that every member of the 
political constituency can achieve, everyone in her personal way, an overlapping 
consensus in which some liberal ideals are embedded in her doxastic system of beliefs 
and therefore are made coherent with her comprehensive doctrine. Then, when we are 
dealing with the nonideal phase of the theory, the agreement that was reasonable within 
an idealized context is again under scrutiny, this time without the possibility of been 
granted in advance. In the nonideal phase, consequently, political liberalism should 
demonstrate to be able, thanks to its theoretical tools and its justificatory structure, to 
deal with an unconstrained reality. During the search for stability for the right reasons, 
political liberalism tries to achieve a full justification of its tenets and a stable 
establishment of public reason as the correct framework for political deliberation. This 
never ending search for stability is expressed by the intrinsic difficulties of an upside 
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down pyramid to keep the balance and avoiding the collapse. In this regard, the upside 
down pyramid is the metaphorical expression of the concept of realist utopia that Rawls 
regards as the most adequate label for describing the political liberalism enterprise. 
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Chapter 3 – Reflective Agreement in Nonideal Theory 
 
 
 
“A conception of justice cannot be deduced from self-evident 
premises or conditions on principles; instead, its justification is 
a matter of the mutual support of many considerations, of everything 
fitting together into one coherent view” 
John Rawls (1971, p. 21) 
 
 
“They are much better at finding their way 
through the trees than at surveying 
whole forest. 
They complain that advocates of rules 
or principles or theories ignore 
the details and texture of real cases” 
Norman Daniels (1996, p. 336) 
 
 
“It is their status as judgments 
 that makes them open to revision 
 as the ‘Socratic’ process 
of seeking reflective equilibrium proceeds” 
Thomas Scanlon (2003, p. 149) 
 
 
 
 
 
3.0   Introduction 
 
  I began this work with a chapter focused mainly on epistemic issues regarding 
the structure of justification of moral and political principles. So far, I have defended a 
coherentist view about justification, as this paradigm is compatible with a general 
moderate approach with regard to the general meaning of “justifying” a political 
principle or concept. In my opinion this moderate approach in moral epistemology, 
when coupled with a fallibilist view with regard to moral knowledge, expresses the best 
theory available to us – as moral agents constrained by the limit of our rationality – for 
establishing a normatively binding, and yet realistic, procedure of justification for 
political institutions and practices. In the second chapter, then, I focused my attention 
on the Rawlsian proposal for a strictly political theory of liberalism. The political turn in 
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the Rawlsian paradigm has been induced by the acknowledgment of the fact of 
pluralism. Again, I believe that the best epistemic way for accounting for the deep 
disagreement among citizens is to uphold a moderate view regarding the procedure of 
justification. If the justification of a political concept must take into account the 
doxastic systems of beliefs of the members of the political constituency, then 
disagreement is a sensible outcome of the justificatory procedure. Even when a specific 
concept of justice happens to be victoriously justified through a sound and normatively 
binding justification, still the way in which this concept is embedded within the doxastic 
system of beliefs of every member of the constituency cannot be determined in advance 
by the theory. Therefore, a concept of justice may be defended as victoriously 
justifiably, but not as conclusively justifiably as well. The nested inconclusiveness is a 
stable feature of our moral and political reasoning. However, this conclusion does not 
imply that the justification that can be provided within the field of political theory is 
hopelessly weak and unstable. Rather, in this chapter and in the next I want to argue in 
favour of a justificatory paradigm that, thanks to the moderate account of moral 
epistemology, is able both to respect the realistic ties of the here and now and to provide 
a theory that is validly justified. 
 In the previous chapter I introduced and discussed the issue of the dilemma of 
liberalism claiming that it is true that the philosophical and motivational aspects of 
political liberalism are in tension. The more political liberalism attempts to become 
ecumenical, the more the theory loses philosophical strength and relevance. Thus, it is 
important to focus the analysis on the attempt to solve disagreement, and yet this could 
not be the only goal of a political liberalism. For a liberalism that merely tries to tame 
disagreement is a liberalism that has lost one of its fundamental scope, to wit, the 
establishment of a normative framework of reasoning and evaluation with regard to 
political matters. Rawls’ attempt to articulate a strictly political account of liberalism, 
neutral with regard both to metaphysical and epistemic theories
1
, looks in this direction. 
However, I think that there are good possibilities of providing an account of 
justification in political philosophy that, articulated in the light of Rawlsian attempt, can 
respect some fundamental neutrality constraints and yet avoiding the liberal dilemma.  
 It might seem that my attempt to justify a specific epistemic conception of the 
procedure of justification mitigates the strictly political paradigm of the second Rawls. 
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However, the moderate approach that I am defending does not require to take a stance 
with regard to the ontological status of moral facts. It is not necessary to establish if 
moral facts are independent reality or outcomes of a procedure of construction or even 
supervening facts over natural facts in order to defend a specific model of justification 
instead than another one. Of course, choosing a model of justification as the most 
adequate for dealing with the issue of establishing a political conception is an epistemic 
relevant issue and certainly is not a neutral decision. Nevertheless, given the fact that a 
decision must be taken, it is better to affirm and defend such conclusion, instead that 
assuming a model of reasoning without justifying it in order to eschew any 
epistemological debate. In this regard, I agree with Gaus when he claims that: “If public 
justification is the core of liberalism (as I believe it is), and because there is no such 
thing as an uncontentious theory of justification, an adequately articulated liberalism 
must clarify and defend its conception of justified belief—its epistemology”2. As a 
matter of fact, even Rawls upholds a specific paradigm with regard to the structure of 
justification, namely a coherentist view. He believes, as I do, that even if it turns out 
that our moral knowledge is actually grounded in some basic beliefs, still the way in 
which we can justify such beliefs depends on moral intuitions that we held in our 
doxastic systems. In the same way, even if from the epistemic perspective a perfectly 
justified belief should necessarily be coincident with a warranted belief, still our 
imperfect epistemic capacities do not allow us to assume this coincidence. The 
coherentist paradigm is the most reasonable with which we are left in order to account 
both for a normatively valid procedure of justification and for the fact that our practical 
reasoning is far away from being perfect and unflawed. As Rawls states: 
“I note in passing that one's moral conception may turn out to be based on self-evident 
first principles. The procedure of reflective equilibrium does not, by itself, exclude this 
possibility, however unlikely it may be. For in the course of achieving this state, it is 
possible that first principles should be formulated that seem so compelling that they lead 
us to revise all previous and subsequent judgments inconsistent with them. Reflective 
equilibrium requires only that the agent makes these revisions with conviction and 
confidence, and continues to affirm these principles when it comes to accepting their 
consequences in practice”3. 
 
 Rawls introduces a coherentist procedure of justification within his system through 
the concept of reflective equilibrium (hereafter RE). RE is a justificatory procedure 
                                                 
2
 Gaus, 1996, p. 4. 
3
 Rawls, 1974, p. 8. 
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that looks for the establishment of coherence between some general principles and 
particular moral intuitions held by the citizens to whom the general principles should be 
addressed. The method of RE looks for a coherent balance between some general 
principles and some “considered moral judgments” held by moral agents. Rawls defines 
the considered judgement in connection with the concept of competent judger: “I have 
defined, first, a class of competent judges and, second, a class of considered judgments. 
If competent judges are those people most likely to make correct decisions, then we 
should take care to abstract those judgments in which our moral capacities are most 
likely to be displayed without distortion”4. These judgements, then, represent the strong 
moral intuitions that every moral agent held in her doxastic system of belief. According 
to a moderate paradigm of moral epistemology, no sound and definite justification of 
general principles can be achieved without discussing the issue of how these principles 
approximate our strong beliefs on moral matters. In order to achieve a proper 
justification, general principles of justice should be embedded in our doxastic systems
5
. 
Consequently, if they are incoherent with our strong intuitions about justice all the 
process of justification is destined to fall down. Therefore, RE can be described as the 
procedure that, within the structure of justification, looks for the actual possibility that 
principles of justice, already supported by a sound philosophical and top-down 
argument, might be embedded within the doxastic sets of beliefs held by citizens. One 
of the goals of this chapter is to demonstrate that this procedure can be described as 
adequate, efficient and reasonable.  
 Rawls describes RE as a state “reached after a person has weighted various 
proposed conceptions and he has either revised his judgments to accord to one of them 
or held fast to his initial convictions” 6. As this quotation explains very well, RE is a 
deliberative procedure in which the intuitions held by agents play a fundamental role 
within the process of justification. This fact should not sound strange, as in the previous 
two chapters I highlighted the relevance of the doxastic presupposition many times. In 
this chapter I want to discuss the evolution of the concept of RE within the Rawlsian 
                                                 
4
 Rawls, 1951, p. 183. For a broad description of the different features that characterize considered 
judgments see ivi pp. 181-183. 
5
 According to this articulation of the general aim of the practice of public justification, Steven Wall 
(2002, p. 387) claims that the proper and most fundamental function of public justification is a 
reconciliatory action: “Proponents of public justification principle can plausibly claim that the only way 
in which people in these societies can be reconciled to the political authority that constraints them is to 
make sure that each person, given his background moral beliefs, has a good reason to affirm, or at least 
not oppose, this political authority”. 
6
 Rawls, 1971, p. 48. 
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paradigm (3.1). Then, I introduce some further developments and discuss the main 
critiques to this procedure of justification (3.2). Afterwards, in the section (3.3), I focus 
my analysis of the possibility of developing a new concept, the reflective agreement, in 
order to deal with the consensus that can be achieved within the nonideal phase of the 
theory. Finally, in the last section (3.4), I briefly analyse the issue of public reason and 
introduce the issue of open negotiation as valid practice when an agreement over a 
specific rule or principle is not available.  
 Although a discussion of RE cannot eschew an initial reference to the Rawlsian 
approach, my analysis extends the intrinsic meaning of the method beyond the strict 
possibility of choosing among different conceptions of justice. This method, in fact, 
helps me to broaden my articulation of a coherentist procedure of justification in 
political theory. I have already defended such coherentist paradigm in the first chapter, 
yet in this chapter I want to connect the defence of coherentism with the actual 
possibility of developing a justification of a specific political conception within the 
political domain. Naturally, the way in which a coherentist method works respectively 
in the ideal and nonideal phase is different, as both the justificatory arguments and the 
goals of the justification itself are different in these two stages. In order to stress the 
difference between the role played by the justificatory procedure in the two phases of 
the theory I will introduce the concept of reflective agreement, a coherent method of 
justification that is employed in the nonideal stage of the justificatory framework. 
 
 
3.1  The History of RE 
  
3.1.1 A General Description of RE 
  In the first chapter, I introduced a fundamental epistemic distinction between a 
principle being justified as “it is supported by good and sufficient reasons” (a) and “a 
person’s being justified in holding a certain view” (b)7. This distinction is an important 
one for understanding the epistemic relevance of RE. Indeed, within TJ, it seems that 
the original position provides a top-down deductive argument for justifying the 
principles of justice without any reference to the actual beliefs held by the citizens. By 
contrast, does RE involve just a second form of justification? Does the fact that a person 
                                                 
7
 Recall Scanlon distinction in his “Rawls on Justification”, 2003. 
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achieves equilibrium among her considered judgments and principles of justice imply 
that this person has no reasons to abandon these principles? To understand in which 
sense RE is a method of justification, it is fundamental to ascertain whether RE implies 
justification only as in sense (b) or if this method is part of a wider justification, as in 
(a). On the one hand, the RE procedure grants legitimacy to principles of justice from 
the point of view of agents’ reasons; hence, it is a procedure that fits the (b) model of 
justification. On the other hand, I have already claimed that, within a moderate 
paradigm of moral justification, it cannot be the case that the justification of a principle 
of justice is completely detached from the doxastic perspective of the agents. According 
to this view, then, RE would determine both the input and the output of the procedure of 
justification, since it would be impossible to have a sound justification of form (a) 
without implying at the same time a justification of kind (b).  
 This distinction between justification (a) and (b) is useful for emphasizing 
something unclear in the Rawlsian use of RE in TJ. Rawls writes that RE “is an 
equilibrium because at last our principles and judgments coincide; and it is reflective 
since we know to what principles our judgments conform and the premises of their 
derivation”8. According to this description, RE seems to be a second-order justification 
in which principles of justice that are already “justified” have to pass an individual test 
of acceptability
9
. Following this interpretation, many authors maintain that within TJ, 
the argument of original position assumes almost all of the relevance for granting the 
“justifiability” of the principles of justice. By contrast, I believe that, already in TJ, the 
theoretical weight of the original position partly depends on the value of the RE method, 
though the form of justification provided by the original position is a theoretically 
independent argument.  
  According to Rawls, RE is a procedure that accounts for the ordinary deliberation 
of individuals in moral reasoning. RE is introduced as a method for achieving an actual, 
but often unstable, equilibrium between our moral judgments and some general 
principles. According to a coherentist paradigm of justification, it cannot be the case 
that a principle of justice is justified if it does not cohere with our broad doxastic 
systems of beliefs. For this reason, again, the method of RE, when understood in a 
                                                 
8
 Rawls, 1971, p. 20. 
9
 “From the standpoint of moral philosophy, the best account of a person’s sense of justice is not the one 
which fits his judgments prior to his examining any conception of justice, but rather the one which 
matches his judgments in reflective equilibrium”, Rawls, 1971, p. 46. 
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broad sense, implies that the justifications (a) and (b) are necessary to each other, as no 
full justification can be reached when one of the two aspects of the justificatory 
procedure is missing.  
 This articulation of RE as a strictly coherentist method is indeed consistent with the 
methodological analysis developed in the first chapter, where I defended a moderate 
epistemic view about moral justification. As a matter of fact, the method of RE is the 
actual expression of the regulative idea that constitute the coherentist framework, 
namely the fact that no principles or judgments are ever self-evident
10
. If RE is a 
method that provides a sound justification promoting a back-and-forth readjustment 
between general principles and specific judgments, then all of the “justified” principles 
remain subjected to a hypothetical revision. Therefore, intrinsic revisability appears to 
be the crucial methodological outcome of RE. Indeed, if one is ready to grant 
justificatory and explanatory force to a procedure that goes back and forth readjusting 
our principles in the light of our considered moral judgments and vice versa, then a 
fallibilist view with regard to the epistemic status of our moral beliefs is the most 
adequate to defend. Following the RE method, it should be said that in the everyday 
practice of moral reasoning, no principles or judgments are assumed by the agents as 
more than provisional fixed points
11
. 
 As Rawls himself states in TJ
12
, RE is actually a method that is not specific to the 
moral domain. On the contrary, the notion of RE that Rawls outlines in TJ is derived 
from an attempt to justify the rules of inductive logic advanced by Nelson Goodman in 
his classic Fact, Fiction, and Forecast
13. In the third chapter of this work, “The New 
Riddle of Induction”, Goodman revises the Humean problem of how one can account 
for the fact that a probable prediction is in any sense better justified than an improbable 
one. According to Goodman, to justify rules of inference in inductive logic, it is 
fundamental to maintain a relation between rules of induction and particular inductive 
                                                 
10
 “I do not claim for the principles of justice proposed that they are necessary truths or derivable from 
such truths. A conception of justice cannot be deduced from self-evident premises or conditions on 
principles; instead, its justification is a matter of the mutual support of many considerations, of everything 
fitting together into one coherent view”, Rawls, 1971, p. 21. 
11
 Rawls himself describes relevant judgments and beliefs as fixed points. He claims: “There are 
questions which we feel sure must be answered in a certain way. For example, we are confident that 
religious intolerance and racial discrimination are unjust. We think that we have examined these things 
with care and have reached what we believe is an impartial judgment not likely to be distorted by an 
excessive attention to our own interests. These convictions are provisional fixed points which we 
presume any conception of justice must fit” Rawls, 1971, pp. 19-20 (emphasis added).  
12
 See Rawls, 1971, p. 20. 
13
 Goodman, 1955. 
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inferences that have already been accepted as valid. This procedure stresses the fact that 
no rule of induction exists that is valid per se; rather, every new rule of induction must 
confront established usages of induction. This assertion is understandable as far as we 
uphold a fallibistic paradigm in epistemology. As a matter of fact, fallibilism helps us to 
understand to what extent inductive reasoning can yield justification. Induction 
maintains an intrinsic self-correcting nature, according to which a general rule can be 
adjusted in the light of new observation cases that are inconsistent with older cases. 
Thanks to a fallibilist perspective, induction may defend the idea that is reasonable to 
use past patterns as evidence for future cases. Indeed, “if anything will work to form 
accurate beliefs about unobserved things, induction will”14. 
 According to Goodman, within the field of science, the possibility of distinguishing 
between a law-like hypothesis (a generalisation that involves probable prediction) and 
accidental statements
15
 is given by a theory of confirmation in which regularity in past 
experience is not sufficient. As a matter of fact, past experience is a guarantor of 
regularity only until the present, and our rules of induction, to be sound, need some 
other support
16
. Such support is obtained through the achievement of an equilibrium 
between any rule of induction and a broad range of acceptable inferences
17
. In this 
regard, no prediction could be justified by referring only to a rule of inference as a 
logical principle grounded merely by syntactic meaning. Rather, every rule has to be 
shown to be compatible with what we take to be an acceptable instances of inferential 
reasoning. In this sense, the acceptability of rules of inference is constrained by the 
“confirmation” provided by what we believe to be good or correct examples of 
inferential reasoning. Still, the equilibrium that we achieve is intrinsically revisable, as 
all inferences that we initially think to be acceptable might end up to be revised in the 
light of an inconsistency with new generally accepted rules that we refuse to reject, 
                                                 
14
 Feldman, 2002, p. 137. 
15
 In order to explain this distinction, Goodman introduces a parallelism between an inference in which 
the existence of a piece of copper that conducts electricity improves the credibility of the assertion that 
other pieces of copper will conduct electricity (law-like statement) and a second inference in which the 
fact that a man in this room is a third son increases the credibility of a statement asserting that all of the 
other men in this room are third sons (accidental statement); see Goodman, 1955, p. 73.  
16
 The famous example provided by Goodman is that of the predicate “grue”. This predicate applies to all 
things that before a certain time t are green but after time t become blue. According to the example, every 
emerald analysed before time t appears to confirm both the general hypothesis that every emerald is 
“grue” and also one stating that every emerald is “green”. How can a theory of induction account for the 
different degrees of probability that an emerald in the future will be “green” or “grue”? See ivi, pp. 72-75. 
17
 “The process of justification is a delicate one of making mutual adjustments between rules and 
accepted inferences; and in the agreement achieved lies the only justification needed for either”, ivi, p. 64. 
PhD Dissertation in Political Theory – XXV Cycle                                 PhD Candidate: Federica Liveriero  
Pag. 131 
 
since they are the rule that right now best account for a broad range of other acceptable 
inferences. 
 This kind of argument is obviously a circular one, as Goodman himself admits
18
. 
However, this circularity is a virtuous one because this method can actually increase our 
knowledge and prevent us from accidental inference. Nevertheless, Goodman has still to 
overcome the theoretical difficulty of sorting out the inferences of our daily reasoning, 
many of which appear to be biased or fallacious. How can one grant the validity of a 
rule of induction if the actual inductions that are in equilibrium with this rule are often 
misleading? Goodman argues that if one goes back and forth between potential 
principles (rules of induction) and practical inferences, then one becomes able to do 
away with vicious inconsistencies. This way of reasoning draws an important 
distinction between weak and strong forms of coherentism. The former, weak 
coherentism requires just that all beliefs are consistent with each other. By contrast, a 
strong notion of coherentism posits that it should be established a mutual implication 
among all the elements of the coherent system. Moreover, a strong coherentism 
produces a system in which some beliefs are assessed as more relevant. Such beliefs, 
which are sort of fixed points, are those beliefs that, more than others, provide support 
and explanation for the whole system of beliefs in equilibrium. Such a distinction 
between weak and strong coherentism will turn out to be fundamental for understanding 
the relevance of the RE argument in Rawls’ system and also for clarifying the 
connection between RE and the issue of normativity. 
 
3.1.2 RE in the Rawlsian Paradigm 
  In the first chapter I distinguished between a moderate view of justification in 
ethics according to which the primary purpose of justification in ethics is to provide 
sound reasons for an agent to choose among different moral theories or principles. As a 
matter of fact, this analysis of the method of RE is compatible with this view, since the 
method itself can be described as a good approximation of the moral practice of 
choosing among competing theories. Taking into account this feature of RE, in this 
section I articulate how this notion was developed by Rawls in the different phases of 
his work. This analysis is required, for a quite common confusion persists about the 
intrinsic value of the RE as a method of justification in ethics. Indeed, too often RE has 
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been viewed just as a method for accommodating internal inconsistency (among 
different beliefs of a single agent) or moral disagreement (among different agents). By 
contrast, following Scanlon, I hold that a proper understanding of RE needs to take into 
account both the descriptive and the deliberative meanings of this method. 
  The descriptive interpretation maintains that RE accounts for ordinary experience 
in which we, as moral agents, have to choose among different conceptions of what is 
right. According to this interpretation, the substantial justification of different 
conceptions is already provided by other arguments (as, for example, the original 
position), and RE is just the method that every agent should adopt to fit this conception 
into her system of beliefs and values. In this regard, RE does not seem to be a method of 
justification at all, but simply the correct method to outline the moral sensibility of each 
agent and granting consistency between her considered judgments and a general theory 
of justice. On the contrary, the deliberative interpretation of RE highlights its 
justificatory role. The method does not just describe how to make moral choices 
consistent with other beliefs, rather plays a fundamental role into moral deliberation by 
discriminating between right and wrong decisions. According to this interpretation, the 
RE method provides a substantial argument that some moral judgments are most likely 
to be correct than others. As a matter of fact, the intrinsic connection between 
justifications of kinds (a) and (b) highlights the fact that in moral reasoning there is no 
possibility that agents can “get outside” of their beliefs and reach a strictly objective 
point of view. Therefore, the correct framework for granting the validity of our 
judgments must take into account our point of view as moral agents. As I will show in 
the next section, RE can be interpreted exactly as the method that supports this 
continuous readjustment between general principles and our specific judgments on 
moral and political matters
19
. 
 In order to underline the substantive value of RE, it is necessary to clarify the 
procedure whereby RE discriminates among relevant and irrelevant judgments. In order 
to grant this “filtering” action, Rawls introduces the notion of considered moral 
judgments. These judgments are “those judgments in which our moral capacities are 
                                                 
19
 According to this wider interpretation of the value in ethics of RE procedure that I am presenting, the 
RE deliberative process when coupled with a coherentist framework builds up a specific model for 
solving the vexata quaestio about the relationship between universal principles and a specific 
implementation of them. 
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most likely to be displayed without distortion”20. In this regard, considered moral 
judgments are exactly those judgments that are more likely to be correct and therefore 
able to avoid biased or fallacious reasoning. Following Goodman’s argument, we can 
say that considered moral judgments play in the procedure of moral deliberation the 
same role that law-like statements play within the framework of inductive logic. This 
parallelism emphasises once again how relevant Goodman’s theory of inductive logic 
has been for Rawls. However, important differences between the moral reasoning 
domain and that of inductive logic must be stressed as well. In fact, considered moral 
judgements are never fixed at an earlier stage like a set of data because they always 
depend on who holds the judgments. As Scanlon clearly points out: “in the case of 
empirical observations we may be convinced that something is the case without having 
any idea why it is. But moral judgments are not in general like this. Only very rarely is 
it clear to us that something is right, wrong, just, or unjust without our having some idea 
what makes it so”21.  
 In the interpretation of RE that I am presenting here, the first relevant feature of RE 
is granted by the fact that this method accounts for the twofold meaning of “justifying” 
within the moral and political domain. Indeed, in moral reasoning the procedure of 
justification must account for both the subjective reasons of an agent (the coherence 
between general principles and considered moral judgments) and the normative ones 
(the procedure for determining a fair framework of deliberation in ethics). The main 
goal that RE achieves is to demonstrate that these two sides of justification should be 
taken together in a coherent and unitary system.  
  Now, to better understand the implications of RE for the general justificatory 
paradigm I have been outlining, I briefly examine the development that this concept has 
undergone within Rawlsian framework. In the 1951 article, “Outline for decision 
procedure in ethics”22, Rawls advanced a strong parallelism between ethics and science 
in order to explain his notion of a “reasonable decision procedure”23 in ethics. In the 
article, which is extremely dependent on a positivistic view of the scientific method, 
Rawls maintains that objectivity in science has to be intended as the property a 
proposition owns by virtue of being evidenced to be true by a reasonable and reliable 
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 Rawls, 1971, p. 47. 
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 Scanlon, 2003, p. 149. 
22
 Rawls, 1951. 
23
 Ivi, p. 177. 
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method. Consequently, the gap between objectivity and subjectivity of moral 
knowledge is drawn depending on the reliability of a specific method for selecting 
evidence and granting justification. According to this interpretation of moral 
justification, the decision procedure for choosing among competing conceptions is 
conceived as follows: 
1. identifying a set of considered judgments about justice that form the set of moral 
facts; 
2. trying to formulate principles that would account for this set of moral facts; 
3. demonstrating how these general principles are accepted as justified, starting from 
the idea that such principles are able to match our considered moral judgments. 
Rawls maintains that this scheme would be a good approximation of how we usually 
deliberate in moral reasoning. In this regard, focusing on RE allows me to stress Ralws’ 
attempt to be faithful toward moral phenomenology. 
 It is worth noting that here the criterion for justifying moral principles rely on the 
possibility of satisfying the correspondence with a set of preselected moral facts. This 
criterion seems to run afoul with the discussion about RE developed in the previous 
section. Indeed, I have stressed the fact that the method of RE hinges on a notion of 
justification that is not exhausted by the attempt to reach a correspondence between 
general principles and moral facts. This inconsistency might be explained by the fact 
that, due to important changes in the paradigm of epistemological confirmation theory 
after 1950
24
, Rawls modifies his epistemic account and reduces the normative relevance 
attached to the procedure that attempt to establish pure moral facts. Indeed, in TJ, the 
normativity of principles of justice do not hinge on the fact that they accounts, and 
represent, independent moral facts. Rather, the principles of justice are assessed thanks 
to a criterion that calls for a coherent equilibrium with some relevant moral judgments 
held by moral agents “with their supporting reasons”25. In this regard, such moral 
judgments still constrain our moral deliberation, but in a way in which they do not need 
to be considered as evidential moral facts. Rather, these judgments constrain the whole 
deliberation because every moral justification should depend also on the reasons 
(justified) held by agents. Hence, we can observe an important shift in the paradigm: in 
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 In this regard, I recall the relevance of the pragmatic conception of the scientific method espoused by 
Goodman (1955) or Quine (1951 and 1969). 
25
 Rawls, 1971, p. 46. 
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TJ is a coherentist rather than a positivistic epistemic paradigm that is working as 
background
26
. 
 First of all, the idea that principles of justice are not justified as far as they do not 
accommodate our moral intuitions about a just society perfectly expresses a coherentist 
framework of justification. Even if a good philosophical argument can be provided for 
justifying specific principles of justice, still the full justification of these principles 
depends on the actual possibility that they can be coherently embedded within our 
doxastic system of beliefs. Therefore, the role played by the philosophical argument is 
not mitigated in its theoretical force. However, this same argument is laid out starting 
from a coherentist perspective about the procedure of justification as a whole. Indeed, 
the same conceptions of justice that are compared in the original position must already 
have been determined by a procedure that depends, at least indirectly, on the RE 
method. Indeed, “the structure of the original position is itself justified by employing 
the method of reflective equilibrium”27. As a matter of fact, RE is the method that, 
along with the philosophical argument for outlining the principles of justice, determines 
which form of objectivity and normativity the ethical inquiry could claim for. The RE 
method accounts for the input and output outcomes of the original position
28
.  
  Second, according to this practical and concrete approach, in moral reasoning we 
have to start from where we are, trying to justify normative principles that can cohere 
with our considered moral judgments in RE. The fact that there is not a privileged point 
of view for judging our situation is explained perfectly by RE, as this method achieves 
coherence thanks to a mutual adjustment between general principles and concrete 
judgments. Therefore, RE method in TJ shows that in moral reasoning no choice 
between correct and incorrect principles is possible without taking into consideration 
our engagement as competent judges and without our ordinary judgments as clues 
toward the right solution. A coherentist approach maintains that the validity conditions 
of an argument are those according to which agents make a practice of judging it. 
Hence, given the fact that moral agents are unable to assume an external point of view 
for assessing their various considered moral judgments, a coherentist approach should 
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 For an analysis developed at some length of the differences between Rawls (1951) and Rawls (1971), 
see Delaney, 1977. 
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 Scanlon, 2003, p. 153. 
28
 Indeed, as Jane English (1977, p. 97) perfectly points out: “The original position is a devise for 
unpacking our considered moral judgments in reflective equilibrium”. 
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argue that a principle is recognised as justified if and only if it coheres with agents’ 
other beliefs
29
. 
 Third, if the possibility of achieving equilibrium among general principles and 
particular judgments is a criterion for assessing the intrinsic validity of principles of 
justice themselves, then the theory should be evaluated as a whole
30
. Indeed, according 
to the coherentist approach, the justification requires a relation of mutual support among 
all the elements of the doxastic web of beliefs and, consequently, every element of the 
system in part explains the others. Thus, a single part of the coherent system can be 
criticised, but this criticism, to demonstrate its intrinsic value, should be justified against 
the whole theory as a coherent system
31
. In this regard, the well-known metaphor of 
Neurath's boat is extremely useful. According to this image, “our ship of beliefs is at 
sea, requiring the ongoing replacement of whatever parts are defective to remain 
seaworthy”32. We can neither abandon the ship because one part needs replacement, nor 
continue on our sail without mending the defective part.  
 
 
3. 2  Reflective Justification 
 
3.2.1  Wide and Narrow RE 
  In the previous section, I argued that RE plays a fundamental role within the 
Rawlsian procedure for justifying political principles. Actually, my impression is that 
very often the pivotal role played by RE is unmentioned. By contrast, my interest in RE 
comes from the fact that analysing this topic allows me to account for the intuition that 
no good outline of the real meaning of “justification” in ethics could ever be developed 
if the theoretical difficulties posed by epistemological issues were not faced as well. Of 
                                                 
29
 It seems to me that the connection between the argument of original position and RE could be 
understood exactly in these terms. Indeed, the original position’s argument provides us with a sound 
deliberative model for choosing among different conceptions of justice. Still, the conditions of objectivity 
for this model of choice are determined by the fact that actual actors are capable of considering such 
conditions as adequate. As Rawls (1971, p. 17) affirms: “Conceptions of justice are to be ranked by their 
acceptability to persons so circumstanced. Understood in this way the question of justification is settled 
by working out a problem of deliberation: we have to ascertain which principles it would be rational to 
adopt given the contractual situation”. 
30
 In this regard, Quine’s holistic notion of confirmation might have influenced Rawls’ development of 
the theory of justification in ethics. 
31
 Many philosophers have criticized the coherentist approach for its “conservativistic” tendencies. I will 
discuss this charge in the next section. 
32
 Kvanvig, 2009, p. 3.  
PhD Dissertation in Political Theory – XXV Cycle                                 PhD Candidate: Federica Liveriero  
Pag. 137 
 
course, ethical reasons for justification are different from those that are strictly 
epistemological. However, the ethical inquiry is based on the possibility of achieving a 
sound account of normativity. In this regard, what seems to me to be relevant about RE 
is that this method strongly maintains and tries to explain the relation between the way 
in which a principle is grounded as soundly justified and the fact that a moral agent is 
justified in holding such a principle. In the first chapter I defended coherentism as a 
general framework in moral epistemology. Now I want to outline the most important 
features of such a coherentist account of justification when actually applied to the 
justification of a theory of justice. 
 According to Norman Daniels, the author who, more than others, has tried to 
broaden the conceptual analysis around the Rawlsian concept of RE, a coherence theory 
is composed of almost the same features in both moral and scientific reasoning
33
. These 
features are:  
- considered judgments;   
- simplicity; 
- methodological conservatism. 
The value of our intuitive judgments derives from the fact that they are ours. Of course, 
this does not mean that all our judgments are meaningful and correct. Nevertheless, a 
sound coherentist theory of justification in ethics should recognise that no general 
principles can be acceptable if they are not able to achieve coherence with our stronger 
and more reliable intuitions. Indeed, one of the main goals of a coherentist approach in 
ethics is to avoid the well-known counter-intuitive outcomes of certain moral theories, 
such as utilitarianism. In this regard, it is stressed that RE imposes a condition of 
adequacy for all moral theories. This condition constraints the different theories to fit 
the considered moral judgments held by individuals. In this way, such a procedure tries 
to avoid every counter-intuitive outcome in the application of a general theory. 
However, such condition of adequacy implies some problems. In fact, a procedure of 
justification that begins from some relevant, given “facts” as are our moral intuitions, 
has to face charges about the risk of lacking any form of objectivity. For this reason, 
Daniels, thanks to a distinction provided by Rawls in his “Independence of Moral 
Theory”34, promotes an important investigation about the differences between a wide 
                                                 
33
 See Daniels, 1996, p. 25. 
34
 Rawls, 1974. 
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reflective equilibrium (hereafter WRE) and a narrow reflective equilibrium 
(hereafter NRE). The latter is a procedure that only tries to achieve a balance among 
some general principles and our intuitions, whereas the former is a stronger form of 
equilibrium in which principles and intuitions also have to match some relevant 
background theories. This distinction is articulated in order to show that the coherence 
achieved by RE is not mere consistency. Indeed, if the value of coherence in ethics 
could be explained just by the fact that we are able to make our intuitions consistent 
with some general principles, then RE will be just a description of a procedure that 
looks for the management of internal inconsistency. However, as I have already shown, 
the real value of the RE method is explained by reference to a deliberative process 
rather than a purely descriptive activity. The method of RE is deliberative because it 
provides us with substantive reasons for accepting or refuting determined principles of 
justice and this procedure can be described as producing objective outcomes
35
. One 
problem arises here. For, without an actual implementation of the procedure itself, RE 
would not be able to demonstrate its validity as an autonomous form of justification. A 
theorist that defends RE must actually accept the burden of proof with regard to the 
statement that coherence is evidential and also normatively relevant. Indeed, coherence 
is able to demonstrate its validity as evidential proof for a valid deliberative practice, 
but it must already be achieved to accomplish this job. For this reason, it is important to 
understand that the justification of the procedure of RE as valid method tout court 
already hinges on the correct implementation of such method. Again, a coherentist 
procedure can be assessed in a correct way if and only if it is evaluated as a whole and 
when its diachronic side is taken into consideration as well. 
 A second relevant point I want to highlight is that the distinction between WRE 
and NRE accounts for the different epistemological weights attached to a strong form of 
coherentism in comparison with a weak one. A strong form of coherentism requires that 
all the elements of the coherent system are in a relation of mutual implication, as the 
consistency criterion – supported as sufficient criterion by weak coherentism - is not 
sufficient for granting the validity of the justificatory procedure in the light of the 
epistemic gap between justification and warrant. Moreover, Daniels’ introduction of 
background theories in the picture accounts for the fact that RE, when viewed as a 
                                                 
35
 In this regard, it is important to recall the distinction I have introduced in the first chapter between two 
senses of objectivity. The first sense of objectivity implies an ontological thesis, whereas the second sense 
is just involved with the ordinary practice of moral objectivity. 
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method that implies a strong form of coherentism, looks for harmony not solely with 
political principles, but with beliefs and principles that we defend and that are pertinent 
to domains other than the political one. This further argument emphasises the fact that 
strong coherentism avoids a fallacious form of circularity. For, even though every form 
of coherentism involves some circularity, thanks to Goodman’s example of inductive 
logic, one can argue for a “virtuous” form of circularity in which the specific value of 
the single piece in equilibrium is justified through other arguments. Hence, the 
importance of WRE and its validity as justification are also provided by reference to 
other elements of the procedure that are themselves already justified: 
a. general principles can derive their theoretical force from other arguments that must 
themselves be part of a coherentist model
36
; 
b. considered moral judgments are defined in this manner as they are filtered by correct 
procedures that attempt to avoid unreasonableness and lack of rationality; 
c. background theories are “theories, or crucial beliefs, about the nature of persons, the 
role of morality or justice in society, and beliefs about procedural justice”, according to 
Daniels’ definition37. These theories are part of a core of deep theories about various 
philosophical issues and provide some relevant links between a theory of ethics and the 
value that such a theory should play for us as individuals within a whole system of 
beliefs. In this regard, the addition of background theories to the system has the goal to 
widen the justificatory circle as much as possible. In this regard, it is important to recall 
that even in the strictly epistemic analysis developed in the first chapter it has been 
discussed the fundamental role played by second-order beliefs within a coherentist 
procedure of justification. Indeed, second-order beliefs are the beliefs that should grant 
– of course always through a coherent argument – our epistemic relation with the 
external world. Hence, we can say that the background theories plays in Daniels’s 
account the same epistemic role played by second-order beliefs in the coherentist 
theories of knowledge
38
. 
                                                 
36
 “More defensible is the method of wide reflective equilibrium, however, since it does not isolate itself 
from any knowledge or wisdom, no matter how far afield, but takes into account everything that may 
seem pertinent”, Sosa, 1991, p. 262 (italics in the original).  
37
 Daniels, 2009, p. 12. 
38
 For the sake of completeness, I should refer to two articles by Margaret Holmgren (1987, and 1989) in 
which she provides a quite different account of the method of RE than mine. Discussing her analysis will 
led me too far away from the actual purposes of my analysis. Yet, it is important to acknowledge that, 
even though I support Daniels’ general view on the method of RE – as I share his emphasis on the 
epistemic aspects of the method -, other relevant interpretations of the method have been articulated and 
soundly defended. 
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 Taking into account all of these features, it seems that WRE could be precisely that 
form of strong coherentism that is able to avoid the charge of “begging the question of 
scepticism”39. Indeed, in the first chapter I have discussed this charge against any 
general form of coherentism, to wit, the no contact with reality objection. Again, what is 
relevant is not to show that a coherent form of justification, and consequently WRE as 
well, is able to grant that, necessarily, a justified belief is true. Rather, the sceptical 
challenge is taken into consideration so seriously by coherentism, that a definitive 
refutation of such sceptical scenarios is impossible. Still, a coherent system of 
justification, especially once that tries to embed in the coherent system as much 
considered beliefs and theoretical arguments as possible, it is probably the best attempt 
we can provide in order to contrast the sceptical challenge
40
. As in the case of inductive 
inference, there cannot be a definitive argument for granting the validity of induction as 
an epistemic procedure for yielding justification. Yet, our cognitive abilities does not 
provide us with a better option as reasoning pattern. According to this model, a system 
that achieves maximal explanatory coherence confers justification to beliefs that are part 
of the coherent system, as this system is determined by a process of cognition that is 
intrinsically normative and able of producing a self-correcting procedure
41
. Moreover, 
the validity of such account might be granted thanks to a different kind of argument, a 
sort of “pragmatic” analysis with regard to the epistemic status of our cognitive 
processes. For example, even though the existence of external objects cannot be granted 
once for all (in this regard the no-contact with reality objection is partly valid) still we 
can justify as correct the belief about their existence, within our coherent system of 
beliefs, thanks to an inference to the best explanation. On this view, the belief about the 
existence of external objects can be justified within our coherent system of beliefs as it 
                                                 
39
 See Scanlon (2003) and Copp (1990). 
40
 Keith Lehrer (1974, p. 202), for example, introduces as normative criterion for assessing the validity of 
a coherentist explanation a probabilistic principle: “If one seeks to guarantee of  truth from justification, 
the expected value of believing some statements is at a maximum only if the probability of the statements 
is one”. 
41
 “One seems forced to choose between the picture of an elephant which rests on a tortoise (What 
supports the tortoise?) and the picture of a great Hegelian serpent of knowledge with its tail in its mouth 
(Where does it begin?). Neither will do. For empirical knowledge, like its sophisticated extension, 
science, is rational, not because it has a foundation but because it is a self-correcting enterprise which can 
put any claim in jeopardy, though not all at once”, Sellars, 1956, p. 170 (for the page of the quotation I 
refer not to the first publication of “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind” in 1956, but the publication 
of the article in Sellars, W., Science, Perception and Reality, London: Routledge, 1963, pp. 127-196. 
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is assumed to be a better explanation of others beliefs we happen to hold, than other 
beliefs that refutes the existence of such external objects
42
.   
 Naturally, this kind of indirect reply is not going to satisfy any critic that upholds a 
strong epistemic view according to which we need certainty in order to have 
knowledge
43
. In the same way, the indirect reply that WRE provides against moral 
scepticism might appear extremely weak as well. Still, I do believe that this reply it is 
the only one that it is available when it has been demonstrated that fallibilism is the 
epistemic paradigm within which our epistemic and moral reasoning must be 
embedded.  
 As a further point, I want to recall the already mentioned issue of circularity. 
Regarding this matter, the fundamental point is to understand how it is possible to have 
an increase in the force of justification through a virtuous form of circularity. My 
argument here is that not in every theoretical field will this circularity be a good 
outcome. Nevertheless, in ethics, if we get rid of any form of foundationalism, then we 
find ourselves as theorists, and also as moral agents, in exactly the same impasse at 
which has arrived Goodman for the theory of confirmation in inductive logic. Indeed, 
we need to accept that the starting point should be the place where we are. Thus, starting 
from what we have, from “our” evidence, implies a necessary reference to our ordinary 
judgments and to concrete examples of the moral process of deliberation. However, this 
reference to the ordinary competence of moral agents is not the only instrument an 
ethical theory possesses. Indeed, WRE tries to develop a procedure for justifying the 
choices among different conceptions of justice that depends also on some deep 
philosophical theories
44
. The reference to such deep and wide theories allows WRE to 
reveal some strengths and weaknesses of competing conceptions of justice. As I have 
already said, the introduction of background theories into the model of WRE grants the 
possibility of broadening the circle of justification beyond strict moral beliefs. This 
enlargement of the number of justified elements that must be in coherent equilibrium 
offers and increments the “evidential force” of the whole system. The difference 
between a descriptive account of our sense of justice and the attempt to produce 
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 See Feldman (2002) and Lehrer (1974). 
43
 For a deep analysis of the topic, see Feldman, 2002, ch. 7, pp. 130-156. 
44
 Concerning this fundamental distinction, Daniels refutes the analogism between RE and the linguistic 
method because this similitude will reduce the WRE procedure to moral anthropology. See Daniels, 1996, 
pp. 66-80. 
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normative statements about what we have to do in our moral life lies in the this search 
for the largest possible justificatory circle. 
 This last, fundamental point is the perfect answer to those authors that charge the 
RE method with the argument that the justificatory procedure employed by this method  
is actually rigged. According to this argument, no justificatory force could be attributed 
to a coherentist argument for the justification of principles of justice because these 
principles, within the RE procedure, need only to match our considered moral 
judgments and therefore all the alleged justificatory weight of the coherentist procedure 
would lie on RE, and this procedure is not enough for guaranteeing objectivity. To 
answer this criticism, let us recall that the RE procedure is valid only if every single 
element that is going to be part of the hypothetical equilibrium is not just consistent 
with other elements, rather is mutually implicated by all the other elements of the 
system as a whole. Moreover, the different elements of the system very often are 
sustained by other theoretical justifications that are consistent, but independent from the 
coherentist procedure
45
. 
 The method of WRE is able to provide us with a criterion for distinguishing 
between mere internal consistency and a stronger form of coherence in which there is an 
evidential relationship of mutual implication among beliefs, principles and background 
theories. While NRE is not able to avoid the charge that coherence ends up being 
nothing more than internal consistency, WRE instead claims for a strong form of 
coherence in which some elements that are part of the coherent system exhibit an 
epistemic priority over the others. Of course, such epistemic priority must itself be 
justified through an adequate procedure; otherwise, the whole RE risks failure in a sort 
of weak form of intuitionism
46
. Indeed, the epistemic priority of considered moral 
judgments is justified by the fact that they have already been “filtered”. Moreover, their 
validity is always subordinate to a possible revision, even though it is true that some 
provisional fixed points are taken for granted. As Daniels affirms: 
 “Since all considered judgments are revisable, the judgement ‘It is wrong to inflict pain 
gratuitously on another person’ is, too. However, we can also explain why it is so hard 
to imagine not accept it, so hard that some treat is as a necessary moral truth. To 
imagine revising such a provisional fixed point we must imagine a vastly altered wide 
                                                 
45
 Fundamental examples of parts of the system sustained by independent theoretical reasons are the 
principles of the background theories that became part of a coherent system. Daniels (1996) provides as 
examples different background theories about the role of morality in society; about persons; about social 
relationship, etc. 
46
 See Brandt (1979), Hare (1996) and Singer (1979). 
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reflective equilibrium that nevertheless is much more acceptable than our own. For 
instance, we have to image persons quite unlike the persons we know”47. 
 
As a matter of fact, starting from an anti-foundationalist approach, the RE procedure 
will never affirm that some judgments are fixed as they are self-evident moral truths. 
Nevertheless, WRE is a form of coherentism that implies some fixed points for which 
the initial credibility is guaranteed by other arguments besides coherence itself
48
. These 
fixed points are what Daniels calls “Archimedean points”: beliefs that are not 
foundational, but still, are strongly evidential for the whole justificatory perspective
49
. 
Moreover, the same system of coherence is a further way of granting strong evidence in 
support of certain principles instead of others. Indeed, if our whole theory of justice has 
already passed through different stages of justification and has also demonstrated its 
ability to achieve coherence, then it is quite understandable that the same theory will 
legitimately refuse particular principles that might go against many of the fixed points 
of that theory. At the end of the day, a whole system of elements that are already 
justified and coherent with one another is more likely to be correct than a system in 
which many elements are inconsistent. For example, if we try to include in our WRE a 
sentence q that states: ‘It is right to inflict pain gratuitously on another person’, then it 
quite easy to understand that accepting this assertion will imply an overly strong 
distortion of many of our common fixed Archimedean points with regard to the 
meaning and value of the term “right”. This outcome is strongly connected with the 
second feature of coherentism presented by Daniels: simplicity. The simplicity 
constraint implies the respect of the “law of least action”. This law, indeed, perfectly 
explains why it would be so difficult, both from an intuitive perspective and from a 
theoretical point of view, to include the principle ‘It is right to inflict pain gratuitously 
on another person’ within our doxastic sets of beliefs. The procedure of RE, under the 
same conditions of achievable coherence, should prefer that option in which the law of 
least action is respected. This procedural implementation of the ideal of simplicity 
reflects the intuitive idea that the more changes are needed in an already coherent 
system, the less reliable is the new evidence that required so many changes in order to 
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 Daniels, 1996, p. 28. 
48
 It is worth noting that Daniels provides an account of RE that stresses more the epistemic tasks fulfilled 
by this method within the procedure for justifying a theory of justice, rather than the moral reasons. This 
account of the method of RE is indeed consistent with the analysis I have provided in the first chapter, 
where I have highlighted the fundamental role played by epistemic features within the nonideal attempt to 
justify a political theory. 
49
 Ivi, pp. 47-65. 
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be embedded within the system. According to this interpretation, the difficulty of 
incorporating a principle about the right to inflict gratuitous pain on another into our 
conception of justice is also expressed by the fact that such principle will change 
dramatically our whole system of beliefs
50
. Therefore, the simplicity condition would be 
part of an argument for refusing this principle as an element of our theory of justice. 
Every already justified principle or belief has a sort of prejudicial-validity-status 
attached to it to the extent that it has been justified in WRE. Indeed, every justified 
sentence of our theory of justice provides “intersubjective checkpoints in the sense that 
if a moral view or theory could be shown to conflict with these sentences, this would 
generally be conceived as a decisive argument against the theory”51. 
 The prejudicial validity attached to the beliefs and principles already embedded 
within WRE implies a sort of conservatory side for the procedure of justification. 
Indeed, methodological conservatism is the last feature of coherentism that I introduced 
at the beginning of this section as a fundamental aspect of RE method. Again, it is true 
that RE has a conservatory side; nevertheless, this feature does not imply a weakness of 
the procedure itself. I think that is extremely difficult to grasp the real value of the RE 
procedure because this method is always on a ridge. It appears to be a conservative 
procedure, but it also claims for the possibility of sustaining constant revisions of the 
partial equilibria achieved. Moreover, RE faces charges both of upholding relativism, 
for the justificatory procedure begins with our considered moral judgments, and of 
being a sort of hidden intuitionism, as some elements of the theory would own 
epistemological priority. Furthermore, RE is still sometimes described as a general 
procedure for justifying some moral and political principles, but it could also be 
interpreted as the status that every single agent achieves after an internal struggle to find 
equilibrium among contrasting personal beliefs. All of these elements appear to be quite 
in conflict with one another. My argument here is that the same RE procedure should be 
evaluated as a whole, respecting the intrinsic value of the coherentist approach
52
. 
Indeed, all criticisms are applicable to some elements of the method, but not to the 
                                                 
50
 Concerning this point, I want to recall the fact that the distinction between the probabilities that all 
emeralds are “green” or “grue” is also conducted through the idea that the acceptance of the predicate 
“grue” would disconfirm too many other physical hypotheses that are taken for granted and whose 
abandonment would imply revising the whole theory on physical objects.  
51
 Tersman, 1998, p. 95.  
52
 Blanshard (1939, p. 286) for example, referring to the intrinsic epistemic aspects of a coherentist 
paradigm, claim: “The charge of conservativism is thus a mistake. It assumes that the system we must 
take as base is a system of first-order beliefs. But we have seen that when beliefs of the second-order are 
included, as they have every right to be, we have a system that provides for its own correction”. 
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whole RE procedure. Concerning this aspect, indeed, it is worth noting that the charge 
of relativism could be faced only if the fact of starting from some moral “facts” as our 
considered moral judgments is understood under the perspective of the whole procedure 
with its independent stages of evaluation. Furthermore, the charge of conservatism, 
which sounds so sensible, at the end loses its force because RE is always both a 
procedure for achieving agreement and a method that reasonably accepts continual 
revisions and that argues for the fact that some non-moral theories play a substantial 
role within the procedure for constructing and justifying our moral beliefs
53
. To 
conclude, we can say that RE, if analyses as justificatory method and therefore 
evaluated as a whole, is able to reply in a quite satisfactory way to many criticisms that 
have been addressed against its validity. After all, as Rawls himself affirms, “The 
struggle for reflective equilibrium continues indefinitely”54. In this regard, it is 
important to understand that RE is a procedure that takes into account the diachronic 
side of morality
55
. For this reason, as I said, even though the burden of proof is on RE 
itself, this burden should not be understood as overly urgent, allowing to the procedure 
of RE to take place before determining if it is a valuable method or not. 
 I began this chapter claiming that RE is an adequate, efficient and reasonable 
method. Now, after the articulation of many issues, I hope that it is clearer why I have 
stated so. First, RE seems to me an adequate method because it tries to take into account 
some relevant aspects of our ordinary experience without losing the normative aspects 
that must characterise every account of moral deliberation. Second, the RE method is 
efficient because it is a concrete and plausible procedure for achieving agreement in 
ethics. Third, the RE procedure is an extremely reasonable method, as it looks for a 
form of agreement that is intersubjective, instead of appealing to foundational, self-
evident beliefs. In this regard, RE method is consistent with the nonideal paradigm of 
political philosophy that I defend, since RE method hinges on the doxastic 
presupposition and, furthermore, although providing an objective justification of a 
political conception, it is always open to re-examinations and to the possibility of 
revising or improving our justificatory procedure. In this regard, I think that Scanlon is 
completely right when he affirms: “it seems to me that this method, properly 
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 Actually, against the charge of conservatism, it is also worth noting that Rawls (1971) considered moral 
judgments to be much more revisable than he did in Rawls (1951).   
54
 Rawls, 1993, p. 97. 
55
 Concerning the value of the diachronic side of moral enterprise, see Bagnoli, 2002. 
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understood, is in fact the best way of making up one’s mind about moral matters and 
about many other subjects. Indeed, it is the only defensible method: apparent 
alternatives to it are illusory”56. 
 
3.2.2  A Modest Account of Objectivity 
  “The fact that the method of RE could lead to a result that called into question 
the objectivity of our moral beliefs is not an objection to that method. It is, rather, a 
necessary consequence of the fact that this method does not ‘beg the question against 
scepticism’”57. With this statement by Scanlon, I introduce the last issue of this section 
of the chapter: namely, the discussion about the possibility that RE method might 
produce objectively justified moral principles and beliefs. In this regard, it is important 
to recall the fundamental difference between NRE and WRE: while the latter is able to 
provide explanatory evidence for the principles that turn out to be supported by the 
coherentist method of deliberation, NRE is strictly connected with the mitigation of 
internal inconsistencies. If WRE supplies the broadest evidence achievable in a field 
such as morality and, moreover, is the guarantor of an important and endless procedure 
of critical scrutiny, then it should be possible to claim that this procedure is capable of 
producing an objective justification. However, which kind of objectivity is this? Again, 
it is important to recall a distinction between two meaning of moral objectivity: 
i. a moral principle can be objective as far as it implies an ontological assumption 
according to which there are moral objects or properties to which moral truths 
correspond; 
ii. a moral principle can also be defined as objective inasmuch the evidence in its favour 
has been obtained through a deliberative process that respects some correctness 
constraints that are determined in the light of the ordinary practice of morality. 
These two senses of objectivity are different, we can define them as a bold and 
moderate notions of objectivity. According to the bold account, sustaining the 
objectivity of the moral discourse implies necessarily that moral realism is true
58
. By 
contrast, the moderate version focuses its attention on the epistemic practice of 
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 Scanlon, 2003, p. 149. 
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 Ivi, p. 153. 
58
 According to Railton (1995), moral realism implies something more than a Literal Truth thesis with 
regard to the objectivity of moral statements. In this regard, Railton provides an account of objectivity 
that can be viewed as close to mine, even though he also wants to argue in favour of moral realism. A 
statement on which, by contrast, I want to remain agnostic. 
PhD Dissertation in Political Theory – XXV Cycle                                 PhD Candidate: Federica Liveriero  
Pag. 147 
 
producing evidence for specific principles and proposition and it remains austere with 
regard to the metaphysical status of moral facts. These two accounts must be 
distinguished, but they are not incompatible. Indeed, they actually focus their attention 
on different aspects of what implies for a proposition to be “objective” and therefore we 
can have a theory of justification in ethics that meet both these objectivity 
requirements
59
. 
 I uphold the second account of objectivity, namely the moderate one, for two 
slightly different reasons. First of all, this account of objectivity is compatible with my 
general epistemic view with regard to the procedure of justification of moral and 
political principles. Assuming as benchmarks a doxastic presupposition and a fallibilist 
paradigm impacts as well the way in which we look to the issue of objectivity. This 
moderate account of objectivity is still a robust account, as it grants the descriptive side 
of moral discourse, claiming that moral propositions can be described as true or false 
and that moral disputes, in principles, can be settled. This approach is coherent with the 
phenomenology of our ordinary moral practice. Yet, according to this moderate version, 
the fact that moral sentence might be defined as objectively true or false stems from a 
normativity implicit in the practice of correcting and revising our beliefs on morality in 
order to achieve a maximum coherent system, rather than on the connection with an 
ontological committing argument
60
. Therefore, a correlation with an ontological 
argument is not necessary for grating the objectivity of the moral discourse – at least in 
the moderate sense. Yet, the bold account of objectivity is not inconsistent with the 
moderate one. Indeed, the two accounts of objectivity refer to different reasons for 
claiming that a moral or political theory is objective. This means that the two versions 
of objectivity are not incompatible and that, therefore, it is possible to sustain a view 
according to which objectivity is granted by the correctness criteria of the moral 
deliberative practice and arguing in favour of either a realist or a non-realist account in 
moral ontology. Consequently, I think it is correct to claim that the moderate account of 
objectivity underdetermines choice between competing ontological thesis with regard to 
                                                 
59
 A long debate has taken place with regard of the relationship between objectivity of the moral discourse 
and the statement – accepted by some authors, criticized by some others - that moral realism is true (see 
Brink (1989); Dworkin (1996); Enoch (2010); Horgan and Timmons (2006); Railton (1995); Wiggins 
(1995); Williams (1995); Wright (1995). 
60
 “I doubted then that there was any distinctive understanding to be gained of the nature of morality or of 
moral judgements from allowing the emphases of the realist/antirealist debate to affect the way one 
should read the questions we need to debate about ethical knowledge, objectivity, etc.”, Wiggins, 1995, p. 
253. 
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the status of moral facts
61
. This last point is important for introducing the second reason 
why I support this model of objectivity in ethics. Since political philosophy – at least 
according to the general paradigm I uphold – must respect some neutrality constraints, 
then I think it is really important to propose an account of objectivity that can be faithful 
to moral phenomenology without necessarily requiring to take a stance on the 
ontological status of moral facts as well 
62
. 
 According to this moderate account of objectivity, the relevant issue at stake when 
we analyse the objectivity of moral discourse is the normativity intrinsic to the 
“epistemic correctness” criteria that are employed in the assessment of the validity of 
our moral practice of deliberation. Our moral deliberation is developed thanks to the 
idea that we, as moral agents, are able to describe our most strongly held moral 
commitments as true and justified through a correct deliberative procedure. In this 
regard, this kind of objectivity involves the idea that there is a right answer and the 
normativity attached to the “rightness” of this answer rests on the correctness-apt 
deliberative procedure we produce as moral agents.  
“These contents have correctness conditions that are commonsensically seen as 
objective in the sense that the content of one’s beliefs is not simply a matter of what one 
takes it to be - it is not a matter of idiosyncratic will, free stipulation, or spontaneous 
creation. […] The puzzle is how they might do this:  how subjects might, by doing what 
they do, place themselves within a normative framework that sustains a distinction 
between what is correct and what is done”63. 
 
 This account of objectivity highlights the practical side of our moral enterprise, to 
wit, the fact that our moral practice is able to produce moral evaluative judgments. 
Indeed, moral agents, starting from what they have, namely rough moral judgments, try 
to achieve a relevant goal: an agreement on some general, justified and objective 
principles of justice. During this productive procedure, there are normative constraints 
that play a relevant role, like for example the notion of considered moral judgments. 
Considered moral judgments, in fact, are doxastic moral beliefs that have been 
“purified” from deviating beliefs in order to meet an adequacy constraint. A parallelism 
can be provided between the productive activity of the ordinary moral evaluative 
practice and the explanatory activity of observational beliefs. In fact, the explanatory 
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 On the same line, Brink’s analysis about how a concept of the person underdetermines choice among 
competing moral theories, see Brink (1987) and (1989, appendix 4, pp. 303-321. 
62
 “I have argued that the cognitivism of everyday moral inquiry, and hence the coherence theory's ability 
to maintain our ordinary understanding of moral inquiry and argument, essentially depends on the 
question of objectivity”, Dorsey, 2006, p. 511. 
63
 Railton, 1995, pp. 275-276. 
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activity of descriptive beliefs has an intrinsic normativity that stems from the epistemic 
activity of justifying such evidence as adequate. The explanatory evidence depends on 
the system of belief that the believer holds, and yet the correctness criteria for assessing 
such evidence can be defined as objective. Of course this normativity implies a 
circularity of mutual supports among beliefs. However, this circularity can be explained 
in the light of the general holistic view about the justification of the procedure of 
production of human knowledge. To conclude, the objectivity of morality can be 
granted thanks to the “durable satisfaction of the discourse’s internal disciplinary 
constraints”64, such as correctness criteria intrinsic to the moral evaluative discourse 
itself
65
.  
 Concerning these aspects, I find quite interesting an argument suggested by 
Bagnoli, following the Kantian distinction between synthetic and analytic judgements
66
. 
Indeed, taking into account the deliberative interpretation of the RE method, it could be 
said that, to achieve a normatively forceful justification, RE needs to be a synthetic 
procedure rather than a strictly analytical one. According to this approach, WRE would 
be able to provide strong evidence for the validity of principles of justice that have met 
the WRE constraints. Moreover, the accomplishment of a valid WRE would guarantee 
the production of normative judgments. These judgments could be understood as 
elements of a synthetic production of practical knowledge. In fact, if RE is just 
descriptive and therefore analytic, then the procedure would lose all of its normative 
force. By contrast, morality requires a procedure that does not just describe our sense of 
morality after that this one has been filtered from the biased ideas. Rather, it is 
important to find a procedure for obtaining the best choice possible.  
                                                 
64
 Wright, 1995, p. 219. 
65
 Both Railton (1995) and Crispin Wright (1995), I think, support this analysis of the evaluative practice 
of morality as intrinsically normative. However, Railton believes that this normativity of the moral 
discourse should be coupled with a realist account of moral facts as supervenient on non-moral ones. By 
contrast, Wright maintains that the validity of the moral discourse can be granted thanks to a discourse-
invariant analysis that attests the “superassertibility” of moral truths. Anyhow, what it is relevant for my 
analysis is that both the authors uphold a view about the practice of morality as able to provide objectivity 
thanks to the reference of some correctness criteria that belongs to the internal disciplinary constraints of 
the moral discourse. Moreover, the fact that this account of objectivity is supposedly compatible both 
with a realist account (Railton’s) and a non-realist one (Wright’s) is supporting my idea that the modest 
form of objectivity underdetermines the choice between realism and anti-realism in ethics. 
66
 “Recall Kant's project: if morality is not chimerical, ‘a phantasm in our brain’, then it must be possible 
to show that practical reason has a synthetic use, that it can be applied to some objects. For a concept to 
have reality, it must be applicable. That is, it is not enough to say that such a concept is analytically 
coherent and intelligible; it must be given an application. In particular, to be objective practical reason 
must be shown to be applicable to us: the moral law is objective insofar as it is shown to be subjectively 
applicable”, Bagnoli, 2001, p. 322. 
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3.3  Reflective Agreement  
 
3.3.1  RE as a General Interpretative Paradigm 
  RE is an extremely valuable method as it allows us to depict a method of 
justification in ethics in which not just moral aspects are taken into consideration. RE is 
the perfect expression of a moderate view with regard to the procedure of justification, 
for the political conception is justified if and only if achieves coherence with all the 
other beliefs held by a moral agent in her doxastic system. Strong intuitions about past 
cases of moral conflict as well as background theories about general matters are parts of 
the doxastic system. All these beliefs constitute a web of beliefs that mutually sustain 
each other. As I have already claimed, one of the most important feature of RE method 
is the theoretically never ending revisability of the outcomes of the method itself. The 
procedure of mutual adjustment between general principles and strong intuitions held by 
moral agents can provide stable results and yet been intrinsically revisable. New 
evidence can be brought into the picture or a new conflict might arise among different 
interpretations of general principles already justified. These are instances of possible 
reasons for revising our previous achieved balance between principles and intuitions. 
RE is therefore an intrinsically liberal method, as it claims for a fallibilist account of the 
justificatory procedure and consequently is benevolent toward the confrontation among 
different opinions and is always open to possible readjustments. Upholding a fallibilist 
view does not mean that the principles of justice are left without normative power, as 
their justification is ultimately not infallible. The normativity is maintained, since a 
specific concept of justice might be coherently embedded within the different doxastic 
sets held by citizens and therefore becomes victoriously justified from the justificatory 
perspective. Yet, the strong disagreement among citizens implies a nested 
inconclusiveness with regard to the interpretation of this concept of justice. The 
procedure in which every citizen achieves a RE among her beliefs and the “political 
module” is not established in advance, as it depends on the actual willingness of every 
citizen to engage herself into the procedure for reaching a stable WRE that is a factual 
precondition for realizing a public procedure of deliberation ruled by the normative 
ideal of public reason. 
 RE is both an individual and an unstable equilibrium that each agent should 
achieve during the process for justifying principles of justice and the coherentist 
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procedure that grants the legitimacy of the whole argument. In this regard, taking into 
account the Rawlsian argumentative structure as paradigmatic, it is important to 
highlight that RE could be interpreted as the background method that leads every stage 
of justification. This interpretation of the fundamental role played by RE is consistent 
with the articulation of the overlapping consensus that I defended in the foregoing 
chapter. Indeed, when it is claimed that the overlapping consensus concerns an 
agreement over some organizing ideas that constitutes a loose normative framework of 
reasoning, the background intuition is that the RE method shapes the whole procedure 
of justification. In the overlapping consensus different members of the idealized 
constituency achieve a consensus over some specific liberal ideals starting from their 
different perspectives. In this regard, a coherentist procedure is engaged, since every 
member tries to find a coherent way for connecting political ideals to her 
comprehensive system of beliefs. The overlapping consensus achieved constitutes the 
loose deliberative framework in which the device of representation of the original 
position is constitutes. Therefore, the original position itself is shaped in the light of the 
already achieved agreement on the loose framework of deliberation. The normative role 
played by the veil of ignorance and the relation among the parties are laid down with 
reference to the already shared notion of well-order society and free and equal citizens. 
Without presupposing an agreement on these organizing ideas, the same construction of 
the original position device would be impossible, or at least normatively irrelevant. A 
normative, philosophically relevant, argument might be provided in order to justify a 
conception of justice. Still, this argument should have already being embedded in a 
coherentist framework in which a normative role is attached to some Archimedean 
points on which there is a convergence of agreement by different comprehensive 
perspectives. In this regard, the role that overlapping consensus plays in the ideal phase 
of the theory is to guarantee a justification of the Archimedean points around which the 
entire structure of justification of political liberalism will be built on. Of course, this 
kind of overlapping consensus is an idealized procedure in which the organizing ideas 
are under the scrutiny of just idealized reasonable members of the constituency. Yet, it 
is reasonable to expect that thanks to a contextual approach, these organizing ideas can 
be actually embedded in the doxastic systems of beliefs of the members of the society. 
Indeed, people that already live in a liberal democracy and that accept the legitimacy of 
the political regime thanks to the procedure of the balloting and that engage themselves 
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in the practice of public deliberation demonstrate to accept, even implicitly, the 
organizing ideas of liberalism. Naturally, this agreement is a loose agreement on vague 
concepts. Still, the Rawlsian insight is that we can start from this loose agreement and 
try to build on it a stronger and as much as possible stable theory of justice. 
 In my proposal, RE is fundamental, as this method is able to bridge the ideal and 
nonideal phases of the justificatory procedure. In order to understand this assumption, 
let’s analyse the role that RE method plays in the different justificatory stages of the 
ideal phase of the theory.  
 Following Quong, I have defended a notion of overlapping consensus according to 
which this consensus constitutes the input of the whole theory of justice. According to 
this interpretation, the overlapping consensus on the underlying ideas of political 
liberalism (i.e. the ideal of a well-ordered society as a fair system of cooperation and the 
idea of citizens as free and equal) is already the outcome of a RE procedure. Such 
organizing ideas are extrapolated by a context where their normativity stems from the 
fact that they already “fit” some of our considered convictions in RE. These 
Archimedean points are the raw material from which we can try to build up a 
normatively relevant theory of justice. The way in which the organizing ideas are 
justified hinges on the reference to a General Wide Reflective Equilibrium in which 
idealized members of the constituency agree on such ideas starting from their specific 
comprehensive doctrines
67
. Naturally this constituency is idealized, as we assume that 
the members of such constituency are reasonable and therefore willing to find an 
agreement between their comprehensive doctrines and these organizing ideas. 
According to Quong, it is much more reasonable to expect different people to be able to 
find an agreement on some underlying ideals, rather than on specific principles of 
justice – as instead sustained by the common view on overlapping consensus. Every 
                                                 
67
 “Insofar as holism is plausible in the deliberation or reasoning of each of the parties, the moral beliefs 
of each will not function as rigidly axiomatized systems. Rather, there will be room for each of them 
potentially to revise most any aspect of his or her view, on the basis of what he or she takes to be good 
reasons. The idea of overlapping consensus suggests how, against the background of such holism, their 
joint effort at working towards moral agreement can proceed on the basis of any initial agreement 
whatsoever. Specifically, there is no need that the initial agreement pertain to what either takes to be 
foundational or basic. This appeal to holism and overlapping consensus makes a schematic case that joint 
moral reasoning is possible even in the face of deep moral disagreement. It reflects at least a bare 
possibility. When moral disagreement is deep, we want to know more about how the parties can 
reasonably approach agreement. Each will need to be willing to compromise: to revise his or her view in a 
way that he or she would not have been willing to do, but for some modicum of concern or respect that he 
or she has for the other party. And this compromise must go deep, in that it must extend to what each 
counts as right or wrong, or as worth seeking or avoiding for its own sake”, Richardson, 2009, pp. 40-41. 
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reasonable citizen, starting from her specific doxastic set of beliefs, agrees on some 
liberal ideals that are outlined thanks to the reference to the actual history and 
development of liberal ideals themselves. In this regard, every citizen establishes a 
WRE between her doxastic system of beliefs – made up by background theories, moral 
intuitions, personal preferences, etc - and the organizing ideals of political liberalism
68
. 
 After that an overlapping consensus among the reasonable members of an idealized 
constituency has been assumed, the freestanding argument for the construction of the 
general liberal principles can be exposed. The rationale for the construction of the 
original position argument is provided by the organizing ideas on which the overlapping 
consensus has already been established. Consequently, these Archimedean points 
constitutes the benchmarks around which developing the freestanding argument of 
justification. The procedure of justification here aims to provide a sound justification of 
general liberal principles, or even more minimally, of a specific concept of justice. 
These justificatory stage is articulated in the light of the idea that the principles that will 
result to be justified, would be determined as the best expression of some shared notions 
of fairness. In this regard, RE method is again employed as an abduction argument 
according to which the general principles that are the outcomes of the device of 
representation of the original position are justified as they are the best explanatory 
principles that accounts for the Archimedean points shared in overlapping consensus
69
. 
The coherence here is viewed as a hint of “explanatory power”, as it is not the 
coherence itself the reason for believing something as correct; rather coherence is the 
proof that the general principles are supported, in RE, by the organizing ideals shared in 
overlapping consensus by an idealized constituency. Looking for a RE between the 
political “module” and fixed normative beliefs that are victorious justified within the 
doxastic systems of idealized moral agents is fundamental, as the coherence achieved is 
a reflection of the reasons why moral agents can support this political module. In this 
regard, coherence is a criterion of justification, not a justifying property
70
. The kind of 
RE that characterizes the pro tanto stage of the justificatory procedure is a strictly 
Political Reflective Equilibrium as the political module is determined thanks to a 
freestanding argument and the equilibrium reached with the Archimedean points relies 
                                                 
68
 For a good analysis of “wide general reflective equilibrium”, see Scanlon, 2003. 
69
 In this regard, Gaus (1996, p. 108) states: “Second, I have argued that principles are to be justified in 
terms of their explanatory power vis-a-vis our other justified beliefs. Thus reflective equilibrium is based 
on an abductive hypothesis about the best possible explanation of our beliefs”. 
70
 For a deep analysis of these issues, see Sayre McCord, 1995. 
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on strictly political arguments that are completely discontinuous with regard to the 
comprehensive doctrines of the citizens
71
. With regard to the Political Reflective 
Equilibrium, it is worth recalling an argument developed by Samuel Scheffler in his 
article “The Appeal of Political Liberalism”72. In this work Scheffler claims that the true 
meaning of the political justificatory structure of PL is not that such procedure provides 
the justification for a political conception tout court. Rather, it can be argued that Rawls 
considers as truly legitimate a liberal conception of justice if and only if such 
conception provides a stage of justification that is strictly political. However, this 
strictly political justification could be a necessary condition, but not a sufficient one as 
well. Therefore, the political stage of justification can be embedded in a wider 
justificatory procedure in which not strictly political arguments can be assumed as 
relevant from the perspective of justification. “It might be less confusing and more 
illuminative to use the adjective ‘political’ to describe arguments for conceptions of 
justice rather than the conceptions themselves”73. This argument is consistent with the 
general framework I have been defending in this chapter. Indeed, I hold the validity of a 
freestanding, strictly political, argument for the construction of a political concept. 
However, I also do believe that the accomplishment of normative role played by the  
political justification hinges on the previous achievement of an overlapping consensus 
over the underlying ideals of a liberal theory of justice. 
 In introducing the distinction between a General Wide Reflective Equilibrium and 
the Political Reflective Equilibrium I have characterized just the first two stages of the 
complex procedure of justification of political liberalism that I have in mind. The part I 
have just discussed deals with the ideal phase of the theory. In this phase RE is both an 
adequacy test for the whole theory and the method for achieving justification with 
regard to the single perspective of moral agents. At the first level, the overlapping 
consensus one, RE is an useful tool for identifying the Archimedean fixed points that 
constitutes a loose liberal framework of reasoning. These organizing ideas, when 
justified in WRE, vis-à-vis the doxastic sets of the members of the idealized 
constituency, become a sort of shared considered moral judgments about what justice 
requires. Here RE is more an individual, reiterated, procedure for achieving coherence 
between comprehensive and political ideals. The way in which different, even though 
                                                 
71
 The first author that has talked about a political reflective equilibrium has been Norman Daniels, 1996.  
72
 Scheffler, 1994. 
73
 Ivi, p. 13. 
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defined as reasonable for the sake of the argument, members of the constituency draw 
the line between the political and the comprehensive domain is a matter that can be 
resolved just with the reference to the actual method of RE. Then, the freestanding 
argument – that it is not necessary to outline in term of original position – provides a 
strong philosophical argument for justifying a general concept of justice that accounts 
for the considered moral judgments shared by the members of the constituency in 
overlapping consensus. This political module is justified as far as it demonstrates to be 
coherent with the ideals shared in overlapping consensus. Again, a RE method is 
employed. However, here the RE is more an adequacy test for the theory that a 
reiterative method for achieving coherence
74
. The adequacy test requires that the theory 
that has been developed thanks to the freestanding argument is able to achieve 
coherence with the considered moral judgments shared by an idealized constituency of 
citizens. The general political theory should match the moral intuitions of the moral 
agents, otherwise this theory would be not fully justified. However, given the fact that 
in this scheme a General Wide Reflective Equilibrium is antecedent to the freestanding 
argument for a Political Reflective Equilibrium, the agreement over the concept of 
justice produced by the freestanding argument is granted almost de jure. Since 
overlapping consensus grants that the political ideals are victoriously justified within the 
doxastic sets of reasonable citizens, then the normativity of the freestanding argument, 
although independent and philosophically valid, hinges on the fact that reasonable 
citizens has actually agreed, in overlapping consensus, on the value of these shared 
Archimedean points. While relegated to the ideal stage, I hold that a justificatory 
paradigm developed in the wake of Rawls’ theory can be soundly defended. However, 
the most dangerous problems arise exactly when the ideal phase is abandoned. If in the 
nonideal stage we cannot assume an idealized constituency of just reasonable citizens, 
then it is not possible to believe that a concrete overlapping consensus is achievable. 
According to Quong this is not a problem, as the internal concept of political liberalism 
does not claim to be able to justify its tenets to unreasonable citizens in the same way 
that it does with reasonable citizens. In this regard, Quong maintains that the full 
justification is achieved when both the overlapping consensus and the pro tanto 
justification are accomplished. By contrast, the aim of this last part of this chapter is to 
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 Ernest Sosa (1991), for example, distinguishes between a social version of RE and the classical view of 
RE as a method that applies to the individual’s set of beliefs.   
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articulate an analysis with regard to the nonideal phase of the political liberalism. 
According to this scheme, the full justification cannot be accomplished if the 
justificatory analysis is reduced to the ideal section of the framework. Rather, a 
fundamental role for a political theory of justice is to accommodate the disagreement in 
nonidealized circumstances. One of the major charges pressed against the political turn 
in the Rawlsian framework has been that such strictly political justificatory procedure 
requires from the citizens a schizophrenic attitude. On the one hand, they have to 
heartily uphold the political concept thanks to the reference to internal reasons they find 
in their doxastic set of comprehensive beliefs. On the other hand, the same political 
concept should be declared as trumping over all the comprehensive considerations they 
may have. Naturally, this twofold line of argument produces tensions. In my opinion, 
however, the difficulties produced by this justificatory account are due to the fact that 
the two phases of the process of justification, the ideal and nonideal one, have not been 
properly distinguished. The ideal phase of the theory is focused on the identification of 
a set of political ideals that constitutes the loose framework in the light of which it is 
then possible to build up a specific theory of justice. This loose framework of 
underlying ideas provides us the raw material from which building up an optimal 
eligible proposal of public rules and principles
75
. The nonideal phase, instead, is 
devoted to the accomplishment of a full justification in which demonstrate the 
possibility that, even when the abstractions are undone, the political concept can still 
claim to be victoriously justified within the doxastic systems of beliefs of the actual 
members of society. For this reason, I think that Quong is wrong when he claims that 
full justification can be accomplished thanks to the pair of the overlapping consensus 
and the freestanding justification of the general liberal principles of justice. I will spend 
the next section discussing why I believe that it is not possible to argue that a full 
justification of a political module can be accomplished with reference to just procedures 
of justification that imply idealisation of some kind. In this regard, I think that Quong is 
wrong when he claims that: 
“The alternative view I have offered does not present the freestanding argument – the 
move from the fundamental ideas to the general liberal principles – as a pro tanto 
justification which then depends on an overlapping consensus in order to achieve full or 
public justification. Because the freestanding arguments builds on certain fundamental 
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 Gaus (2010, p. 323, italics in the original) defines the optimal eligible set in this term: “This allows us 
to identify a socially optimal eligible set of moral rules: no proposed rule in the set is ineligible in 
anyone’s ranking, nor is it dominated by any other member of the set”. 
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ideas that are already assumed to be subject of an overlapping consensus amongst 
reasonable people, the conclusions the free standing argument should be taken as fully 
justified to all reasonable people”.76 
 
 I agree that an overlapping consensus, when viewed as the first justificatory stage 
in an idealized phase of the theory, provides us with a sound and justified common 
evaluative standards. Nevertheless, my thesis is that, for accomplishing a full 
justification, we need a nonideal stage of the theory that deals with the actual 
disagreement among citizens, and that therefore renounces to appeal to justificatory 
arguments that hinge on abstractions and idealizations. The main goal of the nonideal 
phase is to guarantee the stability of the justification even when any abstraction or 
idealization is undone
77
. Hence, the full justification cannot be granted just with the 
reference both to the overlapping consensus and to the pro tanto argument. Rather, for 
achieving full justification we must introduce a new argument, less ideal, in which the 
overlapping consensus that has been achieved thanks to a constituency of just 
reasonable members can be viewed as feasible option even by a nonidealized 
constituency. Quong is right when he claims that political liberalism is not a theory that 
must demonstrate its validity to the unreasonable and illiberal people in the same extent 
to which it does with the reasonable citizens
78
. I agree that it is correct to develop an 
ideal stage of justification in which a concept of liberal justice is constructed and 
justified dealing just with the idealized possibility that all the members of the 
constituency would be reasonable citizens. The fact that actual members of the political 
constituency are not able to agree on the validity of this political general concept does 
not involve that this concept is less justified. Otherwise, the whole procedure of 
justification of political liberalism would collapse into a justificatory populism
79
. 
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 Quong, 2011, p. 186. 
77
 “Related to this point, it must be the case that the deliberative conclusions are not overturned as the 
process of abstraction is undone and Members of the Public are again understood to be guided by their 
full set of evaluative standards. What was simply “freestanding” must, if it is to be fully justified, serve as 
a “module” that fits into each free and equal rational moral person’s set of evaluative criteria. In the end, 
to publicly justify must be to justify in terms of all the relevant evaluative standards. We wish to structure 
common moral life on terms that everyone – considering all that she holds to be important and relevant – 
has sufficient reason to endorse”, Gaus, 2010, p. 336. 
78
 In this regard, Gaus (2011, p. 178) states that “in developing an account of liberalism, our first aim is to 
show that fundamental liberal principles are victoriously justified—that the case for them is conclusive. 
To accomplish this, we formulate a theory of liberalism. Our theory of liberalism can accomplish its task 
of showing that liberal principles are conclusively justified without showing itself to be conclusively 
justified. Our concern is the conclusive justification of substantive liberal political principles, not the 
conclusive justification of any specific philosophical theory of liberalism”. 
79
 See Gaus, 1996, pp. 230-233. 
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However, we still have to look for an actual agreement of citizens over a specific 
conception of justice. In this regard, the third stage of the theory is devoted to the 
concrete possibility of solving disagreement over political matters among citizens. 
When the abstraction is undone, it is not possible any more to assume that every 
member of the constituency is reasonable. This implies that not necessarily all the 
members of the constituency evaluate as victoriously justified, within their doxastic set 
of beliefs, these three considered judgments: 
i. the idea of society as a fair system of cooperation; 
ii. the description of citizens as free and equal; 
iii. the burdens of judgments and the consequent articulation of reasonable disagreement 
as a natural feature of a democratic society.  
 The relevant point, when coping with the nonideal phase of theory, is to understand 
how an agreement can be reached when is not any more possible to assume the perfect 
rationality and reasonableness of the agents that are engaged in the political 
deliberation. In this regard, a liberal theory should derive a concrete norm of political 
conduct starting from an analysis about how democratic institutions could, ideally, be 
stable in the right way. Indeed, in the nonideal stage of the theory we are left with a 
political module that would be stably and victoriously justified under fair and idealized 
conditions. Nevertheless, which is the normative weight of such political module when 
the ideal circumstances are abandoned? The validity of this module is not endangered, 
as its normativity depends on the reference to a freestanding, philosophically relevant, 
argument
80
. However, if the political constituency is not any more necessarily 
reasonable, is it still possible to argue in favour of a public and shared agreement on this 
political module? Given the fact of disagreement, it is more adequate to develop a 
framework according to which the political module constitutes a public shared 
framework for organizing the political deliberation, more than an established – and 
justified - political conception on which the agreement can be taken for granted. The 
actual members of the political constituency are never fully rational and reasonable; 
indeed they often hold some unreasonable beliefs among their doxastic sets. Moreover, 
even if they are willing to accept the reasonableness constraints – epistemic and moral -, 
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 In this regard, Valentini (2009, p. 339) correctly claims: “The point of a theory of justice is precisely to 
give us a conceptual framework from within which to criticise existing agents who do not conform with 
it. So long as, given our best account of human motivation, it is reasonable to expect compliance, the fact 
of actual non-compliance tells us nothing about the adequacy of the theory itself”. 
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still the nested inconclusiveness is a reasonable outcome of our public deliberation over 
a political concept. Therefore, liberal theory, at the nonideal stage, must face two 
fundamental problems. On the one hand, liberalism should try to overcome the 
unreasonable disagreement, in order to achieve a stable legitimacy for its institutions. 
On the other hand, liberal institutions have to face inconclusiveness, since this latter  is 
an expected outcome of deliberation even in case of a just reasonable constituency
81
. As 
a matter of fact, the abstraction argument works if the agreement is reached on a “thin” 
concept, rather than on a complicated and multilayered conception of justice. However, 
when the abstraction is abandoned, both the management of constituency and the 
determination of specific principles of justice become more complex. 
 The possibility, outlined by Rawls, is that the agreement, that in the overlapping 
consensus has been granted by the theoretical expedient of restricting the constituency 
to reasonable citizens, can be reached in the nonideal circumstances thanks to a 
contextual analysis. In the nonideal phase, liberal theory is engaged in the procedure of 
justifying its underlying ideals and its institutions when they have been already 
established. It is not a contract theory model of justification, as the members of the 
constituency have already been living in an institutionalized context. Naturally, these 
institutions are imperfect and certainly a perfect model of democracy has not yet been 
accomplished. Still, the contemporary liberal democracies have been constructed out of 
the loose reference to some general political ideals as liberty and equality among 
citizens. Therefore, the Archimedean points that are explained and legitimated by the 
justificatory procedure of the overlapping consensus are still present in the contextual 
environment of contemporary liberal democracies. Probably they are not so well 
outlined and many citizens accept them without reflecting on such approbation. Still, 
the democratic institutions are more or less directly legitimated by the reference to such 
organizing ideals. For example, the liberal principle of legitimacy can be completely 
understood if and only if one assumes that the liberal ideal of equality among the 
members of the society has already been justified as a regulative ideal within a liberal 
society. Thanks to this ideal of equality, then, it is possible to understand the powerful 
argument according to which, in democracy, every citizen is owed justification for the 
laws that bind her. To conclude, therefore, we can say that full justification is the 
                                                 
81
 Gaus (1996) describes the task of dealing with inconclusiveness as one of the most important to be 
accomplished by political institutions. 
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justification that should be accomplished when the political module justified in the ideal 
stage of theory is able to reaffirm its validity even when the idealizations are undone. 
The ideal stage tells us what people would think about justice if they were perfectly 
rational and reasonable. The nonideal theory, then, would try to accomplish this ideal in 
the actual, unconstrained political reality. 
 
3.3.2  Nonideal Reflective Agreement 
  Before proceeding with the analysis, let me sum up the most important points of 
the foregoing section. I have claimed that RE is the most adequate method for dealing 
with the justification of a political conception under a moderate epistemic paradigm. 
Indeed, according to the nonideal framework I am defending, we need a procedure of 
justification that is intrinsically work in progress, allowing both a reflective attitude and 
a Socratic approach toward disagreement. Gaus claims that RE is an epistemic ideal that 
can never be achieved definitely. However, the same RE provides us with a good 
method for highlighting the internal inconsistencies in the doxastic sets of beliefs of 
moral agents and trying to solve them. “Though reflective equilibrium—and thus 
constructive interpretation of one's system of beliefs — will always be incomplete and 
approximate, it provides significant constraints on an eligible set of interpretations of 
any single rule or norm”82. RE method helps us to build up an optimal eligible set of 
political conceptions whose validity stems from the achievement of an overlapping 
consensus over a loose normative framework and on some Archimedean ideals. Any 
political conception is valid as far as it has been extrapolated from the eligible set of 
political conceptions. Naturally, the nested inconclusiveness implies that a conclusive 
agreement on a specific conception of justice is likely impossible to reach. Still, every 
option from the eligible set is a valid option. 
 In sum, the procedure of justification outlined so far can be described as follow: 
 There is a first justificatory stage, the overlapping consensus, in which a wide 
reflective equilibrium is achieved by the reasonable members of an idealized 
constituency. Every reasonable citizen finds her personal way for justifying, in RE, 
some organizing liberal ideas in the light of her doxastic system of comprehensive 
beliefs. Consequently, the overlapping consensus yields a consensus on certain 
evaluative standards (determined by the organizing liberal ideals) and such common 
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 Gaus, 1996, p. 115. 
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perspective can be articulated as being a deep part of everyone’s doxastic system of 
beliefs, as its justification depends on the achievement of a wide reflective equilibrium. 
 Then, there is the stage of the pro tanto justification in which, thanks to a 
freestanding argument, a specific political module – that can be articulated in various 
ways (Rawls for example determines his political module through the articulation of an 
argument for determining and justifying two general principles of justice) – is laid down 
as normatively valid and intersubjectively justified.  
 Afterwards, the theory has to face the nonideal stage of the theory. Here, the 
citizens are aware of the full range of their evaluative standards, as the abstraction 
argument is abandoned. Therefore, the challenge for liberal theory is to find a way for 
obtaining that real citizens do not overturn the solutions reached through abstraction 
when their evaluation encloses the entire doxastic set of their beliefs. This justification 
depends on a contextual appeal to the value of some shared liberal ideals and on a 
deliberative practice that I call reflective agreement (hereafter RA). 
 
 “How do we get from general principles of public morality to the justification of an 
actual social morality?”83. This is the question to which I try to answer appealing to the 
RA method. I call it reflective agreement, instead that reflective equilibrium in order to 
highlight the intrinsic work in progress aspects of such a procedure. For, it is true that I 
articulate RE as intrinsically revisable; still, when achieved, RE is an equilibrium. By 
contrast, RA is an agreement that the members of the political constituency reach on a 
loose normative framework starting from the actual circumstances of justice. This 
agreement depends on an actual public deliberation among citizens and not necessarily 
is achieved out of simply moral reasons, as prudential and strategic reasons as well are 
part of the deliberative account when we are dealing with a nonidealized constituency. 
Even though an equilibrium is not a feasible expectation in the nonideal stage of theory, 
I hold that an agreement can be reached – and this agreement is actually realized in the 
ongoing practice of liberal democracies. 
 Fred D’Agostino has introduced a well-known distinction between consensus and 
convergence
84
. According to this distinction, there is a consensus on a specific principle 
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 Gaus, 2010, p. 42. 
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 See D’agostino, 1996, pp. 30-31 
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or conception if different agents have a common reason for agreeing on it
85
. Otherwise, 
we have convergence if the same conclusion is justified, by agents, for different and 
independent reasons
86
. According to D’Agostino, the notion of public justification 
provided by Rawls is a consensualist one, whereas Gauthier, for example, holds a 
convergentist model. 
“According to Rawls, all of the parties to the project of public justification must be 
shown that beliefs which they already share-for example, about the concept of justice, 
the circumstances of justices, and the role of justice - justify a particular description of 
an ‘initial situation’ of choice, and therefore (subject to equilibration with considered 
judgments of justice), that conception of justice which parties can be expected to choose 
in this situation. […] On this account, (partial) antecedent consensus gives rise to or 
provides a basis for articulating a publicly justifiable conception of justice. According to 
Gauthier, each of the parties must be shown that there are principles of social interaction 
whose acceptance facilitates realization of that individual's (agent-relative) desires. […] 
On this account, there is convergence on a publicly justifiable conception of justice 
from very different starting-points (rather than agreement from a common stand-
point)”87. 
 
 The relevant point here is that, following Quong, I articulated the “antecedent 
consensus” that determines the structure of the freestanding political argument as a 
grounding overlapping consensus. Even if the agreement of the parties on the 
freestanding procedure is a consensus on a specific concept of justice for the same, 
strictly political reasons; this same agreements relies on the assumption that reasonable 
citizens can achieve an agreement on some underlying liberal ideals. The kind of 
justification provided by the overlapping consensus is actually a convergence on these 
organizing ideals starting from different perspectives. In this regard, the reasons for 
sustaining such ideas are different and not reconcilable under one single argument. The 
overlapping consensus is articulated in this way, as it expresses the normative liberal 
ideal according to which no regime is legitimate unless it is reasonable from every point 
of view
88
. When the test of reasonableness is imposed, it is possible to argue in favour 
of a convergence, from different perspectives, on the same political “module”. 
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 “If A and B are members of a community for which a regime S is publicly justified, then, on this 
reading, there must be some reason r, which A has and B has too, which is their common (consensual) 
reason in relation to the regime S”, D’Agostino, 2009, pp. 7-8. 
86
 “If S is reasonable from A's point of view on account of r(A), then it may well be that it is reasonable 
from B's point of view on account of an r(B) which is distinct from r(A)”, D’Agostino, 2009, p. 8. 
87
 D’Agostino, 1992, footnote 7, pp. 160-161. 
88
 Nagel (1987, p. 218, italics in the original) claims: “Defenses of political legitimacy are of two kinds: 
those which discover a possible convergence of rational support for certain institutions from the separate 
motivational standpoints of distinct individuals; and those which seek a common standpoint that everyone 
can occupy, which guarantees agreement on what is acceptable”. 
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Moreover, the fact that the organizing ideals might be justified from different 
reasonable perspectives imply that such ideals constitute a normative framework from 
which evaluate the concrete situations. Indeed, these ideals might seems acceptable and 
justifiable from every – reasonable – point of view, it they fit, in WRE, the considered 
judgments that people hold in their doxastic sets of beliefs. In WRE it is possible to 
accomplish a justification of a normative framework in the light of the fact that such 
normative framework fits the beliefs that reasonable citizens share about which should 
be a just regime. “Rawls’s regime might be alleged to fit the beliefs that individuals 
have about the kind of regime that is a reasonable one for them. It ‘fits’ those beliefs in 
the sense that it constitutes a situation about which those beliefs would be true”89. 
 This argument from abstraction is not motivationally strong enough to guarantee a 
consensus when the actual citizen are engaged in the public deliberation and no 
idealizations are employed. Still, the overlapping consensus argument has a normative 
weight, as provide us with a loose framework of evaluative standards for assessing our 
concrete political situations. Moreover, the analysis of which-would-be-our-beliefs-on-
justice-when-reasonableness-is-imposed might became relevant within our deliberative 
procedure. As a matter of fact, we know that if we want to act as “reasonable citizens”, 
then we have to deliberate on political matters choosing reasons and rules that are part 
of the eligible sets
90
. RA, therefore, tries to solve the contrast between what citizens 
would agree on starting from their actual doxastic systems and what they could agree on 
if their doxastic beliefs were filtered by a reasonableness requirement. In this regard, we 
cannot assume the reasonableness as starting point – as it happens for the overlapping 
consensus -, rather we might try to achieve an agreement on a normative framework 
starting from a contextual analysis. Recalling the metaphor of liberalism-framework and 
liberalism-picture
91
, we can say that RA is the method that attempts to grant the public 
justification of the “liberal normative frame” even when, in the nonideal stage of the 
theory,  the arguments from abstractions are abandoned.  
 The Archimedean points might be victoriously justified in the doxastic system of 
beliefs of every person that accept the reasonable constraints. However, few citizens are 
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 D’Agostino, 1996, p. 31. 
90
 “Someone who believes that she is Rational and Reasonable may be committed, by these beliefs, to 
acting in certain ways - for example, to limiting her Rational pursuit of her own interests in accordance 
with the demand, implicit in her belief that she is Reasonable, that she justify herself to others, or be 
prepared to, in certain kinds of situations. And this may give her a motive as well as a reason to conform 
to certain requirements”, ibid. 
91
 See above, 243. 
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actually fully rational and reasonable. Nevertheless, democratic regimes, although 
imperfect, are a quite stable default option for liberal societies. In this regard, I think 
that Sebastiano Maffettone is right when he claims that, within nonideal theory, the 
institutional bases of liberal democracies should be analysed from a double perspective, 
accounting both for justification and legitimation
92
. 
“Liberal-democratic institutions, taken as a basis for legitimation, are a necessary 
premise of the contractual agreement – from which we derive normative implications. 
Otherwise different justifications, in a regime of pluralism, would never converge 
towards the potential unanimous consent that Rawls has in mind. Nevertheless, given 
that we want a social contract based on consent for the right reasons, justification 
originated by a reasonable comprehensive doctrine is necessary. Justifications, even if 
they vary, must all presume that free and equal citizens look for fair terms of 
cooperation among themselves under a regime of reciprocal respect. In such a way, we 
show how legitimation and justification complement one another in Rawls’ general 
scheme of thought”93. 
 
 According to Maffettone, the normative argument for justification is not strong 
enough for granting the stability and validity of a liberal regime vis-à-vis the 
unconstrained doxastic set of beliefs of actual members of the political constituency. 
For this reason, the freestanding justification of the political concept of justice should be 
embedded in a wider argument that starts from the contextual evaluation of the ongoing 
institutional practice. Actual citizens are not perfectly reasonable; but still they happen 
to live in an institutional framework that already loosely reflects the organizing ideas 
around which the freestanding argument for justice might being built up. Therefore, if 
citizens are living in an institutional framework and accept it de facto
94
, trying to 
improve it through the democratic process, then it is reasonable to assume a sort of 
bottom-up legitimation of the organizing ideals by the contextual reference to the 
institutional practice. While we can have different reasons for sustaining the 
justification of a political concept, as expressed by the WRE achieved in the 
overlapping consensus, the legitimation is a sort of contextual agreement that stems 
from the same institutional process. I think that this “institutional practice of 
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 This distinction is one of the fundamental argument presented by Maffettone is his introduction to 
Rawls. However, for specific references, see Maffettone, 2010, pp. 21-24; 222-228. 
93
 Ivi, p. 24. 
94
 It is worth noting that there are different ways for proclaiming one’s disagreement with regard to the 
institutional decisions of the democratic regime in which it happens to live, such as conscientious 
objection and civil disobedience. Or, even, as definitive solution, the secession. 
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legitimation” is the best way for interpreting the contextual turn in the Rawlsian 
paradigm
95
.   
“Building on it, we can construct the thesis that the existence of a just basic structure 
cannot depend exclusively on a theoretical justification. It must depend also on a 
successful model of institutional interaction. Only this kind of legitimation permits the 
construction of a durable consent, even if the support of some theoretical justification 
was to be taken for granted. In practice, only a quasi-empirical notion of legitimation 
potentially unifies the structural pluralism of justifications under a coherent vision of 
justice”96. 
 
 If we assume as valid the distinction between justification and legitimation, then it 
should be also clear why the Archimedean points might be valid normative constraints 
in the nonideal stage as well as they are in the ideal one. In the nonideal stage, the 
Archimedean points cannot be justified thanks to an overlapping consensus in which 
every citizen converges on these ideals from her doxastic perspective. Given the fact of 
pluralism, the only way for overcoming disagreement is not through a top-down, strictly 
philosophical, argument for the validity of political liberalism itself
97
. Rather, it is 
possible to show to the citizens that when they accept a specific institutional process, 
they, maybe indirectly, are also accepting a loose normative framework and attesting the 
validity of some specific organizing ideals. Of course, the kind of justification that is 
provided is a contextual one, as some background beliefs are taken for granted as 
already justified and their validity is not under scrutiny anymore. As a matter of fact, 
citizens that live in contemporary democratic regimes usually do not debate the validity 
of some background beliefs, such as the wrongness of slavery or the universal suffrage 
or the necessity of some forms of social cooperation. In this regard, we can say that the 
Archimedean points that are widely accepted, and whose justification is in some sense 
assumed as a “default” option, constitute the “society’s political capital”98 of democratic 
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 In this regard, I want to recall the similitude I have introduced between Rawls contextualist move and 
the reconciliatory aspects of Hegel’s social philosophy. See above, section 2.2.2. 
96
 Maffettone, 2010, p. 23. 
97
 It is worth mentioning that a large academic discussion is going on with regard to the possibility for 
political liberalism to reflexively justify its own structure of justification, namely if it possible to provide 
a public justification of the theory of public justification itself. See Cohen (2009), D’Agostino (1996 and 
1998), Estlund (2008), Gaus (1996 and 2011), Wall (2002 and 2010). I think that this issue is extremely 
relevant and interesting. However, treating it will lead us too far away from the actual themes of his 
chapter. Let me just add that, according to D’Agostino (1996, p. 140), the point of view of “reasonable” 
people (obtained through an idealization) provides us with a normative standpoint for evaluating if public 
justification might actually be reflexively publicly justified. 
98
 “The term ‘capital’ is appropriate and familiar in this connection because these virtues are built up 
slowly over time and depend not only on existing political and social institutions (themselves slowly built 
up), but also on citizen’s experience as a whole and their knowledge of the past. Again, like capital, these 
PhD Dissertation in Political Theory – XXV Cycle                                 PhD Candidate: Federica Liveriero  
Pag. 166 
 
regimes. Of course there are different interpretations of these background beliefs, as the 
nested inconclusiveness is a stable feature of contemporary pluralistic societies. 
However, at least a contextual legitimation of these background beliefs is available. 
Then, if we want to discuss the actual validity of this legitimation, wondering whether a 
systematic justification of these same beliefs is available, we can again introduce the 
justificatory arguments articulated in the ideal phase of the theory
99
. On the one hand, 
legitimation provides us a sound, bottom-up, argument for upholding the validity of the 
loose normative framework of liberalism thanks “to fact that liberal democracy is, in our 
age, a (relatively) successful practice”100. In this regard, this form of justification is a 
contextual one, both because refers to the ongoing institutional practice and for it 
provides a justification that is contextual in its structure. On the other hand, the ideal 
stage of the theory yields a justificatory structure that, when appealed, can provide a 
systematic justification for the intrinsic normative value of the Archimedean points
101
. 
 RA is an agreement than can be achieved, in the nonideal stage of the procedure of 
justification, by the actual citizens of a contemporary liberal regime, over a specific 
concept of justice insofar as such concept of justice proves to be victoriously justified 
within the doxastic sets of beliefs of the same citizens. The ideal stage of the theory 
yields a set of optimal eligible proposals, a set that includes all the unvictoriously 
justified interpretations of the principles of justice and of the vague organizing ideas 
that might be accepted by every reasonable citizen. RA is focused on the possibility that 
actual citizens can accept the same optimal eligible proposal as the most adequate. In 
this regard, RA does not aim to achieve an agreement over a specific interpretation 
within the eligible set, rather looks for an agreement on the normative constraints that 
can afterward led citizens to agree on specific rules and principles to be 
institutionalized. In my opinion, RA represents the actual possibility of achieving a full 
justification of the background beliefs that constitutes the loose normative liberal 
framework. These background notions are justified as normatively binding thanks to the 
freestanding argument and the achievement of overlapping consensus among an 
idealized constituency. Still, when the argument from abstraction is abandoned, there 
                                                                                                                                               
virtues depreciates, as it were, and must be constantly renewed by being reaffirmed and acted from in the 
present”, Rawls, 1987, footnote n. 26, p. 17. 
99
 I have already discussed the distinction between a systematic and a contextual form of justification in 
the first chapter, see above, section 1.5. 
100
 Maffettone, 2010, p. 23. 
101
 For the distinction between contextual and systematic justification, see above 1.5.1. 
PhD Dissertation in Political Theory – XXV Cycle                                 PhD Candidate: Federica Liveriero  
Pag. 167 
 
are no guarantees that such arguments might be assessed as valid even by the members 
of the unconstrained constituency. For this reason, before engaging in the social practice 
of public reason, we have to establish an antecedent meta-agreement on some 
normative constraints. Citizens cannot respect the constraint of public reason if they 
do not hold as victoriously justified some background beliefs, within their doxastic sets, 
about a fair system of public deliberation. Again, these constrains are expressed by the 
concept of reasonableness. The point here is that a democratic regime, thanks to the 
actual institutional practice, should be able to motivate actual citizens to acknowledge 
the validity of the reasonableness constraints, such as the burdens of judgments, and the 
normativity attached to some evaluative standards whose validity is granted by the 
overlapping consensus. 
 RA is an agreement on a justificatory framework. The idea is that actual citizens, 
when called to deliberate on political matters, might be able to converge on an 
antecedent meta-agreement over the correct evaluative framework for assessing the 
validity of every proposal introduced into the deliberation
102
. The justificatory 
framework would work as a “filter” that grants that any argument introduced is at least 
mutually acceptable. If citizens are able to accept this justificatory framework, then 
political deliberation will have to cope with a justificatory disagreement, instead that a 
foundational one. Following again Quong, I have introduced this distinction in the 
foregoing chapter claiming that justificatory disagreement is a disagreement in which 
citizens still share some normative premises. Granting the feasibility of a justificatory 
disagreement is the first goal of RA. In this regard, RA is the actual agreement that can 
be achieved among citizens over some evaluative standards of justification. Without this 
agreement, in fact, the disagreement would be so intractable to endanger any normative 
commitment toward public deliberation. By contrast, if RA is obtained, then a public 
political deliberation, that respects some evaluative standards, can be accomplished,. 
 RA is an assent that depends on the internal consistency that every citizen might 
reach between her beliefs and the background beliefs regarding the normative meaning 
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 Articulating the possibility of building up a negotiating agreement that is both efficient and that 
produces wise outcomes, Fisher, Ury and Patton (2011, pp. 10-11, emphasis added) argue that the 
negotiation takes place not just at the level of substances, but also at the level of determining the 
procedures for dealing with substances. “This second negotiation is a game about a game – a ‘meta-
game’. Each move you make within a negotiation is not only a move that deals with rent, salary, or other 
substantive question; it also helps structure the rules of the game you are playing. […] Whether 
consciously or not, you are negotiating procedural rules with every move you make , even if those moves 
appear exclusively concerned with substance”.   
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of the institutional liberal practice. Indeed, the legitimacy of a liberal regime is not just 
an issue of procedural pedigree, rather hinges on a plausible interpretation of what 
justice requires. What reasonable people could accept as a legitimated concept of justice 
works as a filter and RA argues in favour of the fact that actual citizens might consider 
this regulative ideal as victoriously justified in their doxastic sets. In this regard, I call 
this procedure reflective agreement, in order to highlight two features. On the one 
hand, this method looks for an agreement among citizens that cannot be defined more 
strictly as consensus or convergence, as the kind of agreement can vary from one social 
context to another and can never be determined once for all. On the other hand, this 
agreement is a reflective one, as depends more on a reflective attitude of every citizens, 
than on an intersubjective general agreement. Again, the fundamental justificatory role 
is played by the doxastic systems of beliefs held by citizens. The overlapping consensus 
argument provides us with an evaluative normative framework  for assessing the 
validity of the different interpretations of the concept of justice – that Gaus calls the 
optimal eligible set – that is outlined by the freestanding argument. Then, this same 
evaluative standard should demonstrate to be able to endure as a victoriously justified 
standard even when the argument from abstraction is undone
103
. RA is not properly a 
defined method; it expresses a regulative ideal concerning how a deliberative structure 
can be built up in the nonideal phase of a theory of justice. The paradigm of RA 
delegates to each citizen the task of finding a consistent way for including some 
background beliefs about a normative framework of public deliberation within their 
doxastic systems of beliefs. For this reasons, it would be regulatively correct, before 
beginning the actual process of public political deliberation, to wonder how spread it 
might be a RA among citizens on some evaluative normative standards that would 
constraint the actual deliberative practice. RA’s value can be acknowledged to the 
extent that the multi-stages structure of the procedure of justification is accepted as the 
most adequate. As a matter of fact, every different stage provides us with a specific 
feature of the justification and deals with a different articulation of the political 
constituency. In this regard, Quong is right when he talks about a “justificatory division 
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 “How do we stay there once we achieve a well-ordered society? […] telling a plausible story about 
how we might get there from here make it more plausible that we could stay there once we got there, 
since getting there is generally harder than staying there. The story about how we might develop a wider 
and deeper overlapping consensus should make it seem more plausible that, if we were raised in a well-
ordered society governed by a political conception of justice as fairness, we could maintain our 
commitments to giving priority to justice despite the fact of reasonable pluralism”, Daniels, 1996, p. 151 
(italics added). 
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of labour, or alternately, the buck-passing approach to truth”104. According to this 
interpretation, political liberalism provides the general framework of justification, yet 
some justificatory tasks are delegated to the actual citizens. Naturally, the results of this 
justificatory stage cannot be determined ex ante, as the actual willingness of the citizens 
to accept a normative framework of evaluative standards cannot be taken for granted. 
However, a democratic institutionalized regime might promote the realization of RA 
thanks to the educative role played by democratic institutions and by the example of 
good public deliberations that have been accomplished thanks to the recognition of the 
normative framework by the citizens engaged in the deliberation itself
105
. 
 The possibility of increasing the number of citizens that accept, in RA, the 
normative framework of evaluative standards and that, consequently, are able to 
deliberate over political matters respecting such normative standards, does not rely 
exclusively on theoretical argument. Rather, it depends as well on the ordinary practice 
of public discussion and on the  democratic institutions’ ability to improve the 
democratic attitude of citizens
106
. RA, when achieved, reflects the individual 
willingness of every citizen to engage in a public method of justification and to respect 
some normative constraints when dealing with political deliberation. Within the 
nonideal stage of the theory it is not feasible to expect every citizen to be reasonable. 
For this reason, it is possible that the set of citizens that are willing to achieve a RA 
might be empty or occupied by few, extremely reasonable, citizens. However, I also do 
believe that the actual, maybe not reflexively justified, acceptance of the democratic 
procedures by the citizens that live into the democratic societies is already a starting 
point from which it is possible to work on for developing a concrete RA on a normative 
framework of deliberation. 
“Such an institutional framework not only promotes the instrumental exercise of 
freedom by citizens, it also educates them through participation and discussion into a 
perception of the dependency of their social relations and individual autonomy upon 
collective rules and arrangements – discouraging free-riding and other self-defeating 
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 Quong, 2011, p. 232. 
105
 “Thus, the account of justice as fairness connects the desire to realize a political ideal of citizenship 
with citizens two moral powers and their normal capacities, as these are educated to that ideal by the 
public culture and its historical traditions of interpretation. This illustrates the wide role of a political 
conception as educator”, Rawls, 1993, pp. 85-86. 
106
 “In a representative democracy, voting is not simply a way to select deliberative bodies but is an 
educative experience insofar as it encourages ordinary citizens to think in terms of justice and the 
common good. Responsive and deliberative procedures that require all citizens to register judgments, if 
not directly on issues, then on the representatives, encourage all to engage in public debate”, Gaus, 1996, 
p. 236. 
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forms of self-interest. Moreover, by providing a forum for public discussion it enables 
preferences to be transformed and not just aggregated, allowing opposed interests to 
find acceptable compromises on shareable values which can offer new forms of 
individual expression to all. In these ways, it promotes a ‘society with law’, creating the 
common political culture without which no polity lasts for long”107. 
 
 
3.4  Reflective Deliberation
108
 
 
3.4.1  Public Reason 
  The nonideal stage of the justificatory paradigm can be divided into two levels. 
The first one is exhausted by the search for RA. The second, instead, looks for the 
establishment of public reason as the general practice of public deliberation within a 
democratic political arena. While RA looks for and actual agreement among the citizens 
over a normative framework of deliberation, the public reason stage is dedicated to the 
concrete deliberation for establishing a victorious interpretation of the concept of justice 
that is outlined in the ideal phase of the theory. Public reason characterizes the public 
justification stage of the structure of justification, even if its meaning is broader than 
that. As a matter of fact, we can have two slightly different interpretations of the role 
played by public reason in public deliberation. On the one hand, public reason entails a 
specific notion of democratic deliberation that presupposes that citizens have already 
been able to achieve a RA over the validity of a specific normative framework of rules 
and guidelines about how to reason “publicly” with the other fellow citizens. Here, the 
value of public reason stems from a normative framework of public justification that 
provides us the criteria for assessing the legitimacy of the reasons that citizens provide 
in the context of political deliberation. This first, more procedural, meaning of public 
reason derives its value from the idea that a concept of justice, when soundly justified, 
might work as a public standard for determining the evaluative set of acceptable 
reasons. On the other hand, public reason is the mean by which the public justification 
can be achieved. Of course these two meanings of public reason are intertwined, as the 
public justification both of a political regime and of its principles and rules depends on 
an intersubjective agreement achieved by a public deliberation via public reason. When 
citizens share an agreement over a normative framework of deliberation thanks to the 
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 Bellamy, 1999, pp. 187-188. 
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 D’Agostino (1992, p. 146) uses this label for referring to the model of public justification outlined by 
Rawls.  
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individual achievement of a RA, then these citizens should respect the duty of civility 
and therefore be ready to engage themselves in a public deliberation regulated by the 
constraints of public reason
109
. 
 The practice of public reason requires that citizens, when discussing publicly, 
respect the bounds of the normative framework of deliberation and therefore do not 
address other citizens with reasons that they cannot translate in “public reasons 
arguments” that can be understood even from a completely different comprehensive 
perspective. Indeed, the fallibilist account I have been defending shows us that there are 
good epistemic reasons for supporting a view according to which I am not inconsistent 
with my set of reasons ‘R’ even if I recognize that another agent is justified, in the light 
of her doxastic set, in supporting a set of reasons ‘R1’ that is completely inconsistent 
with my personal set ‘R’. However, in order to establish a deliberative communication 
between two agents that hold extremely different set of reasons it is important to 
provide normative reasons in favour of establishing public reason as the standard of the 
public deliberation. 
 According to the democratic deliberation interpretation of public reason, the major 
task accomplished by public reason is to guarantee that political decisions in a 
democratic arena are obtained following a normative framework of discussion. Thanks 
to the ideal stage of the theory, we are able to justify, at least ideally, an eligible set of 
undefeated but unvictoriously justified conceptions of justice from which we can start 
our public deliberation over political matters
110
. In this regard, the legitimation of 
political decisions in part relies on the normative relevance attached to the public 
reason’s constraints. 
“A political decision can be publicly justified whenever each and every member of the 
relevant constituency is justified in endorsing the decision, even if each person believes 
the decision is justified for different, and even incompatible, reasons. This approach 
thus permits citizens to converge on a political decision for different non-public reasons 
without appeal to any shared or common reasons”111.  
                                                 
109
 Rawls introduces the concept of duty of civility in LP (1993, p. 217): “And since the exercise of 
political power itself must be legitimate, the ideal of citizenship imposes a moral, nor a legal, duty—the 
duty of civility- to be able to explain to one another on those fundamental questions how the principles 
and policies they advocate and vote for can be supported by the political values of public reason. This 
duty also involves a willingness to listen to others and a fairmindedness in deciding when 
accommodations to their views should reasonably be made”. 
110
 “The content of public reason is given by a family of political conceptions of justice, and not by a 
single one. There are many liberalisms and related views, and therefore many forms of public reason 
specified by a family of reasonable political conceptions. Of these, justice as fairness, whatever its merits, 
is but one”, Rawls, 1997, pp. 773-774. 
111
 Quong, 2011, p. 258. 
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 This articulation of public reason is coherent with the proviso introduced by Rawls 
in his last work on public reason “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited”112. According 
to the proviso, it is possible to introduce our personal doctrines and comprehensive 
beliefs within the public discussion, “provided that, in due course, we give properly 
public reasons to support the principles and policies our comprehensive doctrine is said 
to support”113. Thanks to the proviso, citizens are not constrained to eschew any 
reference to their comprehensive beliefs when they are engaged in public reasoning. 
Again, this wider version of public reason respects the fallibilist perspective I have 
claimed being the most adequate in order to account for the fact of moral disagreement. 
Indeed, the notion of legitimacy is necessarily modified when the fact of disagreement 
is acknowledged as an intrinsic feature of contemporary democracies. If a political 
principle is legitimated if and only if can be justified in the light of the different 
perspective of citizens to whom this principle is addressed, then the fact that citizens 
hold different, even in contradiction among each other, doxastic sets of beliefs is a 
fundamental matter. A reasonable citizen recognizes the fact that she has not political 
right to impose her comprehensive doctrine over other citizens. Moreover, a reasonable 
citizen calls for the same kind of attitude by other citizens. In this regard, the best 
paradigm for explaining such attitude by reasonable citizens is a fallibilist one, as this 
approach is consistent with the claim that it is possible for S to be justified in believer 
that p, while also being justified in believing that Z is justified in believing that ~p. As a 
matter of fact, in the nonideal stage of the theory, it cannot be assumed that the doxastic 
beliefs held by citizens are considered judgments that have been already been filtered by 
epistemic and moral constrains. Consequently, there is disagreement both for what 
concerns the different interpretations of the political concept of justice and for the 
procedure of justification of the concept of justice itself. I claim that fallibilism is the 
correct framework for dealing with such wide spread disagreement, as it is an 
intrinsically anti-dogmatic intellectual stance that provides us with good reasons for 
believing in the rightness of our beliefs and still remaining open to new evidence. Given 
the fact of disagreement, if we obtain quite wide spread RA over a mutually intelligible 
evaluative system, then we can grant that different citizens share evaluative standards, 
even though they do not hold shared reasons as well. Thus, I believe that the proviso 
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 Rawls, 1997. 
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introduced by Rawls is correct and necessary, for different citizens could introduce their 
personal reasons within public deliberation to the extent that this move does not 
undermine the shared normative framework of reasoning
114
. If we want to respect the 
moderate epistemic paradigm concerning political justification, then we cannot defend a 
single model of reasoning as the only one adequate in order to justify a political system. 
Within the nonideal phase of the theory, it is required that every citizen, for being 
actually reasonable, should recognize that some other citizens hold in their doxastic 
systems undefeated beliefs that, by contrast, in her doxastic set are defeated. The only 
way for dealing with this deep disagreement, and in the meanwhile providing a 
normative framework for ruling the procedure of public reasoning, is to translate the 
justificatory problem in a more tractable deliberative one. Once that a socially optimal 
eligible set is defined thanks to an ideal procedure of justification, the democratic 
practice of public reasoning should try to reaffirm the validity of such eligible set by the 
reference to the contextual legitimation of the democratic system itself and by engaging 
in a public discussion over its regulative ideals. The fundamental role played by public 
reason is to demonstrate to be robust enough to face the full, unconstrained, doxastic 
perspective of citizens. If RA becomes a wide spread contextual agreement over the 
validity of some evaluative public standards of reasoning, then a public deliberation 
developed following the bounds of public reason becomes feasible. Then, the public 
deliberation will be focused on determining which of the conceptions of justice (or of a 
principle or of a background concept) that are part of the legible set might be justified as 
victoriously justified vis-à-vis the full and unconstrained perspectives of citizens. 
Hence, citizens will be engaged in public discussions in which, following some 
accepted rules of reasoning, they introduce different reasons for justifying different 
interpretations of the same concept –  all of them includable within the eligible set 
                                                 
114
 “One might say that public reason excludes sectarian reasons of every stripe, whether religious or 
secular. But public reason does not exclude all religious reasons from public debate and deliberation, any 
more than it excludes all ‘secular’ reasons. The crucial thing is that reasons be public. For people with 
religious worldviews – and that includes the vast majority of Americans – the values of freedom and 
human equality, fairness, concern for the poor and sick, and just treatment of others, are both public and 
religious values. These values have a dual aspect for many. They are part of our political culture and 
shared by reasonable fellow citizens from all faith and philosophical traditions, so they are ‘public’. But 
they are also embedded within the differing religious and philosophical worldviews that citizens hold. 
What is crucial for proponents of public reason is that there should be a common, public rationale for 
laws that will be binding on all (and this is especially urgent where fundamental considerations of justice 
are at stake): when we seek to pass a law we should look for reasons and evidence that are good for our 
reasonable fellow citizens. In addition to public reasons for laws, there will also be religious reasons that 
are shared by some members of the political community”, Macedo, 2008, p. 14. 
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though – and looking for an agreement that will determine one interpretation as the one 
that is publicly justified and therefore valid and normatively binding. 
 Political deliberation is a sort of large scale coordination among moral agents and 
its first aims it to grant the establishment of an agreement over a political conception of 
justice that has been victoriously justified through public reason
115
. 
“Even if public reason is inconclusive on many issues, this does not imply that public 
reason should be abandoned in favour of appeals to religious or otherwise non-public 
reasoning. Although it may not provide conclusive answers to every political question, 
the idea of public reason is still the right one for regulating our political deliberations. If 
the choice is between a model of public reason that is sometimes inconclusive, but 
grounds its decisions in reasons that are reasonably acceptable to these who are bound 
by them, and a model of perfectionist or non-public reasoning that is conclusive in all 
cases, but is based on premises and reasons that many people do not accept or even 
understand, we ought to choose the former. Public reason need not be as conclusive as a 
comprehensive doctrine in order to be preferable to it as a model of political 
discourse”116.  
 
 Quong defends a broad version of public reason according to which we should 
apply public reason, when possible, to every political decision. According to the broad 
view of public reason, Rawls is wrong in claiming that solely matters of basic justice, as 
the determination of constitutional essential, should be regulated by public reason 
(narrow view)
117
. I hold that Rawls, aware of the deep disagreement among citizens, 
has argued in favour of a restricted application of public reason in order to avoid 
inconclusiveness. Following Rawls, if an overlapping consensus among reasonable 
citizens is reached, then a public justification of the basic structure of justice is available 
and it does not imply any nested inconclusiveness
118
. By contrast, if the overlapping 
consensus in described as the starting point of the whole procedure of justification and, 
moreover, is articulated as a consensus obtained within an idealized constituency, then 
the nested inconclusiveness is a feature of public deliberation that cannot be mitigated 
definitely, even when deliberation expressly refers to the justification of the 
constitutional essentials. Of course, a decision should be taken; otherwise will be 
impossible to establish a legitimated political regime. Still, disagreement reaches the 
same content of public reason and for this reason the practice of public reason should 
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 See Gaus, 2010, p. 47. 
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 Quong, 2011, pp. 286-287. 
117
 See ivi, pp. 273-289. 
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 However it is worth recalling that the same concept of public justification is a contested one, as every 
articulation of such concept implies taking a non-neutral stance with regard to the political framework we 
asses to be the most adequate. See D’Agostino, 1992. 
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intrinsically be opened to constant revisions. We can have constitutional principles that 
are required to be conclusively justified in order to respect the basic fact of accepting a 
democratic regime as legitimated. Still, when coping with different interpretations of the 
concept of justice that is part of the eligible set, the nested inconclusiveness is a 
reasonable outcome. Here public reason does not represent an ultimate tool for 
overcoming disagreement in a definite way. Rather, when citizens are engaged in the 
practice of democratic deliberation, public reason is a regulative ideal for developing a 
public discussion not completely free, but constrained by some normative criteria. It is 
not possible to grant the achievement of an agreement on any relevant political matter. 
Also, when an agreement is reached, still it is always revisable. Public reason is a 
fundamental deliberative tool for avoiding the risk of indeterminacy in public 
deliberation, but nor for solving inconclusiveness as well. According to this distinction, 
an inconclusive justification is an argument that, although justificatory correct, is not 
decisive all the way down, leaving room for different interpretations of the same 
justified inconclusive belief. By contrast, indeterminacy implies a situation in which no 
sound argument can be provided in order to justify either the acceptance or the rejection 
of a belief β. Therefore, the choice between the acceptance or rejection of the belief β is 
underdermined in relation to the available justificatory evidence within the deliberative 
procedure
119
. 
 Following this justificatory paradigm, public reason should be described as the 
adequate political standard of reasoning for the deliberation over every political matter. 
Some issues will be resolved finding an agreement among the different interpretations 
of justice held by citizens. Some other issues will not be solved once for all and 
probably a public negotiation will be required. Still, the fact that public reason cannot 
grant a definite resolution of all the political matters is not a good reason for 
circumscribing the use of public reason to the deliberation over some specific essential 
matters. I believe that the openness and intrinsic revisability of public reason are two 
extremely important features in order to cope with the contemporary multicultural 
society. Moreover, it should be recalled that public reason has a double meaning. On the 
one hand it represents the normative ground for achieving a public justification of a 
specific conception of justice. On the other hand, public reason should rule, as 
regulative ideal, every democratic deliberation over political matters. A perfect situation 
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would be one in which reasonable citizens achieve a public justification over a specific 
conception of justice and therefore public reason can be described as the victoriously 
justified standard of political deliberation accepted in every reasonable doxastic system 
held by citizens. However, in the nonideal stage of theory, we cannot presuppose a 
constituency of solely reasonable citizens. For this reason, a public justification of a 
specific conception of justice is not a feasible option with regard to every member of the 
constituency. As a matter if fact, the daily democratic deliberation is not focused on the 
articulation of a general conception of justice; rather it looks for the justification of 
social rules, of “middle-level social-moral objects”120. Indeed, democratic deliberation 
is not an “all or nothing” practice. Different trade-offs are possible and the distinction 
between reasonable and unreasonable citizens is blurred in the nonideal stage. 
Consequently, public reason provides the general normative framework, still the 
outcomes of democratic deliberation cannot be determined in advance. 
 To conclude, I want to introduce again the up-side down pyramid scheme I have 
discussed in the previous chapter. The scheme is the same, but I add to it some features 
that I have presented in this chapter focused on the nonideal stage of the theory. In this 
regard, in the image C, the second part of the pyramid represents the nonideal phase of 
the theory that is divided in two parts: the RA and public reason stages. The last stage, 
the public reason one, is subdivided internally in two areas that are interconnected but 
that is important to distinguish theoretically, namely one focused on reaching public 
justification and the other determined by the practice of democratic deliberation. 
 The last point I want to highlight with regard to this scheme is that the up-side 
down structure of the pyramid accounts also for the fact that the structure of justification 
starts with a defined and restricted constituency and that, afterward, this same 
constituency is broadened to the extent that the idealizations are abandoned. In this 
regard, the wider part of the pyramid is reached at the end of the procedure, when every 
member of the society, reasonable or not, is in some sense part of the framework in 
which the democratic deliberation should be accomplished. 
 The thinnest part of the pyramid, its tip, leans on the overlapping consensus phase 
in which the political constituency is depicted as a strictly idealized constituency of 
reasonable citizens. The more the pyramid is enlarged, the more the political 
constituency abandons abstraction constraints until every member of the constituency is 
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taken into consideration within the paradigm of justification, even those citizens that 
should be described as illiberal or unreasonable. Consequently, this figure schematically 
illustrates the whole justificatory paradigm that I have been defending in this 
dissertation. The achievements of the ideal stage of the theory, namely the justification 
of an eligible set of different interpretations of a concept of justice thanks to two 
different justificatory argument (viz. overlapping consensus and freestanding argument), 
are not taken for granted; rather they should pass the test of the nonidealized 
constituency as well. Here, the possibility of achieving an overlapping consensus over 
some liberal organizing ideas and Archimedean fixed points is discarded as unfeasible. 
For this reason, at this level I argue in favour of the possibility of granting an agreement 
over a justificatory framework and some evaluative standards thanks to the method of 
RA. Then, the last stage relies on the possibility that citizens might agree on the value 
of public reason as a public standard for political deliberation. Since RA is not so 
strictly committing as it can be overlapping consensus at the ideal level, I hold that at 
the stage of public reason might be possible to solve indeterminacy thanks to the fact 
that fundamental justificatory issues can be translated in more tractable 
deliberative matters
121
. Yet, the nested inconclusiveness will remain a stable feature of 
our political processes of deliberation. And, moreover, not always the practice of 
deliberation will provide solutions to conflicts. When this happens, open negotiation 
will remain as the only option available in order to avoid indeterminacy in the practice 
of political deliberation. 
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 Farrelly introduces a quite similar view in his discussion over the flaws of a strictly ideal theory of 
justice, He affirms (2007, p. 859): “I believe a shift from ideal to non-ideal theory will also bring about a 
shift from first-order to ‘second-order’ theorizing. Second-order theories are theories that are primarily 
concerned with dealing with the claims of conflicting first-order 
theories”. 
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3.4.2  For an Open Negotiation 
  In the foregoing chapter I discussed some of the most well-known criticisms 
against the political theory of justice articulated by Rawls in LP. Among these 
criticisms I spent some times describing Sen’s critiques against Rawls. Sen claims that 
the Rawlsian theory of justice is intrinsically transcendent and therefore not adequate 
for dealing with the real circumstances of justice. In order to show the main differences 
between his approach and the Rawlsian one, Sen specifies which are the most important 
features of a nonideal theory of justice
122
. I have already introduced the list of features 
that Sen describes as necessary for building up an adequate nonideal theory of justice. 
However, my main goal in this section of the chapter is to explain why I believe that the 
same features that Sen articulates in order to distinguish his theory of justice from a 
transcendental approaches might actually be used for describing a political theory of 
justice modelled on the wake of Rawlsian paradigm
123
. For it is true that a Rawlsian 
approach to the theory of justice starts from an idealized – and therefore transcendental 
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 See above, section 2.3.2. 
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 In this regard, my interpretation of Rawlsian paradigm is consistent with the one provided by 
D’Agostino. Indeed, he claims (1992, p. 153) that “Rawls’s approach is pragmatic rather than 
transcendental in character”. 
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according to Sen’s terminology – argument. Still, the idealized stage of the theory is 
embedded in a wider justificatory structure in which a nonideal phase of the theory has 
the ultimate authority in the determination of the actual possibility of implementing a 
normative concept to justice within a concrete political context. 
 Sen constantly highlights the fact that in the actual context of choice we have to 
face a plurality of competing principles and therefore it is impossible to provide a 
definitive justification of a specific conception of justice that would be able to overcome 
every disagreement. I completely agree with Sen in this regard. In fact, if we accept as 
valid a fallibilist paradigm of the epistemic justificatory enterprise, within the moral and 
political fields, then nested inconclusiveness is a sensible outcome of our deliberative 
public practice. Moreover, a broad view of public reason, demanding that we always 
respect the normative constraints of public reason, even when it is extremely probable 
that we, as actual citizens, would be unable to meet such standards
124
, provides us with 
a normative framework that is loose and intrinsically revisable. Therefore, a broad view 
of public reason does not require that every matter on which citizens deliberate should 
be solved thanks to a conclusive agreement. Rather, work in progress and contextual 
solutions play a fundamental role in the nonideal stage of the theory. Consequently, the 
paradigm of justification of a theory of justice I am defending is consistent with many 
of Sen’s requirements, such as the openness to constant re-examinations or the 
theoretical acceptability of partial resolutions. Finally, I also agree with Sen about the 
fact that the actual practice of deliberation might play an educative role thanks to the 
fact that the development of democratic institutions might produce a modification of  
the citizens’ behavioural parameters125. 
 In sum, I do believe that a theory of justice modelled in the light of Rawlsian 
insights and developed in multi-stage procedure might reconcile the idealistic and 
strictly normative side of a theory of justice with more contextual and work in progress 
aspects. According to this explanation of the main goals of a theory of justice, it should 
now be clear why I have deeply insisted on dividing the justificatory structure in an 
ideal and nonideal phase. On the one hand, the ideal stage deals with the strictly 
normative characterization of a theory of justice and in this regard starts with an 
idealization that involves both the moral and epistemic capacities of the members of the 
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constituency. On the other hand, the nonideal phase tries to grant the support to the 
concept of justice articulated in the ideal phase of the theory even when abstractions are 
abandoned. Naturally, the agreement in the nonideal phase cannot be granted or 
assumed in advance. Rather, it is only through the actual practice of public deliberation 
that it is possible to grant support to the political concept of justice and reach an actual 
agreement over a specific interpretation of this concept that can be employed in 
different circumstances and for dealing with different political matters.  
 Naturally, when the liberal theory has to cope with a nonidealized constituency, it 
is impossible to assume that every member of the political constituency would be 
reasonable. Therefore, a multi-stage theory of justice has to take into consideration the 
unreasonable members of the society as well. In this regard, contra Quong
126
, I claim 
that a procedure of justification of a liberal conception of justice is not exhausted when 
has proved to be able to justify its normative framework to a reasonable constituency. 
Of course, the way in which we can deal with unreasonable people is completely 
different from the procedure of justification employed with regard to a constituency of 
just reasonable citizens. Still, in the nonideal stage of the theory we have to take into 
consideration illiberal and unreasonable citizens as well. Given the fact that we cannot 
anymore assume an initial idealization, I have introduced the concept of RA in order to 
provide a new normative argument for determining who are the citizens willing to act 
according to the loose regulative ideal of “being a reasonable citizen”. The citizens that 
reach a RA about the validity of a justificatory framework are the actual members of the 
political constituency that are willing and/or able to achieve consistency between their 
personal doxastic beliefs and a normative evaluative set of standards with regard to the 
practice of public reasoning. By contrast, the citizens that do not reach a RA do not 
limit their public reasoning according to some normative constraints and therefore are 
members of the constituency that endangered the possibility of achieving a public 
justification of a specific conception of justice. Still, political deliberation is not an “all 
or nothing” practice. Indeed, when we are facing the nonideal stage of the theory, it is 
not necessary to establish in advance who are the reasonable citizens or even if we want 
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 “Why restrict the constituency of justification to reasonable people? If we aspire to answer the grander 
question - why liberalism? - it seems suspiciously circular to focus on what people who already endorse 
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to refer to just reasonable members of the society. In the nonideal stage, starting from a 
contextual analysis of the historical achievements of democratic regimes, we try to 
enlarge RA to as many as possible citizens. Some citizens will respects normative 
bounds without reflecting on them, just as part of the legitimate political context in 
which they happen to live. Some others will be more aware of the normative weight and 
the difficulties attached to the public ideal of “being a reasonable citizen”. Yet, other 
citizens will reject any normative constraints, as they are unwilling to renounce to the 
strong commitment toward their personal comprehensive values. However, the practice 
of political deliberation addresses both reasonable and unreasonable individuals qua 
citizens. For this reason, I believe that the last stage of a theory of justice, public 
justification,  according to the Rawlsian paradigm, should be sub-divided as follow: 
 the citizens that, thanks to the establishment of a RA, have accepted the normative 
constraints that apply to the practice of public reasoning, can deliberate together in 
order achieve a public justification of specific mid-level rules and principles that 
are extrapolated from the different valid interpretations of the loose normative 
framework of justice around which democratic regimes have been built up. 
 democratic deliberation addresses both reasonable and unreasonable citizens. In 
this regard, open negotiations are available some times as second best options in 
order to find a concrete trade-off among contrasting views and interests. Open 
negotiation can be extremely useful when coping with political relation of the 
vertical kind, namely negotiations in which actual claims by the citizens are 
addressed by the political institutions. Horizontal negotiations among citizens often 
turn out to be a strictly bargaining practice. By contrast, the negotiations among 
institutions and citizens can at least be ruled by the some procedural constraints 
enforced by the institutions
127
. 
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 For a deep analysis of the negotiation practice, see Bellamy, 1999. In this text, Bellamy defends the 
practice of political negotiation of compromises as the best solution for solving plural conflicts within 
liberal regimes. “Negotiators practise reciprocal accommodation as part of a search for conditions of 
mutual acceptability that reach towards a compromise that constructs a shareable good. Unlike traders, 
they seek a mutually satisfying solution rather than one that simply satisfies their own concerns. Instead 
of viewing a conflict as a battle to be won or lost, the parties see it as a collective problem to be solved. 
The aim is an integrative as opposed to a distributive compromise, with the interests and values of others 
being matters to be met rather than constraints to be overcome through minimal, tactical concessions. 
Thus negotiators adopt a more deliberative model of democracy than the instrumental account favoured 
by the trader […]. The negotiator contends that our preferences are largely shaped and ranked 
endogenously through the democratic process itself”, ivi, p. 101 (italics in the original). 
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 Defining a negotiation practice is a different task from the fundamental goal that 
has mainly concerned me in these central chapters of this work, to wit, the articulation 
of a structure of justification that might be both normatively valid and concretely 
feasible. Still, mentioning the issue of negotiation is helpful for highlighting, even more 
strongly, the intrinsically work in progress character of political liberalism. As a matter 
of fact, when dealing with an unconstrained political constituency, the validity of a 
concept of justice cannot be established just through the reference to sound normative 
arguments. Rather, it is necessary that the actual political practice, developed in the light 
of a loose normative framework, demonstrates its ability of facing challenges both from 
unreasonable citizens and from the concrete changes in the circumstance of justice. In 
this regard, Sen is completely right when he claims that a non-transcendental theory of 
justice – what I would label as a nonideal approach – must include within its paradigm 
of public deliberation constant re-examinations as well as inconclusive partial solutions. 
 I want to conclude this chapter with two brief considerations. The first one 
concerns a useful distinction among political and philosophical unreasonable citizens 
introduced by Erin Kelly and Lionel McPherson
128
. According to this distinction, there 
is a more stringent notion of unreasonable citizen that hinges on a philosophical 
definition of reasonableness. By contrast, a political notion of reasonableness is 
determined thanks to a narrower and strictly political standpoint and therefore includes 
within the category of politically reasonable citizens even individual that holds a 
philosophically unreasonable views
129
. A theory of justice that looks for a flexible 
justificatory paradigm with regard to the determination of who are the actual 
unreasonable citizens should provide a more inclusive version of justification, a “wide 
public justification, that is, a form of justification by agreement that aims to include as 
many people as would be consistent with the political values of democracy. This is 
likely to include significant numbers of unreasonable people”130. This more flexible 
articulation of the democratic arena is in my opinion an extremely positive feature, as 
allows liberalism to respect its regulative ideals of openness and inclusivity. Therefore, 
I believe that Kelly and McPherson are right when they claim that in the actual 
democratic practice we justify practices and views, extremely different and often 
incompatible among each other, thanks to a minimal constraint: the “compatibility 
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requirement”. According to the compatibility requirement, the acceptability of different 
views stems from “their compatibility with the greatest range of equal basic rights and 
liberties for all”131. 
 To conclude, I want to articulate one last insight concerning the “open negotiation” 
side of democratic deliberation. I hold that democratic deliberation is a multilayered 
concept that can be employed in different ways, with regard to different contextual 
circumstances and to the different public reasoning procedures that can be uphold by 
reasonable or unreasonable citizens. Different citizens react differently with regard to 
the public practice of political deliberation. Some of them, for example, will accept the 
reasonable constraints and willingly engage themselves in public deliberation. Some 
others, more for passive acquiescence, will accept principles and rules outlined by the 
democratic procedure of decision without necessary looking for a more committing 
participation in the public debate and they may also turn out to uphold some 
philosophically unreasonable view. Finally, politically unreasonable citizens will 
endangered the same practice of political deliberation, rejecting any normative 
constraints that should rule the democratic process. However, the modality in which 
unreasonable citizens endanger the political practice of democratic deliberation cannot 
be determined in advance and once for all. The reality is much more blurred than the 
theory. For this reason, there might be citizens that, although holding philosophically 
unreasonable views, are able to accept the political constraints of a public form of 
deliberation or, at least, accepting passively the validity of the outcomes of the 
democratic deliberative process
132
. Or, for example, some usually reasonable citizens 
might lack the political reasonableness when facing a particular harsh case of 
disagreement that calls into question some of their most believed non-political beliefs. 
Therefore, the attempt to yield a full justification of normative liberal evaluative 
standards of public reasoning is a never ending enterprise. In this regard, if some 
citizens are unable or unwilling to achieve a personal RA with regard to the validity of 
such evaluative standards, then we need a political arrangement, different from a strictly 
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 Quong (2011, pp. 292-301) is against the distinction between philosophical and political 
unreasonableness, as he hinges the whole justificatory procedure on the fact that an idealized constituency 
of reasonable people would achieve a stable overlapping consensus. I do not believe that the general 
framework proposed by Quong is wrong; however I have tried to embed the ideal stages of the 
justificatory procedure in a wider structure in which a nonideal phase is relevant as well. If we claim in 
favour of the normative relevance of the nonideal phase of the theory, then the way in which democratic 
deliberation copes with unreasonable citizens becomes a relevant political matter. 
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normative justification, for facing such foundational disagreement. In my opinion, the 
practice of open negotiation is extremely valuable in these cases. Provided that 
political institutions respect some normative constraints, it is possible to articulate an 
open negotiation between citizens and institutions in which even unreasonable citizens 
are included in the political processes. Naturally, the trade-off achieved would be less 
than a justified and conclusive agreement over a specific principles or mid-level rule. 
However, even partial resolutions are better than an unsolvable clash among different 
and irreconcilable views. Rather than seeing partial and reviewable trades-off as 
irremediable weak solutions, as too close to a modus vivendi; we should interpret this 
proximity to a modus vivendi as an opportunity for liberalism itself
133
. As a matter of 
fact, Rawls himself has shown appreciation for the fact that liberalism is such a flexible 
theory that, historically, it has been able to develop a normative theory of tolerance out 
of an agreement that at the beginning was reached just thanks to a mere modus vivendi. 
The flexible and multi-stage structure of a liberal theory of justice allows for the 
possibility of establishing an initial modus vivendi and trying afterward, thanks to the 
educative role played by democratic deliberation, to develop a more stable and 
normatively binding agreement. Even though open negotiations sometimes can provide 
nothing but an unstable agreement via modus vivendi; still this modus vivendi is not a 
fixed fact of our contextual democratic reality. Rather, an initial modus vivendi – 
hopefully – can be transformed in a more stable agreement or, even better, ends up in 
the establishment of a wider RA. Liberalism does not have a conclusive answer that is 
already defined for all circumstances and issues, but it has the opportunity to 
demonstrate that its theoretical background is adequate for answering in the best way, 
given the concrete conditions of reality, to the multi-faceted and complex reality of 
contemporary democracies. Hence, sometimes a liberal framework of reasoning should 
accept its limits and maintain that a trade-off obtained out of an open negotiation is 
better than nothing. Especially because there is always a reasonable faith, as Rawls 
would call it
134
, in the possibility of developing a more stable and just agreement over a 
                                                 
133
 “Whereas philosophical disagreement characteristically leads to attempts to philosophical resolution, 
there need be no drive to philosophical resolution in political arena. Political deliberation often can and 
should leave philosophically disagreement alone. Moreover, given the philosophical unreasonableness of 
some, there may be no rational grounds for attempting a resolution. Such is life in a just democratic 
society”, Kelly and McPherson, 2001, p. 54. 
134
 “These matters connect with the larger question of how political liberalism is possible. One step in 
showing how it is possible is to exhibit the possibility of an overlapping consensus in a society with a 
democratic tradition characterized by the fact of reasonable pluralism. In trying to do these things 
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loose normative framework for the establishment of a public practice of political 
reasoning.  
 
                                                                                                                                               
political philosophy assumes the role Kant gave to philosophy generally: the defense of reasonable faith. 
As I said then, in our case this becomes the defense of reasonable faith in the possibility of a just 
constitutional regime”, Rawls, 1993, p. 172. 
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Chapter 4 - “The Justification of Human Rights and the Same-sex 
Marriage Case” 
 
 
 
“Human rights constitute a realistic utopia 
 insofar as they no longer paint 
deceptive images of a social utopia that  
guarantees collective happiness but 
anchor the ideal of a just society in  
the institutions of constitutional states 
themselves” 
Jürgen Habermas (2010, p. 476)  
 
 
“Perhaps ironically, in actual democracies 
 working toward a binding decision, 
 negotiations, even among cooperative antagonists,  
may produce more self-understanding 
 and mutual understanding 
 than the processes of classic deliberation, 
 in which each party aims  
a consensus on the common good”  
Jane Mansbridge (2009, p. 32) 
 
 
  
 
 
4.0  Introduction 
 
  In the previous chapter I introduced the concept of RA as the kind of 
agreement that can be achieved at the nonideal stage of the procedure of justification by 
actual citizens. RA is an agreement that citizens reach on a justificatory framework and 
on some normative constraints that, in part, derive their validity from the actual 
democratic environment in which such citizens happen to live. According to my 
scheme, RA is required as preliminary agreement, in order to guarantee the normative 
framework for an open and public discussion of public issues. Still, within the nonideal 
stage of the theory should be recognized that the public discussion begins with 
disagreement, instead that agreement. In this regard, the reference to the democratic 
context is an helpful instrument, as there are normative values attached to the actual 
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political practices that, once they have been exposed, might become extremely relevant 
for constraining the political debate within a loose normative framework. 
  The main goal of this last chapter is to adjudicate the adequacy of my proposal by 
coping with the justification of actual case studies. In this regard, I believe it is 
theoretical fruitful to distinguish between an ideal and a strictly nonideal case. Indeed, 
with regard to the ideal case we can provide an analysis of the role played by 
coherentism as a general justificatory paradigm. Then, facing the nonideal case, we can 
expose RA and the open negotiation procedure in a more precise way. 
 The underlying idea is that there are principles and/or issues that should be solved 
at the ideal stage of justification, as they are such fundamental matters that it is even 
impossible to build up a liberal theory of justice without providing a justification and 
granting a wide agreement on such issues. On the other hand, there are political issues 
that are less fundamental and that therefore does not require reaching an ideal 
agreement – extremely more demanding both from the normative and the feasibility 
perspective – and that might be solved at the nonideal stage of public deliberation.  
 I believe that the best example of an issue that should be solved at the ideal level is 
the justification of human rights. Indeed, human rights “purport to offer a metapolitical 
moral framework for politics and social interaction more generally that is compatible 
with a wide variety of political and legal institutional arrangements”1. In this regard, the 
justification of the validity of human rights is a sort of pre-condition for promoting the 
outline and the justification of a liberal and democratic theory of justice. Therefore, the 
recognition of the validity of human rights as a fundamental political and moral concept 
should be considered as a feature of the loose normative framework that is established 
and justified at the overlapping consensus stage. A public justification of liberal tenets 
cannot be achieved if there is not a wide agreement on the justification of human rights. 
Hence, the theory of human rights must be able to claim for a degree of universality and 
objectivity that guarantees a wide agreement on the recognition of the validity of human 
rights as fundamental evaluative standards within the political domain. People can argue 
and disagree on which rights should be included among the human rights set and new 
rights that are not now included might be included in the future. In this regard, the 
human rights set is not fixed once for all, nevertheless I believe that it is quite 
impossible to build up a sound and consistent theory of liberal justice if the justification 
                                                 
1
 Bellamy, 1999, pp. 167. 
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of the theory of human rights is not granted in a way that place the justification of such 
concept among the “issues that are not controversial anymore”. In order to achieve this 
stage, it is important to show that the human rights set and the normative ideals that 
underlying their defence are part of a conceptual framework that is consistent with 
extremely different conceptions of the good life.  
“In particular, they must be able to sustain in a plausible manner their claim to be 
fundamental and universal conditions of a just social order that are capable of applying 
equally to all individuals. […] Human rights cannot themselves be based on any 
particular ethos or conception of the good”2. 
 
 As second section of this chapter, I want to discuss a very harsh case that is widely 
debated nowadays, namely the legal attempt to extend the right to marry to same-sex 
couples. This case is extremely relevant as helps me showing that even when there is a 
stable and shared agreement on a specific human right as it happens for the right to 
marry
3
, still many public conflicts arise with regard to the implementation of such right. 
As a matter of fact, the case of same-sex marriage involves a public discussion with 
regard to the meaning of a specific concept, as “marriage”, that has been determined 
long time ago and that now are undergoing a process of re-conceptualization. A set of 
members of the society is against this process, while some others believe that modifying 
the concept, in order to make it more inclusive, is the only way for respecting the liberal 
ideal of equal respect for persons. An important aspect would consist in  determining if 
this reconceptualization can be pursued via deliberation or if negotiation is the only 
option available. When I refer to negotiation I mean a dialogic practice between parties 
that aim to find a compromise and that therefore are willing to cooperate and gain an 
advantage from the outcomes. According to Habermas – that calls such kind of 
negotiation bargain
4
 –  
“such compromises provide for an arrangement that (a) is more advantageous to all than 
no arrangement whatever, (b) excludes free riders who withdraw from cooperation, and 
(c) excludes exploited parties who contribute more to the cooperative effort than they 
gain from it. Bargaining processes are tailored for situations in which social power 
                                                 
2
 Ibidem. 
3
 The Universal Declaration  of Human Rights states at the article 16: (1) Men and women of full age, 
without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family. 
They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution. (2) Marriage shall 
be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses. (3) The family is the natural 
and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State. See on Unites 
Nation website: 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhuman rights/index.shtml. 
4
 “There remains the alternative of bargaining, that is, negotiation between success oriented parties who 
are willing to cooperate”, Habermas, 1996, p. 165. 
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relations cannot be neutralized in the way rational discourses presuppose. The 
compromises achieved by such bargaining contain a negotiated agreement 
(Vereinbarung) that balances conflicting interests. Whereas a rationally motivated 
consensus (Einverstandnis) rests on reasons that convince all the parties in the same 
way, a compromise can be accepted by the different parties each for its own different 
reasons”5. 
 
 In the next section (4.1) I will introduce the general issue of theories of justification 
of human rights confronting two different models: the natural-law approach and the 
political approach to human rights doctrine. Then, in (4.2) I will provide reasons for 
supporting the political view and, also, I will suggest some possible development for 
making such model more adequate and sound. In the section (4.3) I will articulate the 
same-sex marriage case exposing two fundamental reasons for arguing in favour of the 
extension to marry to same-sex couples. Finally, in (4.4) I will end this analysis 
introducing some general remarks about the possibility of arguing in favour of 
deliberative models of negotiations.  
 
 
4.1 The Lingua Franca of Human Rights 
 
4.1.1 General Remarks 
 The theoretical analysis of the concept of human rights is one on the broader 
issue in contemporary political theory debates. Ever since the 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), many theorists have tried to understand which 
rights must be included in the list and, also, to emphasize the normative connection 
between the institutionalized value of Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
moral side of these same rights, and the kind of justification that these rights call for. 
These different issues are normatively correlated, since in order to justify X, we need to 
know which is the real meaning of X, as well its function. For this reason, any attempt 
to justify human rights involves a discussion about what exactly a human right “is” and 
about the special role that this concept plays in contemporary social life. 
 As John Tasioulas has correctly pointed out, the discourse of human rights has 
acquired in recent times “the status of an ethical lingua franca”6. As a matter of fact, the 
practical recognition of the validity of the human rights doctrine is widely accepted than 
                                                 
5
 Ivi, pp. 165-166. 
6
 Tasioulas, 2004, p.1. 
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it has ever been. Human rights have become part of the currency of international 
relations, and most countries participate in the human rights system. Thanks to a 
paradigm that is intrinsically work in progress,  we can say that the human rights project 
continues and has not failed. However, this positive attitude toward a general – and very 
sketchy – description of the value of human rights is not sufficient for building up an 
exhaustive account of the justification required at the political level.  
 In order to articulate this issue more specifically, let me begin distinguishing 
between two different aspects of human rights. As Habermas pointed out, “human rights 
are Janus-faced, looking simultaneously toward morality and the law”7. On the one 
hand, human rights can be justified deriving their intrinsic normativity from a moral 
argument referring to our reciprocal duties as moral agents. On the other hand, an 
exhaustive argument can be developed looking at the juridical nature of human rights as 
political entitlements. These two aspects of human rights can be reconciled; still it is 
important to be aware of this theoretical distinction. Indeed, in order to determine which 
is the best strategy for publicly justify human rights, it is necessary to have already 
established, at the metatheoretical level, which of the two paradigms of human rights we 
are going to deal with.   
 The justification of human rights can play a fundamental role within the political 
domain, as we are currently observing that the acceptance of human rights as an 
institutionalized international practice has been becoming wider and wider if not almost 
unanimously accepted in certain contexts. However, one can decide to focus her 
attention on the moral reasons that back up the determination of human rights instead 
that on the actual instantiation of human rights theory. Indeed, these two aspects of the 
theory of human rights are not necessarily consistent, as the institutional aspects of the 
social practice of human rights looks for different criteria than the strictly philosophical 
analysis of what does it mean for a right to be defined as a “human right”. In this regard, 
it is important to distinguish between different issues that are often confused and 
erroneously conflated into one description of the matter: 
i. It is relevant to stress the institutional implementation of the ideal of human rights and 
the fact that on its validity it has been reached a quite wide agreement among people 
that hold extremely different moral and political opinions and that live in completely 
different contexts. 
                                                 
7
 Habermas, 1998, p. 91. 
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ii. Meanwhile, it is necessary to acknowledge the deep disagreement among people 
whether some particular rights should be included within the list of  human rights or not 
and on the correct procedure for granting the implementation of a specific right.  
iii. Another issue is determining the philosophical meaning of human rights and 
establishing the correct procedure for justifying their existence from the strictly 
theoretical perspective.  
 Following this distinction among different issues related to the human rights 
analysis, we could say that people are inclined to agree on a general – rough – idea of 
what human rights are and they are ready to affirm that these human rights should be 
defended and a correct institutional framework built up in order to institutionalize them. 
Meanwhile, however, people happen to disagree when the general issue about the 
validity of human rights validity is substituted with more specific issues, such as the 
determination of which right can aspire to be included within the list of human rights or 
which government policies are required in order to implement them. I believe that this 
tension between the wide agreement on the general concept and, instead, a quite strong 
disagreement on the specific features of human rights is due to the tension between two 
fundamental aspects of human rights I have already introduced, namely the 
institutionalized practice of human rights and the philosophical meaning of them. 
Indeed, the institutionalized practice of human rights has led the concept of human 
rights to become a lingua franca among people of different cultures and for this reason 
it is sensible to claim that, generally speaking, there is a wide recognition of the 
normative validity of human rights’ ideal. Nevertheless, the normative power of human 
rights is justified by different people in different way, thanks to extremely different 
theories of the good or personal motivations. In this regard, recalling the conceptual 
framework employed in the previous chapter, we can say that, thanks to the 
international institutional framework of human rights, people has been sharing a general 
human rights ideal as a victoriously justified doctrine within the different doxastic 
systems they happen to hold. While there is disagreement on the definition of what 
really is “a human right” from the philosophical perspective or on the determination of 
which rights belong to the human rights list, a quite stable agreement has been reached 
with regard to the normative validity of the institutional practice of human rights. 
Therefore, I suggest that any satisfactory theory of human rights should refer to the 
historical uniqueness of the practice of human rights. Starting from 1948 this theory 
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has been developed both theoretically and as an ongoing global practice and these two 
aspects should be reconcile if one wants to grasp the real meaning of human rights. 
 A correct doctrine of human rights should provide a conceptual analysis of the 
meaning of the term “human right”. However, my line of argument is that for actually 
understanding the meaning of human rights it is not possible to leave aside the analysis 
of the ongoing practice of human rights. The legitimation attached to the procedure that 
has conducted to the actual international paradigm of human rights as a lingua franca is 
a fundamental feature for the determination of human rights meaning itself. 
Consequently, any exhaustive theory of human rights should try to achieve consistency 
between the international practice of human rights (that depends on the normativity and 
the universality attributed to human rights as an ongoing practice) and the actual 
disagreement, on the definition and justification of human rights at the theoretical and 
metaphysical level, that is due to the intercultural moral diversity that characterizes 
contemporary democratic societies. 
 The analysis of the meaning of human rights could be divided into different issues: 
on the one hand, the discussion of the intrinsic logic structure of a right
8
; and, on the 
other hand, the analysis of the concrete role played by rights within the perspective of 
human rights as an international practice
9
. In this chapter I am dealing with the second 
line of inquiry according to which the term “right”, involved within human rights 
framework, plays the role of a high-priority norm
10
. This emphasis on the practical use 
of rights, rather than on the logical meaning, allows us to better grasp the “moral 
relevance” of the debate over human rights. Moreover, the institutional role played by 
human rights constraints them to be  minimal – or at least modest – standards. Hence, it 
is important to understand that a good account of the political meaning of human rights 
needs to maintain a balance between two different – although often confused – aspects: 
the moral and legal side of rights. Indeed, a human right can be described as 
normatively binding both as a shared norm of actual human moralities (justified through 
the reference to good moral reasons) and as a legal right recognizes both by national and 
                                                 
8
 In this regard, see the analysis developed by Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld. 
9
 “Finally, the model of constitution-making is understood in such a way that human rights are not pre-
given moral truths to be discovered but rather are constructions. Unlike moral rights, it is rather clear that 
legal rights must not remain politically nonbinding. As individual, or ‘subjective’, rights, human rights 
have an inherently juridical nature and are conceptually oriented toward positive enactment by legislative 
bodies”, Habermas, 1998, p. 95 (italics in the original).  
10
 With regard to the special value of human rights Dworkin (1984) speaks of rights as trumps and Raz 
(1979) describes rights as exclusionary reasons. 
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international institutions. Still, even if one wants to stress the difference between the 
moral and legal aspect of human rights issue, the two sides should be taken together in 
order to outline a correct theory of human rights. In this regard, we can say that the 
“high priority of human rights needs support from a plausible connection with 
fundamental human interests or powerful normative considerations”11. 
 These introductory remarks are useful in order to understand the different 
perspective from which the issue of human rights could be analysed. Indeed, the way in 
which human rights are described affects also the kind of justification that results to be 
adequate. In order to support their high priority, human rights require robust 
justifications. Finding a stable moral ground for human rights could be the best option 
from a theoretical perspective; all the same the necessity of taking into account also the 
perspective of the historical practice of human rights implies that the disagreement 
should be part of the picture. For this reason, I hold that the correct justification for 
human rights is a robust one, although not an irresistible one. In the next two sections I 
will analyse two models of justification of human rights doctrine: the natural-law 
approach and the political view
12
. 
 
4.1.2  Natural-law Approach 
 According to the natural-law approach, the justification of the high-priority of 
human rights stems from the recognition of the value of an intrinsic interest attached to 
every individual qua human being. In this regard, human rights are “natural rights”, as 
they belong to human beings by default, independently from any institutional or 
historical context. The pivotal point of the argument is the definition of a normatively 
weighty interest that, in order to be protected, asks for human rights theory. Indeed, the 
normative bindingness of all the structure hinges on the shared agreement that people 
can reach in determining the intrinsically valuable human interest that human rights 
doctrine should protect. In this regard, the paradigm of natural rights does not 
necessarily require the formulation of a human rights positive law, since natural human 
rights, by definition, exist in every time and space in which exist human beings. 
 Natural rights are universal both because we possess them independently of our 
social relationships and because all human beings are entitled to claim human rights. 
                                                 
11
 Nickel, 2010, p.5. 
12
 Beitz is The Idea of Human Rights (2009) refers to these model as a “practical conception” of human 
rights. 
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Moreover, a naturalistic approach provides a weight critical standard for assessing 
contemporary positive laws on human rights, since according to this approach human 
rights are independent and pre-institutional. This pre-institutional side should be 
understood in a logical, rather than in a historical sense. Indeed, it is the structure of the 
argument for justifying the existence of these rights that attaches logical priority to these 
natural rights over every social construction
13
. 
 In order to better understand the structure of this kind of argument, let me shortly 
outline the perspective of one of the most important exponent of naturalistic approach: 
James Griffin. In his On Human Rights
14
, Griffin argues that human rights are useful for 
protecting personhood. This notion of personhood is an interpretation of the idea of 
human dignity and recalls the intrinsic relevance of normative agency shared by every 
human being. Such agency is characterized by three components: autonomy (“choose 
one’s own path through life”15); minimum provision (one must have the resources, 
education, information and capabilities to choose and act effectively) and liberty 
(“others must also not forcibly stop one from pursuing what one sees as a worthwhile 
life”16). According to Griffin, the normative reference to personhood is not sufficient to 
ground human rights, as we need something more concrete for guaranteeing that the 
content of human rights will be determinate. This second goal is attained by 
practicalities that are “empirical information about […] human nature and human 
societies”17. 
 Griffin maintains that this foundation of human rights through the concept of 
personhood avoids the charge of being too comprehensive, since human rights, 
according to his interpretation, are rights not to anything that might promote the human 
good; rather they are necessary, and therefore normatively binding, since they grant the 
protection of one’s status as a human being. This argument grounds human rights 
thanks to a top down argument, since it starts from the determination of an overarching 
interest, personhood, and derives the authority of human rights from that. According to 
this foundational approach, any ongoing practice of human rights should conform to a 
                                                 
13
 One of the best example of the logical priority of natural root of human rights is provided by John 
Locke through his description of natural rights within the state of nature.  
14
 Griffin, 2008.  
15
 Ivi, p. 33. 
16
 Ibidem. 
17
 Ivi, p. 38. 
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given philosophical version of the natural meaning of human rights; in Griffin’s case to 
the fact that human rights protect the fundamental interest of personhood.  
 After having briefly outlined one law-nature theory approach, I want to articulate 
this approach in a more formal way, since it could be useful delineate the central aspect 
of this approach, in order to grasp the fundamental differences with the political line of 
argument I will introduce in the next section. First, the nature of human rights in this 
kind of naturalistic approach is pre-institutional and depends on some features shared by 
all human beings. Second, the justification provided by these theorists is grounded on a 
specific definition of human nature. Third, the content of the list of human rights is 
neither derived from nor compared with the actual list of human rights in the UDHR. 
Indeed, this approach provides a critical point of view for assessing the actual list of 
human rights: the rights that are recognized by UDHR are justified if and only if they 
guarantee and protect the normatively weighty interest of human beings that is defined 
by the naturalistic theory. Finally, the authority of human rights is derived from the 
intrinsic normativity attached to a universal human interest like, for example,  
personhood
18
. 
 As final remarks of this section on natural-law theories I want to explain which I 
believe being the pros e cons of this approach. On the one hand, this approach provides 
a justification that, starting from the intrinsic value of a human interest, is able to 
guarantee the normative side of human rights in an ultimate way. Moreover, this 
naturalistic perspective provides a strong critical standpoint, since any actual practice of 
human rights must be revised in the light of the grounding theory. These are optimum 
outcomes for a top down theory, since a philosophical foundation seems able to justify 
the universality and the normativity of human rights avoiding any reference to historical 
practices and contextual disagreement. On the other hand, this approach is less 
satisfactory when we try to make it consistent with the public political justification of 
the ongoing practice of human rights. As a matter of fact, the institutional practice of 
human rights has been established quite successfully even though it has been impossible 
to reach an agreement on the ultimate metaphysical definition of human rights. 
Naturally, a natural-law approach might be completely indifferent to this remark, as 
according to this approach human rights can be defined as a fundamental human value 
                                                 
18
 As example of a different natual-law theory I wish to recall the capabilities approach developed by 
Martha Nussbaum (1997) and Amartya Sen (2004). 
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averting any reference to the actual practice of establishing and defending human rights. 
According to the natural-law theory, even within a context in which human rights are 
not respected by anyone, still the definition of human rights as a “natural” human value 
would be valid and indubitable. This position is respectable and extremely powerful 
from the strictly philosophical perspective. Yet, I believe that such an account of human 
rights overlooks some important features of the actual practice of justifying human 
rights. First of all, the epistemic analysis I have introduced in the first chapter of this 
dissertation is valid for the justification of human rights as well as for the general 
attempt to justify a political normative framework. Therefore, any public procedure of 
justification of human rights should take into account the fact of pluralism and the 
epistemic role played by the doxastic sets of beliefs of people. In this regard, there are 
good epistemic reasons for doubting that a stable agreement might be reached on  a 
single procedure of justification of human rights doctrine starting from a single set of 
intrinsically normative natural values attached to the definition of human being in itself. 
Naturally, a natural-law theorist might reply that she does not care about the fact of 
pluralism and of the consequent rising of disagreement among people, as she is 
presenting us the “true” theory of human rights and it does not matter how many people 
would be able to agree on its validity
19
. This possible line of counterargument allows 
me to introduce the second feature of human rights practice I believe is underestimates 
by natural-law paradigm, namely the fact that what is fundamental about human rights 
is that people agree, quite widely, not on the definition of their specific nature or on the 
exact number of them; rather on the public role that human rights doctrine plays in the 
international politics context. This last point is related to the idea, that I will discuss in 
the next section, that what is fundamental about human rights is their function, “as a 
common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations”20,  in the public arena. 
This political account of human rights charges the natural-law theory of being too 
idealistic and of narrowing too much the normative scope of the human rights 
enterprise
21
. 
                                                 
19
 According to Raz (2007, p. 6) in Griffin’s account there is a collapse between the argument for 
grounding human rights and a specific and parochial ideal of a good life. 
20
 See The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml. 
21
 With regard to this difficulty, Charles Beitz (2009) describes the possibility of having first and second-
order rights. The first-order rights are pure natural rights whose normativity does not depend on 
institutional contingencies. Whereas the second-order rights are derived from the normative content of 
first-order rights. This division would permit to enlarge the human rights list to include some rights that 
are already part of UDHR. 
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 It is worth noting that the UDHR does not provide any reference to a naturalistic 
foundation of human rights
22
. This fact is extremely important in the light of the 
decision of maintaining a balance between the philosophical and concrete side of human 
rights practice. Indeed, this decision of avoiding any naturalistic foundation could be 
explained with the fact that even though human rights seem to be the most “universally 
shared” values in the international arena, however this agreement is just a general one. 
As a matter of fact, two people can share, more or less, the same intuitive notion of 
human rights even though they disagree about whether some particular rights must be 
included in the human rights list. A naturalistic based approach is not able to account 
for this discrepancy, given that in such theoretical framework any actual right should be 
derived in a direct way from the argument about the intrinsic normative interest that 
belongs to every human beings. 
 To conclude, we can say that the naturalistic perspective is extremely ambitious, 
philosophically speaking, as it works for providing a universal account of human rights 
that would be valid, and normatively binding, in any circumstance and for any agent. In 
this regard, this account highlights one side of the “uniqueness” of human rights, 
namely their universal validity as rights that protect fundamental interests attached to 
any person qua human being. However, it is debatable that this account of human rights 
that transcends from any actual practice for implementing such ideal would be able to 
grasp the whole meaning of human rights concept. If we accept as valid the twofold 
definition of human rights as both moral and legal concept, then it is reasonable to 
wonder whether the actual practice of establishing an international legal notion of 
human rights would not concurs in establishing the very meaning of human rights 
concept. 
 
4.1.3 Political Views of Human Rights 
 A political account of human rights develops a bottom up arguments according 
to which any justification of human rights should start from the ongoing practice of 
human rights. In this regard, political theories take into account the second side of the 
“uniqueness” of human rights, namely the broad international agreement reached by the 
                                                 
22
 The UDHR refers to the “recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of 
all members of the human family”. Hence, it could be said that even within the UDHR there is a reference 
to the universal recognition of the human dignity. However, this reference does not purport to be 
foundational in the way that natural-law theory thinks that a specific value attached to the definition of 
human nature would be. 
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actual practice of human rights in our contemporary history. These theories, beginning 
from the legal and social diversity that distinguish contemporary societies (while 
naturalistic theories start from what is common in the nature of human beings), try to 
describe human rights as normative standards that could be object of agreement among 
members of different cultures. Given that this approach analyse the concept of human 
rights starting from the agreement on the historical practice, these theories are also 
defined as agreement theories
23
. 
 Political versions of human rights doctrine are different one from another, 
nevertheless they share the same fundamental methodological commitment
24
. In their 
view, the international doctrine of human rights should be interpreted not as the legal 
implementation of an independent order of normative natural rights. Rather, the actual 
practice of human rights itself is the source of the normative authority of human rights 
doctrine. The meaning and the function of human rights is inherently connected to 
existing political realities. Consequently, it is impossible to provide a sound justification 
of human rights avoiding any reference to the institutional practice of human rights 
itself. As Laura Valentini summarizes, “while on the natural-law approach the function 
of human rights (and hence their justification) is practice-independent, on the political 
approach their function (and justification) is practice-dependent”25. 
 According to this approach, human rights are international norms that help to 
protect all people everywhere from severe political, legal, and social abuses. Therefore, 
human rights are primary defined as international standards according to which the 
sovereignty of a state depends on its respect of them. Furthermore, human rights could 
be interpreted as goals for social development and, sometimes, as instruments of social 
criticism in global politics. In this regard, human rights are political norms that mainly 
assess how people should be treated by their governments and political institutions. This 
institutional interpretation of human rights accounts for the eminently “public” meaning 
of human rights. Indeed, as Thomas Pogge notes: “there is something especially 
hideous, outrageous, and intolerable about official disrespect, why official moral 
wrongs are worse than otherwise similar ‘private’ moral wrongs”26. 
                                                 
23
 See Beitz, 2009, ch. 4, pp. 73-95. 
24
 See Rawls (1999b), Pogge (2002), Cohen (2004), Beitz (2001; 2009), Sangiovanni (2008), Raz (2010) 
and Valentini (2012). 
25
 Valentini, 2010, pp. 181. 
26
 Pogge, 2002, p. 65. 
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  Following the political account of human rights, one could ask in which sense is 
“political” the primary meaning of human rights. On the one hand, the term political 
could refers to the context of application of such rights, namely the international arena 
in which UDHR is recognized as a valid normative standard of justice and to the 
political institutions that are evaluated through these standards of conduct. Following 
this interpretation of the political account of human rights, it might seems that, since 
human rights practice deals with contemporary problems and institutions, human rights 
are not transhistorical, but always contextual. On the other hand, the relevant meaning 
of political could account for the specific form of justification that human rights need: a 
strictly political one. Following this second meaning of political the framework 
becomes more complicated, since we have to deal with an approach according to which 
different institutional contexts constrain the content of the theory of human rights not 
just in the definition of the procedure of implementation of the doctrine, but also for the 
determination of the correct procedure of justification of such rights. This second 
option, the political justification one, maintains that the ongoing practice of human 
rights provides an autonomous source of normativity for the theory of human rights and 
consequently the procedure of justification must account for it
27
. 
 According to the political approach, the practice-dependency of the human rights 
theory on the actual international institutionalized framework of human rights modifies 
not just the real meaning of the term “human rights”, but also the way in which such 
rights could be understood as normatively binding. From a methodological perspective, 
the argument starts from the actual role played by X, in order to elaborate a correct 
conception of X
28. “The interpretation, we say, constrains the content of the principles 
by telling us what the principles are for. First principles of justice therefore vary, at a 
fundamental level, with respect to the institutional context they are meant to regulate”29. 
                                                 
27
 In this regard, Sagiovanni (2008, p. 154) states: “The justification of human rights must take into 
account the particularly deep and pervasive nature of cultural and institutional pluralism among societies, 
demonstrating to those affected why they can have no reasonable objection to their enforcement. This 
justification, in turn, must be particularly stringent, since violations of human rights (as their functional 
role indicates) warrant forms of interference which will likely be immensely disruptive to the daily life of 
all within the target societies”. 
28
 It is worth noting that the structure of argument is extremely different from that of naturalistic theories. 
Such theories, indeed, start from the determination of an intrinsic value Y and after argue for the 
instrumental value of a right X that protect Y. The actual practice of implementation of X is irrelevant 
from the perspective of justification, given that the practical role of X must be revised in the light of the 
previous determined and already justified conception of Y. 
29
 Sangiovanni, 2008, p. 164. 
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 Political accounts of human rights argue in favour of grounding the normativity of 
human rights through the pragmatic analysis of the role played by human rights doctrine 
within specific contexts. For this reason, a practice-dependent account of human rights 
doctrine is a theory that needs a work in progress approach and a case-by-case analysis. 
These are exactly the features that provide the eminently “political” aspects of human 
rights doctrine. In this regard, the universal feature of human rights is given by the 
public recognition of being the only international standard that works as bond for state 
sovereignty
30
. According to Charles Beitz, the concept of human rights is not 
discovered through theory and applied to reality; rather is derived and continuously 
compared with the existing practice. “In the case of human rights, surely the most 
important consideration is that a doctrine of international human rights should be suited 
to the public political role it is expected to play. An understanding of this public role 
constraints the content of the doctrine”31. The uniqueness of human rights is given by 
the fact that such doctrine starts from the historical development of the actual practice, 
nevertheless trying to stress the normative strength and to widen its critical role. In this 
regard, human rights doctrine does not need a foundation, but rather a confirmation of 
its value as ongoing emergent practice. 
  The political account of human rights attempts to build up a paradigm in which the 
ideal and realistic insights could find a common theoretical benchmark
32
. These theories 
maintain that it is possible to root normativity in the history, without losing an 
evaluative commitment. In order to guarantee this critical task, the validity of human 
rights practice, that cannot only depend on theoretical arguments, is tied down by the 
actual willingness of citizens and institutions to understand such practice. Hence, the 
theories focused on actual agreement and practice-dependency, by using a work in 
                                                 
30 This interpretation of  human rights has been developed by Rawls in Law of People (1999b), where he 
claims (pp. 79-80) that human rights are “a class of rights that play a special role in a reasonable Law of 
Peoples: they restrict the justifying reasons for war and its conduct, and they specify limits to a regime's 
internal autonomy. In this way they reflect the two basic and historically profound changes in how the 
powers of sovereignty have been conceived since World War II. First, war is no longer an admissible 
means of government policy and is justified only in self-defense, or in grave cases of intervention to 
protect human rights. And second, a government's internal autonomy is now limited. […] Human rights 
set a necessary, though not sufficient, standard for the decency of domestic political and social 
institutions. In doing so they limit admissible domestic law of societies in good standing in a reasonably 
just Society of Peoples”. 
31
 Beitz, 2009, p. 105.  
32
 In this regard, Valentini (2012, p. 180) distinguishes among three reasons why an account of human 
rights can be defined as “political”: a. political are the institutions that are assessed through human rights 
criteria; b. the procedure of justification of human rights is defined as political, as it appeals to strictly 
public arguments; and c. this view is political as it looks to granting the feasibility with regard to the 
actual political circumstances. 
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progress approach, would promote opportunities for progressive improvement of human 
rights doctrine as a result of the negotiating dialogue between institutions, states and 
citizens
33
. In this regard, cases of successful enlargement of consensus about human 
rights (both for the number of rights and for the number of individual and also states 
that accept them) will represent the best presentation of the theory itself. Furthermore, 
this historical development of human rights doctrine would not be an outcome of an 
infallible theory, rather the result of political practice. 
 Charles Beitz, in The Idea of Human Rights, introduces different accounts of a 
political justification of human rights through the reference to diverse notions of 
agreement. One interpretation is the common core idea, according to which it is 
necessary to ground human rights on a minimal common core that can be shared by 
every culture. However, this interpretation, being strongly tied down by the contextual 
circumstances, risks to imply the exclusion a large part of contemporary human rights 
doctrine (e.g. religious toleration; legal equality for women), if such rights were not part 
of the common core on which extremely different worldview happen to agree on. 
Another possibility is provided by the overlapping consensus idea that involves a 
procedure of political justification that hinges on a public notion of human rights as 
political norms that can be justified by an wide array of different moral, philosophical 
and religious worldviews
34
. The positive feature of this account, in comparison with the 
common core idea, is that the normative value of human rights doctrine can be upheld 
by different comprehensive doctrines and therefore such consensus is not tied down by 
the search for an actual common core shared by any comprehensive view and it is 
therefore more respectful of the fact of pluralism. 
 Beitz defines these two models of justification as agreement conceptions. He 
maintains that these proposals are laudable and yet they miss a fundamental aspect of 
the role played by human rights within the international politics domain, namely the fact 
of being a normative criterion for assessing the validity of political practice and the 
actions perpetrated by institutions. Beitz wonders whether agreement conceptions 
would not lack a critical force if the human rights emerging practice depends on the 
                                                 
33
 Beitz (2009, p. 93) speaks of “the aspiration of human rights to constitute a widely sharable public 
doctrine – perhaps as an element of a global “public reason”. 
34
 It is worth noting that Beitz (2009, p. 76) maintains that such overlapping consensus that can be 
reached with regard to human rights justification is different from the one introduced by Rawls, as the 
former involves not just reasonable comprehensive doctrines, but any actual existing doctrine, reasonable 
or not. 
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actual agreement that can be reached among the existing comprehensive doctrine. 
According to this criticism, agreements theories would not be able to overcome the 
tension between the partiality of the actual context in which human rights ideal should 
be implemented and the “uniqueness” of such an ideal. As Michael Freeman states: 
“there is a tension in contemporary philosophy between the concept of universal human 
rights and that of moral pluralism”35. Very often this tension has implied that the 
agreement theories on human rights has focused their attention on the attempt to reach 
an agreement on a quite wide array of human rights, regardless of the possibility of 
being more critical against the status quo.  
 In order to solve the tension between universality and pluralism
36
, Beitz introduces 
a third solution: a progressive convergence model. This third form of agreement implies 
a procedure for achieving a progressive overlapping consensus through reinterpreting 
normative concepts of different cultures, maintaining the actual importance of human 
rights doctrine within the international arena
37
. The pivotal idea of this perspective is 
that human rights doctrine should be reachable from each comprehensive worldview. 
However, this convergence is not require to be achieved right now, starting from the 
actual array of different worldviews. Rather, it is a convergence that might be reached 
thanks to “the best available elaboration of the basic normative materials of these 
cultures for the circumstances of modern life”38. Beitz maintains that this model can 
avert paternalistic outcomes as well as a positive bias toward the status quo. The human 
rights emerging practice would maintain its normative and critical role and such practice 
itself would provide support for creating a political context in which new elaborations 
of ethical traditions might show that human rights doctrine is “reachable from”39 deeply 
different worldviews.  
 According to Beitz’s political conception, human rights are standards for 
institutions to which all citizens can agree, as far as the agreement is interpreted as 
                                                 
35
 Freeman, 1994, p. 513. 
36 “Those attracted to agreement theories face a dilemma. On the one hand, human rights are supposed to 
provide reasons for action to members of every culture to which human rights apply. The idea of an 
agreement is a natural interpretation of this aspiration. On the other hand, taken as a whole, international 
human rights doctrine cannot be seen as actually shared among the world’s main political moral cultures 
nor, therefore, as the object of an agreement. Moreover, the parts of human rights doctrine that fall 
outside such an agreement include some elements (e.g. freedom of religious practice, the right against 
discrimination on grounds of sex) one might regard as too important to be abandoned”, Beitz, 2009, p. 88. 
37
 As good examples of an agreement approaches based on progressive convergence, Beitz mentions 
Charles Taylor and Joshua Cohen. 
38
 Beitz, 2009, p. 88. 
39
 Ibidem, (emphasis added). 
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reachable thanks to a progressive convergence procedure that involves all different 
worldviews. However, it is true that for averting the charge of producing a circular 
argument, such justificatory approach should articulate the process by which a 
progressive convergence emerge as determined by reasons that are different from those 
focused in defining human rights and in justifying them thanks to the reference to the 
ongoing practice.  
“Perhaps it is best to regard progressive convergence as a hypothesis about moral 
progress. We cannot know whether it will turn out true. The most we can do is to 
imagine as sympathetically as possible how various worldviews might evolve (or be 
‘freshly elaborated’) in response to the range of social forces we understand, roughly, as 
those of modernization, including those associated with the growth of a global economy 
and culture. If through such a process of sympathetic imagination we can see how a 
progressive convergence on human rights might emerge, we might acquire a reason to 
hope for the success of a global human rights regime”40. 
 
 The political account described by Beitz stresses both the normative role played by 
the international practice of human rights and the relevance of the normative criteria 
employed in the procedure of implementations of these rights (understood as public 
standards of legitimacy for state’s sovereignty). According to Beitz, human rights have 
a distinctive identity as normative standards. Furthermore, such normativity is not 
derived from a moral argument that grounds human rights in the reference to a 
naturalistic account of human fundamental interests, rather it stems from the special role 
that human rights play as norms of global political life. However, Beitz is aware that if 
we look for a normatively binding notion of human rights it is not sufficient to observe 
that a political institutionalized doctrine recognizes a right to X. Rather, we need an 
argument for stating that it should do so. In order to achieve this further goal, therefore, 
it is required not just to sustain a political conception of human rights, but also to 
provide a public justification of the value of human rights. I will come back on this 
issue in the next section of this chapter. Meanwhile, in order to end up this part of the 
analysis, let me articulate the political account of human rights with reference to the 
same fours features that I have introduced for illustrating the naturalistic theories. First, 
the nature of human rights is determined by an intercultural agreement on an actual 
ongoing practice of human rights. Second, the justification is provided by a progressive 
convergence that, starting from the actual institutional role played by human rights, 
employs public arguments that can be shared by people that hold different worldviews 
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 Ivi, pp. 94-95. 
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and conceptions of the good. Third, the content of the list of human rights depends on a 
back and forth procedure of readjustment between the actual list provided by the UDHR 
and the potential list of human rights (this procedure affirms the aspirational side of this 
perspective about human rights). Finally, the authority of human rights is derived both 
from the broad agreement that the ongoing practice of human rights has obtained 
historically and from the fact the actual practice is convergent with our strong intuitions 
of the value of the political conception of human rights. 
 This approach to human rights doctrine that focus its attention of the institutional 
framework aims to achieve an equilibrium between the actual practice of human rights 
and the theory that should endorse such practice. Nevertheless, it is a sensible to wonder 
whether the political view of human rights engages part of its procedure on first order 
moral reasoning, or if it is completely detached from strictly moral arguments. 
Recalling the institutional role played by human rights doctrine within the international 
context might be not sufficient in order to distinguish between acceptability and actual 
acceptance of human rights practice
41
. As matter of fact, political accounts of human 
rights are charged with the lack of critical assessment, since the normativity of internal 
elements is not guaranteed by the reference to a moral, practice-independent, argument. 
Habermas is aware of this difficulty when he speaks of the “Janus-faced” aspect of 
human rights. Indeed, there are first order moral reasons supporting human rights 
doctrine. Still, as Pogge has pointed out
42
, the fundamental aspect of human rights is 
that they identify a violation of fundamental rights not in general, but the violation 
perpetrated by institutions of officials. The fundamental duty bearers, when we talk 
about human rights, are not the other fellow citizens, but political institutions. 
 Once we have determined the specific role played by human rights, namely the fact 
that “they define standards of conduct applicable to political arrangements”43, then I think it is 
correct to highlight the political features of such a doctrine. Still, this political paradigm 
of human rights faces the same dilemma I have introduced when discussing the attempt 
of justifying a strictly political theory of justice. According to one horn of the liberal 
dilemma, if a procedure of justification tries to account for the pluralism of the 
                                                 
41
 Habermas (1998, p. 87, italics in the original), in this regard, claims: “That is, law requires more than 
mere acceptance; besides demanding that its addressees give it de facto recognition, the law claims to 
deserve their recognition. Consequently, all the public justifications and constructions meant to redeem 
this claim to be worthy of recognition belong to the legitimation of a government organized in the form of 
law”. 
42
 Pogge, 2002. 
43
 Valentini, 2012, p. 182. 
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contemporary societies, and therefore the adequacy of the justificatory procedure is 
delineated in the light of its feasibility, then the philosophical strength of the 
justification is weaken in order to provide strictly “public”, and more shareable, 
arguments. On the other hand, following the second horn of the dilemma, if the first aim 
is to provide a normative binding theory of justice, then the justification will engage in 
first order moral reasoning. In this second scenario, the procedure of justification would 
provide strong moral arguments without caring of dealing with the fact of pluralism. 
 A political account of human rights risks to fall into the same dilemma. Justifying 
human rights simply as an ongoing practice is compatible with the fact of pluralism. 
However, this “contextual and strictly political” argument might not be able to provide 
an adequate criterion for critically assessing the status quo. By contrast, a public 
justification of human rights that refers to first order moral arguments claims for the 
universality of human rights from a strictly normative perspective but risks to produce a 
justification of human rights that can be assessed as paternalistic and sectarian by a 
portion of members of the international arena. It is true that human rights, even more 
than other values, might be defined as intrinsically universal. Still, granting their 
enjoyment universally depends on contextual conditions and political circumstances. 
Given this intrinsic tension between the universal normative aspects of a theory of 
human rights and the political good reasons for providing a public justification of such 
doctrine, I believe that focusing on the ongoing practice of human rights is a sensible 
attempt. Yet, I think that Valentini is right when she claims that even a political 
conception of human rights should involve a minimal level of first order moral 
reasoning. Naturally, in order to respect the “public justifiability”44 of human rights 
doctrine, such reference to first order moral reasoning should be something on which 
people, that support extremely different worldviews, can agree on. In this regard, we 
can see that natural-law views on the justification of human rights provide an argument 
that begins from what we have common as human being, regardless of what we happen 
to believe within our doxastic system of beliefs. By contrast, political conceptions of 
human rights starts from the recognition of the actual disagreement among people and 
from the fact that an ongoing institutional practice for protecting human rights has been 
established. Then, the political approach can assumes two different position with regard 
to the attempt to justify human rights doctrine publicly. On the one hand, it might 
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 See Valentini, 2012, pp. 185-187. 
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provide a justification that is public, as it refers to the possibility of achieving a 
progressive convergence on the value of the ongoing practice of human rights starting 
from extremely different comprehensive perspectives. On the other hand, a political 
account of human rights might decide to walk through a more winding road, to wit, 
trying to understand which are the moral underpinning values that inform the ongoing 
practices of human rights and looking for a justificatory argument of these values that 
might respect the public justifiability constraints.  
 
 
4.2  Public Justification of Human Rights 
 
 “These rights embody fixed points in our judgments of what tolerable institution 
must be like”45. I decide to begin this section of this chapter with this quotation, since it 
explains the idea that human rights doctrine has built up a sort of common public 
culture within contemporary history. It is exactly this feature of human rights that a 
political account tries to highlight. I prefer this political version of the human rights 
doctrine for different reasons. First of all, the political version is able to account for the 
normativity that stems from the ongoing public practice. Second, this version pays 
attention to the contextual circumstances of applicability of such rights and therefore it 
is realistic with regard to the feasibility constraint. Third, the procedure of justification 
upheld by this account looks for a public argument that might be neutral with regard to 
the different conceptions of the good life and moral comprehensive doctrines held by 
different citizens in extremely vary societies. Finally, the political account allows for 
work in progress solutions and even for negotiations with regard to the concrete 
application of the human rights doctrine. 
 There are normative difficulties concerning a political justification of human rights. 
Still, I have claimed that the natural-law approach is less adequate for dealing with a 
pluralistic environment as the international politics one. As a matter of fact, even if a 
naturalistic account of human rights could supposedly gain an indisputable normative 
force from a justification that appeals solely to first order moral reasoning, I believe it is 
at the level of metatheory that these kind of approaches are wrong. Indeed, human rights 
meaning is not contingently related with its implementation as a political practice. 
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Rather, there is an explicatory correlation between the actual practice of human rights as 
we know it and the determination of the actual meaning of it. If we agree with Pogge
46
 – 
and with Habermas
47
 –  that for having a violation of human rights we need not simply 
the disclaim of a moral duty, but a violation of a right that involves a role played by a 
political institution within the procedure that has conducted to the supposed 
infringement; then it logically follows that for defining human rights is not enough to 
provide a moral argument that defines which particularly fundamental human interests 
are at stake when we talk about human rights. Rather, it is intrinsically part of a 
comprehensive definition of what “human rights” means the reflection about 
institutional features of such concept. 
 According to Habermas, human rights are a legal concept, and therefore a practice-
dependent analysis is required for defining them. Still, the legal aspects of human rights 
that define who are the duty bearers and which are the fundamental human interests that 
when infringed leads to a human rights violation do not exhaust the whole normative 
meaning of human rights. Indeed, the institutional and political meaning of human 
rights hinges on “the moral promise of equal respect for everybody”48. Following this 
line of argument, then, the moral requirement of equal respect for everybody would be 
translated in legal term through the normative concept of human dignity. “The idea of 
human dignity is the conceptual hinge that connects the morality of equal respect for 
everyone with positive law and democratic lawmaking in such a way that their interplay 
could give rise to a political order founded upon human rights”49. 
 I have vindicated the political account of human rights as a more adequate and 
correct model, even at the metatheoretical level, in order to account for the very concept 
of human rights. Nevertheless, I agree with Habermas and Valentini, among others
50
, 
that it is impossible to grasp the real meaning of the concept of human rights without 
presupposing that the actual practice of establishing and defending human rights stems 
from a concern for human dignity. Indeed, even the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights begins with a preamble that states: “Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity 
                                                 
46
 “A human right to X is tantamount to declaring that every society [and comparable social system] 
ought to be so organized that all its members enjoy secure access to X”, Pogge, 2000, p. 52. 
47
 “Consequently, the understanding of human rights must jettison the metaphysical assumption of an 
individual who would exist prior to all socialization and would, as it were, come into the world already 
equipped with innate rights”, Habermas, 1998, p. 97. 
48
 Habermas, 2010, p. 470. 
49
 Ivi, p. 469 (italics in the original). 
50
 See Habermas (2010), Valentini (2012), Donnelly (1999). 
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and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the 
foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world”51. This normative reference to 
moral values that underpin the human rights practice seems in contrast with the political 
account of human rights I have introduced and defended. However, I want to show that 
this contrast is merely apparent. In order to understand this argument, let me recall 
Rawls’ reply to a similar difficulty with regard to the determination of a strictly political 
theory of justice. According to Rawls, political philosophy is part of moral philosophy 
but is defined by its peculiar goals and content
52
. For this reason, when we are trying to 
justify political principles, we can introduce first order moral concepts, but the 
justificatory framework in which they are embedded is strictly political. In the same 
way, I believe that a view that claims that the whole normative meaning of human rights 
stems from the ongoing practice is irremediably weak, as it lacks the ability of 
criticizing the status quo in the light of independent normative criteria. Yet, the solution 
is not, on the other hand, to reduce the analysis about human rights to the first order 
moral reasoning that establishes which are the fundamental human interests that belong 
to every person qua human beings. The moral concern for human dignity underpins the 
formulation of human rights and provides us with a normative criterion for assessing the 
ongoing practice. Still, the full meaning of human rights can be grasped solely taking 
into consideration both the human dignity value and the ongoing practice for 
establishing an institutional framework in which such value is cashed out
53
.  
 In the previous section I claimed that human rights doctrine can be defined as 
political not just as its definitions stems from the analysis of the ongoing political 
practice. Rather, a fundamental “political” aspect of human rights practice is that it  
requires a public justification of such doctrine. Indeed, if a public justification is 
required within the domestic context with regard to the principles of justice, even more 
necessary would be a public justification of the practice of human rights in the contexts 
of a deeply pluralistic international arena. Therefore, I now want to assess if the 
requirement of public justifiability can be met by a paradigm of human rights that 
maintains the reference both to the institutional practice of human rights and to the 
normative value attached to human dignity as underpinning ideal. First of all, it is 
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 UDHR, UN, preamble.  
52
 See Rawls, 1993, p. 135. 
53
 “Human rights circumscribe precisely that part (and only that part) of morality which can be translated 
into the medium of coercive law and become political reality in the robust shape of effective civil rights”, 
Habermas, 2010, p. 470. 
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important to specify that this kind of justification, to be public, should not involve 
arguments that derive their validity from a specific and partisan – according to the plural 
context of worldviews in the international arena – doctrine of values or the good life. 
Therefore, the argument that stems from the recognition of the value of human dignity 
could not be foundational if interpreted as a first order moral reasoning that introduces 
completely practice-independent concepts. In line with this justificatory constraint, I 
hold that there is an intrinsic aspect we think of when referring to human dignity that is 
practice-dependent in the same exact way in which the determination of human rights 
concept is in part determined by the reference to an institutional framework. Following 
Habermas and Valentini, in fact, I hold that a definitory feature of human dignity is 
practice-dependent. Habermas has claimed that human dignity is that very concept that 
has filled the gap between the moral duty to equally respect every person and the legal 
concept of human rights
54
. Valentini, more technically, has highlighted that the value of 
human dignity requires “appropriate acknowledgement of human agency and its 
value”55. Then, this acknowledgment implies a mutual recognition of self-respect. This 
procedure of mutual recognition should be realized both by horizontal relationship 
among different persons and by a vertical relation between political institutions and 
citizens.  
 Since political institutions have a fundamental impact on our life
56
, then it is 
important to understand that the value of human dignity cannot be exhaustively 
articulated without referring to the way in which political institutions treat citizens and 
deal with their requests and needs. This account is consistent with the definition of 
human rights I have defended. Indeed, the fact that human rights express a peculiar 
human interest that should be protected against institutional actions or wrong political 
                                                 
54
 “Thus the legal recognition claimed by citizens reaches beyond the reciprocal moral recognition of 
responsible subjects; it has the concrete meaning of the respect demanded for a status that is deserved, 
and as such it is infused with the connotations of the ‘dignity’ that was associated in the past with 
membership in socially respected corporate bodies. At the same time, however, the universalized dignity 
that accrues to all persons equally preserves the connotation of a self-respect that depends on social 
recognition. As such a form of social dignity, human dignity also requires anchoring in a social status, 
that is, membership in an organized community in space and time. But in this case, the status must be an 
equal one for everybody”, Habermas, 2010, p. 472. 
55
 Valentini, 2012, p. 188. 
56
 In this regard, it is extremely interesting the genealogical analysis provided by Habermas (2010) for 
explaining the historical development of the legal concept of human rights. “First, the cumulative 
experiences of violated dignity constitute a source of moral motivations for entering into the historically 
unprecedented constitution making practices that arose at the end of the eighteenth century. Second, the 
status generating notion of social recognition of the dignity of others provides a conceptual bridge 
between the moral idea of the equal respect for all and the legal form of human rights”, p. 470. 
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practices is in line with an account of human dignity that refers to the need of human 
agency to be acknowledged by political institutions as well as by other fellow human 
beings. According to this interpretation of human dignity, such value is fully respected 
not just when people acknowledge, in horizontal relations, the equal respect due to other 
people, but requires as well that the institutional framework in which one person is 
embedded is outlined in a way that is respectful of human dignity.  
“We can make sense of our thinking of these abuses in terms of human-rights violations 
precisely by virtue of their specific dignity undermining character. Human-rights 
violations represent a lack of public recognition of one’s status as an inherently valuable 
being, and this is why they are particularly harmful to human dignity”57. 
 
 Following this definition of human dignity that logically implies a practice-
dependent aspect, it is now possible to assess if a public justification argument might be 
construed for justifying human rights. First of all, it is important to highlight that this 
definition of human dignity is helpful for understanding why the public justifiability of 
human rights doctrine is so important. Once that the fact of pluralism has been accepted 
as a characterizing aspect of contemporary societies, there are good normative reasons – 
and not just pragmatic reasons that look for stability – for claiming in favour of public 
justification. For the underlying principle of acknowledging human dignity requires that 
even the justification of human rights is provided through arguments that can be 
understood and accepted by people that hold extremely different worldviews. Let see 
how this public justification might be reached. 
 As I have already noted, very often different persons share a general idea of what 
human rights should be, even though they disagree on the concrete list of human rights  
or on the procedure for guaranteeing their observance
58
. This shared notion of human 
rights, although is an extremely rough intuition, it seem to be backed by an argument 
according to which the universality of human rights depends on the fact that such rights 
are “claimable” by everyone (especially as general concept), rather than on the fact that 
a single defined conception of human rights is supported by everyone. Theoretically 
speaking, it seem to me possible to claim that every person might share a rough 
intuition about the importance of the universal claimability of human rights. The 
                                                 
57
 Valentini, 2012, p. 189, (italics in the original). 
58
 Regarding this discussion, I think is important to recall the Rawlsian remark of the fact that very often 
there is a widespread agreement on the concept, but a plurality of interpretations of that concept. “Thus it 
seems natural to think of the concept of justice as distinct from the various conceptions of justice and as 
being specified by the role which these different sets of principles, these different conceptions, have in 
common”. Rawls, 1993, p. 5. 
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universal claimability of human rights reflects the “Janus-faced” structure of human 
rights, as the vindication of human rights expresses both a legal issue and a moral 
concern with regard to the recognition of equal dignity qua human beings
59
.  
 Since public justification of human rights cannot appeal to partisan or 
comprehensive values, we should find a way to guarantee the normative force to the 
human rights doctrine, without affecting the public justifiability requirement. In my 
opinion this standard can be met by a coherentist argument according to which for 
determining which conception of X is the most adequate for playing the role of public 
conception of X, we need to find the conception that best embodies the ideal of X as it 
can be extrapolated from the institutional practice and with reference to the doxastic set 
of beliefs held by individuals. Again, if we cannot appeal to a foundational argument 
that hinges on a first order moral reasoning apparatus, then we should begin from what 
we have, namely our ongoing practice of human rights and our considered judgments on 
them. Unlike the agreement approaches that maintain that the human rights practice is 
legitimate because an actual empirical convergence of worldviews on the validity of 
such practice could be reached, I claim that we should assess if the actual international 
practice that aims to the protection of human rights might be justified referring to the 
justificatory structure I have defended in the previous chapters. According to this 
model, at the nonideal level the practice of public justification cannot provide a 
conclusive justificatory argument in favour of a specific interpretation of a concept of 
justice. Indeed, there are epistemic reasons (i.e. nested inconclusiveness, doxastic 
presupposition) that suggest to focus the public justification on evaluative standards and 
on eligible set of valid alternatives rather than on the attempt to conclusively justify a 
particular conception of justice. I hold that the justification of the human rights practice 
is compatible with this paradigm. Indeed, a political account of human rights requires a 
                                                 
59
 Beitz (2003) argues for a justificatory structure of human rights in which it is possible to argue both for 
the strong connection between human rights and human dignity and for the fact that human rights practice 
must be a global concern. According to Beitz these two ideas must be taken together, in order to outline a 
correct and definitive account of human rights. Thus, we can see that the philosophical side of the 
description of the meaning of human rights might be an independent argument, but still should be 
understood within a context in which the concrete practice of human rights is the starting point of the 
whole argument. At page 46, Beitz concludes: “We begin with the observation that there is an 
international practice of human rights, and we ask some distinctively theoretical questions : What kinds of 
things are these human rights, why should we believe in them, and what follows if we do? But whereas 
present practice is the beginning, it need not be the end; in fact, it would be surprising if a critical theory 
of human rights did not argue for revisions in the practice - conceivably substantial ones. If so, however, 
one should expect this to be the conclusion of an argument that takes seriously the aspirations of the 
practice as we have it. To dismiss the practice because it doesn't conform to a received philosophical 
construction seems to me dogmatic in the most unconstructive way”. 
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justification that refers to two different arguments. One the one hand, it appeal to the 
legitimazing value that is attached to the established international practice of human 
rights. In this regard, it is important to recall Maffettone’s idea that the normative 
analysis of institutional political practices is able to grant a bottom-up legitimation of 
such practices thanks to the contextual support that such practice has received by 
citizens and by the reference to the work in progress democratic process that attempts to 
improve such practices in the light of new circumstances and rising challenges
60
. On the 
other hand, human rights are justified as fundamental interests that should be protected 
by political institutions and such intrinsic value attached to the concept of human rights 
stems from the concern for human dignity.  
 It is important to recall that public justifiability is a standard that a political account 
of human rights should meet in order to cope with the dilemma of liberalism. In order to 
be respectful of the intrinsic pluralism of contemporary multicultural societies and, at 
the same time, guaranteeing normative force to the justificatory procedure, the 
justification of human rights should appeal to arguments that could be endorsed by 
people that hold different comprehensive doctrines and worldviews. Thus, even the 
reference to human dignity as a value that informs human rights practice should respect 
the public justifiability constraint. 
 The legal aspects of human rights doctrine are expressed by the historical 
development of the ongoing international practice and they are justifiable through the 
legitimation argument that maintains that the historical development of a public culture 
of human rights plays a normative role. This bottom-up legitimatory procedure is 
consistent with the progressive convergence model introduced by Beitz. For according 
to this model it is reasonable to hope in a progressive convergence of different 
worldviews on the validity of the human rights ongoing practice
61
. This model 
maintains that in the light of a contextual establishment of public culture that endorses 
the validity of human rights practice, then it is reasonable to argue in favour of the 
emerging of a progressive reinterpretation of worldviews that would imply a public 
convergence on the value and authority of the concept of human rights. The moral 
aspects of human rights, instead, is related to the public recognition of the normativity 
attached to the requirement of respecting human dignity. The problem with this second 
                                                 
60
 See above, section 3.3. 
61
 It is worth noting that while analysing the possibility of achieving such progressive convergence, Beitz 
(2009, p. 120) speaks of an “aspirational view of human rights”. 
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aspect of the justification of human rights is that referring to the moral concept of 
human dignity could be extremely problematic, as the justification risks to be dismissed 
by a part of the audience as “partisan”. Disagreement arises with regard to the moral 
determination of what “human dignity” really means and about which are the correct 
political practices for addressing such issue. However, since the practice of human 
rights has already been established, the burden of the justification does not entirely lie 
on the moral argument that refers to human dignity. Rather, the procedure of 
justification begins referring to the procedure that has led to the establishment of an 
international practice of human rights. Then, it is reasonable to wonder which are the 
normative values that have been underpinning such practice. Where a naturalistic view 
grounds all the discussion about the validity of human rights on the determination of the 
specific set of human interests that they are supposed to protect; the political account of 
human rights highlights the relevance of human dignity, since such concept has already 
informed the actual development of the human rights practice. 
 A similar procedure is articulated by Rawls in PL when he claims that the political 
procedure for justifying a liberal theory of justice hinges on two values, namely equality 
and freedom. Still, the justification provided by Rawls does not involve a top-down 
argument that grounds the whole justificatory procedure on the moral assumptions that 
freedom and equality are two fundamental values. Rather, the public justification of 
liberalism shows how the very same history of liberal tradition has been developed – 
sometimes even implicitly and, of course, not always – in the light of these two 
underpinning values. In the same way, we can think of human dignity as articulated 
through a thin definition that does not involves many first order moral reasoning 
aspects. According to this model, people should not agree publicly on a specific and 
thick definition of human dignity. Rather, it is sufficient that they, starting from their 
different perspectives, recognize the intrinsic normativity attached to the ongoing 
practice of human rights and accept the reference to human dignity as valid in such 
context.  
 With regard to the ideal part of the theory – namely a section of the theory in which 
some idealizations are involved – I hold that the agreement on a general concept of 
human dignity can be reached in WRE by an international constituency of reasonable 
citizens. This WRE reflects the fact that reasonable people, once they have assessed the 
pro and cons of the ongoing practice of human rights, might realize that the thin 
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principle of human dignity that informs such procedure is consistent with their 
considered moral judgements about what should be required from a theory of human 
rights. According to this interpretation, reaching an overlapping consensus – through the 
justificatory instrument of WRE – on the value of a general concept of human rights is a 
fundamental aspect of the procedure for establishing a liberal account of international 
politics. Moreover, when in the second chapter, following Quong, I described the 
overlapping consensus as an agreement over some general organizing ideas that build 
up a loose normative framework through which is later on possible to produce a public 
deliberation on specific matters; I had in mind the possibility of including among the 
general organizing ideas the political concept of human rights. Indeed, the fact that 
human rights are such a general and well spread doctrine, that is also supported by an 
established international practice, makes it reasonable to claim in favour of the 
possibility that people that hold different comprehensive doctrines can adhere to such 
ideal and justify it in WRE – respecting therefore the public justifiability constraint. 
 Notwithstanding the validity of ideal procedure for justifying the human rights 
doctrine, it is fundamental to acknowledge that the disagreement rises not so much at 
the general level of conferring some normative validity to the general concept of human 
rights. Rather, disagreement across people and cultures rises when we try to specify the 
general requirement of respecting human rights into a determined lists of human rights 
to be defended and we assess actual institutions through the lens of a specific 
interpretation of such general concept of human rights. Recalling the terminology I have 
been using in the previous chapters, the disagreement on the contextual interpretation of 
the general concept of human rights is due to the fact that the public justification 
reached with regard to such concept does not provide us as well with an argument for 
determining the “best” interpretations of such concept. Instead, the agreement on a 
general concept of human rights provides the theory with a loose normative framework 
and an eligible set of valid interpretations that would be extremely useful – both from 
the normative and the pragmatic perspective – when the theory will be applied and will 
have to cope with disagreement among people about what are their expectations about 
human rights practice and about which is the best interpretation of the values that 
informs such practice.   
 This account of the justification of human rights doctrine is also consistent with the 
articulation of RA that I have introduced as important tool for coping with disagreement 
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within the nonideal part of the theory. Indeed, when actual citizens fight against each 
other for establishing a public interpretation of a concept or for determining a strategy 
for implementing a political principles, the conflict concerns the possibility of imposing 
one partisan interpretation as victorious over the others available. The goal that can be 
accomplished through the previous achievement of RA is that the conflict and 
disagreement might be restrained within a loose normative framework that does not 
allow disagreement to become foundational
62
, questioning even the general public 
criteria that are usually taken for granted. Naturally, RA does not provide us with an 
ultimate solution. Rather, RA is an agreement that constraints the public discussion to 
respect the criteria imposed by a loose normative framework. Which would be the 
outcome of the public discussion is unknown. Notwithstanding the fact that some 
people would be bothered by the fact that such proposal does not  provide a determinate 
solution for solving concrete cases of public disagreement, this work in progress and 
open-to-different-solutions framework is extremely liberal as passes the buck
63
 on the 
deep questions to the actual citizens and to the public discussion that they should yield 
in order to solve public conflicts. In the second part of this chapter, I will show the 
fundamental role that RA can play in the nonideal analysis of a concrete case of 
disagreement with regard to the possibility of extending a specific human right to a 
category of people that has until now been excluded from the enjoyment of such right.  
 
 
4.3  The Same-sex Marriage Case 
 
4.3.1 Two Arguments in Favour of Same-sex Couples Marriage 
 In the last two decades an important legal and political issue has provoked harsh 
public battle and has shown that the majority discriminatory power is one of the 
relevant features at stake when institutions try to extend a right to previously 
misrecognized minority. The case I want to discuss is the attempt to extend the right to 
marry to same-sex couples. I take this case as emblematic for different reasons. First of 
all, such case could be analysed referring both to the legal and the moral aspects that 
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 See above, section 2.4.3. 
63
 Quong (2010, ch. 8, pp. 221-255) has introduced this notion of “passing the buck” when he refers to 
political liberalism strategy of refuting to define its own theory of justice as ”true”, leaving space to the 
critical ability of every citizen to evaluate how political values integrate into the wider comprehensive 
doctrine she held in her doxastic system of beliefs. 
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constitutes the concept of right. Second, dealing with a concrete case helps me to show 
that even when people widely agree on the value of a specific right, in this specific 
instance on the validity of the right to marry, still they disagree on the correct 
interpretation of the concept they agree on (i.e. provide a unique and ultimate definition 
of “marriage”) and on the most correct procedure for implementing such right. Third, it 
is relevant to bring out that even when there are extremely sound reasons for supporting 
a revision of the actual practice, still political circumstances and weak motivation by a 
majority of people to engage themselves in a public deliberation on such matter can lead 
to a refutation of revising the practice and therefore in reaffirming the previous status 
quo. 
 The same-sex marriage case can be faced from a strictly legal perspective. Such 
modality is expressly investigated by those authors that refer to the USA legal system, 
as the USA Constitution as been articulated so as to reflect and cope with the 
Tocqueville insight about the tyranny of the majority
64
. According to this line of 
argument, it should be assessed if the extension of the right to marry involves a judicial 
review that can be determine by the Court regardless of the majority opinion
65
. The 
underlying idea is that even when the majority is not ready for accepting a revision of 
the status quo that will favour a group that until now has suffered an unequal treatment, 
still the right choice is to modify the legal system in order to be loyal to the democratic 
principles of equality and fairness
66
. The strictly legal arguments in favour of the 
extension of the right to marry to the same-sex couples stems from the recognition of 
the right to marry as a fundamental right. Once that such right has been defined as 
fundamental, then the legal issues is reframed within the equal protection paradigm
67
. 
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 See the Federalist Papers [1787-1788]. 
65
 Gerstmann (2004, ch. 2, pp. 14-47) exposes the three different standards of scrutiny that USA Supreme 
Court should meet in different case. “In attempting to protect legal equality, federal courts have focused 
much of their energy in dividing people into ‘classes’ that receive different levels of constitutional 
protection against governmental discrimination. ‘Suspected Classes’ are protected by ‘strict scrutiny’, 
‘quasi-suspected classes’ are protected by ‘intermediate scrutiny’, and others, such as gays and lesbian 
are protected by the lowest level of scrutiny”, (i.e. ‘rational basis scrutiny’), pp. xi, emphasis added. 
In this regard, Kory Schaff (2004) provides arguments for sustaining that sexual orientation is a category 
that  meet the criteria of suspect classification that the Court has established in order to determine which 
standards of scrutiny should be employed in the different cases.  
66
 The legal issues of judicial review with regard to the right to marry has started in USA with the  
Baehr case (1991–1999) decided by Hawaii Supreme Court. Then, two other famous cases are the Brause 
v. Bureau of Vital Statistics (1998) addressed by Alaska Supreme Court and Baker v. State of Vermont 
(2000) decided by Vermont Supreme Court. 
67
 The judicial review about the case of same-sex marriage has been trying to reframe the issue in term of 
the principle of equal protection that rules the allocation of a bundle of rights, instead of referring to the 
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Thus, acknowledging the right to marry as a fundamental one – a decision that is line 
with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights – implies many positive aspects. First 
of all, assuming this perspective avoids to have the same-sex couples’ requests labelled 
as “special rights request”. Second, determining the right to marry as a fundamental 
constrains the Court to assesses it through a more compelling standard. Third, referring 
to this right as fundamental allows to frame the same-sex couples’ claim in term of due 
equality instead of protection of difference. “The virtue of fundamental rights doctrine 
is that it promotes judicial protection of certain specific freedoms for unpopular groups 
and individuals while allowing democratic decision making for vast majority of 
issues”68. Indeed, such approach maintains that the right to marry is such a fundamental 
right that the principle of equality should be respected in spite of what the majority of 
people in the country might think about the case. This argument, therefore, hinges on 
the normative idea that even in democracy it is important to limit the political bargain, 
especially when the infringement of fundamental rights is at stake. According to this 
view, once that the democratic principles of equality and fairness has been established 
by a constitution, the Court duty is to enforce rights even when they are unpopular. 
Naturally, there are limits to the Court power and they should vary with regard to the 
prominence of the rights at stake. Indeed, there are cases in which the battle about the 
possible extension of a right to new groups or to new circumstances can be determined 
by the public deliberation and by the normal process of determining decisions through 
the political debate. Other times, instead, the rights at stake are so fundamental, that it is 
possible to prompt for a judicial decisions that challenge the traditional unequal 
treatment of minorities. “Civil rights, legal equality, and human dignity cannot be 
legitimately revoked by the majority; they exist as inalienable human rights not 
subjected to community approval”69. 
 This tension between judicial decisions and the public opinion is perfectly 
expressed in the same-sex marriage case. Indeed, there are sound legal reasons, 
                                                                                                                                               
principle of substantive due process that is led by the ideal of establishing a zone of protected privacy. 
See Gerstmann, 2004. 
68
 Gerstmann (2004, p. 141) provides us with a set of criteria for determining if a right is a fundamental 
one: “to determine whether a right is fundamental, the Court should consider whether it squares with 
precedent; whether it is inherently connected to other rights, whether government exercises monopoly 
power over it; and whether it runs afoul of the political question doctrine”. 
69
 Snyder, 2006, p. 7. 
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appealing to the principle of genuine legal equality
70
, according to which it is correct to 
extend the right to marry to same-sex couples
71
. Yet, legal litigation is still going on
72
 
and not so many countries have recognized the right to marry to same-sex couples 
equating such couples to opposite-sex couples. This difficulties in implementing and 
enforcing a correct legal principle are due to the public opinion resistance to modify 
traditional aspects of our societies that have been supported by the majority for 
centuries
73
. In this context, it is clear that legal litigation can push the social movement 
forward, challenging majority traditions and benefits through the legal process. I think 
that this “destabilizing” – for established social and political categories – role played by 
legal litigation is extremely important. Yet, many thinkers highlight the difficulties are 
usually encountered when Court decisions are running afoul of majority opinion. The 
Court should rule in the light of what is required by the law. Still, the public opinion 
cannot be dismissed as biased and irrelevant. Rather, it is important to promote a fruitful 
exchange of reasons and explanations among Court organisms, politicians and citizens; 
as both citizens and political organisms should be placed in the position of 
understanding the rationale of Court decision and therefore avoiding to suffer such 
decision as a paternalistic imposition. Moreover, the Court has a weak implementation 
capacity and therefore the legal litigation is not sufficient for achieving a stable solution 
of hard cases. The legal litigation is a fundamental aspect of a wider process for 
granting equality and full citizenship to any member of a society, but judicial review 
should go along with a political dialogic process that involves both citizens and political 
institutions and educational procedures designed to support social transformations and a 
wider acceptance of minorities. Indeed, law is not an independent variable for assessing 
                                                 
70
 In the case of USA Constitution this legal argument grounded in the protection of equality hinges on 
the Fourteenth Amendment that states the Equal Protection Clause. Regarding this feature of the 
Fourteenth Amendment Cass Sunstein (1994b, pp. 272-273) claims that it provides us with an anticaste 
principle: “The motivating idea behind an anticaste principle, broadly speaking Rawlsian in character, is 
that without very good reasons, social and legal structures ought not to turn differences that are irrelevant 
from the moral point of view into social disadvantages. They certainly should not be permitted to do so if 
the disadvantage is systemic. A difference is morally irrelevant if it has no relationship to individual 
entitlement or desert. Race and sex are certainly a morally irrelevant characteristic in this sense”. 
71
 According to Snyder (2006) the extension of the civil right to marry to everybody it a matter of 
principle, as marriage is a civil right that must be extended to all people. 
72
 See for example the legal battle that arises in California after the California Supreme Courts has ruled 
in the In re Marriage Cases (2008) that same-sex couples have a constitutional right to marry. In order to 
contrast such decision, a ballot propositions was presented, the Proposition 8, that states that “only 
marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California”. Such proposition was voted 
by the majority of California’s citizens in the November 2008 state elections. 
73
 For a specific analysis on the impact of public opinion on the possibility that state recognizes same-sex 
marriage, see Lewis and Seong Soo Oh (2008) and Lewis and Gossett (2008). 
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social changes and improvements with regard to the actual implementation of the ideals 
of fairness and equality. Rather, the efficacy of rights depends on social, cultural and 
institutional circumstances
74
. For example, it has been observed that the political 
system, following harsh majority opposition, can push for backlash actions
75
 against the 
Court decisions, as political institutions and politicians see the Court decision as a threat 
against the status quo and the traditional “meaning” of relevant political concepts76.  
 I have claimed that there are extremely compelling legal reasons for supporting the 
request of extending the right to marry to same-sex couples. The legal line of argument 
is fundamental, as the political meaning of rights hinges on a legal account of them. 
However, I want to show that it is also important to dwell on the political arguments – 
regarding what political institutions ought to do - in favour of the extension to marry to 
same-sex couples
77
. Indeed, marriage has a social meaning, and it is especially the 
revision of such social and moral meanings what scares and troubles the majority. 
Beyond the legal act of ruling on a specific case, the fundamental issue at stake, when a 
minority claims an extension of a right in order to be allowed to enjoy it or to obtain 
protection from the state against majority unfair protection of the status quo, is the fight 
in favour or against reframing the social meaning of fundamental moral and political 
concepts. According to this line of argument, the strictly legal analysis of these hard 
cases is not enough, as an exhaustive account of these public issues should involve an 
analysis of the symbolic and indirect aspects of the litigation.  
 Same-sex marriage case perfectly expresses the fundamental role played by the 
symbolic aspects in the political deliberation over the matter. In fact, same-sex couples’ 
request challenges the traditional view on family and in the case that their claim were 
                                                 
74
 For an exhaustive analysis on the value of legal litigation as booster for social and political progresses, 
see Dupuis (2002) and Goldberg and Hiller (2002). 
75
 As good example of backlash see “The Defence of Marriae Act” (DOMA) a federal law enacted on 
1996 and voted by the two houses of Congress by a large majority and that denied federal benefits to 
marriage people of the same-sex, as after such act no states or political subdivision were obliged to 
recognize a same-sex marriage from another state. 
76
 Cass Sustein is extremely aware of such difficulties in implementing Court decisions. For this reasons, 
he argues in favor of judicial minimalism; an approach of legal review that focuses more on determining 
the single case at stake, instead of making decisions with broad effect on a wide range of cases. Judicial 
minimalism claims that is fundamental to leave space to public discussion and that, therefore, Court 
should leave as much as possible as undecided, determining what is right but not also establishing why is 
right. See Sunstein 1995 and 1996. 
77
 For a good development of the argument that defends the validity of same-sex marriage thanks to 
political arguments that hinge on the recognition of the political principle of equality, see Wellington 
(1995) and Wedgwood (1999). “So the law excluding same-sex couples from marriage are, prima facie, a 
violation of the principle of equality, and hence an unjust form of discrimination. So long as there is not a 
sufficient evidence that allowing same-sex marriages would have uncontroversially harmful effects, the 
refusal to allow such marriages must be presumed to be seriously unjust”, Wedgwood, 1999, p. 241.  
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accepted as valid, then the public meaning of marriage will drastically being modified,  
running afoul of the morality of the majority. This modification of traditional 
interpretations of publicly relevant concepts or practices is such a fundamental issue as 
it involves an enlargement of the number of the members of the polis that obtain a 
symbolic recognition as full citizens. Within liberal democracies, the public space is 
defined as a neutral and impartial space that should not be partisan and hostage of one 
party. Yet, historically established majorities do not see their positional power in 
determining the social meanings of political and moral concepts as an unfair advantage. 
Majorities accept minorities claims with difficulty, since reframing the public space via 
re-interpretations of rights and by modifying political practices in order to make them 
more equal involves an enlargement of the paradigm of “normality”. Even when the 
distribution of material goods is not at stake, the struggle for determining who has the 
power of revising the symbolic meaning of fundamental political concepts could be 
extremely hard
78
. As a matter of fact, the public recognition of identity differences by 
the political institutions involves a re-articulation of the public space in a more equal 
and less sectarian space. The same-sex marriage case is a perfect example of such 
dynamic. Indeed, in the case that the same-sex marriage were accepted and legalized, 
then such decision would involve a radical revision of the concept of “marriage” and 
consequently an enlargement in the set of alternatives that constitutes the “normality”79 
as symbolically recognized within the public context of public space. 
 Majority members interpret such kind of claims purported by a minority, as the 
same-sex couples’ request, as unjustified aggressions against the public space itself, 
without ever noticing (or perhaps refusing to note) that the status quo is already 
culturally mediated by stereotypes regarding who belongs to the polis by full right and 
who, instead, is not directly entitled to it. Since members of the majority usually fail to 
recognize the double standards tendencies provoked by the symbolic appraisal of the 
public space, they often interpret minorities requests as unjustified pressures for 
obtaining special rights or undue privileges. Hence, a fundamental aspect for solving 
such dynamics is to find the correct way for showing to the members of the majority, 
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 For a broad articulation of the distribution of public spaces in democracy, see Liveriero, 2010. 
79
 It is worth noting that many criticisms against the legal recognition of same-sex marriage involves an 
argument that refers to the idea that a legal recognition would involve a sort of stamp-of approval for 
same-sex couples that it would be against the neutrality constrain that works as standard for political 
institutions. Naturally, this kind of argument is affected by a double standard, as nobody has never been 
bothered by the fact that institutions were supporting the legal right to marry for opposite-sex couples. 
See Schaff (2004). 
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who feel that they are members of the polis by default, that there are both political and 
legal good reasons for reframing public space in a way that might offset the 
disadvantages historically suffered by minorities. In order to establish a more inclusive 
and fair public space it is necessary to establish a normative dialog among citizens, both 
members of the majority and of the minorities, and political and legal institutions, as 
“first class“ citizens (who belongs to the majority by default) acceptance of new 
identities and group within the range of the “normal” alternatives is not effortlessly. 
Therefore, it is important to insist upon the attempt to establish a correct dialogic 
procedure that could highlight the intrinsic normative reasons that back up the legal and 
political corrective procedures. 
 This survey on the symbolic meaning of public space has been helpful for 
understanding that the legal battle in favour of same-sex marriage implies fighting for 
full citizenship, namely equal visibility and equal membership within the public space. 
At this point, should be clear that the legitimation of same-sex couples’ request does not 
solely stems from legal reason (e.g. the appeal to the Fourteenth Amendment for USA 
legal system), rather hinges on good political reasons as well. Indeed, the democratic 
ideal of full citizenship reflects the attempts of meeting the standard of respecting 
human rights as concrete instantiation of the moral principle of human dignity. In order 
for human dignity to be respected, every person should be included within the public 
space as a full a member. Majority’s arguments in this case claim that right now, in 
contemporary democracies, same-sex couples are free to practice, even publicly, their 
favourite form of intimacy and that therefore they are not discriminated. However, as 
Galeotti has perfectly pointed out in a paper on this issue
80
, full membership does not 
simply require to be “tolerated” within the public space as second-class citizens. Rather, 
full membership calls for a full enjoyment of civil rights as long as such enjoyment has 
been historically granted by default to the majority of citizen. The misrecognition of 
same-sex couples as full members of the public space is an outcome of the long history 
of public invisibility that homosexuals have suffered and of the attempt, by the majority, 
to maintain the control over the positional power for determining the public standards of 
“normality” that articulated the public arena. In this regard, the extension of the right to 
marriage to same-sex couples would not constitute an unnecessary modification of an 
established practice in order to favour a minority that is already tolerated and whose 
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equal dignity is recognized in the public space
81
. On the contrary, extending the right to 
marriage to same-sex couples is the only correct way for granting them the full 
enjoyment of the status of equal citizens. Indeed, even in the section focused on the 
articulation of the political meaning of human rights, I dwelled on the fact that a specific 
feature of the recognition of human dignity is determined by the political recognition of 
such dignity. According to this argument, respecting human dignity all the way down 
requires not just private correct relations among human beings; rather it is necessary to 
build up a normatively correct political and institutional framework. Consequently, the 
determination of the costs of access to the public space as “full citizen” is a fundamental 
aspect of the attempt to respect human dignity. If for some members of the society the 
access to the public space is more costly, as they have to hidden some of their peculiar 
characteristics, or to renounce to the full enjoyment of some rights, then the ideal of 
equal recognition of human dignity is dismissed.  
“Majority cannot take away the liberty for others to marry while retaining it for 
themselves”82. 
 I have highlighted the fundamental role played by the symbolic recognition of 
minorities as full member of the polis showing that the legal recognition of specific 
rights is often not enough for granting actual equality. Consequently, I hold that 
addressing the same-sex marriage case through the second-best option of providing a 
system of legal recognition of partnerships outside marriage is not enough
83
. Even 
though the legal partnership or civil unions institution will provide to same-sex couples 
the same amount of rights and advantages granted by marriage; still this solution will 
completely dismisses the symbolic aspects of the issue
84
. Indeed, such solution would 
avert any re-interpretation of the concept of marriage, reaffirming the status quo and the 
traditional morality as an undisputable feature of our society. Furthermore, the majority 
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 Some arguments against the extension of the rights to marry to same-sex couples claim that same-sex 
couples are claiming for the recognition of a special rights that would infringe the liberal ideal of 
neutrality. 
82
 Gerstmann, 2004, p. 172.  
83
 Some theorists claim in favour of granting to same-sex couples the right to the legal recognition of 
partnership instead that the right to marry in the light of a “slippery slope” argument . According to this 
argument, le legalization of same-sex marriage will lead to allow polygamy, incestuous marriages and 
child marriages as well. Analysing this issue will led me too far away from the purposes of this chapter. 
For a deep analysis of this issue, I refer to Eskridge (1996) and March (2010). 
84
 Here, in highlighting the relevance of symbolic recognition, I follow Galeotti (2008). However, her 
arguments are developed within the normative framework of tolerance as recognition, while here I am 
dealing with this issue from the perspective of the justification of same-sex marriage as a fundamental 
right. 
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would preserve its positional power and same-sex couples would have to accept legal 
partnership as the “best” solution, as they cannot dare to ask for a full equality that 
implies – as necessary step – the recognition of the legitimacy of same-sex couples 
marriage. 
“None of the options currently available to same-sex couples - ‘commitment ceremonies’ with 
sympathetic clergymen, private contracts, or ‘registered domestic partnership’- has a social meaning of 
this kind; none of this options has is a familiar and widely understood as marriage. As a result, these 
options will be less effective than marriage for couples who want to affirm their commitment in a way 
that community will readily understand. […] In effect, they need to be able to say that they are married. 
Suppose that same-sex unions had a different name - as it might be, ‘quarriage’. There will presumably be 
many fewer same-sex quarriages than opposite-sex marriages; so the term ‘quarriage’ would be much less 
familiar and widely understood than the term ‘marriage’, and for this reason ‘quarriage’ would be less 
effective at fulfilling this serious desire than marriage”
 85
. 
 
 To conclude, it is important to re-state that the extension of the right to marry to 
same sex-couples can be backed up by the reference to two fundamental arguments. 
First of all, there are sound legal arguments that, following the “fundamental right” 
strategy, show that law should enforce rights whose enjoyment grants equal treatment 
before the law for every citizen. Second, the legitimation of same-sex marriage can be 
defended appealing to the democratic ideals of equality and respect for human dignity. 
Indeed, once that the fundamental role played by symbolic recognition has been made 
explicit, then there are sound reasons for justifying the legitimation of same-sex 
marriage as the only fair way for granting equal opportunity to same-sex couples to 
pursue their ideal of the good life and, meanwhile, to become full members of the 
society sharing with the established majority the public space as fellow – and equal – 
citizens. 
 
4.3.2 Symbolic Public Space and Concept Negotiation 
 In the previous section I investigated the possibility of justifying the extension of 
the right to marry to same-sex couples referring to two specific lines of argument. The 
first hinges on the legal practice of judicial review, while the second derives its validity 
from the reference to the democratic ideal of fairness and recognition of equal dignity of 
human beings. I am persuaded by the validity of such arguments, still it is true that the 
extension of the right to marry to same-sex couples is still extremely criticized and the 
countries that are trying to support such extension are facing a very harsh public debate 
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on the matter
86
. These contextual difficulties can be explained by the reference to the 
epistemic arguments I have introduced in order to explain why the justificatory 
procedure should be different with regard to the ideal and nonideal circumstances. 
Naturally, the debate and conflict that are relate to same-sex marriage case regard the 
nonideal realm. Even if I have claimed, following Rawls, that it is possible to argue in 
favour of a bottom-up justificatory procedure that refers to the legitimacy recognized to 
the democratic process itself, yet it is hard to sustain that every citizen is aware of 
normative constraints she should abide by when the ideal conditions are abandoned. In 
this regard, I have introduceds a new concept, reflect agreement, in order to transfer to 
the nonideal context some elements discussed within the ideal paradigm. On the one 
hand, overlapping consensus is an agreement over some organizing ideas that 
constitutes the correct pre-condition to the ideal procedure of justification of a liberal 
and strictly political theory of justice. On the other hand,  RA illustrates the attempt to 
grant a loose normative framework within which embedding the public, nonideal, 
deliberation over concrete political matters. As a matter of fact, western liberal 
democracies, even with many flaws and inconsistencies, have already been established 
and people stably live and exchange reasons among each other within this institutional 
context. Consequently, contemporary conflicts arise with regard to the new 
interpretations or modification of already established Constitutions and system of rights, 
rather than on the possibility of justifying a throughout deliberation over every 
grounding aspect involved in establishing a theory of justice. Therefore, RA stresses the 
fact that citizens, that already conduct a life within a democratic society, should be able 
to recognize the validity of a set of principles and regulative ideals in order to 
consistently enjoy the right to be a citizen. Indeed, I believe that the actual dialogic 
practice that incurs among citizens and political institutions, if conducted in the right 
way, could result in demonstrating that the very same citizens, through their claims, are 
expressing adherence to a certain loose normative framework that is working on the 
background. That is, the analysis of specific claims by minorities toward political 
institutions already reflect the fact that the minority’s members might be carriers of 
certain ideals about political society itself. If one believes of being entitled (by right) to 
fight for the recognition of her identity, not only in terms of a public acquiescence for 
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private individualistic differences, but via a public re-framing of the public space, then 
it means that individuals who raise such claims believe that democratic societies have 
particular obligations towards their citizens. In this regard, if a citizen struggles for the 
public recognition of her identity (or for a specific need) calling for the normative fact 
that such recognition is “due” and publicly justifiable within a democratic context, then 
the same citizen has demonstrated that she agree (at least implicitly) on a loose 
normative framework that informs her public requests
87
. According to this account, it is 
the very same dynamic of public negotiation, if conducted in the right way, to bind 
citizens to respect some evaluative standards. As a matter of fact, when citizens directly 
claims for an action from the political institution for amending a previous situation of 
injustice, this political claim reflects the confidence of getting a positive answer. 
Essentially, they are declaring that they believe that democratic political institutions can 
indeed respond properly to their requests. Consequently, the normative principles 
underlying democratic institutions are recognized, at least implicitly, by those 
advancing claims for amending previous injustice and making the public space a more 
inclusive locus
88
. 
 Notwithstanding this compelling argument, the reality is extremely different from 
such an ideal description. Even citizens that take advantages from the democratic 
context in which they happen to live are ready to take up an illiberal stance if such 
position favours their positional conditions instead of those of a minority. Of course 
such inconsistencies are not due solely to cynic calculus. Rather, very often citizens do 
not realize the unfairness or illegitimacy of some positions that they hold. For this 
reason, again, is fundamental that a multilogical
89
 dialogue is established among 
citizens (horizontal relation) and among all citizens and institutions (vertical relation)
90
. 
However, establishing such a normative committing dialogue is extremely difficult and 
very often people are not willing to submit the background theories and comprehensive 
principles they hold to a revisionary process in order to make them consistent with the 
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 “The shared belief that is produced, or even just reinforced, between speaker and hearer by the 
intersubjective recognition of validity claim raised in a speech act implies a tacit acceptance of 
obligations relevant for action; to this extent, such acceptance creates a new social facts”, Habermas, 
1996, p. 147 (italics in the original). 
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 For a broad analysis of these issues, see Galeotti, 2002 and 2010. 
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 See Moodod, 2010, p. 10. 
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 Kymlicka (2007, p. 96), in this regard, speaks about a process of citisenisation: “The task for all liberal 
democracies has been to turn this catalogue of uncivil relations into relationships of liberal-democratic 
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political framework they contextually support. Same-sex marriage case, again, is a 
perfect example of such lack of consistency between the legitimation recognized to the 
democratic system and the individual refutation of abide by the normative framework 
that informs such democratic system. Extending the right to marry to same-sex couples 
is seen by the vast part of the majority as a quasi-obscene request, as it involves a 
radical modification of the interpretation of one of the historically established dogma of 
the traditional morality, namely the definition of marriage as a moral and legal bound 
between a man and woman in order to constitute a family and – very often – procreate. 
The troubles provoked by the request of modifying this model, in order to make it more 
inclusive, expresses the negative aspects of a coherentist paradigm of reasoning. Indeed, 
even though I have highlighted the fundamental revisionary energy that is intrinsic to a 
justificatory model that is coherentist instead that foundational, it is also true that 
coherentism might produce as a side effect, especially at the individual level, a general 
positive bias toward the status quo. In this regard, citizens that belong to the majority – 
in the case of the example we are dealing with, heterosexual citizens – should be 
correctly motivated, by justice-driven reasons and not just for pragmatic and political 
calculus, to revise some important aspects of the background theories they hold in their 
doxastic sets of beliefs. Some people view this request of modifying some aspects of 
their background theories as an illegitimate claim and are ready to face it, re-stating the 
intrinsic validity of their own interpretation/determination of the issue at stake. Of 
course this tendency of restating the validity of the status quo is more dangerous, and at 
the same time more likely to happen, when the majority’s monopoly of the public space 
is put under pressure by a minority claim that is recognized as legitimate by a legal or 
political institution. 
 At the nonideal level, when the idealization is undue, it is fundamental that citizens 
can agree on a loose general normative framework that will allow a fair procedure for, 
later on, addressing concrete cases and conflicts respecting some normative constraints. 
This role, in my picture, is played by RA. I defined this latter as the agreement that 
actual citizens reach, sometimes even implicitly, on some organizing ideas around 
which the notion of a liberal democracy has been built up. Naturally, the agreement on 
such organizing ideas does not provide an ultimate solution to the conflicts or a 
definitive articulation of the victorious interpretation of the fundamental political 
concepts. Rather, RA is a shared agreement on a loose framework and therefore actual 
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disagreement will still arise with regard to the concrete interpretation of such organizing 
ideas. Yet, RA plays an extremely relevant role, for it is impossible to believe that 
citizens could be motivated to revise their background theories if they do not recognize 
a normative commitment toward some democratic ideals. Without achieving a minimal 
agreement on some normative standards or general procedural principles, it is 
impossible to argue in favour of a public dialogue among citizens and institutions. Even 
without hoping to reach – at the nonideal level – the ideal conditions depicted by 
deliberative democracy models, it is however important to assess the existence of shared 
evaluative standards that can be employed both by the citizens and by political 
institutions. According to this model, legal review can be interpreted as one of the 
method that promotes a re-interpretation of the organizing ideas in order to cope with 
contextual modifications of political circumstances and new claims by the ongoing 
political society
91
. Since such organizing ideas establishes a loose normative 
framework, they should be interpreted in order to be applied to concrete cases. Not 
necessarily the interpretation should always be the same. Again, as I claimed in the 
previous chapters, the nested inconclusiveness is a stable feature of our moral and 
political reasoning. Therefore, we should look for a stable agreement, that I call RA, 
among citizens, over a general normative framework that encloses an eligible set of 
political conceptions, or more specifically, of available interpretations of the general 
concepts and ideas. Besides an agreement over general organizing ideas, RA should 
focus as well on determining an evaluative normative standard that could work as a 
filter for assessing the validity of the political procedures. According to this picture, 
when people maintain that it is correct to refer to human rights doctrine both as a 
political concept that can be publicly justifies and as one of the normative benchmarks 
of contemporary liberal democracies, then arguing in favour of establishing a RA on 
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 I believe that Rawls (1993, p. 238) holds a similar view, with regard to the public role played by the 
Supreme Court in USA, when he states: “One idea of an amendment is to adjust basic constitutional 
values to changing political and social circumstances, or to incorporate into the constitution a broader and 
more inclusive understanding of those values”. 
Moreover, Cass Sunstein (1996) has developed an interesting theory coupling both political theory and 
legal review practice. According to Sunstein, a viable strategy for avoiding indeterminacy is to look for 
an incomplete theorized agreement. “Participants in legal controversies try to produce incompletely 
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abstract explanations than are necessary to decide the case. When they disagree on an abstraction, they 
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such organizing ideas is not a too idealistic commitment. Naturally, assuming RA as a 
starting point does not imply that conflicts and disagreements can be avert. RA simply 
guarantees that political conflicts might be managed through the reference to shared 
normative evaluative standards and appealing to the same organizing ideas, even when 
such ideas are interpreted in different ways
92
. For example, one thing is to deal with 
citizens that do not recognize the validity of same-sex couples’ claim on marriage, as 
they argue that homosexuality is immoral and that therefore any public recognition of 
such practice should be banned for moral reasons. Another thing is to debate about this 
issue when both the proponents and the opponents share a commitment toward some 
normative standards – such as reciprocal respect, recognition of equality before the law 
and requirement of restrain oneself from stating political arguments that are grounded in 
one’s own specific comprehensive doctrines. Again, starting the political deliberation 
from an already achieved RA would guarantee that citizens and political institutions 
will accepts reasonable constraints as valid and legitimate. Of course, this adherence to 
a RA model is work in progress, as citizens sometimes agree on it implicitly; other 
times instead they dismiss it, since revising their background theories on specific 
concepts seems to them too costly. Hence, we can describe the same-sex marriage case 
as a circumstance in which many citizens, even citizens that usually are willing to agree 
on the general validity of the organizing ideas justified in RA, do not see the compelling 
normative reasons for revising their interpretation of the marriage practice. Therefore, 
the fundamental role that both the political institutions and the legal system can play is 
to publicly recognize the normative reasons that underpin the requests of extending the 
right to marry to same-sex couples
93
. In this regard, a correct deliberative procedure 
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 “Because of their abstract character, basic rights need to be spelled out in concrete terms in each 
particular case. In the process, lawmakers and judges often arrive at different results in different cultural 
contexts; today this is apparent, for example, in the regulation of controversial ethical issues, such as 
assisted suicide, abortion, and genetic enhancement. It is also uncontroversial that, because of this need 
for interpretation, universal legal concepts facilitate negotiated compromises. Thus, appealing to the 
concept of human dignity undoubtedly made it easier to reach an overlapping consensus, for example 
during the founding of the United Nations, and more generally when negotiating human rights agreements 
and international legal conventions, and when adjudicating international legal disputes between parties 
from different cultures”, Habermas, 2010, p. 467. 
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would involve a “concept negotiation”94 in which different alternatives are depicted 
and evaluated assessing their adherence to the normative evaluative standards that 
people have legitimated via RA and the contextual circumstances in which they should 
gain support from actual citizens. Again, this concept negotiation is a work in progress 
procedure and positive outcomes, both from the perspective of justice and stability, are 
not granted. Still, I hold that if an actual RA over a normative evaluative set of 
standards and about the political legitimacy of some organizing ideas is established, 
then the concept negotiations can provide good results
95
.  
 To recapitulate the arguments advanced in this section, let me briefly articulate the 
most common arguments pushed against the extension of the right to marry to same-sex 
couples
96
. I will introduce such arguments and show that all of them would be 
inconsistent with the organizing ideas and the evaluative standards that supposedly 
would be justified in a RA stage of the public procedure for the justification of a 
political normative framework.  
a. The first argument against the extension of the right to marry to same-sex couples 
hinges on the claim that the concept of marriage has a definitive and not negotiable 
definition. According to this argument, it is logically inappropriate to ask for an 
extension of the right to marry to same-sex couples as, by definition, marriage is the 
legal and symbolic recognition of a long-term union between a man and a woman. 
According to this reply against same-sex couples, a descriptive argument implements a 
normative idea about the right definition of marriage. This argument is extremely 
appealing for the members of the majority, since it refers to the supposedly superiority 
of majority’s standards with regard to the determination of fundamental political 
concepts. However, I have already sustained that there are sound reasons, that appeal to 
                                                                                                                                               
variant thereof. In doing this it is expected that the justices may and do appeal to the political values of the 
public conception whenever the constitution itself expressly or implicitly invokes those values, as it does, 
for example, in a bill of rights guaranteeing the free exercise of religion or the equal protection of the 
laws. The court's role here is part of the publicity of reason and is an aspect of the wide, or educative, role 
of public reason” (p. 236, italics in the original). 
94
 I use here a concept introduced by Roberto Casati (2011) in his attempt to describe the first role played 
by philosophy into the society, namely that of producing and ruling the historic and contextual procedure 
of “concept negotiation”. “My position with regard to the general role of philosophy is that philosophy, as 
a theory, does not look for the truth of the world directly; rather explores the various alternatives that 
allow us to reframe the world in ways that are fruitful from the negotiation perspective”, Casati, p. 158 
(translation from Italian by the author). 
95
 “Fair bargain, then, does not destroy the discourse principle but rather indirectly presupposes it”, 
Habermas, 1996, p. 167. Habermas uses the term “bargain” for referring to a public deliberative practice 
that I define here as negotiation. I think that, a part from a different terminology, my position on 
negotiation is quite close to the bargain notion presented by Habermas. 
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 For a deep analysis of this arguments, see Eskridge (1996), Gerstmann (2004) and Galeotti (2008). 
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the symbolic meaning of public space, according to which it is against the liberal and 
democratic ideal of recognition of equal human dignity to allow the majority to 
determined who are first-order citizens referring solely to historically established 
standards, since such standards reflect the positional power enjoyed by the majority 
itself. In this regard, Snyder claims that: “tradition does not justify continued 
injustice”97. 
b. A second argument, on the same line of the previous one, refers to the religious roots 
of marriage, therefore claiming that a same-sex marriage is not an option at stake, since 
it is against the natural and intrinsic meaning of marriage as established by the dominant 
morality. This kind of argument can be faced referring to the fact that legitimated 
political decisions – and interpretation of fundamental social and political concepts – 
cannot refer to partisan comprehensive doctrines or traditions, even when such doctrines 
or traditions were backed up by the majority of citizens.  
c. A further objection against same-sex marriage refers to the idea the extending such 
right to same-sex couples will involve a stamp-of-approval toward the homosexual 
practice by the government. However, such argument is hostage of a double standards, 
as it implies that since heterosexual marriages are socially acceptable by default, then 
the legal recognitions of such unions does not involves any positive approval of such 
practice, while recognizing same-sex marriage will involve something more, a non-
neutral moral approval of such unions. However, same-sex couples are not claiming for 
special rights, rather they are asking for the equal opportunity to profit from legal and 
economic benefits – and to enjoy the symbolic meaning -  that derive from marriage as 
much as it happens for opposite-sex couples. 
d. Another argument against the legitimation of same-sex marriages describes the right 
to marry as an instrumental right focused primarily in the procreation. According to this 
line of argument, procreation would be a fundamental definitory feature of marriage 
legal practice. Again, even this argument involves a double standard, as many opposite-
sex couples get married and do not have children. Think, for example, of opposite-sex 
couples that get married at an old age or people that are infertile. Since opposite-sex 
couples do not need either to show the ability or the intention to procreate in order to get 
married, it does not seem right to describe procreation as a condition sine qua for 
justifying marriage when at stake are the right to marry of same-sex couples. 
                                                 
97
 Snyder, 2006, p. 100. 
PhD Dissertation in Political Theory – XXV Cycle                                 PhD Candidate: Federica Liveriero  
Pag. 231 
 
e. Finally, a less compelling argument involves a strictly pragmatic analysis according 
to which same-sex couples movements are wrong in working on a target too far. 
Following this pragmatic analysis, some people propose that same-sex couples work for 
obtaining the recognition of same-sex civil unions, averting the more complicated issue 
– and extremely more destabilizing for the majority’s “normal” standards – of 
modifying the marriage practice
98
. I agree that from a strictly pragmatic perspective this 
strategy might be more efficient. Yet, I believe that there are extremely compelling 
reasons of justice for refuting such argument. Indeed, civil unions would be shaped in 
the light of the legal benefits that married couples enjoy from the legal institution of 
marriage. If this is the case, and at the end civil union will end for being a “civil copy” 
of the marriage, why should same-sex couples just ask for the recognition of their union 
as a partnership instead that as a legal marriage? I hold that it is not just relevant to 
assess what one party can obtain thanks to a political strategy. Rather, it is also 
important to focus on the underpinning reasons and justifications that have led to the 
legal decision. Here, I believe that there are important normative reasons against the 
pragmatically “less ambitious” solution of looking for the recognition of civil unions, 
instead that of same-sex marriage. First of all, accepting the civil unions solution will 
have a very important symbolic meaning, as it will re-state the fact that homosexuality 
is not part of the set of normal alternatives within the public space. Second, recognizing 
same-sex couples marriage will potentiate the inclusive process, making same-sex 
couples able to enjoy the legal rights that belong to first-order citizens by default.  
 To sum up this analysis on same-sex marriage case, I want to stress that political 
debates and conflicts should be assessed following two normatively distinct, though 
complementary, perspectives: 
 a normative analysis that describe and frame the issue at stake in the light of the 
normative ideals and evaluative standards around which liberal democracies have 
been established and legitimated; 
 and a more dialogical and contextual perspective that focuses on the actual practice  
of negotiation that involves political institutions and citizens. 
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 Another extremely important issue connected to this one is the fact that the legal recognition of same-
sex couples marriage will involve extending to same-sex couples the right of adoptions. I do not want to 
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 Whether public actions proceed top-down (decisions by institutions) or bottom up 
(via citizens’ requests), it is important to draw a line between these two perspectives. As 
a matter of fact, even when negotiations occur correctly, according to justice-oriented 
reasons, the outcomes are not always entirely satisfactory (and vice versa). In this 
regard, it is important to distinguish between the potential outcomes of a negotiation 
and the reasons that underlie it. Indeed, what should be considered as most relevant are 
precisely the underpinning reasons of justice that drives institutions and citizens in the 
attempt to reframe the political domain in a more equal and fair public space. The 
relevant justice-driven reasons, for being legitimate, should be derived from the 
normative framework justified at the RA stage. According to this account, promoting 
negotiations supported by good reasons and by a fair dialogical dimension not only 
allows justice to develop, but fosters the stability of the polis as well. In this regard, the 
negotiating process, even when is conducted in nonideal conditions, if reflects a 
previous shared agreement on some organizing ideas and a convergence on evaluative 
standards, can produce political solutions that can be consistent with the democratic and 
liberal ideals. Once that it has been shown that it is possible to reach satisfying solutions 
about public and political issues even when ideal conditions are not attained, it is then 
possible to promote a work in progress deliberative process in which negotiations are 
allowed. Such deliberative process, if correctly cashed out, might be able to grant a 
positive attitude toward public debates by citizens instead of exacerbating the reasons of 
conflicts. Furthermore, examples of historical good political negotiations (e.g. the 
abortion case) will potentiate the educative role that political institutions can play, since 
such good examples will show that two debating parties can at least share the terms of 
the negotiations and that such starting point is fundamental in order to achieve a 
reasonable compromise. In this regard, if political and legal institutions work properly 
with citizens in favour of a correct dialogic procedure, then they can look for an open 
negotiation in which the correct outcomes are not granted, but in which it would be 
reached the highest degree of mutual recognition available among citizens that are 
debating against each other. 
“In sum, the aim of a good compromise is to integrate the various interests and ideals in 
play, and to reach solutions that are mutually acceptable and embody equal concern and 
respect for those involved. The art of compromising is negotiation. By engaging with 
others, individuals and groups are led to take an enlarged view of a situation. Instead of 
seeking to get as much of their own way as they can, in the manner of traders, 
negotiators try and accommodate others as far as possible. Whereas trimmers seek a 
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lowest common denominator, negotiators strive for collective agreements embodying 
the highest degree of mutual recognition attainable. That goal arises out of a deliberative 
process through which all parties moderate and in part transform their preferences by 
placing them in the context of the claims and needs of the rest of the community. Such 
negotiations have to be carried out in a spirit of reciprocity, within which each 
acknowledges an obligation to participate on an equal basis with others in the framing 
of joint decisions. Demands that are incompatible with such conditions go beyond what 
can be legitimately compromised with”99. 
 
 To conclude, I want to bring out the fact that not necessarily consensus should be 
the goal of political discussion. Indeed, within the multicultural context of 
contemporary societies, very often achieving a compromise that is acceptable for all the 
opponents is the only solution available. Since most of the theories of justice have tried 
to argue in favour of reaching a stable consensus, via some kind of idealizations, then 
every form of compromise has been viewed as irremediably weak and normatively 
irrelevant as it is described as nothing more than a trade-off among clashing different 
interests. Notwithstanding this general negative account of public deliberation 
frameworks that open up the practice to include negotiations, there are authors, as 
Richard Bellamy and Jane Mansbridge
100
, that have investigated the normative 
potentiality of such procedures. Mansbridge identifies a specific form of negotiation, the 
deliberative negotiation
101
, that is able to produce sensible outcomes – both from the 
normative and the pragmatic perspective – even in a nonidealized political context. This 
analysis is in line with the various arguments I have discussed along this work. As a 
matter of fact, there are both epistemic (i.e. the difficulties of arguing in favour of 
foundationalism; fallibilism, the emergence of nested inconclusiveness, etc.) and 
historic/contextual reasons (i.e. the fact of pluralism, historical legitimation of 
democratic systems; disagreement in interpreting the Constitutions) that support the 
idea that very often, during political deliberations, a full consensus is a target too far. 
For this reason, it is important to articulate a nonideal stage of the theory of justice in 
which it could be possible to include negotiation procedures within the picture as well. 
Such procedures, even though not perfectly adherent to an ideal deliberative model, are 
able to reflect a commitment toward some normative ideas. This commitment is 
                                                 
99
 Bellamy, 1999, p. 111. 
100
 See Bellamy (1999) and Mansbridge (2009). 
101
 “These forms are ideally based on mutual justification, mutual respect, and a search for both fair terms 
of interaction and fair outcomes. […] Deliberative form of negotiation not only can approach the 
deliberative criteria for legitimacy, they are also efficient”, Mansbridge, 2009, p. 39. 
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expressed in my model by the achievement of a quite stable – even though always 
revisable and open to new instances from reality – RA that exposes the normative core 
that both citizens and institutions recognize at the grounding bottom of democratic 
procedures. Once that such normative core is backed up by a wide majority – although 
perhaps not by the same majority every time and not for any issues steadily –, then I 
hold that it is sensible to argue in favour of a deliberative model of negotiations. 
Furthermore, the more these deliberative negotiations among citizens and among 
citizens and political institutions obtain good results, the more it is possible to foster an 
attitude of reciprocity among citizens and gain loyalty toward the democratic 
procedures from the citizens themselves. Indeed, as Bellamy clearly points out, 
“individuals are more likely to accept the legitimacy of decisions they disagree with if 
they feel they have been to some degree involved in making them, that their interests 
have been explicitly consulted and that there are opportunities for re-opening the debate 
in the future”102. 
 If political institutions accept to engage themselves in negotiations with citizens 
and meanwhile citizens are able to recognize the possibility of agreeing on a RA - over 
some evaluative standards and organizing ideas that are already reflected in democratic 
procedures, legal practices and in the ongoing political culture-, then the political arena 
might properly become that public space in which all individuals are equally entitled to 
be first-class citizens and where a fair exchange of reasons and motivations can lead to 
efficient and normatively committing negotiations that, at the end of day, would also 
promote democratic values. 
                                                 
102
 Bellamy, 1999, pp. 179-180. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
 
 In this doctoral dissertation I defended a specific view on the practice of political 
justification, arguing that the only way available to political liberalism for solving the 
dilemma of liberalism is to divide the justificatory procedure in an ideal and nonideal 
stage. The first theoretical task was to specify in which sense a theory of justification is 
ideal or nonideal. I distanced myself from Rawls on this matter, as he claims that the 
normative task is fulfilled just by ideal theory, while nonideal theory has to deal with 
the actual implementation of a perfect notion of justice when the circumstances of 
justice are not idealized. Indeed, the focal point of my analysis has been that both ideal 
and nonideal theory fulfil normative tasks and that they are mutually supporting each 
other within a justificatory paradigm that is intrinsically coherentist. 
 In the first chapter I specified the epistemic constraints that bind nonideal 
theorizing. In this regard, I introduced different epistemic arguments in favour of a 
doxastic presupposition and, moreover, I described fallibilism as the best account of the 
epistemological status of our knowledge. An epistemic account that claims for the 
validity both of a doxastic presupposition and of fallibilism can be defined as a 
moderate epistemic view. Moreover, I argued in favour of coherentism as general 
justificatory framework, showing that under the fallibilist perspective, this theory of 
justification is the most adequate. Indeed, holding a fallibilist approach implies that one 
claims for the validity and justification of her moral and political beliefs, but along with 
the awareness that such justification is not irresistible. In this regard, I claimed that the 
epistemic regulative ideal of a nonideal model of deliberation does not sit well with a 
theory of justification – as foundationalism – that looks for the establishment of at least 
one basic belief that should be self-evident and therefore once and for all undefeated. 
Rather, fallibilism is consistent with a theory of justification, as coherentism, that 
pursuits principles that moral agents would be best justified in believing. As last point 
of the first chapter, then, I connected the strictly epistemic discussion about a moderate 
epistemic view with the more specific issue of justifying a liberal theory of justice 
within pluralist multicultural societies and I highlighted the theoretical significance of 
the procedure for determining the political constituency to which public justification 
should be referred. 
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 In the second chapter I addressed issues that specifically concern the political 
philosophy debate. Here I discussed Rawls’ proposal for a strictly political liberalism. 
Even though I defended such model against different critiques; I also showed that 
Rawls’ paradigm is not able to definitely solving the dilemma of liberalism. Therefore, 
referring to different arguments introduced by Jonathan Quong and Gerald Gaus, I 
introduced my own interpretation of Rawls paradigm, claiming that this version of his 
paradigm, bringing out the fundamental distinction between the normative tasks 
accomplished on the one hand by the ideal phase and on the other hand by the nonideal 
phase of the theory, is more adequate for dealing with the actual circumstances of 
justice. 
 In the third chapter, the most important of the dissertation, I displayed the nonideal 
stage of the theory and I introduced the concept of reflective agreement. It is possible 
to establish a parallelism between the role played by RE in the ideal theory and the 
method of RA in nonideal theory. Admittedly, the fact that RA deals with the 
unconstrained set of beliefs of actual citizens implies that the achievements of this 
method cannot be exhaustive and comprehensive as it was for the outcomes of RE at the 
ideal level. Therefore, I argued that while in the ideal stage of the theory, the validity 
and normative force of the freestanding political argument were grounded on the 
overlapping consensus – where the method of RE were employed –, at the nonideal 
level we have to call into question the possibility of actually achieving a sort of 
“nonideal overlapping consensus”. RA is the method that should fulfil this task. In this 
regard, I described RA as a an agreement on a justificatory framework. The idea is 
that actual citizens, when called to deliberate on political matters, are able to converge 
on an antecedent meta-agreement over the correct evaluative framework for assessing 
the validity of every proposal introduced into the deliberation. The justificatory 
framework would work as a “filter” that grants that any argument introduced is at least 
mutually acceptable. Hence, at the nonideal level, the goal that RA should accomplish is 
that of translating a justificatory problem in a more tractable deliberative one. 
 Finally, in the fourth chapter, I addressed two case studies: the attempt to publicly 
justify human rights concept and the still open debate about the possibility to extend the 
right to marry to same-sex couples. The articulation of these two case studies has 
allowed me to show the role played by coherentism as a general justificatory paradigm 
and to describe the application of RA method in a more precise way. After having 
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discussed these two cases studies, in the last chapter I also briefly introduced the issue 
of open negotiations. Indeed, showing the possibility of open up the paradigm of 
justification to include deliberative models of negotiation is the last goal that I set for 
this dissertation. I did not develop this issue completely. However, the theoretical 
findings of the last chapter suggest a possible direction for an extension of this issue in a 
future research. It would be interesting to extend the research about the deliberative 
models of public negotiation within nonideal theory. 
 The main theoretical conclusion of this doctoral thesis is that, in order to eschew 
dilemmatic outcomes, a liberal theory of justice should address the issue of public 
justification dividing the normative tasks between an ideal and a nonideal stage. The 
ideal phase of the theory is focused on the identification of a set of political ideals that 
constitutes the loose framework in the light of which it is then possible to build up a 
specific theory of justice. In order to accomplish this job, ideal theory provides 
normative arguments that begin with strong idealizations with regard both to the 
epistemic and moral capacities of the actors and to favorable social conditions. The 
nonideal phase, instead, is devoted to the completion of a full justification whose 
purpose is to show that, under real conditions, the political concepts can still claim to be 
victoriously justified within the doxastic systems of beliefs of the actual members of 
society. The ideal and nonideal theory mutually support each other and it is not possible 
to achieve a full justification of a political paradigm if one of the two stage is missing. 
Again, as I said in the introduction of this work, the ideal and the nonideal theory are 
like a frame and the picture that is contained within it. And we are, as citizens, the 
actors that are supposed to work together in order to paint the picture. 
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